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ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Review MFA actions alongside authentication logs to ensure that MFA-based logins are functioning as intended. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot can identify the user and groups the user belongs to on a compromised host.[189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\svServiceUpdate.exe prior being executed in a new process in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate folder and file.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has used HTTP to receive stolen information from the infected machine.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
A Patchwork file stealer can run a TaskScheduler DLL to add persistence.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can use sdclt.exe to bypass UAC in Windows 10 to escalate privileges; for older Windows versions WarzoneRAT can use the IFileOperation exploit to bypass the UAC module.[61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2014-4114, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798 for execution.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
On iOS, the allowEnterpriseAppTrust and allowEnterpriseAppTrustModification configuration profile restrictions can be used to prevent users from installing apps signed using enterprise distribution keys. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can execute WMI queries to gather information.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to gather information from the compromrised asset, including the computer version, computer name, IIS version, and more.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ajax Security Team
Ajax Security Team has used FireMalv custom-developed malware, which collected passwords from the Firefox browser storage.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI can collect data from the victim and stage it in LOCALAPPDATA%\MicroSoft Updatea\uplog.tmp.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0221
ATT&CK Technique Name:Umbreon
Umbreon provides additional access using its backdoor Espeon, providing a reverse shell upon receipt of a special packet.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 HostSplit: Exploitable Antipatterns in Unicode Normalization
This talk demonstrates new exploit techniques that leverage Unicode normalization behavior to bypass URL security filters and, in some cases, allow one domain to impersonate another. Where previous attacks against internationalized domain... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0181
ATT&CK Technique Name:FALLCHILL
FALLCHILL can collect operating system (OS) version information, processor information, system name, and information about installed disks from the victim.[130] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Hacking a Capsule Hotel - Ghost in the Bedrooms
IOT devices are widely deployed. Some hotels are now allowing their guests to control their room from their smartphone or other devices.While traveling in a foreign country, a few nights were booked in a capsule hotel that was using various modern tec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain, and net group "Exchange Trusted Subsystem" /domain to get account listings on a victim.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
To establish persistence, Okrum can install itself as a new service named NtmSsvc.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used webshells including P.A.S. Webshell to maintain access to victim networks.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has used netsh to find RPC connections on remote machines.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segregate SNMP traffic on a separate management network.[2] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 A Tangled Curl: Attacks on the Curl-P Hash Function Leading to Signature Forgeries in the IOTA Signature Scheme
Our talk presents attacks on the cryptography used in the cryptocurrency IOTA, which is currently the 10th largest cryptocurrency with a market capitalization of 2.8 billion USD. IOTA is ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca used Python scripts for port scanning or building reverse shells.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has encrypted traffic with the C2 to prevent network detection.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used BITSAdmin to download additional tools.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can detect commonly used and generic virtualization platforms based primarily on drivers and file paths.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has the ability to decode downloaded files prior to execution.[24] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Breaking the Isolation: Cross-Account AWS Vulnerabilities
Multiple AWS services were found to be vulnerable to a new cross-account vulnerability class. An attacker could manipulate various services in AWS and cause them to perform actions on other clients' resources due to unsafe identity policies ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
Systems and devices should restrict access to any data with potential confidentiality concerns, including point and tag information. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Searching for RPC Functions to Coerce Authentications in Microsoft Protocols
Although they have been used for several decades, Microsoft's Remote Procedure Calls have always lacked a serious security analysis. They always were the source of many security weaknesses, with coerced authentications, Loc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has used legitimate credentials to hijack email communications.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:SSL/TLS Inspection
SSL/TLS inspection can be used to see the contents of encrypted sessions to look for network-based indicators of malware communication protocols. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Re-opened Applications
Adversaries may modify plist files to automatically run an application when a user logs in. When a user logs out or restarts via the macOS Graphical User Interface (GUI), a prompt is provided to the user with a checkbox to "Reopen windows when logging bac... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Achieving Linux Kernel Code Execution Through a Malicious USB Device
How robust is the security of a fully updated, widely used and locked-down Linux-based device without any known rooting methods? Where the only non-trusted code being executed is heavily sandboxed JavaScript? Which has almost no u... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 7 changed how the Device Administrator password APIs function. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
Derusbi is capable of obtaining directory, file, and drive listings.[103][74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0592
ATT&CK Technique Name:RemoteUtilities
RemoteUtilities can enumerate files and directories on a target machine.[249] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto's installation file is an unsigned DMG image under the guise of Intego’s security solution for mac.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer has established persistence by creating the following scheduled task schtasks /create /sc minute /mo 1 /tn QQMusic ^ /tr C:Users\%USERPROFILE%\Downloads\spread.exe /F.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can recognize the presence of monitoring tools on a target system.[113] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 DevSecOps: What, Why and How
Security is often added towards the end of a typical DevOps cycle, through manual/automated review. In DevSecOps, security can be injected at every stage of a DevOps pipeline in an automated fashion. Having a DevSecOps pipeline enables an organisation to:Create a secur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA can collect application database files, including Gmail, Hangouts, device photos, and container directories of third-party apps.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Application developers can apply the FLAG_SECURE property to sensitive screens within their apps to make it more difficult for the screen contents to be captured.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed creating new services to maintain persistence. [48][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxy
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Stress-Testing Democracy: Election Integrity During a Global Pandemic
Technologists have long warned that much of the technology and infrastructure we depend on for voting suffers from exploitable vulnerabilities that could be used to cast doubt on the integrity of elections. Those problems are ext... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Every Security Team is a Software Team Now
As software is eating the world, every company is becoming a software company. This doesn’t mean that every company is shipping software products, it means that services and products in every field are becoming increasingly driven, powered, and differentia... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely. (e.g. plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to determine if the security setting for restricting default programmatic access is enabled.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT encrypts collected data with AES and Base64 and then sends it to the C2 server.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has used spearphishing emails containing attachments (which are often stolen, legitimate documents sent from compromised accounts) with embedded malicious macros.[91][92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer used a tool called Total SMB BruteForcer to perform internal password spraying.[16] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Protecting the Protector, Hardening Machine Learning Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks
Humans are susceptible to social engineering. Machines are susceptible to tampering. Machine learning is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Researchers have been able to successfully attack deep learning models... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0076
ATT&CK Technique Name:Thrip
Thrip has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data from a targeted organization over FTP.[30] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Investigating Malware Using Memory Forensics - A Practical Approach
The number of cyber attacks is undoubtedly on the rise targeting government, military, public and private sectors. Most of these cyber attacks make use of malicious programs (Malware) for financial theft, espionage, intellectual p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has collected information about installed applications.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST attempted to disable software security services following checks against a FNV-1a + XOR hashed hardcoded blocklist.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon established persistence by setting the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load registry key to point to its executable.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Making Big Things Better the Dead Cow Way
Trying to change the security culture of a single company can be daunting. The Cult of the Dead Cow managed to change the culture of the entire security industry.In this session, three key figures from the 35-year-old group's history — Mudge Zatko, Chris Rio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net share command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can allow abuse of a compromised AD FS server's SAML token.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD can harvest saved credentials from browsers such as Google Chrome, Microsoft Internet Explorer, and Mozilla Firefox.[68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
A Conficker infection at a nuclear power plant forced the facility to shutdown and go through security procedures involved with such events, with its staff scanning computer systems and going through all the regular checks and motions before putting the plant back into pr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used the Plink utility to tunnel RDP back to C2 infrastructure.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can obtain a webpage hosted on Pastebin to update its C2 domain list.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu has used msiexec to execute malicious Windows Installer packages. Additionally, a PROPERTY=VALUE pair containing a 56-bit encryption key has been used to decrypt the main payload from the installer packages.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used a valid certificate to sign their primary loader Silence.Downloader (aka TrueBot).[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0680
ATT&CK Technique Name:LitePower
LitePower can create a scheduled task to enable persistence mechanisms.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky has two hard-coded domains for C2 servers; if the first does not respond, it will try the second.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0355
ATT&CK Technique Name:Final1stspy
Final1stspy creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Communication authenticity will ensure that any messages tampered with through AiTM can be detected, but cannot prevent eavesdropping on these. In addition, providing communication authenticity around various discovery protocols, such as DNS, can be used ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has a command to list account information on the victim’s machine.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used domain credentials, including domain admin, for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in brute-force mode it typically sent over 300 authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several hours or days.[4] APT28 has also used a Kubernetes cluster to conduc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has created a snapshot of running processes using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot.[284] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can use junk code to hide functions and evade detection.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 downloaded and launched code within a SCT file.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used malware to collect information on files and directories.[274] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Defense Against Rapidly Morphing DDOS
In June 2018 ProtonMail suffered rapidly morphing sustained DDOS attacks that included Syn Floods, TCP handshake violations, TCP Zero Sequence, ACK floods, NTP non-standard port floods, reflection attacks on SSDP, NTP, Chargen, LDAP and Memcache protocols[1].We... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 malware TIDYELF loaded the main WINTERLOVE component by injecting it into the iexplore.exe process.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Emissary injects its DLL file into a newly spawned Internet Explorer process.[25] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Knockout Win Against TCC - 20+ NEW Ways to Bypass Your MacOS Privacy Mechanisms
"TotallyNotAVirus 2.app" would like to access the camera and spy on you. To protect your privacy, Apple introduced the Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) framework that restricts access to sensitive personal resour... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall can inject a DLL into rundll32.exe for execution.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy 2 contains a "Destroy" plug-in that destroys data stored on victim hard drives by overwriting file contents.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0553
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoleNet
MoleNet can collect information about the about the system.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Modify network and/or host firewall rules, as well as other network controls, to only allow legitimate BITS traffic. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:CORESHELL
CORESHELL contains unused machine instructions in a likely attempt to hinder analysis.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has stored stolen emails and other data into new folders prior to exfiltration.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot communicates with the C2 using HTTP requests.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Consider enforcing multi-factor authentication for the CreateKeyPair and ImportKeyPair API calls through IAM policies.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can identify the user name on a compromised system.[148][149] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 A Hole in the Tube: Uncovering Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure of Healthcare Facilities
A hidden infrastructure that transports critical care items within all modern hospitals, lies in plain sight - the pneumatic tube system (PTS). This critical infrastructure is responsible for deliveri... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE is capable of reading files over the C2 channel.[11] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.