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title:blackhat:us-18 ZEROing Trust: Do Zero Trust Approaches Deliver Real Security?
Over the last year, the "zero trust" network (ZTN) security architecture concept has generated interest both for its abstract security properties, and the marketing hoopla proclaiming it the "next big thing." The value proposition of "... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has conducted spearphishing campaigns using malicious email attachments.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in Confluence repositories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has used DLL side-loading to execute its payload.[21] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Core Escalation: Unleashing the Power of Cross-Core Attacks on Heterogeneous System
As features of smartphones continue to advance, their SoCs become increasingly complex. In addition to the Application Processor (AP), the SoC also runs other cores such as baseband, camera, sensor hub and low power... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has exploited known vulnerabilities in remote services including RDP.[20][21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0351
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cannon
Cannon can obtain victim drive information as well as a list of folders in C:\Program Files.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can be used to establish persistence using a systemd service.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used legitimate local admin account credentials.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Fixing a Memory Forensics Blind Spot: Linux Kernel Tracing
The ubiquity of Linux servers across the internet and within cloud instances necessitates that defensive research maintains pace with the introduction of new features to the platform. Unfortunately, these research efforts have not adequately... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use signed loaders to evade detection.[59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0333
ATT&CK Technique Name:UBoatRAT
UBoatRAT encrypts instructions in the payload using a simple XOR cipher.[340] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used ipconfig/all to gather network configuration information.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can use tasklist to gather information about the process running on the infected system.[261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates has exfiltrated data using FTP.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT has a plugin to perform RDP access.[48] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Deception at Scale: How Malware Abuses Trust
The attackers actively use techniques to disguise malware files as legitimate, including reliable distribution channels, stolen certificates, hiding malicious files in legitimate applications, or using system tools to deploy malicious activity. At Virus... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has used FTP to exfiltrate reconnaissance data out.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1578
ATT&CK Technique Name:Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure
An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as comp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use side-loading to run malicious executables.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has used a file stealer to steal documents and images with the following extensions: txt, pdf, png, jpg, doc, xls, xlm, odp, ods, odt, rtf, ppt, xlsx, xlsm, docx, pptx, and jpeg.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Environment Variable Permissions
Making the environment variables associated with command history read only may ensure that the history is preserved.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 created a RAR archive of targeted files for exfiltration.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 has the ability to persist on a system using WMI events.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 actors have compressed data from remote systems and moved it to another staging system before exfiltration.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium has the ability to inject DLLs into specific processes.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1583.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Serverless
Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure u... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable Bluetooth in local computer security settings or by group policy if it is not needed within an environment. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Reversing a Japanese Wireless SD Card - From Zero to Code Execution
Toshiba FlashAir are wireless SD cards used by photographers and IoT enthusiasts. They integrate both a Japanese SoC and a Japanese Operating System. None of those have been discussed in security conferences, nor were clearly ident... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has used JavaScript to create a shortcut file in the Startup folder that points to its main backdoor.[21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has injected its DLL component into EhStorAurhn.exe.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can communicate using custom TCP.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can use Dropbox to download malicious payloads, send commands, and receive information.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys associated with COR_PROFILER. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0258
ATT&CK Technique Name:RGDoor
RGDoor establishes persistence on webservers as an IIS module.[12][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can collect a list of anti-virus products installed on a machine.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has exploited CVE-2007-5633 vulnerability in the speedfan.sys driver to obtain kernel mode privileges.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0123
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volatile Cedar
Volatile Cedar has targeted publicly facing web servers, with both automatic and manual vulnerability discovery.[58] [59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has sent locally staged files with collected credentials to C2 servers using cURL.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
One variant of BlackEnergy creates a new service using either a hard-coded or randomly generated name.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1600
ATT&CK Technique Name:Weaken Encryption
Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor performs the injection by attaching its code into the APC queue using NtQueueApcThread API.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer can escalate privileges to root by asking the user for credentials.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Quantum Security and Cryptography: You Are (Probably) Doing it Wrong
Quantum Cryptography is not just Alice and Bob exchanging qubits: There is a whole world of exotic applications that use quantum effects for securing information and that are just impossible to achieve with traditional cryptography... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dylib Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own payloads by placing a malicious dynamic library (dylib) with an expected name in a path a victim application searches at runtime. The dynamic loader will try to find the dylibs based on the sequential order of the search paths. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can use GetKeyState and GetKeyboardState to capture keystrokes on the victim’s machine.[11][12] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Permission Mining in GCP
Do you know exactly what each user can do in your Google Cloud Platform (GCP) environment? Do you know if you have users who can assume other identities to escalate their privileges? Do you know the effective permissions the users would have if they assume other identities?... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can store its encoded configuration file within Software\Classes\scConfig in either HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
The CozyCar dropper copies the system file rundll32.exe to the install location for the malware, then uses the copy of rundll32.exe to load and execute the main CozyCar component.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
LockerGoga has been observed deleting its original launcher after execution.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has the ability to list files upon receiving the ls command from C2.[232] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer has commands to delete files and persistence mechanisms from the victim.[81][82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has modified Safari’s default search engine, bookmarked websites, opened pages, and accessed contacts and authorization tokens of the IM program "QQ" on infected devices.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok adds admin ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL to the /etc/sudoers file.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 The Virtual Battlefield in 2022: Russia-Ukraine War & Its Policy Implications
Information is key to human survival. Therefore, information warfare is an inherent part of human conflict. Nation-states run thousands of computer network operations every day. Some are designed to support democrac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can enumerate the domain user accounts on a targeted system.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unknown Logger
Unknown Logger can obtain information about the victim's IP address.[241] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper's backdoor could list the infected system's installed software.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind has a command to return a list of running processes.[174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can take screenshots on compromised hosts.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto collects Keychain storage data and copies those passwords/tokens to a file.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT uses the netstat command to find open ports on the victim’s machine.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
A version of KONNI drops a Windows shortcut on the victim’s machine to establish persistence.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher creates a new Windows service with the malicious executable for persistence.[53][54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor has staged collected data in a central upload directory prior to exfiltration.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has installed a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can download a hosted "beacon" payload using BITSAdmin.[13][14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
Some SeaDuke samples have a module to extract email from Microsoft Exchange servers using compromised credentials.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete’s downloaded data is decrypted using AES.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Application control and software restriction tools, such as SELinux, KSPP, grsecurity MODHARDEN, and Linux kernel tuning can aid in restricting kernel module loading.[18][19][20][21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has registered domains to stage payloads.[10][11] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Timeless Timing Attacks
25 years ago, the first timing attacks against well-known cryptosystems such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman were introduced. By carefully measuring the execution time of crypto operations, an attacker could infer the bits of the secret. Ever since, timing attacks have frequently ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that reduced their fingerprint on a compromised system by deleting malware-related files.[167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from DCSync/NetSync.[... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious link.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1559.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dynamic Data Exchange
Adversaries may use Windows Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) to execute arbitrary commands. DDE is a client-server protocol for one-time and/or continuous inter-process communication (IPC) between applications. Once a link is established, applications can auton... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0945
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity of the installed program on safety or control assets has not been changed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used malware to obtain a list of running processes on the system.[176][177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can download its second (Loader) and third (Core) stages after the dropper is installed.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has multiple C2 channels in place in case one fails.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1553.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing Policy Modification
Adversaries may modify code signing policies to enable execution of unsigned or self-signed code. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a program from a developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Security c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1625.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Runtime API Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way an operating system run applications. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence since this hijacked execution may reoccur at later points in time. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Pwning the Core of IoT Botnets: From a Honeypot to Gigabytes of Botnet Source Code
With the leak of Mirai botnet source code back in 2016, countless IoT botnet variants have emerged and evolved as the new fashion trends. In this session, we love to share the interesting stories from single honeyp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0172
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reaver
Reaver queries the Registry to determine the correct Startup path to use for persistence.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has collected the current date and time of the victim system.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Use strong passphrases for private keys to make cracking difficult. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can use the Registry for code updates and to collect credentials.[99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 temporarily replaced legitimate utilities with their own, executed their payload, and then restored the original file.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-1314
Threat Group-1314 actors used compromised domain credentials for the victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, to move laterally.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group malware can insert malicious macros into documents using a Microsoft.Office.Interop object.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Frequently check permissions on cloud storage to ensure proper permissions are set to deny open or unprivileged access to resources.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise exfiltrates data using cookie values that are Base64-encoded.[34] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Android Parcels: The Bad, the Good and the Better - Introducing Android's Safer Parcel
Parcel is the serialization mechanism in Android and is behind almost every OS cross-process interaction. Parcelable implementations have been the source of vulnerabilities in Android for ~8 years, often rate... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has enumerated installed software on compromised systems.[12] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Lowering the Bar: Deep Learning for Side Channel Analysis
Deep learning can help automate the signal analysis process in power side channel analysis. So far, power side channel analysis relies on the combination of cryptanalytic science, and the art of signal processing. Deep learning is essentially... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 A Journey Into Fuzzing WebAssembly Virtual Machines
Since the MVP release in 2017, WebAssembly evolve gradually, bringing new adepts and new VM implementations over time. It's now possible to run WebAssembly modules over every modern browser, in some blockchain, or using a standalone VM.In the same... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.