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ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Operate intrusion detection, analysis, and response systems on a separate network from the production environment to lessen the chances that an adversary can see and interfere with critical response functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that cloud accounts, particularly privileged accounts, have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Passwords and access keys should be rotated regularly. This limits the amount of time credentials can be used to access resources if a c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Check for common UAC bypass weaknesses on Windows systems to be aware of the risk posture and address issues where appropriate.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a UEFI BIOS rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has staged malware and malicious files on compromised web servers, GitHub, and Google Drive.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS looks for processes from a hard-coded list.[88][89][90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT has the ability to collect the MAC address of an infected host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.[4] Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain acc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1586.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Email Accounts
Adversaries may compromise email accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised email accounts to further their operations, such as leveraging them to conduct Phishing for Information, Phishing, or large-scale spam email campaigns. Ut... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 replaces the Sticky Keys binary C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe for persistence.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0821
ATT&CK Technique Name:Modify Controller Tasking
Adversaries may modify the tasking of a controller to allow for the execution of their own programs. This can allow an adversary to manipulate the execution flow and behavior of a controller. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 How to Better Fuzz Windows 10 Directx Kernel at Present
DirectX is the engine that handles rendering on the Windows platform. Many outstanding people have made outstanding contributions in the research of DirectX. In this talk, I will share new research content of DirectX including the discovery of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can use port-knocking to authenticate itself to another implant called Cryshell to establish an indirect connection to the C2 server.[2][3] | secon |
title:botconf2013 Distributed Malware Proxy Networks
This presentation discusses several existing proxy networks used in malware campaigns and our efforts to track them in an automated fashion. Criminals are increasingly turning to proxy networks to provide an additional layer of protection between their adversaries (l... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can collect system information including the OS version and domain on a compromised host.[290][291][292] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0489
ATT&CK Technique Name:WolfRAT
WolfRAT can record the screen and take screenshots to capture messages from Line, Facebook Messenger, and WhatsApp.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used a modified version of HTRAN in which they obfuscated strings such as debug messages in an apparent attempt to evade detection.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has compromised email credentials in order to steal sensitive data.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0938
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use tools that restrict program execution via application control by attributes other than file name for common system and application utilities. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Resting on Feet of Clay: Securely Bootstrapping OPC UA Deployments
While most protocols in industrial control systems (ICS) rarely implement security features, the OPC Foundation's Unified Architecture (OPC UA) promises security features such as authentication, authorization, integrity, and confiden... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0922
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Use file system access controls to protect system and application folders. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 From Logic to Memory: Winning the Solitaire in Reparse Points
In recent years, two types of reparse points: mount point and symlink are frequently used in file redirection vulnerabilities in Windows system services. Hundreds of logic vulnerabilities (from permanent DoS and info leak to privilege es... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has added Registry Run key KCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SystemTextEncoding to establish persistence.[167][168][169][170][171][172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0347
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuditCred
AuditCred uses XOR and RC4 to perform decryption on the code functions.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can identify the geographical location of a victim host.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 The Data Distribution Service (DDS) Protocol is Critical: Let's Use it Securely!
We discovered and disclosed vulnerabilities in most of the OMG Data Distribution Service (DDS) implementations. DDS enables crucial technologies like autonomous driving, healthcare machinery, military tactical systems, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0506
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViperRAT
ViperRAT can collect system information, including brand, manufacturer, and serial number.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0252
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brave Prince
Brave Prince gathers file and directory information from the victim’s machine.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0164
ATT&CK Technique Name:TDTESS
TDTESS has a command to download and execute an additional file.[438] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can steal credentials in files belonging to common software such as Skype, Telegram, and Steam.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors executed PowerShell commands which were encoded or compressed using Base64, zlib, and XOR.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 have created firewall exemptions on specific ports, including ports 443, 6443, 8443, and 9443.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Steal Application Access Token
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has accessed internet-facing identity providers such as Azure Active Directory and Okta to target specific organizations.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Like Lightning From the Cloud: Finding RCEs in an Embedded TLS Library and Toasting a Popular Cloud-connected UPS
Modern Cloud-connected devices are based upon a single TLS connection to the Cloud, through which they can be controlled. Interaction with the local network is limited to a bare minimu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Audit applications and their permissions to ensure access to data and resources are limited based upon necessity and principle of least privilege. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used Azure Run Command and Azure Admin-on-Behalf-of (AOBO) to execute code on virtual machines.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors scanned for open ports and used nbtscan to find NETBIOS nameservers.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has deployed malware that has copied itself to the startup directory for persistence.[16] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Weaponizing Mobile Infrastructure: Are Politically Motivated Cyber Attacks a Threat to Democracy?
The talk is mainly driven by the cyber intelligence gathered in response to political shifts in the region. The core focus of the talk is to bring awareness, and reveal actionable intelligence to a l... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [7]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technol... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE can execute ProcessList for process discovery.[251] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Domain Borrowing: Catch My C2 Traffic if You Can
For red teams, CDN is a good redirector and protector for their C2 traffic, especially with domain fronting. However, if there are HTTPS decryption devices in the network, domain fronting can be easily detected by comparing SNI and HOST.This talk w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Employ network segmentation for sensitive domains.[3]. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger can extract backdoor malware from downloaded images.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation can often detect jailbroken devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections fromsoftware and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 WIFI-Important Remote Attack Surface: Threat is Expanding
Wi-Fi technology is one of the most important infrastructures of today. A large amount of devices, such as cellphones, laptops, IoT devices, cars, and infrastructure of smart city are heavily depending on Wi-Fi. As a consequence, Wi-Fi has... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has delivered trojanized executables via spearphishing emails that contacts actor-controlled servers to download malicious payloads.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and the Startup folder to establish persistence.[244] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
Some SeaDuke samples have a module to extract email from Microsoft Exchange servers using compromised credentials.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
Some of Norsk Hydro's production systems were impacted by a LockerGoga infection. This resulted in a loss of view which forced the company to switch to manual operations. [6] [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke can securely delete files, including deleting itself from the victim.[211] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with system-level process changes and service configurations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:China Chopper
China Chopper's server component can change the timestamp of files.[14][15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries can replace accessibility features binaries with alternate binaries to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through accessibility features functionality by using application control [13] tools, like Wind... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession has the ability to capture keystrokes on a compromised host.[38][148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can collect the TCP/IP, DNS, DHCP, and network adapter configuration on a compromised host via ipconfig.exe /all.[214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has the ability to capture input on the compromised host via keylogging.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can use the GetTickCount and GetSystemTimeAsFileTime API calls to measure function timing.[20] DRATzarus can also remotely shut down into sleep mode under specific conditions to evade detection.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used a ransomware called Encryptor RaaS to encrypt files on the targeted systems and provide a ransom note to the user.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used Registry Run keys for persistence. The group has also set a Startup path to launch the PowerShell shell command and download Cobalt Strike.[60] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Escaping Virtualized Containers
Containers offer speed, performance, and portability, but do they actually contain? While they try their best, the shared kernel is a disturbing attack surface: a mere kernel vulnerability may allow containerized processes to escape and compromise the host. This issu... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 How Did the Adversaries Abusing the Bitcoin Blockchain Evade Our Takeover?
Cyber security has been a game of cat-and-mouse. In the past, we have seen the malware ecosystem adopt concepts such as code obfuscation, polymorphism, domain-generation algorithms (DGAs), as well as virtual machine and san... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit has attempted to bypass UAC and gain elevated administrative privileges.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has used PowerShell to execute its payload.[216][217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can identify the user id on a target machine.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
Most strings in USBStealer are encrypted using 3DES and XOR and reversed.[343] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0553
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoleNet
MoleNet can achieve persitence on the infected machine by setting the Registry run key.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a local user account.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore can access the victim's webcam and capture data.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0942
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent risk of discovery and potential exploitation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors disguised some executables as JPG files.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas uses phishing popups to harvest user credentials.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa dropped and added officeupdate.exe to scheduled tasks.[80][81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1569
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Services
Adversaries may abuse system services or daemons to execute commands or programs. Adversaries can execute malicious content by interacting with or creating services either locally or remotely. Many services are set to run at boot, which can aid in achieving persiste... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used compromised servers to host malware.[18][19][20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used an encrypted http proxy in C2 communications.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT collects the victim IP address, MAC address, as well as the victim account domain name.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Browser Extensions
Adversaries may abuse Internet browser extensions to establish persistent access to victim systems. Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of Internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyZBot
TinyZBot can create a shortcut in the Windows startup folder for persistence.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can timestomp any files or payloads placed on a target machine to help them blend in.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has sent spearphishing attachments attempting to get a user to open them.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:cmd
cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has created a hidden file in the Startup folder of the current user.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI has downloaded a remote module for execution.[320] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT has used the InterlockedExchange, SeShutdownPrivilege, and ExitWindowsEx Windows API functions.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:China Chopper
China Chopper's server component is a Web Shell payload.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate has used InstallUtil.exe as part of its process to disable Windows Defender.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used valid accounts including shared between Managed Service Providers and clients to move between the two environments.[44][45][46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used is_debugger_present as part of its environmental checks.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Ghost
During Operation Ghost, APT29 used WMI event subscriptions to establish persistence for malware.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa has used Apple’s Core Graphic APIs, such as CGWindowListCreateImageFromArray, to capture the user's screen and open windows.[98][99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0162
ATT&CK Technique Name:Komplex
The OsInfo function in Komplex collects a running process list.[148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can spawn processes with alternate PPIDs.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Upgrade to Windows 8 or later and enable secure boot. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Find and eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for e... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Internal Affairs: Hacking File System Access from the Web
The File System Access API deployed to browsers this year is the current version of a W3C draft to give websites, with user approval, the ability to read, write, and edit files and folders the user selects on their devices, an outgrowth of a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke can securely delete files by first writing random data to the file.[68] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.