text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon's first stage has been executed by a call to CreateProcess with the decryption password in an argument. PipeMon has used a call to LoadLibrary to load its installer.[134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can check for VMware-related files and DLLs related to sandboxes.[48][49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has the ability to self-extract as a RAR archive.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos decrypts strings right after the initial communication, but before the authentication process.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS can set the AutoRun Registry key with a PowerShell command.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1616
ATT&CK Technique Name:Call Control
Adversaries may make, forward, or block phone calls without user authorization. This could be used for adversary goals such as audio surveillance, blocking or forwarding calls from the device owner, or C2 communication. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
The net use \system\share /delete command can be used in Net to remove an established connection to a network share.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used the Windows Command Shell and batch scripts for execution on compromised hosts.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
cron permissions are controlled by /etc/cron.allow and /etc/cron.deny. If there is a cron.allow file, then the user or users that need to use cron will need to be listed in the file. cron.deny is used to explicitly disallow users from using cron. If neither ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
Some versions of CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. If it detects that it is, it will exit.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server the title of the window for each running process. The KilaAlfa keylogger also reports the title of the window in the foreground.[15][16][17] | secon |
title:botconf2020 A Proposed Civil Liability Framework for Disrupting Botnets, with a particular focus on Smart Devices
This paper proposes a legal methodology aimed at disrupting Botnets, whose nodes are mostly comprised of Smart Devices. The methodology allows for the attachment of civil liability to both the manufac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0410
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fysbis
Fysbis has the ability to create and execute commands in a remote shell for CLI.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has relied on victims to open malicious links in e-mails for execution.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can use rundll32.exe to gain execution.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:MiniDuke
MiniDuke can use DGA to generate new Twitter URLs for C2.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can inject into the svchost.exe process for execution.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Keep Everyone In Sync: Effective Approaches Borrowed from Open Source Communities
Keeping members of a community in sync is a resource-consuming task. For example, many security researchers have to spend the whole day on IMs in order not to miss a single threat.As a former creator of an open sourc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0254
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLAINTEE
PLAINTEE gains persistence by adding the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.[193] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has collected emails from targeted mailboxes within a compromised Azure AD tenant.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK is capable of performing keylogging.[37][3][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
The CozyCar dropper has masqueraded a copy of the infected system's rundll32.exe executable that was moved to the malware's install directory and renamed according to a predefined configuration file.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0471
ATT&CK Technique Name:build_downer
build_downer has the ability to download files from C2 to the infected host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has used VPS hosting providers in targeting of intended victims.[2] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 TiYunZong: An Exploit Chain to Remotely Root Modern Android Devices - Pwn Android Phones from 2015 to 2020
As more and more mitigations have been introduced into Android, modern Android devices become much more difficult to be rooted, in particular, remotely rooted. This is especially true for Pixel... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit unquoted path vulnerabilities.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Restrict use of protocols without encryption or authentication mechanisms. Limit access to administrative and management interfaces from untrusted network sources. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has attempted to discover third party endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools on compromised systems.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-Factor Authentication
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has sent malicious links including links directing victims to a Google Drive folder.[61][62][63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0166
ATT&CK Technique Name:RemoteCMD
RemoteCMD copies a file over to the remote system before execution.[378] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Fuzzing the Native NTFS Read-Write Driver (NTFS3) in the Linux Kernel
In 1993, Microsoft introduced the proprietary NTFS with Windows NT 3.1. Over two decades later, the full-fledged NTFS native driver, dubbed NTFS3, contributed to the Linux 5.15 kernel in late 2021 by Paragon Software. As a new a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Scheduled Task
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1498.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reflection Amplification
Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy uses PsExec locally in order to execute rundll32.exe at the highest privileges (NTAUTHORITY\SYSTEM).[45] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 AMSI Unchained: Review of Known AMSI Bypass Techniques and Introducing a New One
AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) is a built-in API in Windows that allows security products to scan and therefore allow or restrict several types of content sent by applications and services (AMSI consumers) which i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has attempted to get users to click on a malicious zipped file.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot uploads files and secondary payloads to the victim's machine.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Replication Through Removable Media
Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0345
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seasalt
Seasalt is capable of installing itself as a service.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader can download additional tools to a compromised host.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can collect the username from a compromised host.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has the ability to run cancel or closeanddeletestorage to remove all files from storage and delete the storage temp file on a compromised host.[222] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 May the Trust be with You: Empowering TrustZone-M with Multiple Trusted Environments
Over the last decade, Arm TrustZone has been pivotal for securing hundreds of millions of mobile devices. Within the realm of the Internet of Things (IoT), Arm has recently introduced TrustZone on its new generati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike's execute-assembly command can run a .NET executable within the memory of a sacrificial process by loading the CLR.[9] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Biometrics & Privacy: Time to Faceoff or is that FaceApp?
FaceApp sparked outrage recently when it was thought that the app was taking photos from your phone and uploading them to servers in Russia without permission and for nefarious reasons. The evidence didn't support this claim, but it was... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using SPF) and integrity of messages (using DKIM). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as DMARC) may en... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.[72][73][74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has performed C2 using DNS via A, OPT, and TXT records.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet installs an RPC server for P2P communications.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer has executed a .command script from a hidden directory in a mounted DMG.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET exfiltrates data stolen from a system over its C2 channel.[146] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Routopsy: Modern Routing Protocol Vulnerability Analysis and Exploitation
An often-overlooked area of network security are the routing and redundancy protocols used between routing endpoints. Specifically, Dynamic Routing Protocols (DRP) such as OSPF, RIP, EIGRP, and First Hop Redundancy Protocols ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Most Sakula samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.[234] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0248
ATT&CK Technique Name:yty
yty establishes persistence by creating a scheduled task with the command SchTasks /Create /SC DAILY /TN BigData /TR " + path_file + "/ST 09:30".[182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can lower security settings by changing Registry keys.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has used a .NET tool named dog.exe to exiltrate information over an e-mail account.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can utilize web services including Google sites to send and receive C2 data.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can query the Registry to get random file extensions to append to encrypted files.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0550
ATT&CK Technique Name:DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent has accessed browser history, as well as the files for 15 other apps.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
New OS releases frequently contain additional limitations or controls around device location access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has utilized multiple techniques to bypass UAC.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used search order hijacking to force TeamViewer to load a malicious DLL.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.[7] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Collecting Malicious Particles from Neutrino Botnets
Neutrino Bot (also known and detected as Win/Kasidet) is a rapidly changing threat. It first became known around December 2013. It has been actively developed ever since resulting in version 5.4 at the very beginning of 2018. From the early times, w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has loaded a malicious DLL by spoofing the name of the legitimate Version.DLL and placing it in the same folder as the digitally-signed Microsoft binary OneDriveUpdater.exe.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0079
ATT&CK Technique Name:MobileOrder
MobileOrder has a command to upload information about all running processes to its C2 server.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has named services to appear legitimate.[57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used fake personas on social media to engage and target victims.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
PingPull can collect data from a compromised host.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive can upload files to C2 from victim machines.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has been distributed in e-mails with malicious Excel or Word documents.[196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to identify hardware information, the computer name, and OS information on an infected host.[366] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has the capability to harvest credentials and passwords from the SAM database.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used malware disguised as Mozilla Firefox and a tool named mfevtpse.exe to proxy C2 communications, closely mimicking a legitimate McAfee file mfevtps.exe.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy uses VBS scripts for installing files and performing execution.[72] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 POSWorld. Should You be Afraid of Hands-On Payment Devices?
The dark market is full of cloned Point of Sales terminals and offers for fake merchant accounts. But how do they get there if every terminal is built to have anti-tampering mechanisms, segregated memory for private crypto keys, and multip... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper has the ability to execute a PowerShell script to get information from the infected host.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
One variant of BlackEnergy locates existing driver services that have been disabled and drops its driver component into one of those service's paths, replacing the legitimate executable. The malware then sets the hijacked service to start automatically to establish pers... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0811
ATT&CK Technique Name:Redundancy of Service
Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communica... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used tools to identify if a mouse is connected to a targeted system.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has compromised legitimate websites to host C2 and malware modules.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has the ability to search for designated file paths and Registry keys that indicate a virtualized environment from multiple products.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
A Gamaredon Group file stealer can gather the victim's username to send to a C2 server.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Configure browsers or tasks to regularly delete persistent cookies. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has lured victims into opening malicious files containing malware.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
The TAINTEDSCRIBE main executable has disguised itself as Microsoft’s Narrator.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:WIRTE
WIRTE has downloaded PowerShell code from the C2 server to be executed.[482] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\Windows\System32\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\Cur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
One of Dtrack can replace the normal flow of a program execution with malicious code.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger has the ability to inject shellcode into svchost.exe.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can delete all files created during its execution.[205][206] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has routinely deleted log files on a compromised router, including automatic log deletion through the use of the logrotate utility.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel can automatically scan for and collect files with specific extensions.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet sends an SQL statement that creates a table and inserts a binary value into the table. The binary value is a hex string representation of the main Stuxnet DLL as an executable file (formed using resource 210) and an updated configuration data block. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0465
ATT&CK Technique Name:CARROTBALL
CARROTBALL has the ability to use FTP in C2 communications.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0616
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEATHRANSOM
DEATHRANSOM can download files to a compromised host.[142] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.