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ATT&CK ID:T1636.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Call Log
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather call log data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Call Log Content Provider. iOS provides no standard API to access the call log. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asynchronous Procedure Call
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has delivered self-extracting 7z archive files within malicious document attachments.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.[5][6] These audits should also include if default ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0600
ATT&CK Technique Name:Doki
Doki was executed through an open Docker daemon API port.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer downloads and executes root exploits from a remote server.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as BloodHound (version 1.5.1 and later).[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Disappeared Coins: Steal Hashrate in Stratum Secretly
Most cryptocurrencies with high value are based on proof-of-work (PoW), including Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Ether. The process to "produce" them is usually called "mining", and the people involved are called "miners". The mining process is one of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0391
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAWKBALL
HAWKBALL has used an OLE object that uses Equation Editor to drop the embedded shellcode.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors obtained malware, including Remcos, njRAT, and AsyncRAT.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Consider implementing access control mechanisms that include both authentication and authorization. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Develop Capabilities
Adversaries may build capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than purchasing, freely downloading, or stealing capabilities, adversaries may develop their own capabilities in-house. This is the process of identifying development requirements and ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 The Motion Sensor Western: The Good (Automatic Functionality Support), the Bad (Security Risks to Devices), and the Ugly (Privacy Risks to Individuals)
In the last decade, motion sensors (accelerometers, gyroscopes) have become more and more ubiquitous in various IoT devices (e.g., smartphones, sm... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has a dynamic debugging feature to check whether it is located in the %TEMP% directory, otherwise it copies itself there.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
The IceApple Server Variable Dumper module iterates over all server variables present for the current request and returns them to the adversary.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has searched local system resources to access sensitive documents.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0680
ATT&CK Technique Name:LitePower
LitePower has the ability to download payloads containing system commands to a compromised host.[264] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0068
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLATINUM
PLATINUM has sent spearphishing emails with attachments to victims as its primary initial access vector.[178] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Browser-Powered Desync Attacks: A New Frontier in HTTP Request Smuggling
The recent rise of HTTP Request Smuggling has seen a flood of critical findings enabling near-complete compromise of numerous major websites. However, the threat has been confined to attacker-accessible systems with a reverse ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group tools decrypted additional payloads from the C2. Gamaredon Group has also decoded base64-encoded source code of a downloader.[95][96] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Bypass CFG in Chrome
Chrome has announced plans to enable CFG recently. It indeed has value, especially when coupled with CET, however, supporting a complicated mitigation like CFG effectively is not just simply enabling some compiler options, there is more work to do.In this presentation, more t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell can list PHP server configuration details.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain account permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups acros... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0079
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkHydrus
DarkHydrus leveraged PowerShell to download and execute additional scripts for execution.[70][71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop has used a simple XOR operation to decrypt strings.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea collects the current username from the victim.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can identify the hard disk volume serial number on a compromised host.[355] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has used verclsid.exe to download and execute a malicious script.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain the compromised machine's name.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
T9000 searches removable storage devices for files with a pre-defined list of file extensions (e.g. * .doc, .ppt, .xls, .docx, .pptx, *.xlsx). Any matching files are encrypted and written to a local user directory.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has added the following rule to a victim's Windows firewall to allow RDP traffic - "netsh" advfirewall firewall add rule name="Terminal Server" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=3389.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk overwrites the first sector of the Master Boot Record with "0x00".[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team establishes an internal proxy prior to the installation of backdoors within the network. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can attempt to run the program as admin, then show a fake error message and a legitimate UAC bypass prompt to the user in an attempt to socially engineer the user into escalating privileges.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Moses Staff
Moses Staff has dropped a web shell onto a compromised system.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control where appropriate. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower sets up persistence with a Registry run key.[199] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 On Trust: Stories from the Front Lines
Time and again, we as consumers read about the latest significant data breach, and we feel a familiar disappointment. Disempowered, helpless, without recourse. Angry for being treated like a commodity. Frustrated that nothing's likely to change.On the other sid... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has downloaded code from a C2 server.[403] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can identify domain group membership for the current user.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet executes malicious SQL commands in the WinCC database server to propagate to remote systems. The malicious SQL commands include xp_cmdshell, sp_dumpdbilog, and sp_addextendedproc. [11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has created a scheduled task named "Maintenance" to establish persistence.[154] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider using IP allowlisting along with user account management to ensure that data access is restricted not only to valid users but only from expected IP ranges to mitigate the use of stolen credentials to access data. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat can enumerate connected drives for infected host machines.[51] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 From Coordinated Disclosure to Cooperative Vulnerability Research When Dealing with Critical Software Stacks
When it comes to critical software stacks (like embedded network libraries or real-time OSs), is it time to change the way we, as researchers, approach vendors when disclosing vulnerabilities... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has changed file permissions of files so they could not be modified.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass uses PowerSploit to inject shellcode into PowerShell.[146][147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed encrypting the data it collects before sending it to the C2 server. [18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0600
ATT&CK Technique Name:Doki
Doki has used the DynDNS service and a DGA based on the Dogecoin blockchain to generate C2 domains.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1474.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary, VPDN_LU.exe, to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL, navlu.dll.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader recursively searches through directories for files.[280] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can use a variant of the sysprep UAC bypass.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM targeted presidential campaign staffers with credential phishing e-mails.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net accounts command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used WMIC for discovery as well as to execute payloads for persistence and lateral movement.[66][67][68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell has a module to perform brute force attacks on a system.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete has used TLS-encrypted FTP to exfiltrate data.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker exploited the MS08-067 Windows vulnerability for remote code execution through a crafted RPC request.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex can stop and disable services on the system.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has called cmd through a Word document macro.[263] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\Windows\System32\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\Cur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to set itself to be executed at system startup by adding a Registry value under one of the following Registry keys: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ HKLM\Soft... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore has disguised a malicious .app file as a Flash Player update.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can retrieve passwords from messaging and mail client applications.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0642
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADFLICK
BADFLICK has compressed data using the aPLib compression library.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used a scheduled task to establish persistence for a keylogger.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0544
ATT&CK Technique Name:HenBox
HenBox can load additional Dalvik code while running.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon has used call to LoadLibrary to load its installer. PipeMon loads its modules using reflective loading or custom shellcode.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM tries to add a scheduled task to establish persistence.[151][152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.[17][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can initiate communication over HTTP/HTTPS for its C2 server.[201] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Information Security in the Public Interest
Computer security is now a public policy issue. Election security, blockchain, "going dark," the vulnerabilities equities debate, IoT safety, data privacy, algorithmic security and fairness, critical infrastructure: these are all important public policy i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has removed various hooks before installing the trojan or bootkit to evade sandbox analysis or other analysis software.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Straight Outta VMware: Modern Exploitation of the SVGA Device for Guest-to-Host Escapes
This presentation focuses on modern exploitation techniques for VMware Workstation guest's virtual graphics device in order to achieve code execution on the host operating system. There will be in-depth analysis... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Don't Eat Spaghetti with a Spoon - An Analysis of the Practical Value of Threat Intelligence
Threat Intelligence is a sound proposition that has its place in a mature security operation. But like so many good concepts in our industry, its path to commercialization has involved commoditization... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has cleared command history with history -c.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0809
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Destruction
Adversaries may perform data destruction over the course of an operation. The adversary may drop or create malware, tools, or other non-native files on a target system to accomplish this, potentially leaving behind traces of malicious activities. Such non-native fi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0418
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViceLeaker
ViceLeaker can obtain a list of installed applications.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT collects various information via WMI requests, including CPU information in the Win32_Processor entry (Processor ID, Name, Manufacturer and the clock speed).[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Service Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port and/or vu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit unquoted path vulnerabilities.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb's loader can check for the FoggyWeb backdoor .pri file on a compromised AD FS server.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used PowerShell to discover domain accounts by exectuing Get-ADUser and Get-ADGroupMember.[43][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT can also embed data within a BMP image prior to exfiltration.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0945
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Devices should verify that firmware has been properly signed by the vendor before allowing installation. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 A Brief History of Mitigation: The Path to EL1 in iOS 11
In December last year, I released the async_wake exploit for iOS 11.1.2. In this talk, I'll cover how each step of the exploit worked and discuss in depth each mitigation which was defeated along the way.I'll focus on what was supposed to make... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Login Items
Adversaries may add login items to execute upon user login to gain persistence or escalate privileges. Login items are applications, documents, folders, or server connections that are automatically launched when a user logs in. Login items can be added via a shared ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the the secure enrollment and deactivation of authentication mechanisms, such as MFA, for user accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has used DNS tunneling for C2 communications.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has placed a malicious payload in %WINDIR%\SYSTEM32\oci.dll so it would be sideloaded by the MSDTC service.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to get directory listings or drive information on a compromised host.[270] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT collects the MAC address, computer name, and CPU information.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can download additional files and tools.[247][248] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.