text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya used network sniffing to obtain login data. [12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack’s can download and upload a file to the victim’s computer.[156][157] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Fixing a Memory Forensics Blind Spot: Linux Kernel Tracing
The ubiquity of Linux servers across the internet and within cloud instances necessitates that defensive research maintains pace with the introduction of new features to the platform. Unfortunately, these research efforts have not adequately... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute malicious PowerShell code on remote systems.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro has used a legitimate application to sideload a DLL to decrypt, decompress, and run a payload.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:MiniDuke
MiniDuke uses Google Search to identify C2 servers if its primary C2 method via Twitter is not working.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1596.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Digital Certificates
Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0310
ATT&CK Technique Name:ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A
ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A gathers the device OS version, device build version, manufacturer, and model.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has a CommandPromptPacket and ScriptPacket module(s) for creating a remote shell and executing scripts.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can enumerate service and service permission information.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca used the command ipconfig to obtain information about network configurations.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE uses the Confuser protector to obfuscate an embedded .Net Framework assembly used for C2. OopsIE also encodes collected data in hexadecimal format before writing to files on disk and obfuscates strings.[237][238] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can use junk code to generate random activity to obscure malware behavior.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has modules to interact with the Windows task scheduler.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command "C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe" /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR "c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe".[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors employed code that used regsvr32 for execution.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Cloud-Native Sandboxes for Microservices: Understanding New Threats and Attacks
Sandboxing is a proven technique for detecting malware and targeted attacks. In practice, sandboxes inspect network traffic and identify the suspicious behaviors. However, the emergence of new forms of malware and explo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has created a directory named "out" in the user's %AppData% folder and copied files to it.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used CVE-2015-4902 to bypass security features.[1][2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0171
ATT&CK Technique Name:Felismus
Felismus collects the system information, including hostname and OS version, and sends it to the C2 server.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors had the ability to use FTP for C2.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS installs a registry Run key to establish persistence.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats saved malicious files within the AppData and Startup folders to maintain persistence.[165] | secon |
title:botconf2020 Building and maintaining a honeypot for medical devices
As confinement against COVID-19 began, I decided to do my part and help secure medical devices. I built a honeypot for medical devices, both to lure attackers off real equipment and to learn how they intended to attack them.Scanning through known... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has attempted to lure targets into clicking links in spoofed emails from legitimate banks.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has encoded bidirectional data communications between a target system and C2 server using Base64.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has used a Base64 key to decode its components.[142] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 The Undeniable Truth: How Remote Attestation Circumvents Deniability Guarantees in Secure Messaging Protocols
In 2016, attackers broke into John Podesta's e-mail account and published his mailbox via WikiLeaks; many messages could be authenticated by their DKIM signatures. After this, secure messag... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used the BlackEnergy KillDisk component to overwrite files on Windows-based Human-Machine Interfaces. [32][33] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Exploiting Windows COM/WinRT Services
The Component Object Model (COM) and Windows Runtime (WinRT) are widely used in windows systems, they are often used for cross-process communication and UWP Application. Both of them provide large attack surfaces for hackers to hunt for LPE, RCE and Sandbox Esca... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malware to store malicious binaries in hidden directories on victim's USB drives.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 used a backdoor, NESTEGG, that has the capability to download and upload files to and from a victim’s machine.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak searches recursively for Outlook personal storage tables (PST) files within user directories and sends them back to the C2 server.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 New Vulnerabilities in 5G Networks
The security in the 5G network has evolved and is more efficient than the previous generations. In this talk, we visit security features of 5G radio networks and reveal new vulnerabilities affecting both the operator infrastructure and end-devices (including mobile... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can utilize net use commands to identify domain users.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 E-Meet (or Emit?) My Keystrokes: How Benign Screen-sharing Meetings Could Leak Typing Behaviors
Have you ever wondered whether screen-sharing could pose a threat to your privacy? Or, perhaps imagine whether it is truly safe to keep your screen-sharing mode active when typing passwords, even if t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0639
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seth-Locker
Seth-Locker can encrypt files on a targeted system, appending them with the suffix .seth.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used malware to enumerate active processes.[271] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak actors used legitimate credentials of banking employees to perform operations that sent them millions of dollars.[16] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Hacking the Supply Chain – The Ripple20 Vulnerabilities Haunt Tens of Millions of Critical Devices
<span style="font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-size:
10pt;">This is the story of how we found and exploited a series of critical vulnerabilities (later named Ripple20) affecting tens or hundreds ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used CreateProcessW to create child processes.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka encrypts some C2 traffic with the Blowfish cipher.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has downloaded additional files, including by using a first-stage downloader to contact the C2 server to obtain the second-stage implant.[15][16][17][18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy uses the Camellia cipher to encrypt communications.[108] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Certified Pre-Owned: Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services
Microsoft's Active Directory Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) implementation, known as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), has largely flown under the radar by both the offensive and defensive realms. AD CS is widely deplo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Set group policies to restrict file permissions to the ~/launchagents folder.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can retrieve system information including OS version, memory usage, local hostname, and system adapter information.[378] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has acquired mobile phone numbers of potential targets, possibly for mobile malware or additional phishing operations.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet will store and execute SQL code that will extract and execute Stuxnet from the saved CAB file using xp_cmdshell with the following command: set @s = master..xp _ cmdshell extrac32 /y +@t+ +@t+x; exec(@s); [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT modified its security token to grants itself debugging privileges by adding SeDebugPrivilege.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can inject code through calling VirtualAllocExNuma.[10] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and Review Board members Stephanie Domas, Alex Ionescu, Kymberlee Price, and Chris Rohlf for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has exfiltrated files using web services.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Enter Sandbox
Applications are growing ever more complex, leading to an increase in exploitable vulnerabilities. One efficient method for mitigating potential attacks is the use of application sandboxing. The idea behind sandboxing is to constrain software within a tightly controlled environment. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indicator Removal
Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis can modify administrator settings and disable Play Protect.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman uses HTTPS for command and control.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has the ability to take screen captures.[121][122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has sent malicious files requiring direct victim interaction to execute.[160][161][162][163][164][165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has exploited Microsoft vulnerabilities, including CVE-2018-0798, CVE-2018-8174, CVE-2018-0802, CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2019-9489 CVE-2020-8468, and CVE-2018-0798 to enable execution of their delivered malicious payloads.[84][85][86][87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:DLL Side-Loading
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by side-loading DLLs. Similar to DLL Search Order Hijacking, side-loading involves hijacking which DLL a program loads. But rather than just planting the DLL within the search order of a program then waiting ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Monsters in the Middleboxes: Building Tools for Detecting HTTPS Interception
The practice of HTTPS interception continues to be commonplace on the Internet. In a basic HTTPS connection, a browser (client) establishes a TLS connection directly to an origin server to send requests and download conten... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can delete tools from a compromised host after execution.[250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Net
The net time command can be used in Net to determine the local or remote system time.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple .NET assemblies have used App_Web_ in their file names to appear legitimate.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0830
ATT&CK Technique Name:Adversary-in-the-Middle
Adversaries with privileged network access may seek to modify network traffic in real time using adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks. This type of attack allows the adversary to intercept traffic to and/or from a particular device on the network. If a Ai... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has added entries to the Registry for ransom contact information.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot can download and execute a payload onto a compromised system.[200] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used spearphishing e-mails with malicious password-protected archived files (ZIP or RAR) to deliver malware.[45][46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer can use HTTP to communicate with its C2 servers.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME variants can add malicious DLL modules as new services.TYPEFRAME can also delete services from the victim’s machine.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has used raw sockets for network communication.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can modify the registry run keys HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay has downloaded as a XOR-encrypted payload.[265] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to download, unpack, and decrypt tar.gz files .[215] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0537
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperStack
HyperStack can use default credentials to connect to IPC$ shares on remote machines.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable the WinRM service. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto presents an input prompt asking for the user's login and password.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke steals user files from local hard drives with file extensions that match a predefined list.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Use user training as a way to bring awareness to common phishing and spearphishing techniques and how to raise suspicion for potentially malicious events. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0443
ATT&CK Technique Name:MESSAGETAP
MESSAGETAP has XOR-encrypted and stored contents of SMS messages that matched its target list. [22] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Defender-Pretender: When Windows Defender Updates Become a Security Risk
EDRs evolved over the years and become the endpoint's most powerful layer of security. The signature update process is a critical component of security controls, without it, the security control would be useless against new th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to side-load malicious DLLs with legitimate applications from Kaspersky, Microsoft, and Google.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can capture images from webcams on compromised hosts.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can move laterally using worm-like functionality through exploitation of SMB.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT contains watchdog functionality that periodically ensures HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load is set to point to its executable.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Installer Packages
Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by using an installer to trigger the execution of malicious content. Installer packages are OS specific and contain the resources an operating system needs to install applications on a system. Insta... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has used valid credentials with various services during lateral movement.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to click on a malicous link.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot can use a VBA macro embedded in an Excel file to drop the payload.[38] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Breaking Through Another Side: Bypassing Firmware Security Boundaries from Embedded Controller
Hardware security boundaries are really difficult to support and correctly design. On modern x86 platforms exist a lot of different hardware components. It's clear they should be included in the usual thre... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials to access cloud assets within a target organization.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that conducted a variety of system checks to detect sandboxes or VMware services.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can shutdown a compromised host through execution of ExitWindowsEx with the EXW_SHUTDOWN flag.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Follow best practices for network firewall configurations to allow only necessary ports and traffic to enter and exit the network.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0931
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may ... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.