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titleblackhat:us-21 The Dark Age of Memory Corruption Mitigations in the Spectre Era
The prevalence of memory corruption bugs in the past decades resulted in numerous defenses, such as stack canaries, control flow integrity (CFI), and memory-safe languages. These defenses can prevent entire classes of vulnerabilities, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0486
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bonadan
Bonadan can download additional modules from the C2 server.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
A menuPass macro deletes files after it has decoded and decompressed them.[142][143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can write its configuration file to Software\Classes\scConfig in either HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE or HKEY_CURRENT_USER.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM has used a one-way communication method via GitLab and Digital Point to perform C2.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can search for the HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System Registry key to gather system information.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Utilize network allowlists to restrict unnecessary connections to network devices (e.g., comm servers, serial to ethernet converters) and services, especially in cases when devices have limits on the number of simultaneous sessions they support. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0430
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Linux
Winnti for Linux has used ICMP, custom TCP, and UDP in outbound communications.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the binaries used by an installer. These processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the per... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT has the capability to take screenshots of the victim’s machine.[82][83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL.[2] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Money-rity Report: Using Intelligence to Predict the Next Payment Card Fraud Victims
Right now, combatting credit card fraud is mostly a reactionary process. Issuers wait until transactions occur that either appear fraudulent according to rules-based analytic engines or are reported by customers, a... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 APTs Go Teleworking: The Rise of VPN Exploits
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, workforces rely even more on VPN technologies for remote access into private networks.Pulse Secure by Ivanti is a leading VPN technology. Enterprise VPN devices often are deployed at the intersection between trusted and untru... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME variants can add malicious DLL modules as new services.TYPEFRAME can also delete services from the victim’s machine.[128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries may use new payloads to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through hijacking by using application control solutions also capable of blocking libraries loaded by legitimate software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik can use the Android CallScreeningService to silently block incoming calls.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa has used VBScript code on the victim's machine.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1548.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bypass User Account Control
Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group registered a domain name identical to that of a compromised company as part of their BEC effort.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to exfiltrate data over the Microsoft Outlook C2 channel.[53] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Catch me, Yes we can! – Pwning Social Engineers using Natural Language Processing Techniques in Real-Time
Social engineering is a big problem but very little progress has been made in stopping it, aside from the detection of email phishing. Social engineering attacks are launched via many vectors in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1137.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Outlook Home Page
Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be lo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1221
ATT&CK Technique Name:Template Injection
Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx)... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
If devices are enrolled using Apple User Enrollment or using a profile owner enrollment mode for Android, device controls prevent the enterprise from accessing the device’s physical location. This is typically used for a Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) deployment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses a function named is_debugging to perform anti-debugging logic. The function invokes sysctl checking the returned value of P_TRACED. ThiefQuest also calls ptrace with the PTRACE_DENY_ATTACH flag to prevent debugging.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal has used specially crafted SMS messages to control the target device.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer has used Process Doppelgänging to evade security software while deploying tools on compromised systems.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0618
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIVEHANDS
FIVEHANDS has the ability to decrypt its payload prior to execution.[90][91][92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a Windows Service.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has decrypted files and payloads using a XOR-based algorithm.[220][221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has created Windows tasks to establish persistence.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet decrypts resources that are loaded into memory and executed.[223] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0577
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrozenCell
FrozenCell has retrieved account information for other applications.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has accessed victim security and IT environments and Microsoft Teams to mine valuable information.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0536
ATT&CK Technique Name:GPlayed
GPlayed can register for the BOOT_COMPLETED broadcast intent.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has encrypted network communications with AES.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer can escalate privileges to root by asking the user for credentials.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has run hostname and systeminfo on a victim.[257][258][259][260] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch has the ability to persist using scheduled tasks.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used scheduled tasks to persist on victim systems.[11][12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor has been disguised as the Windows Power Efficiency Diagnostics report tool.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky can delete files it creates from the infected system.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0586
ATT&CK Technique Name:TAINTEDSCRIBE
TAINTEDSCRIBE has used FileReadZipSend to compress a file and send to C2.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has collected files from infected systems and uploaded them to a C2 server.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel can automatically upload collected files to its C2 server.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian has the ability to use a XOR decryption key to extract C2 server domains and IP addresses.[239] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Bridging Security Infrastructure Between the Data Center and AWS Lambda
While serverless is all the rage, creating secure infrastructure that integrates serverless technology with existing Data Center (DC) services remains a challenge. Square's DC uses a microservice architecture. Services communic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Protect domain controllers by ensuring proper security configuration for critical servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT creates a scheduled task to maintain persistence on the victim’s machine.[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0284
ATT&CK Technique Name:More_eggs
More_eggs will decode malware components that are then dropped to the system.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
During Operation Sharpshooter, a first-stage downloader installed Rising Sun to %Startup%\mssync.exe on a compromised host.[189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
A Gamaredon Group file stealer can transfer collected files to a hardcoded C2 server.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro has been spread via malicious links embedded in e-mails.[54][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyZBot
TinyZBot can install as a Windows service for persistence.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors used HTTP for C2 communications.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0450
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHARPSTATS
SHARPSTATS has the ability to identify the current date and time on the compromised host.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1134.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Make and Impersonate Token
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used PowerShell-based tools and scripts for discovery and collection on compromised hosts.[115][116][117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Strider
Strider has used a hidden file system that is stored as a file on disk.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used WMI to collect information about target machines.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Ensure extensions that are installed are the intended ones as many malicious extensions will masquerade as legitimate ones. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure containers are not running as root by default and do not use unnecessary privileges or mounted components. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely check account role permissions to ensure only expected users and roles have permission to modify defensive tools and settings. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence on a compromised host.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used networkdll for network discovery and psfin specifically for financial and point of sale indicators. Wizard Spider has also used AdFind and nltest/dclist to enumerate domain computers, including the domain controller.[6][91][92][4][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can use group policy to push a scheduled task from the AD to all network machines.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Zero - The Funniest Number in Cryptography
What is the funniest number in cryptography? 0. The reason is that for all x, x*0 = 0, i.e., the equation is always satisfied no matter what x is. This talk will explore crypto bugs in four BLS signatures' libraries (ethereum/py ecc, supranational/blst, h... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0648
ATT&CK Technique Name:JSS Loader
JSS Loader has the ability to launch scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack can collect the RegisteredOwner, RegisteredOrganization, and InstallDate registry values.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0519
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYNful Knock
SYNful Knock can be sent instructions via special packets to change its functionality. Code for new functionality can be included in these messages.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Miasm: Reverse Engineering Framework
Miasm is a reverse engineering framework created in 2006 and first published in 2011 (GPL). Since then, it has been continuously improved through a daily use. The framework is made of several parts, including an assembler/disassembler for several architectures (... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has used the csc.exe tool to compile a C# executable.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 LCDPwn: Breaking Enterprise-Things with Layer 2 Discovery Protocol Vulnerabilities Again
When targeting enterprise devices, compared to higher layer protocols, the attack surface exposed by layer 2 protocols is often neglected. The recent research CDPwn, conducted by the Armis labs, sheds light on t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has attempted to use WMI event subscriptions to establish persistence on compromised hosts.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Breaking the Chain: An Attacker's Perspective on Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Flaws
Our talk divides the cloud development flow into 5 phases: IDE, SCM, package managers, CI/CD and Artifacts. We will demonstrate how supply chain attacks can affect organizations at each phase. This inclu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can issue shell commands to download and execute additional payloads.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth has been delivered via malicious e-mail attachments.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Application control and software restriction tools, such as SELinux, KSPP, grsecurity MODHARDEN, and Linux kernel tuning can aid in restricting kernel module loading.[18][19][20][21][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can enumerate services on a victim machine.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet modifies the Import Address Tables DLLs to hook specific APIs that are used to open project files. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has used a legitimate DLL file name, Duser.dll to disguise a malicious remote access tool.[148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [6], including the management of go... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has spoofed legitimate applications in phishing lures and changed file extensions to conceal installation of malware.[48][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell can gather a list of processes running on the machine.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's loader can detect presence of an emulator by using two calls to GetTickCount API, and checking whether the time has been accelerated.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credential Access Protection
Some embedded network devices are capable of storing passwords for local accounts in either plain-text or encrypted formats. Ensure that, where available, local passwords are always encrypted, per vendor recommendations. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used valid credentials for privileged accounts with the goal of accessing domain controllers.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera's malware has altered the NTLM authentication program on domain controllers to allow Chimera to login without a valid credential.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar has a module to collect usernames and passwords stored in browsers.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has injected malicious DLLs into memory with read, write, and execute permissions.[75][76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
The Black Basta dropper has been digitally signed with a certificate issued by Akeo Consulting for legitimate executables used for creating bootable USB drives.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has called GetLogicalDrives to emumerate all mounted drives, and GetDriveTypeW to determine the drive type.[323] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use asynchronous procedure call (APC) injection to execute commands received from C2.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Logon Script (Windows)
Adversaries may use Windows logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. This is done via adding a path to a scr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
Some InnaputRAT variants create a new Windows service to establish persistence.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0370
ATT&CK Technique Name:SamSam
SamSam encrypts victim files using RSA-2048 encryption and demands a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.[82] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 ELF Section Docking: Revisiting Stageless Payload Delivery
When it comes to generating and delivering malware on Linux, offensive operators have choices. Some objectives call for a dynamic payload bootstrap off the wire, others require stageless implants. Often, malware deployed with bundled payloa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has been distributed via spearphishing link.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0547
ATT&CK Technique Name:DropBook
DropBook can download and execute additional files.[153][154] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.