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title:blackhat:us-23 Apple PAC, Four Years Later: Reverse Engineering the Customized Pointer Authentication Hardware Implementation on Apple M1
Since 2018, Apple has deployed PA on all Apple-silicon-based products to improve the security of the system. There have been many incredible security researchers who have condu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar adds a sub-key under several Registry run keys.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux uses HTTPS for C2 communications.[117][118] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 UWB Real Time Locating Systems: How Secure Radio Communications May Fail in Practice
Ultra-wideband (UWB) is a rapidly-growing radio technology that, according to the UWB Alliance, is forecasted to drive sales volumes exceeding one billion devices annually by 2025. Among its current applications, of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0410
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fysbis
Fysbis has installed itself as an autostart entry under ~/.config/autostart/dbus-inotifier.desktop to establish persistence.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0309
ATT&CK Technique Name:Adups
Adups was pre-installed on Android devices from some vendors.[1][2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has obtained domains to host their payloads.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0434
ATT&CK Technique Name:Imminent Monitor
Imminent Monitor has a PasswordRecoveryPacket module for recovering browser passwords.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tarrask
Tarrask is able to create "hidden" scheduled tasks by deleting the Security Descriptor (SD) registry value.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Authenticate connections fromsoftware and devices to prevent unauthorized systems from accessing protected management functions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has the ability to do real time screen viewing on an infected host.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0926
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict root or administrator access on user accounts to limit the ability to capture promiscuous traffic on a network through common packet capture tools. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has several VBS scripts used throughout the malware's lifecycle.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0403
ATT&CK Technique Name:Riltok
Riltok can access and upload the device's contact list to the command and control server.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0086
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZLib
ZLib creates Registry keys to allow itself to run as various services.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu downloads additional modules for the collection of data from local systems. The modules are named: infostealer 1, infostealer 2 and reconnaissance. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Network allowlists can be implemented through either host-based files or system host files to specify what external connections (e.g., IP address, MAC address, port, protocol) can be made from a device. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete uses the netsh wlan show networks mode=bssid and netsh wlan show interfaces commands to list all nearby WiFi networks and connected interfaces.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 successfully gained remote access by using pass the ticket.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can download additional payloads hosted on a Discord channel.[36][37][38][39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has used its C2 channel to exfiltrate data.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has used PowerShell Empire for execution of malware.[120][121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can use shell scripts for execution, such as /bin/sh -c.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has changed user account passwords and logged users off the system.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan has the ability to use DNS for C2 communications.[40][36][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can use WinSock API for communication including WSASend and WSARecv.[143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.[37][263] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Library Loading
Disallow loading of remote DLLs. This is included by default in Windows Server 2012+ and is available by patch for XP+ and Server 2003+.Enable Safe DLL Search Mode to force search for system DLLs in directories with greater restrictions (e.g. %SYSTEMROOT%)t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0450
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHARPSTATS
SHARPSTATS has the ability to identify the IP address, machine name, and OS of the compromised host.[285] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors communicated with C2 via an encrypted RC4 byte stream and AES-CBC.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing attempts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can encrypt its C2 with RC4 with the password warzone160\x00.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT uses cmd.exe to execute scripts and commands on the victim’s machine.[244] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper contains modules that will use schtasks to carry out malicious operations.[156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0593
ATT&CK Technique Name:ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can capture and store keystrokes.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's New-UserPersistenceOption Persistence argument can be used to establish via a Scheduled Task/Job.[129][130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has used the BOtB tool that can break out of containers. [9] | secon |
title:botconf2015 The dirty half-dozen of the Brazilian threat landscape
Brazilian Cybercrime? Easy Does It!Brazil is a unique cybercrime landscape that has evolved on its own to surpass even the Russian-speaking underground in terms of how large and diverse it is. Brazilian cybercrime has considerably expanded in 2014... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used move to transfer files to a network share.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can capture screenshots of the infected system using the gdi32 library.[144][145][146][147][148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including Responder and PuTTy PSCP.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Administrators should perform an audit of all access lists and the permissions they have been granted to access web applications and services. This should be done extensively on all resources in order to establish a baseline, followed up on with periodic audits of new or upda... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has the ability to query device information.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff injects the global action GLOBAL_ACTION_BACK to mimic pressing the back button to close the application if a call to an open antivirus application is detected.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos can access a system’s webcam and take pictures.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can download and deploy additional payloads, including ransomware and post-exploitation frameworks such as Cobalt Strike.[58][59][60][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can leverage its implementation of Mimikatz to obtain and use silver tickets.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses RC4 encryption over TCP to communicate with its C2 server.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
Enabled features, such as Protected Process Light (PPL), for LSA.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Skeletons in the App Sandbox: 5+ Ways to Escape
The safety and trust promised by the App Store is in large part due to mandatory sandboxing requirements. The required App Sandbox lets users install apps with abandon and without worry, keeping malicious ones contained. This talk will deep dive into a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects a list of files and directories in C:\ with the command dir /s /a c:\ >> "C:\windows\TEMP[RANDOM].tmp".[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
One of Dtrack can replace the normal flow of a program execution with malicious code.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:CallMe
CallMe has the capability to download a file to the victim from the C2 server.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest invokes time call to check the system's time, executes a sleep command, invokes a second time call, and then compares the time difference between the two time calls and the amount of time the system slept to identify the sandbox.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware is capable of keylogging.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can delete its dropper component from the targeted system.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0917
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Develop and publish policies that define acceptable information to be stored in repositories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell is injected into a shared SVCHOST process.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot creates processes using the Windows API calls: CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessAsUserA().[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne, Mimikatz, and ProcDump to dump credentials.[13][14] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Turing in a Box: Applying Artificial Intelligence as a Service to Targeted Phishing and Defending Against AI Generated Attacks
With recent advances in next-generation language models such as OpenAI's GPT-3, AI generated text has reached a level of sophistication that matches or even exceeds human g... | secon |
title:botconf2022 How to Eavesdrop on Winnti in a Live Environment Using Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)
This paper explains how we used VMI to detect an infection with the remote access trojan Winnti, specifically version 3.0, and how to extract and decrypt its communication data with its C&C servers. It should be... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can delete downloaded executables after running them.[175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda has been obfuscated and contains encrypted functions.[201] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has duplicated the token of a high integrity process to spawn an instance of cmd.exe under an impersonated user.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can log keystrokes on the victim's machine.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has the ability to download additional files from C2.[209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can create a Startup item for persistence if it determines it is on a Windows system.[280] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0159
ATT&CK Technique Name:SNUGRIDE
SNUGRIDE communicates with its C2 server over HTTP.[273] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider used fake updates for FlashPlayer plugin and Google Chrome as initial infection vectors.[74] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Defending Containers Like a Ninja: A Walk through the Advanced Security Features of Docker & Kubernetes
Today, with a few commands anyone can have containers running on their machine; at this point, they seem to be neither complex nor complicated to secure. However, the story dramatically change... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist has used Base64 for encoded C2 traffic.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet used a digitally signed driver with a compromised Realtek certificate.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hi-Zor
Hi-Zor has the ability to upload and download files from its C2 server.[212] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0511
ATT&CK Technique Name:RegDuke
RegDuke can persist using a WMI consumer that is launched every time a process named WINWORD.EXE is started.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has used 7Zip to compress .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files prior to exfiltration.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can use the command-line utility cacls.exe to change file permissions.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has the capability to stop services and kill processes.[34][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor can establish persistence by creating a service.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can disconnect all network adapters on a compromised host using powershell -Command "Get-WmiObject -class Win32_NetworkAdapter | ForEach { If ($.NetEnabled) { $.Disable() } }" > NUL.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1200
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hardware Additions
Adversaries may introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. Replication Thr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok uses AppleScript to install a login Item by sending Apple events to the System Events process.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to replace system firmware. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use tools to collect credentials from web browsers.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has enumerated DC servers using the command net group "Domain Controllers" /domain. The group has also used the ping command.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has installed a new Windows service to establish persistence.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Domain Policy Modification
Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
The discovery modules used with Duqu can collect information on accounts and permissions.[12] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Discovering Hidden Properties to Attack the Node.js Ecosystem
Node.js is widely used for developing both server-side and desktop applications. It provides a cross-platform execution environment for JavaScript programs. Due to the increasing popularity, the security of Node.js is critical to web serv... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit local accounts permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [16] [17] These audits should check if new local accounts are created that have ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can inject its backdoor as a portable executable into a target process.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea writes collected data to a temporary file in an encrypted form before exfiltration to a C2 server.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 AEPIC Leak: Architecturally Leaking Uninitialized Data from the Microarchitecture
CPU vulnerabilities undermine the security guarantees provided by software- and hardware-security improvements. While the discovery of transient-execution attacks increased the interest in CPU vulnerabilities on a mic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Enterprise email solutions have monitoring mechanisms that may include the ability to audit auto-forwarding rules on a regular basis.In an Exchange environment, Administrators can use Get-InboxRule / Remove-InboxRule and Get-TransportRule / Remove-TransportRule to discover an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 can run on a daily basis using a scheduled task.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used a variety of Web shells.[38] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.