text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a Windows service.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can collect the local time on a compromised host.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.[3][16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity can use the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key for persistence.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit DLL hijacking opportunities in services and processes.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1000
ATT&CK Technique Name:ACAD/Medre.A
ACAD/Medre.A can collect AutoCad files with drawings. These drawings may contain operational information. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has used publicly accessible DNS logging services to identify servers vulnerable to Log4j (CVE 2021-44228).[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:STARWHALE
STARWHALE can establish persistence by installing itself in the startup folder, whereas the GO variant has created a HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\OutlookM registry key.[251][252] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT has used HTTP if DNS C2 communications were not functioning.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Authenticate all access to field controllers before authorizing access to, or modification of, a device's state, logic, or programs. Centralized authentication techniques can help manage the large number of field controller accounts needed across the ICS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1021.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Services
Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using Valid Accounts that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon collects endpoint information using the systeminfo command.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae can use DLL side-loading to gain execution.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Properly configure firewalls and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to only necessary ports for that particular network segment. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can inject the loader file, Speech02.db, into a process.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar has a plugin designed to obtain a list of processes.[158][159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication. Where possible, also enable multi-factor authentication on externally facing services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has added persistence via the Registry key software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\microsoft windows html help.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1067
ATT&CK Technique Name:FluBot
FluBot has encrypted C2 message bodies with RSA and encoded them in base64.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker may attempt to connect to removable drives and mapped network drives.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0479
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEFENSOR ID
DEFENSOR ID has used Firebase Cloud Messaging for C2.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used ARP spoofing to redirect a compromised machine to an actor-controlled website.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict storage and execution of Control Panel items to protected directories, such as C:\Windows, rather than user directories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has checked for the existence of specific files including /usr/sbin/setenforce and /etc/selinux/config. It also has the ability to monitor the cryptocurrency miner file and process. [277] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
On Windows 8.1 and Server 2012 R2, enable LSA Protection by setting the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL to dword:00000001. [7] LSA Protection ensures that LSA plug-ins and drivers are only loaded if they are... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0459
ATT&CK Technique Name:MechaFlounder
MechaFlounder has the ability to run commands on a compromised host.[209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can be controlled via a custom C2 protocol over HTTP.[120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has used an open source batch script to modify Windows Defender registry keys.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive can download files to the compromised host.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed enumerating local processes.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Create the Registry key used to execute it and set the permissions to "Read Control" to prevent easy access to the key without administrator permissions or requiring Privilege Escalation.[2] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Room for Escape: Scribbling Outside the Lines of Template Security
Now more than ever, digital communication and collaboration are essential to the modern human experience. People around the globe work together online as they share information, create documents, send emails, and collaborate on spre... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0420
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dvmap
Dvmap decrypts executables from archive files stored in the assets directory of the installation binary.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can use cmd.exe to execute commands.[350] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk is able to delete system files to make the system unbootable and targets 35 different types of files for deletion. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has deployed a bootkit along with Downdelph to ensure its persistence on the victim. The bootkit shares code with some variants of BlackEnergy.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor has opened the registry and performed query searches.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has used regsvr32.exe to execute malicious DLLs.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Provider DLL
Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer checks the system for certain Registry keys.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors encoded some payloads with a single-byte XOR, both skipping the key itself and zeroing in an attempt to avoid exposing the key; other payloads were Base64-encoded.[242] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Perfectly Deniable Steganographic Disk Encryption
Deniable encryption and steganography nominally safeguard sensitive information against forced password disclosure by concealing its very existence. However, while the presence of sensitive information may be 'plausibly' denied, the possession of st... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates can collect messages from GSM, WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook, and Threema by reading the application’s notification content.[4] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 The Firmware Supply-Chain Security Is Broken: Can We Fix It?
Nowadays, it's difficult to find any hardware vendor who develops all the components present in its products. Many of these components, including firmware, are outsourced to ODMs. As a result, this limits the ability of hardware vendors... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 8 introduced additional limitations on the implicit intents that an application can register for.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum can impersonate a logged-on user's security context using a call to the ImpersonateLoggedOnUser API.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used a compromised global administrator account in Azure AD to backdoor a service principal with ApplicationImpersonation rights to start collecting emails from targeted mailboxes.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit’s infpub.dat file creates a scheduled task to launch a malicious executable.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette can identify payment systems, payment gateways, and ATM systems in compromised environments.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot used COM to setup scheduled task for persistence.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain has authenticated itself to a different implant, Cryshell, through a port knocking and handshake procedure.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0220
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaos
Chaos conducts brute force attacks against SSH services to gain initial access.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
The name of the Industroyer payload DLL is supplied by the attackers via a command line parameter supplied in one of the main backdoors execute a shell command commands. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has added itself to the Registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ for persistence.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has changed memory protection permissions then overwritten in memory DLL function code with shellcode, which was later executed via KernelCallbackTable hijacking. Lazarus Group has also used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs into m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors deployed the MaoCheng dropper with a stolen Adobe Systems digital signature.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT used TLS to encrypt communications over port 143[29] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Breaking Brains, Solving Problems: Lessons Learned from Two Years of Setting Puzzles and Riddles for InfoSec Professionals
Many of us got into security because we like solving hard problems, and problem-solving is often listed as a specific requirement in security job descriptions. You might need pr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hijack Execution Flow
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run applications. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 The Dark Age of Memory Corruption Mitigations in the Spectre Era
The prevalence of memory corruption bugs in the past decades resulted in numerous defenses, such as stack canaries, control flow integrity (CFI), and memory-safe languages. These defenses can prevent entire classes of vulnerabilities, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use asynchronous procedure call (APC) injection to execute commands received from C2.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can communicate with C2 over TCP and UDP.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can determine the time on the victim machine via IPinfo.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."[272] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used WebDAV to upload stolen USB files to a cloud drive.[26] Turla has also exfiltrated stolen files to OneDrive and 4shared.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has used WMIC to execute commands on remote computers.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury has used DNS requests over UDP port 53 for C2.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used schtasks for persistence including through the periodic execution of a remote XSL script or a dropped VBS payload.[92][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Default Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on W... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used MS-SQL access to a pivot machine, allowing code execution throughout the ICS network.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
The creation and modification of systemd service unit files is generally reserved for administrators such as the Linux root user and other users with superuser privileges. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has acquired dynamic DNS services for use in the targeting of intended victims.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has collected data from victims' local systems.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0186
ATT&CK Technique Name:DownPaper
DownPaper collects the victim host name and serial number, and then sends the information to the C2 server.[114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can use group policy to push a scheduled task from the AD to all network machines.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 spear phishing campaigns have included malicious Word documents with DDE execution.[17] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Charged by an Elephant – An APT Fabricating Evidence to Throw You In Jail
It's easy to forget the human cost of state-sponsored threats operating with impunity. While we often think of espionage, intellectual property theft, or financial gain as the objectives of these cyber operations, there's a fa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer can suppress UAC prompts by setting the HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command registry key on Windows 10 or HKCU\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command on Windows 7 and launching the eventvwr.msc process, which launches BitPaymer with elevate... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYPLUG
The KEYPLUG Windows variant has retrieved C2 addresses from encoded data in posts on tech community forums.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0068
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLATINUM
PLATINUM is capable of using Windows hook interfaces for information gathering such as credential access.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu will inject itself into different processes to evade detection. The selection of the target process is influenced by the security software that is installed on the system (Duqu will inject into different processes depending on which security suite is installed on the infe... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Turing in a Box: Applying Artificial Intelligence as a Service to Targeted Phishing and Defending Against AI Generated Attacks
With recent advances in next-generation language models such as OpenAI's GPT-3, AI generated text has reached a level of sophistication that matches or even exceeds human g... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor has automatically collected data about the compromised system.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
T9000 uses the Skype API to record audio and video calls. It writes encrypted data to %APPDATA%\Intel\Skype.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can use keylogging to capture user input.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used a DGA to generate domain names for C2.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Consider adjusting read and write permissions for NTFS EA, though this should be tested to ensure routine OS operations are not impeded. [24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
Impacket's wmiexec module can be used to execute commands through WMI.[60] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 The Hidden RCE Surfaces That Control the Droids
Android OS internally uses a large number of libraries to process incoming files through various standard APIs defined in AOSP as well as self-developed APIs. These libraries are not only used to process some internal format files, but also used to p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has established persistence by creating a Registry run key.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY can perform keylogging by polling the GetAsyncKeyState() function.[90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0144
ATT&CK Technique Name:ChChes
ChChes establishes persistence by adding a Registry Run key.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has encrypted its binaries via AES and encoded files using Base64.[326][327] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Winter is Coming Back: Defeating the Most Advanced Rowhammer Defenses to Gain Root and Kernel Privileges
Rowhammer attacks can break the MMU-enforced memory protection to achieve privilege escalation, without requiring any software vulnerability. To mitigate such an attack, numerous software-only... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can achieve persistence by modifying Registry key entries.[8] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.