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ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider enabling the "Network access: Do not allow storage of passwords and credentials for network authentication" setting that will prevent network credentials from being stored by the Credential Manager.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall has relied on a user opening a malicious document for execution.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0230
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZeroT
ZeroT has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.[68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple can use reflective code loading to load .NET assemblies into MSExchangeOWAAppPool on targeted Exchange servers.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to isolate and secure those systems against unauthorized access and tampering. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can encrypt victim data with an RC4 cipher.[320] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Ghosts in a Nutshell
At the beginning of 2018, two severe attacks, called Meltdown and Spectre, have been published. These attacks exploit that the CPU either lazily enforces exceptions or speculates on the outcome of branch predictions or data dependencies. While the results of those computations... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0460
ATT&CK Technique Name:Get2
Get2 has the ability to identify running processes on an infected host.[114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare can obtain a list of running processes on a compromised host.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon can use a dynamic Windows hashing algorithm to map API components.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal can check to determine if the compromised system is running on VMware.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used PowerShell commands to explore the environment of compromised victims.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1586
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Accounts
Adversaries may compromise accounts with services that can be used during targeting. For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of an online persona may be important. Rather than creating and cultivating accounts (i.e. Establish Accounts), ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca created a service using the command sc create "SysUpdate" binpath= "cmd /c start "[file path]""&&sc config "SysUpdate" start= auto&&netstart SysUpdate for persistence.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
A Patchwork file stealer can run a TaskScheduler DLL to add persistence.[128] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 The B-MAD Approach to Threat Modeling
Threat modeling is a family of techniques for discovering what can go wrong with a system and improve its security. Threat modeling techniques often aim to be structured, systematic and comprehensive and have to intersect with the organization's systems for d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti has loaded an encrypted DLL into memory and then executes it.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0218
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOWDRIFT
SLOWDRIFT collects and sends system information to its C2.[155] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Owfuzz: WiFi Nightmare
WiFi, which uses unprotected air as a medium, faces unique challenges in ensuring the security and availability of communication. Throughout the development process of WiFi protocol, it is also the evolution process of WiFi security protocol. Even with the popularization of W... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that used the IsDebuggerPresent call to detect debuggers.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used a DLL known as SeDll to decrypt and execute other JavaScript backdoors.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus communicates with the C2 server using HTTP.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1135
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Share Discovery
Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared ne... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
The C# implementation of the CharmPower command execution module can use cmd.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Implement security controls on the endpoint, such as a Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS), to identify and prevent execution of potentially malicious files (such as those with mismatching file signatures). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:4H RAT
4H RAT has the capability to obtain file and directory listings.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Engineering Empathy: Adapting Software Engineering Principles and Process to Security
Software engineering has a lot to teach our 'security engineering' teams - this session will be a live retrospective of a professional role reversal - dropping a principal security engineer into a runtime team, an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has dropped legitimate software onto a compromised host and used it to execute malicious DLLs.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork scanned the "Program Files" directories for a directory with the string "Total Security" (the installation path of the "360 Total Security" antivirus tool).[76] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Behind the Scenes: How Criminal Enterprises Pre-infect Millions of Mobile Devices
Mobile phones may come pre-infected with malicious firmware before they are even delivered to the customers. This is a growing problem for regular users and enterprises. Many businesses produce mobile devices by out... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0295
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSAndroid
RCSAndroid can collect SMS, MMS, and Gmail messages.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT was distributed via malicious Word documents.[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can enumerate the username on targeted hosts.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has also used PowerSploit's Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1 to reflectively load a PowerShell payload into a random process on the victim system.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can capture all device notifications and hide notifications from the user.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has added the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors\UDPrint" /v Driver /d "spool.dll /f to load malware as a Print Processor.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Attestation can detect unauthorized modifications to devices. Mobile security software can then use this information and take appropriate mitigation action. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Enable secure boot features to validate the digital signature of the boot environment and system image using a special purpose hardware device. If the validation check fails, the device will fail to boot preventing loading of unauthorized software. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has installed a new Windows service to establish persistence.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has used reg.exe to create a Registry Run key.[248] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has prompted victims to accept macros in order to execute the subsequent payload.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater maintains persistence on victim networks through side-loading dlls to trick legitimate programs into running malware.[43] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Old New Things: An Examination of the Philips TriMedia Architecture
In today's Intel/AMD and ARM controlled world, it's always interesting, for a reverse engineer, to find new or uncommon CPU architectures to learn and play with. It's a challenge to deal with uncommon/unknown firmware files and weir... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Several Lazarus Group malware families use timestomping, including modifying the last write timestamp of a specified Registry key to a random date, as well as copying the timestamp for legitimate .exe files (such as calc.exe or mspaint.exe) to its dropped files.[32][3... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0699
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mythic
Mythic supports domain fronting via custom request headers.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Towards Discovering Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities in Apple FaceTime
Zero-click or one-click remote exploits targeting Apple FaceTime or iMessage attract increasing attention, but neither real world vulnerabilities nor the attack surfaces in such targets were fully studied and analyzed in the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can decrypt passwords stored in the RDCMan configuration file.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz can use DLL hijacking to bypass security controls.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely audit source code, application configuration files, open repositories, and public cloud storage for insecure use and storage of credentials. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has modified the Registry to hide created user accounts.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used Task Scheduler to run programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike uses a command-line interface to interact with systems.[81][82][83][84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has used the ShowLocalGroupDetails command to identify administrator, user, and guest accounts on a compromised host.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used local account credentials found during the intrusion for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can identify specific analytical tools based on running processes.[14][15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady has created the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\{E6D34FFC-AD32-4d6a-934C-D387FA873A19} Registry key for persistence.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should protect their account credentials and enable multi-factor authentication options when available. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
Derusbi uses a backup communication method with an HTTP beacon.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT relies on a specific victim hostname to execute and decrypt important strings.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1643
ATT&CK Technique Name:Generate Traffic from Victim
Adversaries may generate outbound traffic from devices. This is typically performed to manipulate external outcomes, such as to achieve carrier billing fraud or to manipulate app store rankings or ratings. Outbound traffic is typically generated as SMS ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects a list of accounts with the command net users.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Small Sieve
Small Sieve can use Python scripts to execute commands.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used heavily obfuscated code with Industroyer in its Windows Notepad backdoor.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:The White Company
The White Company has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to victims.[226] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can retrieve nearby cell tower and Wi-Fi network information.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat communicated over HTTP and HTTPS with C2 servers.[300] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus can generate fake notifications and launch overlay attacks against attacker-specified applications.[12] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Detecting Malicious Files with YARA Rules as They Traverse the Network
YARA, the pattern matching swiss knife for malware researchers, has been extremely useful at detecting suspicious files on the endpoint. However, little or no information is publicly available on how to leverage this useful tool ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 None of My Pixel is Your Business: Active Watermarking Cancellation Against Video Streaming Service
Live video streaming services are getting more and more popular in China. In order to ensure their own interests, various service providers have added visible watermarks, which have become increasing... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net time command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can make an HTTPS connection to download additional files.[364][365] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can call NtDelayExecution to pause execution.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0450
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHARPSTATS
SHARPSTATS has the ability to identify the username on the compromised host.[143] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Trust in Apple's Secret Garden: Exploring & Reversing Apple's Continuity Protocol
Apple devices are known for "it works", after you unbox it and login with your Apple ID, and it would be able to integrate other devices from Apple.By using protocols like AirDrop, iMessage which falls unde... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Ghost
For Operation Ghost, APT29 used stolen administrator credentials for lateral movement on compromised networks.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke can create persistence by adding a shortcut in the CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[88] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Dive into Apple UserFS (Userspace Filesystem)
Typically, filesystem code is implemented in kernel, and any flaws in it may cause serious impacts. My previous talk proved that filesystem vulnerabilities (CVE-2020-27904, CVE-2019-8852) make it possible for attackers to gain root privileges on macOS.T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has registered domains to mimic file sharing, government, defense, and research websites for use in targeted campaigns.[68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [8] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Broken Links: Emergence and Future of Software-Supply Chain Compromises
The last two years have been filled with high-profile enterprise security incidents that shared a common origin: breach of a trusted software provider. In truth, supply chain attacks have played a key role in numerous targeted ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has lured victims to execute malicious attachments included in crafted spearphishing emails related to current topics.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0424
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triada
Triada variants capture transaction data from SMS-based in-app purchases.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla has used %HiddenReg% and %HiddenKey% as part of its persistence via the Windows registry.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has created VBScripts to run an SSH server.[138][139][140][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Odbcconf.exe may not be necessary within a given environment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker can enumerate files and directories just prior to encryption.[319] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can check for the number of devices plugged into an infected host.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's dispatcher has used CreateProcessW API for execution.[21] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Can You Hear Me Now? Remote Eavesdropping Vulnerabilities in Mobile Messaging Applications
On January 29, 2019, a serious vulnerability was discovered by multiple parties in Group FaceTime which allowed an attacker to call a target and force the call to connect without user interaction from the targ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0384
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dridex
Dridex has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.[75] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Finding Xori: Malware Analysis Triage with Automated Disassembly
In a world of high volume malware and limited researchers, we need a dramatic improvement in our ability to process and analyze new and old malware at scale. Unfortunately, what is currently available to the community is incredibly cos... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork removed certain files and replaced them so they could not be retrieved.[173] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Hacking Government Cybersecurity
This session delivered by Pete Cooper, the Deputy Director for Cyber Defence at the Cabinet Office will focus on his perspectives and the latest developments in cyber security across government and beyond. From understanding and managing risk at government scale, to ... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Faking a Factory: Creating and Operating a Realistic Honeypot
Designing realistic ICS honeypot requires substantial time and resource investment, as well as in-depth knowledge not only of the technical aspects, but of industrial automation process. Over most of 2019, we designed and built a facto... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell can search for files in directories.[69] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Portable Document Flaws 101
PDF is a document format on steroids. In this talk, we will dive deep into the PDF specification and reveal its less known, insecure features. We perform a systematic and in-depth analysis of the capabilities of malicious PDF documents leading to vulnerabilities in all ma... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.