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ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has been signed with self signed digital certificates mimicking a legitimate software company.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to decrypt and decompress its payload to enable code execution.[206][207] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has used HTTP GET and POST requests for C2.[331] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has exfiltrated data using USB storage devices.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Consider limiting access to the BITS interface to specific users or groups.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1497.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Checks
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower has the ability to capture screenshots.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has relied on user interaction to open their malicious RTF documents.[238][37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can gather hashed passwords by dumping SAM/SECURITY hive.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and replace/modify service binaries, paths, and configs.[95][96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can hide its icon on older Android versions.[18] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Arm IDA and Cross Check: Reversing the Boeing 787's Core Network
In 2008 the FAA issued several Special Conditions for The Boeing 787 Dreamliner. There were serious safety and security concerns about the brand-new network design Boeing had implemented, which provided the Dreamliner with some "e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Apply patch KB2871997 to Windows 7 and higher systems to limit the default access of accounts in the local administrator group.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI uses a unique, custom de-obfuscation technique.[158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has abused local accounts that have the same password across the victim’s network.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors established persistence through a scheduled task using the command: /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN WinUpdate /TR, named "WinUpdate" [66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains a module for exploiting SMB via EternalBlue.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0204
ATT&CK Technique Name:Briba
Briba installs a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[29] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Defense Against Rapidly Morphing DDOS
In June 2018 ProtonMail suffered rapidly morphing sustained DDOS attacks that included Syn Floods, TCP handshake violations, TCP Zero Sequence, ACK floods, NTP non-standard port floods, reflection attacks on SSDP, NTP, Chargen, LDAP and Memcache protocols[1].We ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Transparency in the Software Supply Chain: Making SBOM a Reality
We can't buy a piece of candy without knowing its ingredients, or design and sell a piece of machinery without accounting for each nut and bolt. Yet, even as supply chain uncertainty has emerged as a top information security risk, ther... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker can execute itself as a service.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth collects the machine name and keyboard language from the system. [33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has searched the victim system for the InstallUtil.exe program and its version.[20] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat USA 2022
To close out Black Hat USA 2022, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and Review Board members Sheila A. Berta, Chris Eng, Natalie Silvanovich and Matt Suiche for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow domain administrator or root accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak encrypts strings to make analysis more difficult.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0550
ATT&CK Technique Name:DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent has used exploit tools to gain root, such as TowelRoot.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson contains a command to perform screen captures.[46][47][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0886
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Services
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
The creation and modification of systemd service unit files is generally reserved for administrators such as the Linux root user and other users with superuser privileges. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can execute PowerShell commands and scripts with the use of .NET DLL, WoodyPowerSession.[248] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 What the Fuzz
Fuzzers have become one of the most powerful tools at the disposal of offensive security researchers. Yet, outside of a few big companies, they find little use in defensive scenarios. We believe it is time to change this. If you are not fuzzing your code, someone else will be. Various... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be wary of granting applications dangerous or privacy-intrusive permissions, such as access to location information. Users should also protect their account credentials and enable multi-factor authentication options when available. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can use zlib to compress and decompress data.[11][12] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Security Industry Call-to-Action: We Need a Cloud Vulnerability Database
The shared responsibility model is broken. Companies are unable to keep up with cloud complexity, while vendors and cloud providers do not provide clear identification, tracking or severity for vulnerabilities discovered in the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants as well as rc.exe, a legitimate Microsoft Resource Compiler.[27][61][62][28][63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has called CreateToolhelp32Snapshot to enumerate all running processes.[223] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop can delete the shadow volumes with vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet and can use bcdedit to disable recovery options.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has leveraged malicious Word documents that abused DDE.[32] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 What the Log?! So Many Events, so Little Time...
Detecting adversaries in your environment is a challenging task: Most organizations need at least several months to detect them... IF they detect them at all.Many companies have started to investigate Windows Event Log to improve their detection. Bu... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Breaking the Chain: An Attacker's Perspective on Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Flaws
Our talk divides the cloud development flow into 5 phases: IDE, SCM, package managers, CI/CD and Artifacts. We will demonstrate how supply chain attacks can affect organizations at each phase. This includ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bootkit
Adversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems. Bootkits reside at a layer below the operating system and may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
Enabled features, such as Protected Process Light (PPL), for LSA.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
A Destover-like implant used by Lazarus Group can obtain the current system time and send it to the C2 server.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0208
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pasam
Pasam creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve files.[136] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Beyond Root: Custom Firmware for Embedded Mobile Chipsets
Rooting a smartphone is often considered the ultimate method to allow a user to take complete control of their device. Despite this, many smartphones contain hardware which is closed off to any modification. This talk aims to show how this ha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used compromised credentials to log on to other systems.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chinoxy
Chinoxy can use a digitally signed binary ("Logitech Bluetooth Wizard Host Process") to load its dll into memory.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0507
ATT&CK Technique Name:eSurv
eSurv’s Android version is distributed in three stages: the dropper, the second stage payload, and the third stage payload which is Exodus.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used an RSS feed on Livejournal to update a list of encrypted C2 server names. RTM has also hidden Pony C2 server IP addresses within transactions on the Bitcoin and Namecoin blockchain.[18][19][20] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Government-Mandated Front Doors?: A Global Assessment of Legalized Government Access to Data
Who needs a backdoor when front door access is required? From Tesla to the U.S. tech giants, there has been a growing focus on whether private sector companies are obliged to turn over data to a foreign gov... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 E-Meet (or Emit?) My Keystrokes: How Benign Screen-sharing Meetings Could Leak Typing Behaviors
Have you ever wondered whether screen-sharing could pose a threat to your privacy? Or, perhaps imagine whether it is truly safe to keep your screen-sharing mode active when typing passwords, even if th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy injects its DLL component into svchost.exe.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS update and sends the location of the phone.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
The Winnti for Windows HTTP/S C2 mode can make use of an external proxy.[28] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Efficient Approach to Fuzzing Interpreters
Fuzzing has started to gain more recognition over the past years. The basic concept behind it is passing random, or otherwise procedurally generated data as input to the tested software. Multiple fuzzers emerged, including American Fuzzy Lop and syzkalle... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can check for the existence of files, including its own components, as well as retrieve a list of logical drives.[146][147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1222.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or direc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Properly manage accounts and permissions used by parties in trusted relationships to minimize potential abuse by the party and if the party is compromised by an adversary. In Office 365 environments, partner relationships and roles can be viewed under the "P... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1562.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall
Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in Disable or Modify System Firewall. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0011
For C0011, Transparent Tribe established SSL certificates on the typo-squatted domains the group registered.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system host files to specify what external connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has exploited multiple Windows vulnerabilities (CVE-2010-2743, CVE-2010-3338, CVE-2010-4398, CVE-2008-1084) and a .NET Runtime Optimization vulnerability for privilege escalation.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use Inveigh to conduct name service poisoning for credential theft and associated relay attacks.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used remote code execution to download subsequent payloads.[179][180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has the capability to stop processes and services.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy enumerates the current user during the initial infection.[67][68] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 NoJITsu: Locking Down JavaScript Engines
Data-only attacks against dynamic scripting environments have become common. Web browsers and other modern applications embed scripting engines to support interactive content. The scripting engines optimize performance via just-in-time compilation. Since appl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can silently intercept and manipulate notifications. S.O.V.A. can also inject cookies via push notifications.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Extra Window Memory Injection
Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separa... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Side Channel Attacks in 4G and 5G Cellular Networks
The adoption of Fourth Generation Long Term Evolution (4G LTE)—the de facto standard for cellular telecommunication—has seen a stable growth in recent years, replacing prior generations due to its promise of improved assurances (e.g., higher bandw... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Configure SNMPv3 to use the highest level of security (authPriv) available.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure permissions are properly set on folders containing sensitive private keys to prevent unintended access. Additionally, on Cisco devices, set the nonexportable flag during RSA key pair generation.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed dropping browser password grabber modules. [24][25] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 A Broken Chain: Discovering OPC UA Attack Surface and Exploiting the Supply Chain
OPC Unified Architecture (OPC-UA) is emerging as one of the most important architectures for industrial communication and industry 4.0 transformation. It is platform-independent and trusted for connecting Industrial e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team's BCS-server tool connects to the designated C2 server via HTTP.[295] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1601.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patch System Image
Adversaries may modify the operating system of a network device to introduce new capabilities or weaken existing defenses. Some network devices are built with a monolithic architecture, where the entire operating system and most of the functionality of th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Activate Firmware Update Mode
Adversaries may activate firmware update mode on devices to prevent expected response functions from engaging in reaction to an emergency or process malfunction. For example, devices such as protection relays may have an operation mode designed for fir... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to download additional components and malware.[363][364][365][366][367][368] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emond
Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a Launch Daemon that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0648
ATT&CK Technique Name:JSS Loader
JSS Loader has been delivered by phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Excel attachments.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:BISCUIT
BISCUIT has a command to download a file from the C2 server.[63] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Old New Things: An Examination of the Philips TriMedia Architecture
In today's Intel/AMD and ARM controlled world, it's always interesting, for a reverse engineer, to find new or uncommon CPU architectures to learn and play with. It's a challenge to deal with uncommon/unknown firmware files and wei... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has been dropped through exploitation of CVE-2011-2462, CVE-2013-3163, and CVE-2014-0322.[60] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Who Left Open the Cookie Jar?
Nowadays, cookies are the most prominent mechanism to identify and authenticate users on the Internet. Although protected by the Same-Origin Policy, popular browsers include cookies in all requests, even when these are cross-site. Unfortunately, these third-party cook... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive can use legitimate OAuth refresh tokens to authenticate with OneDrive.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can use the command-line utility cacls.exe to change file permissions.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can steal the victim's cookies to use for duplicating the active session from another device.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 2
Join members of the Black Hat Review Board for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will feature a candid discussion on the key takeaways from day one and how these trends will impact fu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Boundary Bridging
Adversaries may bridge network boundaries by compromising perimeter network devices or internal devices responsible for network segmentation. Breaching these devices may enable an adversary to bypass restrictions on traffic routing that otherwise separate ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT can execute its service if the Service key exists. If the key does not exist, gh0st RAT will create and run the service.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM tries to add a Registry Run key under the name "Windows Update" to establish persistence.[228] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0862
ATT&CK Technique Name:Supply Chain Compromise
Adversaries may perform supply chain compromise to gain control systems environment access by means of infected products, software, and workflows. Supply chain compromise is the manipulation of products, such as devices or software, or their delivery mechani... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer harvests phone call history from victims.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can grant itself contact list access.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0323
ATT&CK Technique Name:Charger
Charger checks the local settings of the device and does not run its malicious logic if the device is located in Ukraine, Russia, or Belarus.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
T9000 can take screenshots of the desktop and target application windows, saving them to user directories as one byte XOR encrypted .dat files.[166] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.