text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:T1574.011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Services Registry Permissions Weakness
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executabl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
The Regin malware platform can use ICMP to communicate between infected computers.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
cron permissions are controlled by /etc/cron.allow and /etc/cron.deny. If there is a cron.allow file, then the user or users that need to use cron will need to be listed in the file. cron.deny is used to explicitly disallow users from using cron. If neither ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy has a module that checks a number of indicators on the system to determine if its running on a virtual machine.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can collect information from a compromised host.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec can obtain information about network configuration, including the routing table, ARP cache, and DNS cache.[196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1601.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Downgrade System Image
Adversaries may install an older version of the operating system of a network device to weaken security. Older operating system versions on network devices often have weaker encryption ciphers and, in general, fewer/less updated defensive features. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Equation
Equation has used tools with the functionality to search for specific information about the attached hard drive that could be used to identify and overwrite the firmware.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0220
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaos
Chaos provides a reverse shell is triggered upon receipt of a packet with a special string, sent to any port.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0816
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
This technique may not be effectively mitigated against, consider controls for assets and processes that lead to the use of this technique. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 exploited CVE-2021-44207 in the USAHerds application and CVE-2021-44228 in Log4j, as well as other .NET deserialization, SQL injection, and directory traversal vulnerabilities to gain initial access.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used scheduled tasks to automatically log out of created accounts every 8 hours as well as to execute malicious files.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1000
ATT&CK Technique Name:ALLANITE
ALLANITE utilized credentials collected through phishing and watering hole attacks. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker can delete the infected system's Shadow Volumes to prevent recovery.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0423
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ginp
Ginp can capture device screenshots and stream them back to the C2.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used base64 encoding and ECDH-P256 encryption for payloads.[296][297][298] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Smishmash - Text Based 2fa Spoofing Using OSINT, Phishing Techniques and a Burner Phone
In recent years the data leaks have escalated, and leaked passwords and usernames have become a common attack vector in phishing attacks. Until recently phone numbers were commonly overlooked by attackers as well... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has leverage NordVPN for its egress points when targeting intended victims.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can retrieve calendar event information including the event name, when and where it is taking place, and the description.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has downloaded additional Lua scripts from the C2.[168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot can decrypt data received from a C2 and save to a file.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Utilize network allowlists to restrict unnecessary connections to network devices (e.g., comm servers, serial to ethernet converters) and services, especially in cases when devices have limits on the number of simultaneous sessions they support. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Exploiting the Hyper-V IDE Emulator to Escape the Virtual Machine
Cloud proliferation continues to increase the worlds dependency on the security of virtualization stacks. But like all software stacks, virtualization stacks have vulnerabilities.In this talk, I'll examine a powerful vulnerability in ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used netstat -an on a victim to get a listing of network connections.[59] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Anatomy of Native IIS Malware
Internet Information Services (IIS) is Microsoft web server software for Windows with an extensible, modular architecture. It is not unknown for threat actors to misuse this extensibility to intercept or modify network traffic – IIS malware targeting payment informatio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has relied on users opening a malicious email attachment for execution.[257] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used compromised Office 365 service accounts with Global Administrator privileges to collect email from user inboxes.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa collected the system volume serial number, GUID, and computer name.[163][164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail can identify the IP address of the victim system.[247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
A variant of Emissary appends junk data to the end of its DLL file to create a large file that may exceed the maximum size that anti-virus programs can scan.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 The Black Hat NOC: Greatest Hits and Holy...Cows
This session will be a look into the most interesting things seen and learned within the Black Hat NOC, by two of the guys that have been running that circus for nearly two decades. It won't just be attacks and failures, I mean, it will be that, but... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Hey Google, Activate Spyware! – When Google Assistant Uses a Vulnerability as a Feature
This talk is based on research that was recently conducted and resulted in serious security findings and 0-day vulnerabilities in Android-based smartphones. Our team found a way of manipulating specific actions... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can modify the Registry to enable itself to run in safe mode and to modify the icons and file extensions for encrypted files.[22][23][24][25][26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has dropped malicious files into the startup folder %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup on a compromised host in order to maintain persistence.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0144
ATT&CK Technique Name:ChChes
ChChes communicates to its C2 server over HTTP and embeds data within the Cookie HTTP header.[60][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 uses a tool to infect connected USB devices and transmit itself to air-gapped computers when the infected USB device is inserted.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 LadderLeak: Breaking ECDSA with Less than One Bit of Nonce Leakage
Although one of the most popular signature schemes, ECDSA presents a number of implementation pitfalls, in particular due to the very sensitive nature of the random value (known as the nonce) generated during the signing algorithm. I... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Scavenger: Misuse Error Handling Leading to Qemu/KVM Escape
Error handling code is used extensively in hypervisors, which is designed to capture unexpected behaviors and avoid crashing the vm, such as invalid inputs from guest users and insufficient memory. However, we find that incorrect use of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1608.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:SEO Poisoning
Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER may collect local group information by running net localgroup administrators or a series of other commands on a victim.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp's passw.plug plugin can gather passwords saved in Opera, Internet Explorer, Safari, Firefox, and Chrome.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used Mimikatz's DCSync to dump credentials from the memory of the targeted system.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0245
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADCALL
BADCALL encrypts C2 traffic using an XOR/ADD cipher.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0369
ATT&CK Technique Name:CoinTicker
CoinTicker executes a bash script to establish a reverse shell.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT has a feature to list the available services on the system.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has sent spearphishing emails with links to harvest credentials and deliver malware.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used net share and net view to identify network shares of interest.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaRicto
During CostaRicto, the threat actors set up remote tunneling using an SSH tool to maintain access to a compromised environment.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used Base64-encoded strings.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0345
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seasalt
Seasalt has a command to download additional files.[63][63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, the threat actors executed /c cd /d c:\windows\temp\ & reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\<username>\PuTTY\Sessions\ to detect recent PuTTY sessions, likely to further lateral movement.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service configurations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 used Remexi to collect usernames from the system.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper has the ability to stop the Volume Shadow Copy service.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0391
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAWKBALL
HAWKBALL can collect the OS version, architecture information, and computer name.[156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla has the ability to act as a second-stage dropper used to infect the system with additional malware.[443] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker has a command to take ownership of a file and reset the ACL permissions using the takeown.exe /F filepath command.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mivast
Mivast has the capability to open a remote shell and run basic commands.[222] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used net.exe in a script with net accounts /domain to find the password policy of a domain.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut includes a subproject DonutTest to inject shellcode into a target process.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0861
ATT&CK Technique Name:Point & Tag Identification
Adversaries may collect point and tag values to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the process environment. Points may be values such as inputs, memory locations, outputs or other process specific variables. Tags are the identifiers given to poin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin uses WMI to check BIOS version for VBOX, bochs, qemu, virtualbox, and vm to check for evidence that the script might be executing within an analysis environment. [46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has established persistence using Userinit by adding the Registry key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer has used dynamic API resolution to avoid identifiable strings within the binary, including RegEnumKeyW.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT decodes many of its artifacts and is decrypted (AES-128) after being downloaded.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy installs an application-defined Windows hook to get notified when a network drive has been attached, so it can then use the hook to call its RecordToFile file stealing method.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can add itself to the Registry as a startup program to establish persistence.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has modified and added entries within HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options to maintain persistence.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0275
ATT&CK Technique Name:UPPERCUT
UPPERCUT uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser has used DNS for command and control.[32][33] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Arm'd and Dangerous
Apple's new M1 systems offer a myriad of benefits ...for both macOS users, and unfortunately, to malware authors as well.In this talk we detail the first malicious programs compiled to natively target Apple Silicon (M1/arm64), focusing on methods of analysis. We'll start with a ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used a PowerShell-based keylogging tool to capture the window title.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:Arp
Arp can be used to display a host's ARP cache, which may include address resolutions for remote systems.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent an application from writing a signed vulnerable driver to the system.[5] On Windows 10 and 11, enable Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist to assist in hardening against third par... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of behaviors related to process injection/memory tampering based on common sequences of indicators (ex: execution of specific API functions). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper has the ability to corrupt disk partitions and obtain raw disk access to destroy data.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet can propagate via peer-to-peer communication and updates using RPC.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda queries the system's keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system. It will terminate execution if it detects LANG_RUSSIAN, LANG_BELARUSIAN, LANG_KAZAK, or LANG_UKRAINIAN.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
DLL side-loading has been used to execute BBSRAT through a legitimate Citrix executable, ssonsvr.exe. The Citrix executable was dropped along with BBSRAT by the dropper.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT can download files to the victim’s machine.[318][319] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0353
ATT&CK Technique Name:NOKKI
NOKKI uses the Windows call SetWindowsHookEx and begins injecting it into every GUI process running on the victim's machine.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot can run a batch script named del.bat to remove any Saint Bot payload-linked files from a compromise system if anti-analysis or locale checks fail.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0183
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tor
Tor encapsulates traffic in multiple layers of encryption, using TLS by default.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can use a custom protocol tunneled through DNS or HTTP.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has obtained and used a customized version of PsExec, as well as use other tools such as pwdump, SDelete, and Windows Credential Editor.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark can pause C2 communications for a specified time.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may en... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu uses mshta.exe to load its program and files.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0253
ATT&CK Technique Name:RunningRAT
RunningRAT adds itself to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence upon reboot.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used a custom hashing method to resolve APIs used in shellcode.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Archive Collected Data
Adversaries may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing data can help to obfuscate its contents and minimize use of network resources. Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detectio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0503
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrameworkPOS
FrameworkPOS can use DNS tunneling for exfiltration of credit card data.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use PowerSploit's Invoke-TokenManipulation to manipulate access tokens.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has established persistence by using S4U tasks as well as the Scheduled Task option in PowerShell Empire.[57][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Ghidra - Journey from Classified NSA Tool to Open Source
This year was a momentous one for the National Security Agency (NSA) as we released our game-changing software reverse engineering (SRE) framework to the open source community: Ghidra. This was a long and arduous process and we want to give Bl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0519
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYNful Knock
SYNful Knock can be sent instructions via special packets to change its functionality. Code for new functionality can be included in these messages.[3] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.