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titleblackhat:us-21 ERROR: BadAlloc! - Broken Memory Allocators Led to Millions of Vulnerable IoT and Embedded Devices
"BadAlloc" is our code name for a class of integer-overflow related security issues found in popular memory allocators' core functions such as malloc and calloc. BadAlloc vulnerabilities affect 17 diff... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Network Defender Archeology: An NSM Case Study in Lateral Movement with DCOM
Adversaries love leveraging legitimate functionality that lays dormant inside of Microsoft Windows for malicious purposes and often disguise their activity under the smoke screen of "normal administrator behavior." Over the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0494
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zen
Zen base64 encodes one of the strings it searches for.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has sent malicious Office documents via email as part of spearphishing campaigns as well as executables disguised as documents.[141][142][143][144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:GeminiDuke
GeminiDuke collects information on running processes and environment variables from the victim.[113] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 How to Detect that Your Domains are Being Abused for Phishing by Using DNS
As a high-profile public-sector organization, the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration deals with criminals claiming to be representatives of the organization and contacting the public with phishing e-mails every day. By usin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has used LoadLibrary(), GetProcAddress() and CreateRemoteThread() API functions to execute its shellcode.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Some Sakula samples install themselves as services for persistence by calling WinExec with the net start argument.[106] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Discovering 20 Year Old Vulnerabilities in Modern Windows Kernel
With the continuous upgrade by Microsoft, the latest windows 10 version has become more and more powerful and supports more and more features. On the other hand, certain components always exist in windows system, such as printer driver... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro has infected victims via malicious attachments.[104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0642
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADFLICK
BADFLICK has delayed communication to the actor-controlled IP address by 5 minutes.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can dump hashed passwords associated with Active Directory using Windows' Directory Replication Services API (DRSUAPI), or Volume Shadow Copy.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1021.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:SSH
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can check for blocklisted process names on a compromised host.[183] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST had commands to enumerate files and directories.[291][292] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used Amazon Web Services to host C2.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can collect process filenames and SID authority level.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has created web accounts including Dropbox and GitHub for C2 and document exfiltration.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0204
ATT&CK Technique Name:Briba
Briba creates run key Registry entries pointing to malicious DLLs dropped to disk.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has used a custom implementation of DNS tunneling to embed C2 communications in DNS requests and replies.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0498
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cryptoistic
Cryptoistic can engage in encrypted communications with C2.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 How We Organize Large-Scale DDoS Exercises in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands, following a large number of DDoS attacks experienced in January 2018, it was apparent that things needed to change. Specifically, we decided to implement the concept of cooperative DDoS mitigation at the national level... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Hardware Installation
Limit the use of USB devices and removable media within a network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
If running in a Windows environment, Kazuar saves a DLL to disk that is injected into the explorer.exe process to execute the payload. Kazuar can also be configured to inject and execute within specific processes.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0344
ATT&CK Technique Name:Azorult
Azorult can recursively search for files in folders and collects files from the desktop with certain extensions.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Many Misdat samples were programmed using Borland Delphi, which will mangle the default PE compile timestamp of a file.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has enumerated processes on targeted systems.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use tools that restrict program execution via application control by attributes other than file name for common operating system utilities that are needed. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Where 2 Worlds Collide: Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX
Over the past fifteen years there's been an uptick in "interesting" UNIX infrastructures being integrated into customers' existing AD forests. Whilst the threat models enabled by this should be quite familiar to anyone securing a heterogeneous... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Ensure only authorized keys are allowed access to critical resources and audit access lists regularly. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE creates and uses a VBScript as part of its persistent execution.[106][107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be advised to be extra scrutinous of applications that request location or sensitive phone information permissions, and to deny any permissions requests for applications they do not recognize. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has the ability to download files to target systems.[132][133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Prevent unauthorized systems from accessing control servers or field devices containing industrial information, especially services used for common automation protocols (e.g., DNP3, OPC). | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Better Privacy Through Offense: How To Build a Privacy Red Team
Red teams are an important component of a holistic cyber security program because they test how well the program stands up to threats from real adversaries. In 2021, Meta created a privacy red team to help improve our privacy posture an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can obtain a list of installed applications.[1] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Are You Trading Stocks Securely? Exposing Security Flaws in Trading Technologies
With the advent of electronic trading platforms and networks, the exchange of financial securities now is easier and faster than ever; but this comes with inherent risks. Nowadays, not only rich people can invest in th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 modified Windows Services to ensure PowerShell scripts were loaded on the system. APT32 also creates a Windows service to establish persistence.[11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has collected victim employee name information.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie attempts to detect several anti-virus products.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to exfiltrate data over the C2 channel.[140][141][142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can use AdjustTokenPrivileges to grant itself privileges for debugging with SeDebugPrivilege, creating backups with SeBackupPrivilege, loading drivers with SeLoadDriverPrivilege, and shutting down a local system with SeShutdownPrivilege.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
LockerGoga has been observed moving around the victim network via SMB, indicating the actors behind this ransomware are manually copying files form computer to computer instead of self-propagating.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth can create a new process in a suspended state from a targeted legitimate process in order to unmap its memory and replace it with malicious code.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker created and established a service that runs until the encryption process is complete.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has used Nt* Native API functions to inject code into legitimate processes such as wermgr.exe.[63] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 DroidGuard: A Deep Dive into SafetyNet
SafetyNet is the Android component developed by Google to verify the devices' integrity. These checksare used by the developers to prevent running applications on devices that would not meet security requirements but it is also used by Google to prevent bots... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
MMC may not be necessary within a given environment since it is primarily used by system administrators, not regular users or clients. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has collected a list of running processes.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT’s Java payload is encrypted with AES.[175] Additionally, backdoor files are encrypted using DES as a stream cipher. Later variants of jRAT also incorporated AV evasion methods such as Java bytecode obfuscation via the commercial Allatori obfuscation tool.[176] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0103
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mofang
Mofang's spearphishing emails required a user to click the link to connect to a compromised website.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux can execute commands with high privileges via a specific binary with setuid functionality.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host.[270][271] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca used the command schtasks /Create /SC ONLOgon /TN WindowsUpdateCheck /TR "[file path]" /ru system for persistence.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0932
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining access to valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collectin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0393
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerStallion
PowerStallion modifies the MAC times of its local log files to match that of the victim's desktop.ini file.[44] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Multiple Bugs in Multi-Party Computation: Breaking Cryptocurrency's Strongest Wallets
Cryptocurrency wallets in exchange platforms or banks require strong security because they protect vast amounts of money. Some solutions rely on advanced cryptographic methods that distribute trust across mult... | secon |
title:botconf2015 BoxBotNet
A hosted box botnet, is a botnet of compromised web servers, usually using vulnerabilities in CMS on low cost hosted servers. Since last year I had followed an indonesian group which operate this kind of botnet and resell access to theses powned servers.The amazing thing is that this botnet ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has dropped implants in folders named for legitimate software.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang uses command-line interaction to search files and directories.[160][161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke has a command to write random data across a file and delete it.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0277
ATT&CK Technique Name:FruitFly
FruitFly saves itself with a leading "." to make it a hidden file.[20] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Bounty Operations: Best Practices and Common Pitfalls to Avoid in the First 6-12 Months
Ever want to talk to someone that runs a bug bounty program and trade best practices and horror stories? Join this panel of bounty managers for real talk on signal vs noise, ROI, interacting with bounty hunters, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's installer can attempt to achieve persistence by creating a scheduled task.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0560
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEARDROP
TEARDROP was decoded using a custom rolling XOR algorithm to execute a customized Cobalt Strike payload.[228][229][186] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group uses HTTP and HTTPS to contact actor-controlled C2 servers.[237] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:China Chopper
China Chopper's server component can download remote files.[107][108][109][110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has performed frequent and scheduled data exfiltration from compromised networks.[8] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Getting Your Hands Dirty: How to Analyze the Behavior of Malware Traffic and Web Connections
Nowadays there are a lot of tools to analyze traffic, but the most important thing to have is the experience and knowledge of a malware analyst. The goal of the workshop is to give a hands-on experience on ana... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX can be added as a service to establish persistence. PlugX also has a module to change service configurations as well as start, control, and delete services.[89][90][91][92][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE can ensure it executes only on intended systems by identifying the victim's volume serial number, hostname, and/or DNS domain.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used stolen credentials to compromise Outlook Web Access (OWA).[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Change GPOs to define shorter timeouts sessions and maximum amount of time any single session can be active. Change GPOs to specify the maximum amount of time that a disconnected session stays active on the RD session host server.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0682
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrailBlazer
TrailBlazer has the ability to use WMI for persistence.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
The Netwalker DLL has been injected reflectively into the memory of a legitimate running process.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can use LDAP queries, net group "Domain Admins" /domain and net user /domain for discovery.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can allow abuse of a compromised AD FS server's SAML token.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has searched file contents on a compromised host.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors ran encoded commands from the command line.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1484.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Group Policy Modification
Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and compute... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0950
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Utilize exploit protection to prevent activities which may be exploited through malicious web sites. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL is capable of setting and deleting Registry values.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Internal Spearphishing
Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campai... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot uses SSL for encrypting C2 communications.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used PowerShell profiles to maintain persistence on an infected machine.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1137.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Outlook Rules
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in O... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0460
ATT&CK Technique Name:Get2
Get2 has the ability to run executables with command-line arguments.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has leveraged the Windows API, including using CreateProcess() or ShellExecute(), to perform a variety of tasks.[156][157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sudo and Sudo Caching
Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 obtained Ticket Granting Service (TGS) tickets for Active Directory Service Principle Names to crack offline.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
A FinFisher variant uses DLL search order hijacking.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can sleep for a time interval between C2 communication attempts.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can hook logging functions so that nothing from the backdoor gets sent to the logging facility.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Patch the BIOS and other firmware as necessary to prevent successful use of known vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used malicious links in e-mails to deliver malware.[111][112][113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny has executed commands via scheduled tasks.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used legitimate credentials to login to an external VPN, Citrix, SSH, and other remote services.[10][11] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.