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ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [3] [4] These audits should also include if default ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT adds a shortcut file to the startup folder for persistence.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0645
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wevtutil
Wevtutil can be used to clear system and security event logs from the system.[31][2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used Mimikatz to exploit a domain controller via the ZeroLogon exploit (CVE-2020-1472).[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use PsExec to help propagate itself across a network.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has the ability to use multiple dynamically resolved API calls.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has been decompressed by included shellcode prior to being launched.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to use Telnet for communication.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1222
ATT&CK Technique Name:File and Directory Permissions Modification
Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files. File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or use... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0220
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaos
Chaos provides a reverse shell connection on 8338/TCP, encrypted via AES.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has encapsulated Cobalt Strike's C2 protocol in DNS and HTTPS.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can gain persistence by a creating a shortcut in the infected user's Startup directory.[184] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Ret2page: The Art of Exploiting Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in the Dedicated Cache
Heap isolation is effective mitigation that reduces the exploitability of certain types of vulnerabilities, especially Use-After-Free. In the Android/Linux kernel, A Use-After-Free vulnerability in a dedicated cach... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has encrypted stolen credit card information with AES and further encoded it with Base64.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0132
ATT&CK Technique Name:H1N1
H1N1 contains a command to download and execute a file from a remotely hosted URL using WinINet HTTP requests.[207] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can add itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UIF2IS20VK Registry keys.[275] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0511
ATT&CK Technique Name:RegDuke
RegDuke can create seemingly legitimate Registry key to store its encryption key.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has collected the username and UID from the infected machine.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy uses a keylogger to capture keystrokes it then sends back to the server after it is stopped.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0190
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITSAdmin
BITSAdmin can be used to create BITS Jobs to upload and/or download files from SMB file servers.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate overwrites the MBR with a bootloader component that performs destructive wiping operations on hard drives and displays a fake ransom note when the host boots.[13][14][15][16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has used DLL side-loading to execute its payload.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke used shell scripts to run commands which would obtain persistence and execute the cryptocurrency mining malware.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has automatically collected mouse clicks, continuous screenshots on the machine, and set timers to collect the contents of the clipboard and website browsing.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to side-load malicious DLLs with legitimate applications from Kaspersky, Microsoft, and Google.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 LTE Network Automation Under Threat
The control and management of mobile networks is shifting from manual to automatic in order to boost performance and efficiency and reduce expenditures. Especially, base stations in today's 4G/LTE networks can automatically configure and operate themselves which ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
A Lazarus Group malware sample performs reflective DLL injection.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used net use to conduct connectivity checks to machines.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq C2 traffic is encrypted using bitwise NOT and XOR operations.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot uses web injects and browser redirection to trick the user into providing their login credentials on a fake or modified web page.[18][19][20][21] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Google Reimagined a Phone. It was Our Job to Red Team and Secure it.
Despite the large number of phone vendors, most Android devices are based on a relatively small subset of system on a chip (SoC) vendors. Google decided to break this pattern with the Pixel 6. From a security perspective, this mea... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines.[119][120][121][122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0550
ATT&CK Technique Name:DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent has used exploits to root devices and install additional malware on the system partition.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can download additional files for execution on the victim’s machine.[5][6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Pwning Cloud Vendors with Untraditional PostgreSQL Vulnerabilities
Cloud service providers often provide popular and beloved open-source solutions as multi-tenant managed services. This is a significant power of the cloud - to offer anything as a scalable, managed service. However, these projects we... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.[26][27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can collect Microsoft Word documents from the target's file system, as well as .txt, .doc, and .xls files from the Internet Explorer cache.[153][154] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun has used HTTP and HTTPS for command and control.[287] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1420
ATT&CK Technique Name:File and Directory Discovery
Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or search in specific device locations for desired information within a filesystem. Adversaries may use the information from File and Directory Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behav... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 ClickOnce and You're in - When Appref-ms Abuse is Operating as Intended
As tried-and-true methods of code execution via phishing are getting phased out, new research was required to maintain that avenue of gaining initial access. Sifting through different file types and how they operate led to f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can invoke the Common.Compress method to compress data with the C# GZipStream compression class.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors injected code into a selected process, which in turn launches a command as a child process of the original.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, servi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT checked the size of the hard drive to determine if it was being run in a sandbox environment. In the event of sandbox detection, it would delete itself by overwriting the malware scripts with the contents of "License.txt" and exiting.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0949
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Ensure anti-virus solution can detect malicious files that allow user execution (e.g., Microsoft Office Macros, program installers). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack can collect the victim's computer name, hostname and adapter information to create a unique identifier.[117][118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp installs reboot persistence by adding itself to /etc/rc.local.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has exfiltrated local account data and calendar information as part of Operation ROCK.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has collected data from remote systems by mounting network shares with net use and using Robocopy to transfer data.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors relied on a victim clicking on a malicious link sent via email.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel has maliciously altered the OpenSSH binary on targeted systems to create a backdoor.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used modules that automatically upload gathered documents to the C2 server.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Keeping Secrets: Emerging Practice in Database Encryption
A wide gap exists between real-world attack scenarios and the implicit security guarantees of most popular databases, particularly around confidentiality of encrypted information. This talk will review the latest advances and breaks in databa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has deleted itself from the system after execution.[147][148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Port Monitors
Adversaries may use port monitors to run an adversary supplied DLL during system boot for persistence or privilege escalation. A port monitor can be set through the AddMonitor API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. This DLL can be located in C:\Windows\Sys... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has established persistence via the Startup folder or Run Registry key.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Apple regularly provides security updates for known OS vulnerabilities. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 WebAssembly: A New World of Native Exploits on the Browser
WebAssembly (WASM) is a new technology being developed by the major browser vendors through the W3C. A direct descendent of NaCl and Asm.js, the idea is to allow web developers to run native (e.g. C/C++) code in a web page at near-native pe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has sent spearphishing emails to potential targets that contained a malicious link.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through this technique by using application control tools capable of preventing unknown DLLs from being loaded. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has injected malicious code into a new svchost.exe process.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba has used SeDebugPrivilege and AdjustTokenPrivileges to elevate privileges.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate privilege escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create container orchestration jobs. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Attacking and Defending Blockchains: From Horror Stories to Secure Wallets
This talk will review some of the most spectacular security failures in blockchain systems, and will help you mitigate your risks. We will notably review some of the most dramatic Ethereum smart contract issues, discuss obje... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0917
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 bypassed MFA set on OWA accounts by generating a cookie value from a previously stolen secret key.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke can query the Registry to check for the presence of HKCU\Software\KasperskyLab.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. T... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Inside Out - The Cloud has Never been so Close
The public cloud infrastructure adds new management layer and security challenges that need to be well understood and secured. The fact that cloud provider application programming interfaces (API) are accessible through the internet has opened a new wi... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Finding a Needle in an Encrypted Haystack: Leveraging Cryptographic Abilities to Detect the Most Prevalent Attacks on Active Directory
Active Directory has always been a popular target for attackers, with a constant rise in attack tools attempting to compromise and abuse the main secret storage of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Sniffing
Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1565
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Manipulation
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or de... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used local account credentials found during the intrusion for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT can deobfuscate the base64-encoded and AES-encrypted files downloaded from the C2 server.[189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries can replace accessibility features binaries with alternate binaries to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through accessibility features functionality by using application control [13] tools, like Wind... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke has commands to get information about the victim's name, build, version, serial number, and memory usage.[282] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
During C0021, the threat actors used TCP for some C2 communications.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shortcut Modification
Adversaries may create or modify shortcuts that can execute a program during system boot or user login. Shortcuts or symbolic links are used to reference other files or programs that will be opened or executed when the shortcut is clicked or executed by a ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY is written in Python and can use multiple Python scripts for execution on targeted systems.[39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie executes a batch script to store discovery information in %TEMP%\info.dat and then uploads the temporarily file to the remote C2 server.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0310
ATT&CK Technique Name:ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A
ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A gathers the device IMEI and IMSI.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1056.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:GUI Input Capture
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the opera... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack side loads its communications module as a DLL into the libcurl.dll loader.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0271
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYMARBLE
KEYMARBLE has the capability to delete files off the victim’s machine.[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of multi-factor authentication. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has used Wake-on-Lan to power on turned off systems for lateral movement.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can check if a specific process is running, such as Kaspersky's avp.exe.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus can collect the username from the victim’s machine.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. Perform periodic integrity checks of the device to validate the correctness of the firmware, software, programs, and configurations. Integrity c... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Jack-in-the-Cache: A New Code injection Technique through Modifying X86-to-ARM Translation Cache
Recently, the adoption of ARM processors for laptop computers is becoming popular due to its high energy efficiency. Windows 10 on ARM is a new OS for such ARM-based computers. Several laptop computers ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type may create a .lnk file to itself that is saved in the Start menu folder. It may also create the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ IMJPMIJ8.1{3 characters of Unique Identifier}.[231] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the "auto-elevate" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Experimenting with Real-Time Event Feeds
Today, defenders in a typical security operation center rely on their SIEM to do forensics on past logs, and to define real-time detections. This assumes that the SIEM was configured ahead of time to collect the subset of logs that are useful. But how does on... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Developments and Challenges in Cybersecurity from the Nation-State Perspective
Eleven years ago Estonia was the first country in the world to fall under politically motivated cyber-attacks. A lot has changed since then. Cyber-attacks have become a new normality, they target states as well as compan... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has collected the computer name from the infected host.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis deploys additional backdoors and hacking tools to the system.[143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has retrieved iPhone text messages from iTunes phone backup files.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0806
ATT&CK Technique Name:Minimize Wireless Signal Propagation
Reduce the range of RF communications to their intended operating range when possible. Propagation reduction methods may include (i) reducing transmission power on wireless signals, (ii) adjusting antenna gain to prevent extensions beyond organi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1634.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keychain
Adversaries may collect keychain data from an iOS device to acquire credentials. Keychains are the built-in way for iOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as Wi-Fi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, priva... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.