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ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist can execute shell commands on a compromised host.[303] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0524
ATT&CK Technique Name:AndroidOS/MalLocker.B
AndroidOS/MalLocker.B has registered to receive 14 different broadcast intents for automatically triggering malware payloads. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1036.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Double File Extension
Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: File.txt.exe may render in some vie... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 "We Wait, Because We Know You" - Inside the Ransomware Negotiation Economics
Organizations worldwide continue to face waves of digital extortion in the form of targeted ransomware. Digital extortion is therefore now classified as the most prominent form of cybercrime and the most devastatin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can collect device IP address and SIM information.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
Some FinFisher variants incorporate an MBR rootkit.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT has the ability to upload and download files.[381] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can create a cronjob for persistence if it determines it is on a Linux system.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has used tools to download malicious code.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has used the open source tool Essential NetTools to map the network and build a list of targets.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:TA0008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lateral Movement
The adversary is trying to move through your environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has convinced victims to open malicious attachments to execute malware.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can use Rundll32 to execute additional payloads.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used stolen domain admin accounts to compromise additional hosts.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0430
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Linux
Winnti for Linux has used a passive listener, capable of identifying a specific magic value before executing tasking, as a secondary command and control (C2) mechanism.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0417
ATT&CK Technique Name:GRIFFON
GRIFFON has used a reconnaissance module that can be used to retrieve information about a victim's computer, including the resolution of the workstation .[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use cmd.exe to launch itself and to execute multiple C2 commands.[269][270][271][84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has compressed data into password-protected RAR archives prior to exfiltration.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors obtained a list of running processes on a victim machine using cmd /c tasklist > %temp%\temp.ini.[187] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used Remote Desktop Protocol for lateral movement. The group has also used tunneling tools to tunnel RDP into the environment.[41][42][9] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Keynote: Fireside Chat with U.S. National Cyber Director Chris Inglis
Join the inaugural United State National Cyber Director Chris Inglis and Jeff Moss for a conversation about the evolution of the relationship between governments and the private sector. Director Inglis will discuss his positive... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control to mitigate installation and use of unapproved virtualization software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT has the ability to collect the username from an infected host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher obtains the hardware device list and checks if the MD5 of the vendor ID is equal to a predefined list in order to check for sandbox/virtualized environments.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0036
ATT&CK Technique Name:FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD achieves persistence by making an entry in the Registry's Run key.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Attestation can detect rooted devices. Mobile security software can then use this information and take appropriate mitigation action. Attestation can detect rooted devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter application-layer protocol messages for remote services to block any unauthorized activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has a Bluetooth device harvester, which uses Windows Bluetooth APIs to find information on connected Bluetooth devices. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 created and modified startup files for persistence.[27][28] APT41 added a registry key in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Svchost to establish persistence for Cobalt Strike.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy has gathered operating system information.[147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can enumerate drives and their types. It can also change file permissions using cacls.exe.[155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle can collect system profile information from a compromised host.[369] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0257
ATT&CK Technique Name:VERMIN
VERMIN can perform screen captures of the victim’s machine.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can add itself to the Registry as a startup program to establish persistence.[8][9] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Good Motive but Bad Design: Pitfalls in MPU Usage in Embedded Systems in the Wild
As more and more microcontroller-based embedded devices are connected to the Internet, as part of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), previously less tested (and insecure) devices are exposed to miscreants. To prevent them f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0459
ATT&CK Technique Name:MechaFlounder
MechaFlounder has the ability to use HTTP in communication with C2.[204] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Many native binaries may not be necessary within a given environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor can use DeleteFileA to remove files from infected hosts.[233] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to capture the time on a compromised host in order to register it with C2.[85] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Critical Zero Days Remotely Compromise the Most Popular Real-Time OS
VxWorks is the most popular operating system you have never heard about. It is a real-time operating system, used by over 2 billion devices of all kinds - from airplanes to MRI machines, from firewalls to industrial control systems... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to upload and download files to and from the infected host.[451] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 TruEMU: An Extensible, Open-Source, Whole-System iOS Emulator
iOS is one of the most valuable targets for security researchers. Unfortunately, studying the internals of this operating system is notoriously hard, due to the closed nature of the iOS ecosystem and the absence of easily-accessible anal... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry uses an exploit in SMBv1 to spread itself to other remote systems on a network.[36][37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner can automatically launch a Linux virtual machine as a service at startup if the AutoStart option is enabled in the VBoxVmService configuration file.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement. They manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the sche... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can use fileless UAC bypass and create an elevated COM object to escalate privileges.[36][37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used side loading to place malicious DLLs in memory.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0166
ATT&CK Technique Name:RemoteCMD
RemoteCMD can execute commands remotely by creating a new schedule task on the remote system[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has disabled dynamic analysis and other security tools including IDA debugger, x32dbg, and OllyDbg.[56] It has also disabled Windows Defender's Real-Time Monitoring feature and attempted to disable endpoint protection services.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
A Lazarus Group malware sample encodes data with base64.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390's malware can create a new service, sometimes naming it after the config information, to gain persistence.[122][123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has a tool that can enumerate current network connections.[8][9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has enumerated running processes on a compromised host to determine if it is running under the process name dfrgui.exe.[190] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Invisible Finger: Practical Electromagnetic Interference Attack on Touchscreen-based Electronic Devices
Touchscreen-based electronic devices such as smart phones and smart tablets are widely used in our daily life. While the security of electronic devices has been heavily investigated recently, the... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Precursor: Towards Evidence-Based Trust in Hardware
In hardware, the status quo is that we may have faith in our wares, but we have no direct, evidence-based reason to trust it. Even the best microscopes can only reveal partial information about the way a chip is constructed, and typically only in a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can pause for 20 seconds to bypass antivirus solutions.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0163
ATT&CK Technique Name:Janicab
Janicab used a cron job for persistence on Mac devices.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about groups.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0178
ATT&CK Technique Name:Truvasys
Truvasys adds a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[266] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ajax Security Team
Ajax Security Team has used CWoolger and MPK, custom-developed malware, which recorded all keystrokes on an infected system.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali can use large obfuscated libraries to hinder detection and analysis.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot has retrieved a GUID associated with a present LAN connection on a compromised machine.[79] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Reversing a Japanese Wireless SD Card - From Zero to Code Execution
Toshiba FlashAir are wireless SD cards used by photographers and IoT enthusiasts. They integrate both a Japanese SoC and a Japanese Operating System. None of those have been discussed in security conferences, nor were clearly identi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
During Operation Sharpshooter, additional payloads were downloaded after a target was infected with a first-stage downloader.[331] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.[18][19][20] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 A Tangled Curl: Attacks on the Curl-P Hash Function Leading to Signature Forgeries in the IOTA Signature Scheme
Our talk presents attacks on the cryptography used in the cryptocurrency IOTA, which is currently the 10th largest cryptocurrency with a market capitalization of 2.8 billion USD. IOTA is b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0639
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seth-Locker
Seth-Locker can execute commands via the command line shell.[300] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can use protocols like HTTP/HTTPS for command and control traffic.[250] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Cybersecurity Risk Assessment for Safety-Critical Systems
When you consider critical infrastructure, we rarely consider the enabling technology and systems that realize such infrastructure; such as, agribusiness' reliance on weather and climate satellites, the U.S. military's reliance on intelligen... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary used a dedicated analog two-way radio system to send false data and instructions to pumping stations and the central computer.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used check_registry_keys as part of its environmental checks.[81] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 No One Is Entitled to Their Own Facts, Except in Cybersecurity? Presenting an Investigation Handbook To Develop a Shared Narrative of Major Cyber Incidents
You get a fact…and you get a fact…and you get a fact! It sounds like a meme until you realize that's how most people treat their conceptions of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rancor
Rancor attempted to get users to click on an embedded macro within a Microsoft Office Excel document to launch their malware.[200] | secon |
title:botconf2018 The Dark Side of the ForSSHe
In February 2014, ESET researchers from Montreal published a report on a group who compromised more than 40,000 Linux servers worldwide since 2011. ESET named this campaign Windigo. At the centre of this operation, Ebury, an OpenSSH backdoor which allowed the attackers to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has distributed targeted emails containing links to malicious documents with embedded macros.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0950
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [6] Control flow integrity checking is an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, the threat actors used tasklist to collect a list of running processes on an infected system.[188] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has contained a hardcoded list of IP addresses to block that belong to sandboxes and analysis platforms.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
For C0018, the threat actors renamed a Sliver payload to vmware_kb.exe.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Scheduled Task
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with Mimikatz and procdump64.exe.[60][61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAMMERTOSS
HAMMERTOSS exfiltrates data by uploading it to accounts created by the actors on Web cloud storage providers for the adversaries to retrieve later.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0229
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orz
Some Orz strings are base64 encoded, such as the embedded DLL known as MockDll.[197] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Exploring the New World : Remote Exploitation of SQLite and Curl
Over the past years, our team has used several new approaches to identify multiple critical vulnerabilities in SQLite and Curl, two of the most widely used basic software libraries. These two sets of vulnerabilities, which we named "M... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Black-Box Laser Fault Injection on a Secure Memory
With the constant development of electronic devices, their increasing complexity and need for security, cryptography in embedded systems has become a strong requirement to protect data or secure communications. Some devices run on standard low-cost ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used VBScript to drop and execute malware loaders.[143] | secon |
title:botconf2017 SOCKs as a Service, Botnet Discovery
On the internet, no one knows you’re a dog, but they know that you are accessing their website from an IP announced by an ASN that belongs to an ISP on the East Coast of the United States. As the DOM renders a piece of third party fraud detection, javascript runs a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell can collect the local hostname, operating system details, CPU speed, and total physical memory.[415] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle has been compressed and obfuscated using RC4, AES, or XOR.[332] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Find and eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Filter for protocols and payloads associated with firmware activation or updating activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Common tools for detecting Linux rootkits include: rkhunter [16], chrootkit [17], although rootkits may be designed to evade certain detection tools. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1645
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Client Software Binary
Adversaries may modify system software binaries to establish persistent access to devices. System software binaries are used by the underlying operating system and users over adb or terminal emulators. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet transforms encrypted binary data into an ASCII string in order to use it as a URL parameter value.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts.[37] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.