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ATT&CK ID:S0152
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilGrab
EvilGrab has the capability to capture keystrokes.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0506
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViperRAT
ViperRAT can collect network configuration data from the device, including phone number, SIM operator, and network operator.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST strings were compressed and encoded in Base64.[316] SUNBURST also obfuscated collected system information using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm.[317] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon, its installer, and tools are signed with stolen code-signing certificates.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot can use a VBA macro to decode its payload prior to installation and execution.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
If establishing persistence by installation as a new service fails, one variant of Elise establishes persistence for the created .exe file by setting the following Registry key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svchost : %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Network\svchost.e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin installs a TCP and UDP filter on the eth0 interface.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae can use RC4 and XOR to encrypt C2 communications.[97] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Trying to Be Everything to Everyone: Let’s Talk About Burnout
Research shows computer security professionals describe the computer security industry as a high-risk yet high-reward profession with negative effects on the workforce. There is an estimated 805,000 computer security professionals workin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1512
ATT&CK Technique Name:Video Capture
An adversary can leverage a device’s cameras to gather information by capturing video recordings. Images may also be captured, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 used WMI to deploy their tools on remote machines and to gather information about the Outlook process.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
The WhisperGate third stage can use the AdvancedRun.exe tool to execute commands in the context of the Windows TrustedInstaller group via %TEMP%\AdvancedRun.exe" /EXEFilename "C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine "stop WinDefend" /StartDirectory "" /R... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike has the ability to accept a value for HTTP Host Header to enable domain fronting.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has exploited the Microsoft Exchange memory corruption vulnerability (CVE-2020-0688).[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes used the CreateFileW() API function with read permissions to access downloaded payloads.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used tools to encode C2 communications including Base64 encoding.[58][59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora has the ability to gain system privileges through Windows services.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors accessed and collected credentials from password managers.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher checks if the victim OS is 32 or 64-bit.[137][138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:WinMM
WinMM collects the system name, OS version including service pack, and system install date and sends the information to the C2 server.[348] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can gather Windows Vault credentials.[15] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Chasing Your Tail With a Raspberry Pi
For some people, trying to figure out if you're being followed is a matter of physical safety for themselves or others. In this talk, we'll discuss a methodology for using low cost, off the shelf parts and some adequate python code to help determine if you're b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Utilize Yama (ex: /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advance... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper contains modules that will use schtasks to carry out malicious operations.[156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses a shell script to execute Mach-o files and osacompile commands such as, osacompile -x -o xcode.app main.applescript.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to identify the user on a compromised host.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic uses the net time command to get the system time from the machine and collect the current date and time zone information.[34] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 BLEEDINGBIT: Your APs Belong to Us
Enterprise Wi-Fi access points featuring BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) chips have become increasingly common in recent years. While these chips provide new features, they also introduce risks that create a new network attack surface. In this talk, we will demonstrate... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa has used Powershell scripts to deploy its ransomware.[193] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to use application shimming for persistence if it detects it is running as admin on Windows XP or 7, by creating a shim database to patch services.exe.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can query the Registry for installed applications.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[65][66][52][67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum mimics HTTP protocol for C2 communication, while hiding the actual messages in the Cookie and Set-Cookie headers of the HTTP requests.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0565
ATT&CK Technique Name:Raindrop
Raindrop decrypted its Cobalt Strike payload using an AES-256 encryption algorithm in CBC mode with a unique key per sample.[185][186] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used at to register a scheduled task to execute malware during lateral movement.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar encodes communications to the C2 server in Base64.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0547
ATT&CK Technique Name:DropBook
DropBook is a Python-based backdoor compiled with PyInstaller.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARUSH
SUGARUSH has created a service named Service1 for persistence.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 used images embedded into document lures that only activate the payload when a user double clicks to avoid sandboxes.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0242
ATT&CK Technique Name:SynAck
SynAck payloads are obfuscated prior to compilation to inhibit analysis and/or reverse engineering.[321][322] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro has shown a persistent notification to maintain access to device sensors.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Exfiltration modules that can harvest credentials from Group Policy Preferences.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
An EMM/MDM can use the Android DevicePolicyManager.setPermittedAccessibilityServices method to set an explicit list of applications that are allowed to use Android's accessibility features. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 used the commands net start and tasklist to get a listing of the services on the system.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0598
ATT&CK Technique Name:P.A.S. Webshell
P.A.S. Webshell can delete scripts from a subdirectory of /tmp after they are run.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
A QuasarRAT .dll file is digitally signed by a certificate from AirVPN.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has hijacked normal application’s launch routines to display ads.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has renamed malicious DLLs with legitimate names to appear benign; they have also created an Azure AD certificate with a Common Name that matched the display name of the compromised service principal.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type may create the file %HOMEPATH%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Realtek {Unique Identifier}.lnk, which points to the malicious msdtc.exe file already created in the %CommonFiles% directory.[31] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Measuring the Speed of the Red Queen's Race; Adaption and Evasion in Malware
Security is a constant cat-and-mouse game between those trying to keep abreast of and detect novel malware, and the authors attempting to evade detection. The introduction of the statistical methods of machine learning in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting DLL search order hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for DLL hijacking weaknesses.[40]Use the prog... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0553
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoleNet
MoleNet can use WMI commands to check the system for firewall and antivirus software.[66] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Debug for Bug: Crack and Hack Apple Core by Itself - Fun and Profit to Debug and Fuzz Apple Kernel by lldb Script
As we know for security researchers, almost every operation system vendor has highly raised the bar of security vulnerability credit or bonus criteria and lots of security mitigations su... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors used Base64 to encode their PowerShell scripts.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA can open a command line to execute commands.[309] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used a modified version of TeamViewer and Remote Utilities for remote access.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0536
ATT&CK Technique Name:GPlayed
GPlayed can show a phishing WebView pretending to be a Google service that collects credit card information.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer has a destructive wiper that overwrites all ICS configuration files across the hard drives and all mapped network drives specifically targeting ABB PCM600 configuration files. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell can create a new service using the service parser function ProcessScCommand.[143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy uses root access to establish reboot hooks to re-install the application from /data/misc/adn.[8] At boot, FlexiSpy spawns daemons for process monitoring, call monitoring, call managing, and system.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses the ssh launchdaemon to elevate privileges, bypass system controls, and enable remote access to the victim.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu can gather the victim computer name and serial number.[246] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Hacking Public Opinion
Online disinformation has reached fever pitch: grifters pushing fake cures for COVID-19, nation states spinning pandemic conspiracies, domestic ideologues coordinating to push manipulative videos about presidential candidates. Malign actors are finding and exploiting division... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Déjà Vu: Uncovering Stolen Algorithms in Commercial Products
In an ideal world, members of a community work together towards a common goal or greater good. Unfortunately, we do not (yet) live in such a world. In this talk, we discuss what appears to be a systemic issue impacting our cyber-security ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Web Service
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likeli... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0693
ATT&CK Technique Name:CaddyWiper
CaddyWiper can enumerate all files and directories on a compromised host.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can list the current running processes on the system.[219][220] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Process Injection
Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses or even elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another proces... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1505.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:IIS Components
Adversaries may install malicious components that run on Internet Information Services (IIS) web servers to establish persistence. IIS provides several mechanisms to extend the functionality of the web servers. For example, Internet Server Application Programming... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0271
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYMARBLE
KEYMARBLE can upload files to the victim’s machine and can download additional payloads.[243] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME can upload and download files to the victim’s machine.[454] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used a modified version of HTRAN to redirect connections between networks.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0076
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeM
The original variant of FakeM encrypts C2 traffic using a custom encryption cipher that uses an XOR key of "YHCRA" and bit rotation between each XOR operation. Some variants of FakeM use RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT sent username, computer name, and the previously generated UUID in reply to a "who" command from C2.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used the tool EmailStealer to steal and send lists of e-mail addresses to a remote server.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can change the desktop wallpaper on compromised hosts.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has downloaded additional files and tools onto a compromised host.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Most Sakula samples maintain persistence by setting the Registry Run key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\ in the HKLM or HKCU hive, with the Registry value and file name varying by sample.[234] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 9 and above restricts access to the mic, camera, and other device sensors from applications running in the background. iOS 14 and Android 12 introduced a visual indicator on the status bar (green dot) when an application is accessing the device’s camer... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can enumerate the OS version and computer name on a targeted system.[85] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Making Big Things Better the Dead Cow Way
Trying to change the security culture of a single company can be daunting. The Cult of the Dead Cow managed to change the culture of the entire security industry.In this session, three key figures from the 35-year-old group's history — Mudge Zatko, Chris Ri... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Deepfake Social Engineering: Creating a Framework for Synthetic Media Social Engineering
How do you know that you are actually talking to the person you think you are talking to? Deepfake and related synthetic media technologies represent the greatest revolution in social engineering capabilities ov... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Device attestation can often detect jailbroken or rooted devices. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has made use of Python-based remote access tools.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 WebAuthn 101 - Demystifying WebAuthn
Five years later and we're finally at the finish line: Proposed recommendation for W3C WebAuthn. This talk will go into some detail on the use cases WebAuthn sets out solve, how we got here, what's ready for implementation today and what's coming. *Any* service i... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 IoT Manufacturers' New Nightmare: Design Flaws and Deployment Chaos in Cloud-based IoT Access Control Policies
Modern internet-of-things device manufacturers are taking advantage of the managed Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) IoT clouds (e.g., AWS IoT, Azure IoT) ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to execute a process using runas.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer has several commands to delete files associated with the malware from the victim.[246] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used Web shells and HTRAN for C2 and to exfiltrate data.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can gather a list of running processes by using Tasklist.[211] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle has been distributed via a malicious Word document within a spearphishing email.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0369
ATT&CK Technique Name:CoinTicker
CoinTicker initially downloads a hidden encoded file.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used a malware variant called WIDETONE to conduct port scans on specified subnets.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\Windows\System32\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\Cur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Firmware
Adversaries may modify system firmware to persist on systems.The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains modules, such as Get-ComputerInfo, for enumerating common system information.[281] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1570
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lateral Tool Transfer
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e. Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over t... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.