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ATT&CK ID:S0355
ATT&CK Technique Name:Final1stspy
Final1stspy obfuscates strings with base64 encoding.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used servers under their control to validate tracking pixels sent to phishing victims.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has downloaded additional modules and malware to victim’s machines.[411] | secon |
title:botconf2019 Static Android Malware Analysis Workshop
Mobile phones are used more and more in our daily lives. Purely based on someone’s phone, one can find a lot of information: GPS data, chat history, photos, notes, and online banking applications. Because of this, mobile phones are a valuable target for crimina... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim. Lazarus Group also uses secure file deletion to delete files from the victim.[128][129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1202
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indirect Command Execution
Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has used stolen credentials to connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs protected with only a single factor.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Audit images deployed within the environment to ensure they do not contain any malicious components. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used the find command to search for specific files.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1588
ATT&CK Technique Name:Obtain Capabilities
Adversaries may buy and/or steal capabilities that can be used during targeting. Rather than developing their own capabilities in-house, adversaries may purchase, freely download, or steal them. Activities may include the acquisition of malware, software (includ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 7 and later iOS versions introduced changes that prevent applications from performing Process Discovery without elevated privileges. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp communicates with a simple network protocol over TCP.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has enumerated drives, OS type, OS version, and other information using a script or the "systeminfo" command.[192][193] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Poseidon Group
Poseidon Group tools attempt to spoof anti-virus processes as a means of self-defense.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can use cmd.exe to execute commands.[99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0811
ATT&CK Technique Name:Redundancy of Service
Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system is compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communicat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can use cmd.exe for execution.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has searched a victim's network for collaboration platforms like SharePoint to discover further high-privilege account credentials.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure event tracers/forwarders [14], firewall policies, and other associated mechanisms are secured with appropriate permissions and access controls and cannot be manipulated by user accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used masscan to search for open Docker API ports and Kubernetes clusters.[60][32][61] TeamTNT has also used malware that utilizes zmap and zgrab to search for vulnerable services in cloud environments.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Enable application control solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device Guard to block the loading of malicious SIP DLLs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher uses DLL side-loading to load malicious programs.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to use RPC for lateral movement.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS typically loads its DLL file into a legitimate signed Java or VMware executable.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS is capable of downloading additional files through C2 channels, including a new version of itself.[52][53][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to retrieve a list of files in a given directory as well as drives and drive types.[143] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Hey Google, Activate Spyware! – When Google Assistant Uses a Vulnerability as a Feature
This talk is based on research that was recently conducted and resulted in serious security findings and 0-day vulnerabilities in Android-based smartphones. Our team found a way of manipulating specific action... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0547
ATT&CK Technique Name:DropBook
DropBook can execute arbitrary shell commands on the victims' machines.[106][107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster's code is stored in OB9999. The original code on the target is untouched. The OB is automatically detected by the PLC and executed. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:ipconfig
ipconfig can be used to display adapter configuration on Windows systems, including information for TCP/IP, DNS, and DHCP. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Create or Modify System Process
Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these sy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro can be delivered encrypted to a compromised host.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs to spread malware to connected removable USB drives on infected machines.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS can use multiple C2 channels, including RSS feeds, Github, forums, and blogs.[6][7][8] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Fuzzing the Native NTFS Read-Write Driver (NTFS3) in the Linux Kernel
In 1993, Microsoft introduced the proprietary NTFS with Windows NT 3.1. Over two decades later, the full-fledged NTFS native driver, dubbed NTFS3, contributed to the Linux 5.15 kernel in late 2021 by Paragon Software. As a new ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can remove persistence-related artifacts from the Registry.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0393
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerStallion
PowerStallion uses Microsoft OneDrive as a C2 server via a network drive mapped with net use.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent risk of discovery and potential exploitation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya used Bash Bunny, Raspberry Pi, netbooks or inexpensive laptops to connect to the company’s local network.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has uploaded backdoored Docker images to Docker Hub.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot searches for certain Registry keys to be configured before executing the payload.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has variants that check a number of system parameters to see if it is being run on real hardware or in a virtual machine environment, such as sysctl hw.model.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has used the "WNetOpenEnumW", "WNetEnumResourceW", "WNetCloseEnum" and "WNetAddConnection2W" functions to enumerate the network resources on the infected machine.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can create a scheduled task for persistence.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack has used process hollowing shellcode to target a predefined list of processes from %SYSTEM32%.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has used forged Microsoft code-signing certificates on malware.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker has been written in PowerShell and executed directly in memory, avoiding detection.[164][165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppCert DLLs
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppCert DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs Registry key under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentC... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to download files on an infected host.[413] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Regularly audit user accounts for activity and deactivate or remove any that are no longer needed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can obtain system information by querying the Win32_ComputerSystem, Win32_BIOS, Win32_MotherboardDevice, Win32_PnPEntity, and Win32_DiskDrive WMI objects.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal has seen native libraries used in some reported samples [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla RPC backdoors have used cmd.exe to execute commands.[339][340] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has lured victims to launch malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts).[85][86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has deployed a tool known as DarkComet to the Startup folder of a victim, and used Registry run keys to gain persistence.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has injected a DLL backdoor into dllhost.exe and svchost.exe.[71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0832
ATT&CK Technique Name:Manipulation of View
Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the information reported back to operators or controllers. This manipulation may be short term or sustained. During this time the process itself could be in a much different state than what is reported. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used net use to identify and establish a network connection with a remote host.[45] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Mental Health Hacks: Fighting Burnout, Depression and Suicide in the Hacker Community
It's not easy to miss the gunshot wound in the trauma bay, or the cough of a rip-roaring pneumonia. But as anyone who has struggled with mental illness can attest- psychic wounds run just as deep, yet are often shu... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 The Devil's in the Dependency: Data-Driven Software Composition Analysis
We all know that lurking within even the most popular open source packages are flaws that can leave carefully constructed applications vulnerable. In fact, 71% of all applications contain flawed open source libraries, many... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has attempted to disguise itself by registering under a seemingly legitimate service name.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can search a compromised system's running processes and services to detect Hyper-V, QEMU, Virtual PC, Virtual Box, and VMware, as well as Sandboxie.[14] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Title Redacted - Under Embargo until July 25
Abstract redacted, under embargo until July 25. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to inject DLLs for malicious plugins into running processes.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS has connected to C2 servers through proxies.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
One version of Helminth consists of VBScript scripts.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses a function named is_debugging to perform anti-debugging logic. The function invokes sysctl checking the returned value of P_TRACED. ThiefQuest also calls ptrace with the PTRACE_DENY_ATTACH flag to prevent debugging.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper will attempt to enumerate the username of the victim.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAMMERTOSS
Before being appended to image files, HAMMERTOSS commands are encrypted with a key composed of both a hard-coded value and a string contained on that day's tweet. To decrypt the commands, an investigator would need access to the intended malware sample, the day's tweet, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu examines running system processes for tokens that have specific system privileges. If it finds one, it will copy the token and store it for later use. Eventually it will start new processes with the stored token attached. It can also steal tokens to acquire administrative... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
During FunnyDream, the threat actors used cmd.exe to execute the wmiexec.vbs script.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a command to open a file manager and explorer on the system.[341] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves has encrypted C2 traffic with RC4, previously using keys of 88888888 and babybear.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can extract its agent from the body of a malicious document.[188] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team has used a first stage web shell after compromising a vulnerable Exchange server.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has conducted internal spearphishing attacks against executives, HR, and IT personnel to gain information and access.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:SPACESHIP
SPACESHIP achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.[39] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 CDPwn: Taking Over Millions of Enterprise-Things with Layer 2 Zero-Days
The attack surface exposed by proprietary layer 2 protocols is rarely explored by the research community, and it contains hidden bugs that have severe implications to the security of the devices that use them, as well as the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
For C0010, UNC3890 actors obtained multiple publicly-available tools, including METASPLOIT, UNICORN, and NorthStar C2.[26] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 An Attacker Looks at Docker: Approaching Multi-Container Applications
Containerization, such as that provided by Docker, is becoming very popular among developers of large-scale applications. This is likely to make life a lot easier for attackers.While exploitation and manipulation of traditional mo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1590.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Properties
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network domain(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about domains and their properties may include a variety of details, including what domain(s) the victim owns as well as administrative data ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0831
ATT&CK Technique Name:Manipulation of Control
Adversaries may manipulate physical process control within the industrial environment. Methods of manipulating control can include changes to set point values, tags, or other parameters. Adversaries may manipulate control systems devices or possibly leverage... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hi-Zor
Hi-Zor communicates with its C2 server over HTTPS.[155] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0248
ATT&CK Technique Name:yty
yty communicates to the C2 server by retrieving a Google Doc.[51] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Exploiting Qualcomm WLAN and Modem Over The Air
In this talk, we will share our research in which we successfully exploit Qualcomm WLAN in FIRMWARE layer, break down the isolation between WLAN and Modem, and then fully control the Modem over the air.Setting up the real-time debugger is the key. Wit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor can self delete its dropper after the malware is successfully deployed.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Whoops, I Accidentally Helped Start the Offensive Intel Branch of a Foreign Intel Service
When I left the service and the NSA, I was offered a job that seemed WAY too good to be true. Turns out it was. This talk will discuss how I came to work on the UAE's Project Raven, what signs I missed because ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting privilege and service abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0454
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cadelspy
Cadelspy has the ability to discover information about the compromised host.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Consider using Group Policy to configure and block modifications to Terminal Services parameters in the Registry.[2] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Every ROSE has its Thorn: The Dark Art of Remote Online Social Engineering
Traditional phishing and social engineering attack techniques are typically well-documented and understood. While such attacks often still succeed, a combination of psychology, awareness campaigns, and technical or physical ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors use at to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install HTTPBrowser or PlugX on other victims on a network.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0936
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Configure features related to account use like login attempt lockouts, specific login times, and password strength requirements as examples. Consider these features as they relate to assets which may impact safety and availability. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has installed multiple new Launch Agents in order to maintain persistence for cryptocurrency mining software.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0238
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxysvc
As part of the data reconnaissance phase, Proxysvc grabs the system time to send back to the control server.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
A Threat Group-3390 tool can use WMI to execute a binary.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.