text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can track the device’s location.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 SideWinder Uncoils to Strike
SideWinder threat actor also known as RattleSnake and T-APT-04, has been one of the most aggressive threat actors in the past couple of years. Some of the main characteristics of this threat actor that make it stand out among the others, are the sheer number, high fr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Mitigation of some variants of this technique could be achieved through the use of stateful firewalls, depending upon how it is implemented. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has decoded and decrypted its stages multiple times using hard-coded keys to deliver the final payload, and has decoded its server response hex string using XOR.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, Sandworm Team harvested VPN worker credentials and used them to remotely log into control system networks. [2] [4] [5] [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Blockchain Autopsies - Analyzing Ethereum Smart Contract Deaths
In the blockchain, contracts may be lost but are never forgotten. Over 1,500,000 Ethereum smart contracts have been created on the blockchain but under 7,000 unique contracts have value today. An even smaller fraction of those have sour... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use a file exfiltration tool to collect recently changed files on a compromised host.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to hook libc functions in order to hide the installed dropper and mining software in process lists.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0036
ATT&CK Technique Name:FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD achieves persistence by making an entry in the Registry's Run key.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /R... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0614
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaBricks
CostaBricks can inject a payload into the memory of a compromised host.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Download New Code at Runtime
Adversaries may download and execute dynamic code not included in the original application package after installation. This technique is primarily used to evade static analysis checks and pre-publication scans in official app stores. In some cases, more... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList {42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1} or Microsoft WBEM New Event Subsystem {F3130CDB-AA52-4C3A-AB32-85FFC23AF9C1} depending on the system's CPU architecture.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1067
ATT&CK Technique Name:FluBot
FluBot can use Domain Generation Algorithms to connect to the C2 server.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to identify the IP address of the compromised machine.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor and ProcDump to dump credentials.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has delivered malicious links to achieve execution on the target system.[68][69][70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used steganography to hide shellcode in a BMP image file.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain, and net group "Exchange Trusted Subsystem" /domain to get account listings on a victim.[33] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Make Redirection Evil Again - URL Parser Issues in OAuth
Since 2012, OAuth 2.0 has been widely deployed by online service providers worldwide. Security-related headlines related to OAuth showed up from time to time, and most problems were caused by incorrect implementations of the protocol/servic... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 iOS Kernel PAC, One Year Later
In February 2019, I reported to Apple five ways to bypass kernel Pointer Authentication on the iPhone XS . My impression was that the design, while a dramatic improvement on the ARMv8.3 standard, had some fundamental issues when defending kernel control flow against a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has disguised its C2 addresses as the websites of shopping malls, governments, universities, and others.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used spearphishing with PDF attachments containing malicious links that redirected to credential harvesting websites.[9] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Effective Vulnerability Discovery with Machine Learning
Software Composition Analysis (SCA) products report vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies by comparing libraries detected in an application against a database of known vulnerabilities. These databases typically incorporate multiple source... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider used Cobalt Strike to carry out credential dumping using ProcDump.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1498
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Denial of Service
Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can make tokens from known credentials.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Securing Apps in the Open-By-Default Cloud
Services created in cloud environments like GCP or AWS are open to the internet by default. This is a problem that compounds in a workplace where developers are empowered to create new microservices faster than a security team can review them. Even if all o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has scanned for vulnerabilities in the public-facing servers of their targets.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple can use HTTP GET to request and pull information from C2.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0886
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Services
Adversaries may leverage remote services to move between assets and network segments. These services are often used to allow operators to interact with systems remotely within the network, some examples are RDP, SMB, SSH, and other similar mechanisms. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL compresses output data generated by command execution with a custom implementation of the Lempel–Ziv–Welch (LZW) algorithm.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1110.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Guessing
Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar adds a .lnk file to the Windows startup folder.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can capture the victim's screen.[110][111][112][113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore uses the mktemp utility to make unique file and directory names for payloads, such as TMP_DIR=`mktemp -d -t x.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 attempted to get users to launch malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT12
APT12 has exploited multiple vulnerabilities for execution, including Microsoft Office vulnerabilities (CVE-2009-3129, CVE-2012-0158) and vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader and Flash (CVE-2009-4324, CVE-2009-0927, CVE-2011-0609, CVE-2011-0611).[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1098.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Additional Cloud Credentials
Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST removed IFEO registry values to clean up traces of persistence.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole samples were timestomped by the authors by setting the PE timestamps to all zero values. InvisiMole also has a built-in command to modify file times.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can use the CODESYS protocol to download programs to Schneider PLCs.[1][2] INCONTROLLER can modified program logic on Omron PLCs using either the program download or backup transfer functions available through the HTTP server.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sys10
Sys10 collects the computer name, OS versioning information, and OS install date and sends the information to the C2.[348] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has used PowerShell to execute commands.[113] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Election Security: Securing America's Future
The United States Government is intensely focused on election security and is working together with election partners better than ever before. The Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is leading the f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda hooks processes by leveraging its own IAT hooked functions.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel can use a proxy during exfiltration if set in the configuration.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS stops processes related to security and management software.[32][33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
To move laterally on a victim network, FIN6 has used credentials stolen from various systems on which it gathered usernames and password hashes.[29][30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Applications that target Android API level 29 or higher cannot execute native code stored in the application's internal data storage directory, limiting the ability of applications to download and execute native code at runtime. [34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA has used Firebase for C2 communication.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot can steal passwords from the KeePass open source password manager.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Bypass CFG in Chrome
Chrome has announced plans to enable CFG recently. It indeed has value, especially when coupled with CET, however, supporting a complicated mitigation like CFG effectively is not just simply enabling some compiler options, there is more work to do.In this presentation, more th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer can collect data such as PowerPoint files, Word documents, Excel files, PDF files, text files, database files, and image files from an infected machine.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weakne... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, App... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0879
ATT&CK Technique Name:Damage to Property
Adversaries may cause damage and destruction of property to infrastructure, equipment, and the surrounding environment when attacking control systems. This technique may result in device and operational equipment breakdown, or represent tangential damage from oth... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used domain administrator accounts after dumping LSASS process memory.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can execute getinfo to identify the username on a compromised host.[173][174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Web proxies can be used to enforce an external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Restrict use of protocols without encryption or authentication mechanisms. Limit access to administrative and management interfaces from untrusted network sources. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has collected browser information from a compromised host.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used scripting to iterate through a list of compromised PoS systems, copy data to a log file, and remove the original data files.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves attempts to add a shortcut file in the Startup folder to achieve persistence.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:PyDCrypt
PyDCrypt has attempted to execute with PowerShell.[192] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has modified the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key for persistence.[255] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D collects processor information, memory information, computer name, hardware UUID, serial number, and operating system version. OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has used the ioreg command to gather some of this information.[268][269][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can modify the Registry to save encryption parameters and system information.[133][134][135][136][137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used compromised domain accounts to gain access to the target environment.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Review the integrity of project files to verify they have not been modified by adversary behavior. Verify a cryptographic hash for the file with a known trusted version, or look for other indicators of modification (e.g., timestamps). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can gain persistence through use of scheduled tasks.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun variants can use SSL for encrypting C2 communications.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0577
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrozenCell
FrozenCell has gathered the device manufacturer, model, and serial number.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Enable secure boot features to validate the digital signature of the boot environment and system image using a special purpose hardware device. If the validation check fails, the device will fail to boot preventing loading of unauthorized software. [5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Attacks From a New Front Door in 4G & 5G Mobile Networks
The inception of APIs in the telecom industry is destined to change the way mobile networks operated over the last 3 decades. The latest mobile networks now open their doors to enterprise customers, service providers, and application deve... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Hacking the Voter: Lessons from a Decade of Russian Military Operations
Election security faces a persistent problem: defenders are often thinking tactically, while the most capable, deliberate adversaries are thinking strategically. Getting ahead of ever evolving election interference operations wi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk can create .dll files that actually contain a Rich Text File format document.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can scan for open TCP ports on the target network.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves can obtain information about network parameters.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used the NtdsAudit utility to collect information related to accounts and passwords.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that user accounts with administrative rights follow best practices, including use of privileged access workstations, Just in Time/Just Enough Administration (JIT/JEA), and strong authentication. Reduce the number of users that are members of highly p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke has commands to get the current user's name and SID.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used RDP to access specific network hosts of interest.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assig... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has created a scheduled task that executes every hour to establish persistence.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can configure custom listeners to passively monitor all incoming HTTP GET and POST requests sent to the AD FS server from the intranet/internet and intercept HTTP requests that match the custom URI patterns defined by the actor.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0653
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCaon
xCaon has added persistence via the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load which causes the malware to run each time any user logs in.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0349
ATT&CK Technique Name:LaZagne
LaZagne can obtain credentials from macOS Keychains.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to take screenshots on an infected host including capturing content from windows of instant messaging applications.[167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has infected victim machines through compromised websites and exploit kits.[43][44][45][46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
A JPIN variant downloads the backdoor payload via the BITS service.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used ipconfig, Ping, and tracert to enumerate the IP address and network environment and settings of the local host.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves can use HTTP over non-standard ports, such as 995, for C2.[31] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.