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title:botconf2015 (Mostly) Polish threat landscape: not only VBKlip
Last year, I presented a talk about Polish malware authors. Since then, we acquired even more knowledge and Polish malware market evolved slightly. Of course, there still are ”hacker” forums, which use simple, leaked and cracked keyloggers and sell the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Apple regularly provides security updates for known OS vulnerabilities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has used scheduled task XML triggers.[170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has decoded malicious VBScripts using Base64.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
Dacls can collect data on running and parent processes.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has encrypted payloads and strings.[211][212] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0391
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAWKBALL
HAWKBALL has sent system information and files over the C2 channel.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can add directories used by the malware to the Windows Defender exclusions list to prevent detection.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake can manipulate visual components to trick the user into granting dangerous permissions, and can use phishing overlays and JavaScript injection to capture credentials.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Find and eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can use dynamic DNS domain names in C2.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Bypassing KPTI Using the Speculative Behavior of the SWAPGS Instruction
Speculative-execution based attacks and side-channels are more and more common as disclosures continue to increase scrutiny by researchers in this field. In this talk, we demonstrate a new type of side-channel attack based on sp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has presented victims with spoofed Windows Authentication prompts to collect their credentials.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:netsh
netsh can be used as a persistence proxy technique to execute a helper DLL when netsh.exe is executed.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has used malware that repeatedly checks the mouse cursor position to determine if a real user is on the system.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Downdelph
Downdelph uses search order hijacking of the Windows executable sysprep.exe to escalate privileges.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has connected outbound over TCP port 443 with a FakeTLS method.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0691
ATT&CK Technique Name:Neoichor
Neoichor has the ability to configure browser settings by modifying Registry entries under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has the ability to communicate with C2 over HTTP.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure that proper policies are implemented to dictate the the secure enrollment and deactivation of authentication mechanisms, such as MFA, for user accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used the Stealer One credential stealer to target e-mail and file transfer utilities including FTP.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
Many strings in JHUHUGIT are obfuscated with a XOR algorithm.[172][173][22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS checks for new hard drives on the victim, such as USB devices, by listening for the WM_DEVICECHANGE window message.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Use access control lists on cloud storage systems and objects. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used crypto key information stored in the Registry to decrypt Tor clients dropped to disk.[242] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Deep Neural Networks for Hackers: Methods, Applications, and Open Source Tools
Anyone who keeps up with technology news has read about deep neural networks beating human champions at Go, achieving breakthrough accuracy at voice recognition, and generally driving today's major advances in artificial... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1567.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services allow for the storage, edit, and retrieval of data from a remote cloud storage server over the Internet. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has encrypted payloads using the Data Protection API (DPAPI), which relies on keys tied to specific user accounts on specific machines. APT41 has also environmentally keyed second stage malware with an RC5 key derived in part from the infected system's volume serial num... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has obfuscated scripts with the BatchEncryption tool.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has copied itself to and infected files in network drives for propagation.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Have a strict approval policy for use of deployment systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1110
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Force
Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a service to establish persistence.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attestation
Attestation can typically detect rooted devices. For MDM-enrolled devices, action can be taken if a device fails an attestation check. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used PowerShell profiles to maintain persistence on an infected machine.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0459
ATT&CK Technique Name:MechaFlounder
MechaFlounder has the ability to identify the username and hostname on a compromised host.[112] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Return of the Insecure Brazilian Voting Machines
This talk presents a detailed and up-to-date security analysis of the voting software used in upcoming Brazilian elections by more than 140 million voters. It is mainly based on results obtained recently in a restricted hacking challenge organized b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can sniff network traffic to look for packets matching specific conditions.[22][23] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon (and Splunk)
Enterprises and organizations of all sizes are struggling to prevent and detect all malware attacks and advanced adversary actions inside their networks in a timely manner. Prevention focused technology hasn’t been good enough to... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
If running in a Windows environment, Kazuar saves a DLL to disk that is injected into the explorer.exe process to execute the payload. Kazuar can also be configured to inject and execute within specific processes.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has delayed execution using a built-in function to avoid detection and analysis.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit access to the root account and prevent users from creating and/or modifying systemd timer unit files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has used SMBTouch, a vulnerability scanner, to determine whether a target is vulnerable to EternalBlue malware.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has registered domains for targeting intended victims.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure proper process and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with logging or deleting or modifying .evtx logging files. Ensure .evtx files, which are located at C:\Windows\system32\Winevt\Logs[1... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT creates a scheduled task to maintain persistence on the victim’s machine.[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT modified its security token to grants itself debugging privileges by adding SeDebugPrivilege.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0452
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBferry
USBferry can copy its installer to attached USB storage devices.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict read/write access to systemd .timer unit files to only select privileged users who have a legitimate need to manage system services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:TA0043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reconnaissance
The adversary is trying to gather information they can use to plan future operations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0537
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperStack
HyperStack can use default credentials to connect to IPC$ shares on remote machines.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has leveraged AWS CLI to enumerate cloud environments with compromised credentials.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 You Can Run, but You Can't Hide - Finding the Footprints of Hidden Shellcode
Memory scanning is a defensive necessity on Windows systems. Microsoft has not provided executable memory manager kernel callbacks and user-mode hooks are fragile, so defenders have deployed periodic memory scanning ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
The AADInternals Set-AADIntUserMFA command can be used to disable MFA for a specified user. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0393
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerStallion
PowerStallion has been used to monitor process lists.[206] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used tools to exploit Windows vulnerabilities in order to escalate privileges. The tools targeted CVE-2013-3660, CVE-2011-2005, and CVE-2010-4398, all of which could allow local users to access kernel-level privileges.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can adjust token privileges.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used cmd.exe and .bat scripts for execution.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1008
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideCopy
SideCopy has used compromised domains to host its malicious payloads.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0945
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Digital signatures may be used to ensure application DLLs are authentic prior to execution. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can use junk code to generate random activity to obscure malware behavior.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail has the ability to use HTTP for C2 communications.[367] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0272
ATT&CK Technique Name:NDiskMonitor
NDiskMonitor uses AES to encrypt certain information sent over its C2 channel.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 When Knowledge Graph Meets TTPs: Highly Automated and Adaptive Executable TTP Intelligence for Security Evaluation
Nowadays, more and more security assessments will use BAS (Breach and Attack Simulation) solutions. However, two problems become important and difficult.1. How to grasp the TTPs (Tact... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1562.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indicator Blocking
An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events typically captured by sensors from being gathered and analyzed. This could include maliciously redirecting or even disabling host-based sensors, such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), by tampering setti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Restrict execution of Msiexec.exe to privileged accounts or groups that need to use it to lessen the opportunities for malicious usage. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke's miner connects to a C2 server using port 51640.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke downloaded a file "libprocesshider", which could hide files on the target system.[43][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
To establish persistence, SslMM identifies the Start Menu Startup directory and drops a link to its own executable disguised as an "Office Start," "Yahoo Talk," "MSN Gaming Z0ne," or "MSN Talk" shortcut.[157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has been observed disabling the system firewall.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can use the HTTP CGI scripts on Omron PLCs to modify parameters on EtherCat connected servo drives.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Forward Focus – The Impact of Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to revolutionize cybersecurity by enhancing detection and response capabilities, automating routine tasks, and identifying threats that are invisible to humans. However, AI also poses significant r... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1583.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Virtual Private Server
Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT has created a service when it is installed on the victim machine.[104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can collect information about hosts on the victim network.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Login Hook
Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE has the ability to combine multiple sections of a binary which were broken up to evade detection into a single .dll prior to execution.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used administrator credentials for lateral movement in compromised networks.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Preloading Insecurity In Your Electron
Modern browsers are complicated systems. They enforce numerous security mechanisms to ensure isolation between sites, facilitate web security protections and preventing untrusted remote content to compromise the security of the host. When working with Electro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can add Login Items to establish persistence.[13][14] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Deep Dive into an ICS Firewall, Looking for the Fire Hole
Industrial control systems (ICS) security has become a serious concern over the past years. Indeed, threat to ICS systems has become reality and real world attacks have been observed. Many systems driving critical functions cannot be stopped... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has used svchost.exe to execute a malicious DLL .[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used Digicert code-signing certificates for some of its malware.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two can record audio from the compromised device's microphone and can record call audio in 3GP format.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat can hijack the cryptbase.dll within migwiz.exe to escalate privileges and bypass UAC controls.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has been delivered through spearphishing emails.[225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has created a service on victim machines named "TaskFrame" to establish persistence.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1036.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Match Legitimate Name or Location
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files or resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation. This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Native API
Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK ... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 A Walk Through Historical Correlations Between Vulnerabilities & Stock Prices
By common sense, we know that security vulnerabilities, data breaches, ransomware, privacy concerns and state-sponsored attacks impact negatively on the stock prices of public companies, but to what extent? How quickly ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0803
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Apply DLP to protect the confidentiality of information related to operational processes, facility locations, device configurations, programs, or databases that may have information that can be used to infer organizational trade-secrets, recipes, and other inte... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has cleared logs during post compromise cleanup activities.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to decode and decrypt downloaded files.[243][244] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can spread itself by infecting other portable executable files on removable drives.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound enabled and used the default system managed account, DefaultAccount, via "powershell.exe" /c net user DefaultAccount /active:yes to connect to a targeted Exchange server over RDP.[6] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.