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ATT&CK ID:S0459
ATT&CK Technique Name:MechaFlounder
MechaFlounder has the ability to send the compromised user's account name and hostname within a URL to C2.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. [1] [2] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Harm Reduction: A Framework for Effective & Compassionate Security Guidance
Cybersecurity practitioners in defensive roles are regularly confronted with high risk behaviors from the populations they protect. In theory, the security response should be simple: Inform the user of the risks and get... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer monitors victims for insertion of removable drives. When dropped onto a second victim, it also enumerates drives connected to the system.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ixeshe
Ixeshe enumerates the IP address, network proxy settings, and domain name from a victim's system.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has used a malicious loader DLL file to execute the credwiz.exe process and side-load the malicious payload Duser.dll.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skeleton Key
Skeleton Key is used to patch an enterprise domain controller authentication process with a backdoor password. It allows adversaries to bypass the standard authentication system to use a defined password for all accounts authenticating to that domain controller.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0178
ATT&CK Technique Name:Truvasys
Truvasys adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[266] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle can be loaded into the Startup folder (%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\OneDrives.lnk) as a Shortcut file for persistence.[260] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Command and Scripting Interpreter
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider limiting the number of cached credentials (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Current Version\Winlogon\cachedlogonscountvalue)[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.[90][84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors developed their own custom webshells to upload to compromised servers.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate privilege escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create container orchestration jobs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT uses a secret key with a series of XOR and addition operations to encrypt C2 traffic.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can inject a variety of payloads into processes dynamically chosen by the adversary.[15][16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch collects the OS system, OS version, MAC address, and the computer name from the victim’s machine.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0426
ATT&CK Technique Name:Concipit1248
Concipit1248 communicates with the C2 server using HTTP requests.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:PinchDuke
PinchDuke steals credentials from compromised hosts. PinchDuke's credential stealing functionality is believed to be based on the source code of the Pinch credential stealing malware (also known as LdPinch). Credentials targeted by PinchDuke include ones associated with m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT collects the victim’s computer name, processor architecture, OS version, volume serial number, and system type.[133][134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Whitefly
Whitefly has used search order hijacking to run the loader Vcrodat.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut includes a subproject DonutTest to inject shellcode into a target process.[19] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 ElectroVolt: Pwning Popular Desktop Apps While Uncovering New Attack Surface on Electron
Electron based apps are becoming a norm these days as it allows encapsulating web applications into a desktop app which is rendered using chromium. However, if Electron apps load remote content of attackers cho... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy creates a Registry key in the Active Setup pointing to a malicious executable.[7][6][8] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Devils Are in the File Descriptors: It Is Time To Catch Them All
"Everything is a file" describes an important feature of Unix. File descriptor or fd is widely used in the Linux kernel. Exporting an fd to user space and importing an fd from user space are very common and basic operations in the Linu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has dropped an mspaint.lnk shortcut to disk which launches a shell script that downloads and executes a file.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon has the ability to use anti-detection functions to identify sandbox environments.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner has used run-only Applescripts, a compiled and stripped version of AppleScript, to remove human readable indicators to evade detection.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 The Future of ATO
Account Takeover (ATO) is the silent killer of online security. Between password megalists, massive PII breaches and ever more sophisticated attackers, it's becoming almost impossible to help regular users to thread the needle of a usable, but secure, experience. Coinbase is one o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-1314
Threat Group-1314 actors used a victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, for lateral movement.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used ProxyBot, which allows the attacker to redirect traffic from the current node to the backconnect server via Sock4\Socks5.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda collects the current system time (UTC) and sends it back to the C2 server.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has deleted artifacts, including scheduled tasks, communicates files from the C2 and other logs.[217][218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks establish persistence for TrickBot and other malware.[178][179][180][181] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Process Injection Techniques - Gotta Catch Them All
When it comes to process injection in Windows, there are only 6-7 fundamental techniques, right? That's what we thought in late 2018, when we started researching this area. Turned out we were way off the mark. We counted 20 techniques (so far…), wh... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 NoJITsu: Locking Down JavaScript Engines
Data-only attacks against dynamic scripting environments have become common. Web browsers and other modern applications embed scripting engines to support interactive content. The scripting engines optimize performance via just-in-time compilation. Since app... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has loaded coinmining software onto systems to mine for Koto cryptocurrency. [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can identify processes associated with analytical tools.[43][44][45] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 President's Cup Cyber Competition: Finding the Best Cyber Talent in the US Government
In 2019, the Department of Homeland Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) held the first cybersecurity competition for the Federal workforce. Dubbed the President's Cup Cybersecurity Co... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Black-Box Laser Fault Injection on a Secure Memory
With the constant development of electronic devices, their increasing complexity and need for security, cryptography in embedded systems has become a strong requirement to protect data or secure communications. Some devices run on standard low-cost... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner has placed a Stripped Payloads with a plist extension in the Launch Agent's folder. [23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
For C0010, UNC3890 actors used unique malware, including SUGARUSH and SUGARDUMP.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can create a scheduled task named RecoveryExTask to gain persistence.[169] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 The Mummy 2018 – Microsoft Accidentally Summons Back Ugly Attacks from the Past
In the early 2000s attackers could very easily leverage naïve mechanisms of IP fragmentation and reassembly to intercept packets, modify them, or cause denial of service. The same fundamental flaw brought up other techni... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool "ConnectWise Control" to deploy REvil.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can recursively wipe folders and files in Windows, Program Files, Program Files(x86), PerfLogs, Boot, System, Volume Information, and AppData folders using FSCTL_MOVE_FILE. HermeticWiper can also overwrite symbolic links and big files in My Documents and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal can use GetNativeSystemInfo and GetLogicalDrives to enumerate system processors and logical drives.[320][321] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0165
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSInfo
OSInfo performs a connection test to discover remote systems in the network[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
For Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors compromised a server they used as part of the campaign's infrastructure.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has used control panel files (CPL), delivered via e-mail, for execution.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can collect a system's architecture, operating system version, hostname, and drive information.[362][363] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can use an AES key to encrypt C2 communications.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can fill a victim's files and directories with zero-bytes in replacement of real content before deleting them.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe can hide legitimate directories and replace them with malicious copies of the same name.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has executed PowerShell commands via auto-run registry key persistence.[167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the fsutil fsinfo drives command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used spearphishing attachments to deliver Microsoft documents containing macros or PDFs containing malicious links to download either Emotet, Bokbot, TrickBot, or Bazar.[242][243] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Don't Eat Spaghetti with a Spoon - An Analysis of the Practical Value of Threat Intelligence
Threat Intelligence is a sound proposition that has its place in a mature security operation. But like so many good concepts in our industry, its path to commercialization has involved commoditization t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors likely used spearphishing emails to send malicious Microsoft Word documents.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1541
ATT&CK Technique Name:Foreground Persistence
Adversaries may abuse Android's startForeground() API method to maintain continuous sensor access. Beginning in Android 9, idle applications running in the background no longer have access to device sensors, such as the camera, microphone, and gyroscope. Appl... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 hAFL1: Our Journey of Fuzzing Hyper-V and Discovering a 0-Day
Fuzzers are tremendously important in the realm of vulnerability research, as they automate the process of bug discovery by rapidly feeding a target with numerous inputs. Several factors make up an efficient fuzzer. One of them is struct... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0626
ATT&CK Technique Name:P8RAT
P8RAT can download additional payloads to a target system.[159] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Grand Theft Drone: Reaching Breaking Point in Drone Proprietary RF Link Security
The drone industry is under enormous change, and the technology in the remote control for drones has vastly improved. Nevertheless, many remote control vendors reveal a lack of security features, and they use proprieta... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can function as a proxy to create a server that relays communication between the client and C&C server, or between two clients.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0822
ATT&CK Technique Name:External Remote Services
Adversaries may leverage external remote services as a point of initial access into your network. These services allow users to connect to internal network resources from external locations. Examples are VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms. Remote ser... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0317
ATT&CK Technique Name:Marcher
Marcher attempts to overlay itself on top of legitimate banking apps in an effort to capture user credentials. Marcher also attempts to overlay itself on top of legitimate apps such as the Google Play Store in an effort to capture user credit card information.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0206
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wiarp
Wiarp creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can create a service.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that used the IsDebuggerPresent call to detect debuggers.[10] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Morning Refreshment Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can download files to compromised hosts.[78] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Keynote - Our Kryptonite: A Defendable Internet
Five years ago, Thomas Dullien (aka Halvar Flake) presented a keynote at Blackhat Asia that grabbed me like no other. His talk, titled “Why We Are Not Building a Defendable Internet” explored the economics and incentive structures in IT security: Who ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare has created the HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\\InprocServer32 Registry key for persistence.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0811
ATT&CK Technique Name:Redundancy of Service
Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communica... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Is This My Domain Controller? A New Class of Active Directory Protocol Injection Attacks
When analyzing the security of cryptographic systems, a critical part is resiliency against eavesdroppers as well as machine-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks. Over the years, researchers were able to break many sec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has rebooted systems after destroying files and wiping the MBR on infected systems.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1195
ATT&CK Technique Name:Supply Chain Compromise
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare can take screen shots of a compromised machine.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, threat actors relied on a victim to enable macros within a malicious Word document.[178] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Bam the BAM - Electromagnetic Fault Injection & Automotive Systems
This talk introduces an example of how electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) can be used to bypass security used to prevent ECU modifications on a recent (tested on a 2019 model year) automotive ECU. This attack requires extensive p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA can add, modify, and/or delete registry keys. It has changed the proxy configuration of a victim system by modifying the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap registry.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that cloud accounts, particularly privileged accounts, have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Passwords and access keys should be rotated regularly. This limits the amount of time credentials can be used to access resources if a c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can use wmic process call create in a scheduled task to launch plugins and for execution.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type has been injected directly into a running process, including explorer.exe.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has enrolled a device in MFA to an Azure AD environment following a successful password guessing attack against a dormant account.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1219
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Access Software
An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, AnyDesk, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are common... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot uses HTTPS to communicate with its C2 servers, to get malware updates, modules that perform most of the malware logic and various configuration files.[343][9] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 The Hacker's Guide to Policyland
At the end of 2021, the UK Government launched a new National Cyber Strategy which outlined the UK's approach to being a responsible cyber power, setting a new standard internationally. The broad strategy set out an agenda to build both the UK cyber economy and impro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has conducted credential phishing campaigns with embedded links to attacker-controlled domains.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0814
ATT&CK Technique Name:Static Network Configuration
Unauthorized connections can be prevented by statically defining the hosts and ports used for automation protocol connections. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has deleted itself and associated artifacts from victim machines.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:LazyScripter
LazyScripter has used dynamic DNS providers to create legitimate-looking subdomains for C2.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used RDP to move laterally in victim environments.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito's launcher uses rundll32.exe in a Registry Key value to start the main backdoor capability.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has relied upon users clicking on a malicious link delivered through phishing.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Access to SMS messages is an uncommonly needed permission, so users should be instructed to use extra scrutiny when granting access to their SMS messages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has a command to create, set, copy, or delete a specified Registry key or value.[74][75] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.