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ATT&CK ID:T1564.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Resource Forking
Adversaries may abuse resource forks to hide malicious code or executables to evade detection and bypass security applications. A resource fork provides applications a structured way to store resources such as thumbnail images, menu definitions, icons, dialog b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can search for specific strings within browser tabs using a Dynamic Data Exchange mechanism.[29] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Predictive Vulnerability Scoring System
Effective prioritization of vulnerabilities is essential to staying ahead of your attackers. While your threat intelligence might expose a wealth of information about attackers and attack paths, integrating it into decision-making is no easy task. Too often, w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used schtasks.exe for lateral movement in compromised networks.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat can hijack the cryptbase.dll within migwiz.exe to escalate privileges and bypass UAC controls.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
During Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors relied on victims executing malicious Microsoft Word or PDF files.[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis has used motion sensor data to attempt to determine if it is running in an emulator.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 uses PowerShell for execution as well as PowerShell Empire to establish persistence.[91][87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has modified ComSysApp service to load the malicious DLL payload.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY contains a number of modules that can bypass UAC, including through Window's Device Manager, Manage Optional Features, and an image hijack on the .msc file extension.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can detect profilers by verifying the COR_ENABLE_PROFILING environment variable is present and active.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux can run whoami to identify the system owner.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker has attempted to stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries will likely need to place new binaries in locations to be executed through this weakness. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed path interception by using application control tools, like Windows Defender Application Control, App... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has encrypted collected data using a XOR-based algorithm.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:TianySpy
TianySpy can exfiltrate collected user data, including credentials and authorized cookies, via email.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used HTTP POSTs to exfil gathered information.[137][138][139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard has used regsvr32.exe /s /i to execute malicious payloads.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy uses cmd.exe to execute commands on the system.[355][356] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell can use a decryption mechanism to process a user supplied password and allow execution.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has used rundll32.exe to execute as part of the Registry Run key it adds: HKEY_CURRENT_USER \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\"vert" = "rundll32.exe c:\windows\temp\pvcu.dll , Qszdez".[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Regularly check component software on critical services that adversaries may target for persistence to verify the integrity of the systems and identify if unexpected changes have been made. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 All Your Apple are Belong to Us: Unique Identification and Cross-Device Tracking of Apple Devices
Privacy is about people. Smartphones and laptops (e.g., iPhone, iPad, and MacBooks) are the most frequently used personal devices. Consequently, people with ulterior motives (e.g., advertisers) can eas... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has a module for enumerating TCP and UDP network connections and associated processes using the netstat command.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used account credentials they obtained to attempt access to Group Managed Service Account (gMSA) passwords.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should scrutinize every device administration permission request. If the request is not expected or the user does not recognize the application, the application should be uninstalled immediately. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant can retrieve a list of applications from the SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths registry key.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has tricked recipients into enabling malicious macros by getting victims to click "enable content" in email attachments.[132][133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used compromised domain accounts to gain access to the target environment.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used cmd.exe net user /domain to enumerate domain users.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can use BITS Utility to connect with the C2 server.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Anti-virus can be used to automatically detect and quarantine suspicious files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used modified versions of open source PHP web shells to maintain access, often adding "Dinosaur" references within the code.[22] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Keynote: Quantify Security Effectively – Moving the Security Needle From the Security Trenches to the Boardroom
One of our biggest challenges in cybersecurity is determining return on investment and ultimately answering the question - are we moving the security needle? This challenge applies to... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer has the ability to identify the username on a compromised host.[104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors sent phishing emails that included a PDF document that in some cases led to the download and execution of malware.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0553
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoleNet
MoleNet can execute commands via the command line utility.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1185
ATT&CK Technique Name:Browser Session Hijacking
Adversaries may take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify user-behaviors, and intercept information as part of various browser session hijacking techniques. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon has exploited CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 for execution against targeted systems.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has collected a list of files from the victim and uploaded it to its C2 server, and then created a new list of specific files to steal.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Ensure certificates as well as associated private keys are appropriately secured. Consider utilizing additional hardware credential protections such as trusted platform modules (TPM) or hardware security modules (HSM). Enforce HTTPS and enable Extended... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has downloaded and dropped temporary files containing scripts; it additionally has a function to upload files from the victims machine.[428] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure least privilege principles are applied to Identity and Access Management (IAM) security policies.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Software Installation
Restrict software installation to trusted repositories only and be cautious of orphaned software packages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for logon scripts that may lead to persistence. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has hooked APIs to perform a wide variety of information theft, such as monitoring traffic from browsers.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use of multi-factor authentication for public-facing webmail servers is a recommended best practice to minimize the usefulness of usernames and passwords to adversaries. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Multiple Bugs in Multi-Party Computation: Breaking Cryptocurrency's Strongest Wallets
Cryptocurrency wallets in exchange platforms or banks require strong security because they protect vast amounts of money. Some solutions rely on advanced cryptographic methods that distribute trust across multi... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 From Bot to Robot: How Abilities and Law Change with Physicality
Online bots and real-world robots are both capable of manipulating people and communities. Online bots are part of attacks on human belief systems that range in scale from nation-states to smaller communities, aimed at disrupting, caus... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has a persistence component to write a scheduled task for the payload.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has used HTTPS over port 1402 in C2 communication.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 attempted to get users to click on Microsoft Office attachments containing malicious macro scripts.[13][14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors collected a list of installed software on the infected system.[22] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Detecting Fake 4G Base Stations in Real Time
4G/LTE IMSI-catchers (such as the Hailstorm) are becoming more popular with governments and law enforcement around the world, as well as spies, and even criminals. Until now, IMSI-catcher detection has focused on 2G IMSI-catchers (such as the Stingray), d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has variants that check a number of system parameters to see if it is being run on real hardware or in a virtual machine environment, such as sysctl hw.model.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit permissions for deleting new instances in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assign... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can use WinRAR to create a password-protected archive for files of interest.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be encouraged to be very careful with what applications they grant phone call-based permissions to. Further, users should not change their default call handler to applications they do not recognize. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has mimicked the names of known executables, such as mediaplayer.exe.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT applies compression to C2 traffic using the ZLIB library.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot embedded the commands schtasks /Run /TN \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I inside a batch script.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can upload logs and other data from a compromised host.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Web proxies can be used to enforce an external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Protecting the Protector, Hardening Machine Learning Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks
Humans are susceptible to social engineering. Machines are susceptible to tampering. Machine learning is vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Researchers have been able to successfully attack deep learning model... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors executed JavaScript code via mshta.exe.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type first attempts to use a Base64-encoded network protocol over a raw TCP socket for C2, and if that method fails, falls back to a secondary HTTP-based protocol to communicate to an alternate C2 server.[32] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 ECMO: Rehost Embedded Linux Kernels via Peripheral Transplantation
Dynamic analysis based on the full-system emulator QEMU is widely used for various purposes. However, it is challenging to run firmware images of embedded devices in QEMU, especially the process to boot the Linux kernel (we call thi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy uses cmd.exe to execute itself in-memory.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth can abuse alternate data streams (ADS) to store content for malicious payloads.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can search for specific files and list directories.[308] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
An enterprise resource planning (ERP) manufacturing server was lost to the Ryuk attack. The manufacturing process had to rely on paper and existing orders to keep the shop floor open. [11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1557.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:ARP Cache Poisoning
Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has stood up websites containing numerous articles and content scraped from the Internet to make them appear legitimate, but some of these pages include malicious JavaScript to profile the potential victim or infect them via a fake software update.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has manipulated legitimate websites to inject malicious JavaScript code as part of their watering hole operations.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum uses AES to encrypt network traffic. The key can be hardcoded or negotiated with the C2 server in the registration phase. [100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has incorporated at least five different cloud service providers into their C2 infrastructure including CloudMe.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can use a timer to delay execution of core functionality.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Patch deployment systems regularly to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Windows Defender - Demystifying and Bypassing ASR by Understanding the AV's Signatures
Windows Defender is the Windows' built-in antivirus software, giving it a place in most information systems. But still, its signature format is yet undocumented.This talk tries to rectify this situation. This ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0494
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zen
Zen can obtain root access via a rooting trojan in its infection chain.[16] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Unwinding the Stack for Fun and Profit
Stack-based buffer overflows are the holy grail of software exploitation. Unfortunately, it's not 2005 anymore: mitigations (such as stack cookies) have spoiled all the fun! Nowadays, you have to resort to complicated heap feng shui or other exploitation wizar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol has a ENMDSKS command to enumerates available network shares.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1552.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Container API
Adversaries may gather credentials via APIs within a containers environment. APIs in these environments, such as the Docker API and Kubernetes APIs, allow a user to remotely manage their container resources and cluster components. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus One, after checking in, sends a POST request and then downloads Exodus Two, the second stage binaries.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains a module for compressing data using ZIP.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot has been known to establish persistence by adding programs to the Run Registry key.[253] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0519
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYNful Knock
SYNful Knock can be sent instructions via special packets to change its functionality. Code for new functionality can be included in these messages.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has attempted to map to C$ on enumerated hosts to test the scope of their current credentials/context.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has obfuscated code using Base64 encoding.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark has encoded communications with the C2 server with base64.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kasidet
Kasidet creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[128][129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used multiple password spraying attacks against victim's remote services to obtain valid user and administrator accounts.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar has used the PowerKatz plugin that can be loaded into the address space of a PowerShell process through reflective DLL loading.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0478
ATT&CK Technique Name:EventBot
EventBot can display popups over running applications.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has locally staged encrypted archives for later exfiltration efforts.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot uses the command-line interface to execute arbitrary commands.[39][40] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Decade of the RATs – Custom Chinese Linux Rootkits for Everyone
While 2020 is the Year of the Rat for the Chinese, it's felt more like the Decade of the RATs. In this talk, I reveal a nearly decade-long, undetected, state-sponsored effort to strategically target the Linux servers that comprise the b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Do not inherently rely on the authenticity provided by the network/link layer (e.g., 802.11, LTE, 802.15.4), as link layer equipment may have long lifespans and protocol vulnerabilities may not be easily patched. Provide defense-in-depth by implementing a... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.