text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can use AdjustTokenPrivileges() to elevate privileges.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can utilize cmd.exe to execute commands in a victim's environment.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has created accounts on multiple compromised hosts to perform actions within the network.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal can obtain a list of running processes on the victim’s machine.[32][33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can identify the domain membership of a compromised host.[25][26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup can collect sent and received SMS messages.[25] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 All Your Apple are Belong to Us: Unique Identification and Cross-Device Tracking of Apple Devices
Privacy is about people. Smartphones and laptops (e.g., iPhone, iPad, and MacBooks) are the most frequently used personal devices. Consequently, people with ulterior motives (e.g., advertisers) can easi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0144
ATT&CK Technique Name:ChChes
ChChes collects the victim's %TEMP% directory path and version of Internet Explorer.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0298
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbot
Xbot uses phishing pages mimicking Google Play's payment interface as well as bank login pages.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can monitor services.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can determine the IP and physical location of the compromised host via IPinfo.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can retrieve the following information from an infected machine: OS, architecture, computer name, OS build version, environment variables, and storage drives.[400] | secon |
title:botconf2020 xOSSig : Leveraging OS Diversity to Automatically Extract Malware Code Signatures
We present an automated approach to extract code signatures that serve as the forensic fingerprint of a given malware program. Our high-level idea is to compare the memory contents of a sandbox before and after infection... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack can list files on available disk volumes.[111][112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear has the ability to decrypt its RC4 encrypted payload for execution.[249] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can access the webcam on a victim's machine.[47][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates new services to establish persistence.[63][64][65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT gathers the time zone information from the victim’s machine.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0947
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Provide the ability to verify the integrity of control logic or programs loaded on a controller. While techniques like CRCs and checksums are commonly used, they are not cryptographically strong and can be vulnerable to collisions. Preferably cryptographic hash functions (e.g... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used malicious links in e-mails to lure victims into downloading malware.[105][106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can use the RegEnumKeyW to iterate through Registry keys.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor can perform a long sleep (greater than or equal to 3 minutes) to evade detection.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used domain credentials, including domain admin, for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1058
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prestige
Prestige has used the Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection() and Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection() functions to disable and restore file system redirection.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper has the ability to modify Registry keys to disable crash dumps, colors for compressed files, and pop-up information about folders and desktop items.[67][68][69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY has saved information to a random temp file before exfil.[79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0055
ATT&CK Technique Name:RARSTONE
RARSTONE downloads its backdoor component from a C2 server and loads it directly into memory.[371] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS attempts to hide its payloads using legitimate filenames.[20] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Engineering Cybersecurity for a Nation: What Singapore is Learning from Cars and Sanitation
Defending a country is different from a corporate network. Singapore wants to be a Smart Nation and wants to shift the paradigm of cybersecurity in order to achieve that. Doing so will require us to challe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used rundll32.exe to execute malicious scripts and malware on a victim's network.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can suppress UAC prompts by setting the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key on Windows 10 or HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7 and launching the eventvwr.msc process, which launches BitPaymer with elevate... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338
Following exploitation with LOWBALL malware, admin@338 actors created a file containing a list of commands to be executed on the compromised computer.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Binary Proxy Execution
Adversaries may bypass process and/or signature-based defenses by proxying execution of malicious content with signed, or otherwise trusted, binaries. Binaries used in this technique are often Microsoft-signed files, indicating that they have been eith... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use net localgroup to list local groups on a system.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0199
ATT&CK Technique Name:TURNEDUP
TURNEDUP is capable of writing to a Registry Run key to establish.[269] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot uses non-descriptive names to hide functionality and uses an AES CBC (256 bits) encryption algorithm for its loader and configuration files.[335] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used MSbuild to execute an actor-created file.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia searches for anti-virus software and firewall products installed on the victim’s machine using WMI.[79][80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker has performed DLL hijacking before execution.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:TINYTYPHON
TINYTYPHON installs itself under Registry Run key to establish persistence.[40] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Dirty Stream Attack, Turning Android Share Targets Into Attack Vectors
The Android operating system uses intents as its main means of exchanging information between applications. Besides messaging, file exchange is also possible by simply constructing an intent of action ACTION_SEND and using it t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 aggregates staged data from a network into a single location.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker copies itself into the %systemroot%\system32 directory and registers as a service.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can add a service named wind0ws to the Registry to achieve persistence after reboot.[277] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has obtained and used open-source tools like Koadic, Mimikatz, and Responder.[7][8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has relied on users to execute malicious file attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for logons to code repositories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi uses BITSAdmin to communicate with the C2 server over HTTP.[276] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0284
ATT&CK Technique Name:More_eggs
More_eggs has used an RC4-based encryption method for its C2 communications.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors collected whoami information via PowerShell scripts.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can upload and download to and from a victim machine.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has exploited numerous ActiveX vulnerabilities, including zero-days.[3][4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet renames s7otbxdx.dll, a dll responsible for handling communications with a PLC. It replaces this dll file with its own version that allows it to intercept any calls that are made to access the PLC. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk can use ChaCha8 and ECDH to encrypt data.[15][16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 has used cmd.exe for archiving data and deleting files.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates often contain patches for vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Adversaries can instruct Duqu to spread laterally by copying itself to shares it has enumerated and for which it has obtained legitimate credentials (via keylogging or other means). The remote host is then infected by using the compromised credentials to schedule a task on rem... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used OneDrive and MediaFire to host payloads.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
If running with elevated privileges, OSX/Shlayer has used the spctl command to disable Gatekeeper protection for a downloaded file. OSX/Shlayer can also leverage system links pointing to bash scripts in the downloaded DMG file to bypass Gatekeeper, a flaw patched in mac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group disguised malicious template files as JPEG files to avoid detection.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group acquired servers to host their malicious tools.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has performed a time-based anti-debug check before downloading its third stage.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0618
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIVEHANDS
The FIVEHANDS payload is encrypted with AES-128.[125][126][127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos can record the hostname and kernel version of the target machine.[195] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
Some variants of ADVSTORESHELL achieve persistence by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Enable secure boot features to validate the digital signature of the boot environment and system image using a special purpose hardware device. If the validation check fails, the device will fail to boot preventing loading of unauthorized software. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple's Multi File Exfiltrator module can exfiltrate multiple files from a compromised host as an HTTP response over C2.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has used vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet to to delete volume shadow copies and vssadmin resize shadowstorage to force deletion of shadow copies created by third-party applications.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu creates a new service that loads a malicious driver when the system starts. When Duqu is active, the operating system believes that the driver is legitimate, as it has been signed with a valid private key.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM can obtain information about security software on the victim.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has added a registry key in the hive for persistence.[196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS has established persistence through a scheduled task using the command "C:\Windows\system32\schtasks.exe" /Create /F /SC DAILY /ST 12:00 /TN MicrosoftEdge /TR "c:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe C:\Windows\temp\Windows.vbe".[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has exfiltrated victim data to cloud storage service accounts.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has written process names to the Registry, disabled IE browser features, deleted Registry keys, and changed the ExtendedUIHoverTime key.[91][92][93][94] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Bypassing the Maginot Line: Remotely Exploit the Hardware Decoder on Smartphone
Though researchers have found lots of vulnerabilities in Stagefright framework for audio/video codecs on Android smartphones, all these vulnerabilities are in the software implementation of the AOSP. However, almost all... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Defending Containers Like a Ninja: A Walk through the Advanced Security Features of Docker & Kubernetes
Today, with a few commands anyone can have containers running on their machine; at this point, they seem to be neither complex nor complicated to secure. However, the story dramatically chang... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Configure browsers/applications to regularly delete persistent web credentials (such as cookies). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1585.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Accounts
Adversaries may create accounts with cloud providers that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can use cloud accounts to further their operations, including leveraging cloud storage services such as Dropbox, MEGA, Microsoft OneDrive, or AWS S3 buckets for Ex... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used valid accounts to laterally move through VPN connections and dual-homed systems.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARUSH
SUGARUSH has checked for internet connectivity from an infected host before attempting to establish a new TCP connection.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0211
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linfo
Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can delete files.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can uninstall malicious components from the Registry, stop processes, and clear the browser history.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:WIRTE
WIRTE has used regsvr32.exe to trigger the execution of a malicious script.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop.[159][160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0072
ATT&CK Technique Name:OwaAuth
OwaAuth DES-encrypts captured credentials using the key 12345678 before writing the credentials to a log file.[30] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Winter is Coming Back: Defeating the Most Advanced Rowhammer Defenses to Gain Root and Kernel Privileges
Rowhammer attacks can break the MMU-enforced memory protection to achieve privilege escalation, without requiring any software vulnerability. To mitigate such an attack, numerous software-only ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0618
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIVEHANDS
FIVEHANDS has the ability to delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.[26][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Whitefly
Whitefly has named the malicious DLL the same name as DLLs belonging to legitimate software from various security vendors.[175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used PowerShell to execute commands and malicious code.[133] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can add Registry run keys for persistence.[67][68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin will connect to C2 only after sniffing a "magic packet" value in TCP or UDP packets matching specific conditions.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can stop up to 146 Windows services related to security, backup, database, and email solutions through the use of net stop.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has forged POST strings with a random choice from a list of possibilities including "forum", "php", "view", etc. while making connection with the C2, hindering detection efforts.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya disrupted manufacturing facilities supplying vaccines, resulting in a halt of production and the inability to meet demand for specific vaccines. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0164
ATT&CK Technique Name:TDTESS
If running as administrator, TDTESS installs itself as a new service named bmwappushservice to establish persistence.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 has the ability to persist on a system using WMI events.[15] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.