text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0179
ATT&CK Technique Name:MimiPenguin
MimiPenguin can use the <PID>/maps and <PID>/mem file to search for regex patterns and dump the process memory.[3][1] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Safeguarding UEFI Ecosystem: Firmware Supply Chain is Hard(coded)
The UEFI ecosystem is very complicated in terms of supply chain security where we have multiple parties involved in the firmware code development like Intel/AMD with its reference code, or AMI, Phoenix and Insyde with its core framew... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has exploited the Log4j utility (CVE-2021-44228), on-premises MS Exchange servers via "ProxyShell" (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), and Fortios SSL VPNs (CVE-2018-13379).[40][41][42][43][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 will copy files over to Windows Admin Shares (like ADMIN$) as part of lateral movement.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used PowerShell to download and execute payloads.[208][209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer contains an IEC 61850 module that enumerates all connected network adapters to determine their TCP/IP subnet masks. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [3] [4] These audits should also include if default ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Edge Side Include Injection: Abusing Caching Servers into SSRF and Transparent Session Hijacking
When caching servers and load balancers became an integral part of the Internet's infrastructure, vendors introduced what is called "Edge Side Includes" (ESI), a technology allowing malleability in cach... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lock Bootloader
A locked bootloader could prevent unauthorized modifications to protected operating system files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1020.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Traffic Duplication
Adversaries may leverage traffic mirroring in order to automate data exfiltration over compromised infrastructure. Traffic mirroring is a native feature for some devices, often used for network analysis. For example, devices may be configured to forward netw... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect generated event files that are stored locally with proper permissions and authentication and limit opportunities for adversaries to increase privileges by preventing Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Utilize a trust model such as Docker Content Trust with digital signatures to ensure runtime verification of the integrity and publisher of specific image tags.[4][5] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Dridex Gone Phishing
In January 2016, we discovered a new modus operandi launched by Evil Corp, the organization that owned and operated Dridex banking Trojan. A new build was released to the wild, using Andromeda botnet platform, mainly targeting users in the UK. We studied the attacks linked with th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader scans processes to perform anti-VM checks. [53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0855
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unauthorized Command Message
Adversaries may send unauthorized command messages to instruct control system assets to perform actions outside of their intended functionality, or without the logical preconditions to trigger their expected function. Command messages are used in ICS ne... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can replicate itself across connected servers via psexec.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can Base64 encode system information sent to C2.[72][73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 gained access to production environments where they could inject malicious code into legitimate, signed files and widely distribute them to end users.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has been executed via malicious e-mail attachments.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can use wmic.exe to delete shadow copies on compromised networks.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali has been delivered via malicious links embedded in e-mails.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY's credphisher.py module can prompt a current user for their credentials.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has used PsExec to stop services prior to the execution of ransomware.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder /Library/LaunchAgents.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has obtained and used malware such as Cobalt Strike.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has the ability to steal credentials from web browsers including Internet Explorer, Opera, Yandex, and Chrome.[56][57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has redirected compromised machines to an actor-controlled webpage through HTML injection.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used compromised credentials and a .NET tool to dump data from Microsoft Exchange mailboxes.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1056.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Portal Capture
Adversaries may install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. For example, a compromised login page may log provided user credentials before logging the u... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has obfuscated .NET executables by inserting junk code.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Elise
Elise executes ipconfig /all after initial communication is made to the remote server.[78][79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used RDP for direct remote point-and-click access.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles routinely deleted tools, logs, and other files after they were finished with them.[238] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can obtain network information, including DNS, IP, and proxies.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has injected SMB URLs into malicious Word spearphishing attachments to initiate Forced Authentication.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader can use the schtasks utility to bypass UAC.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1072
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer2
Industroyer2 modifies specified Information Object Addresses (IOAs) for specified Application Service Data Unit (ASDU) addresses to either the ON or OFF state.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has created new services to establish persistence.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry uses Tor for command and control traffic.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for cloud accounts, especially privileged accounts. This can be implemented in a variety of forms (e.g. hardware, virtual, SMS), and can also be audited using administrative reporting features.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0469
ATT&CK Technique Name:ABK
ABK has the ability to inject shellcode into svchost.exe.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Leverage services provided by Content Delivery Networks (CDN) or providers specializing in DoS mitigations to filter traffic upstream from services.[4] Filter boundary traffic by blocking source addresses sourcing the attack, blocking ports that are being tar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 malware has injected a Cobalt Strike beacon into Rundll32.exe.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Paging All Windows Geeks – Finding Evil in Windows 10 Compressed Memory
FireEye's FLARE team analyzed the Windows 10 memory compression implementation to enable access to data in the newly introduced (and undocumented) virtual store. This closes the door to malware evading detection during memory f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware gathers a list of running processes.[239] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1569.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Service Execution
Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (services.exe) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GU... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type may create a temporary user on the system named Lost_{Unique Identifier} with the password pond~!@6"{Unique Identifier}.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:admin@338
admin@338 actors used the following command after exploiting a machine with LOWBALL malware to acquire information about local networks: ipconfig /all >> %temp%\download[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
Derusbi is capable of enumerating Registry keys and values.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be advised to be extra scrutinous of applications that request location, and to deny any permissions requests for applications they do not recognize. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0617
ATT&CK Technique Name:HELLOKITTY
HELLOKITTY can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1074.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Local Data Staging
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer's OPC and IEC 61850 protocol modules include the ability to send stVal requests to read the status of operational variables. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has configured persistence to the Registry ket HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, Spotify =% APPDATA%\Spotify\Spotify.exe and used .LNK files in the startup folder to achieve persistence.[159][160][161][162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has used LZMA and base64 libraries to decode obfuscated scripts.[174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun used dynamic API resolutions to various Windows APIs by leveraging LoadLibrary() and GetProcAddress().[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to identify the IP of the infected host.[236] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke has used HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used compromised servers as infrastructure.[11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
Devices that allow remote management of firmware should require authentication before allowing any changes. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors downloaded additional files to the infected system.[332] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 BrokenMesh: New Attack Surfaces of Bluetooth Mesh
Bluetooth Mesh is a mesh networking standard based on Bluetooth Low Energy. It was made public by Bluetooth Special Interest Group (Bluetooth SIG) in 2017. Bluetooth Mesh enables many-to-many device communications and is optimized for creating large-... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk registers as a service under the Plug-And-Play Support name.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has the ability to create the Registry key name EstsoftAutoUpdate at HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce to establish persistence.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 established persistence using Registry Run keys, both to execute PowerShell and VBS scripts as well as to execute their backdoor directly.[19][20][21] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Scaling the Security Researcher to Eliminate OSS Vulnerabilities Once and For All
Imagine a world where a security researcher becomes aware of a security vulnerability, impacting thousands of Open Source Software (OSS) projects, and is enabled to both identify and fix them all at once. Now imagine a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot Integrity
Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. [2] [3] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Deep Impact: Recognizing Unknown Malicious Activities from Zero Knowledge
To detect malicious activities, there are pattern matching, blacklists, behavioral analysis, and event correlation. However, those existing approaches have several problems. For instance:- Unknown threats and sophisticated at... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use a custom command and control protocol that can be encapsulated in HTTP or HTTPS. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.[70][71][72][73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use modules that extract passwords from common web browsers such as Firefox and Chrome.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher queries Registry values as part of its anti-sandbox checks.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used the Microsoft administration tool csvde.exe to export Active Directory data.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has stolen domain credentials by dumping LSASS process memory using Task Manager, comsvcs.dll, and from a Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controller using Mimikatz.[52][53][54][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire includes various modules for enumerating Group Policy.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT has relied on a victim to open a malicious attachment within an email for execution.[251][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects password policy information with the command net accounts.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Provide an alternative method for sending critical commands message to outstations, this could include using radio/cell communication to send messages to a field technician that physically performs the control function. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates typically provide patches for vulnerabilities that could be abused by malicious applications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control where appropriate, especially regarding the execution of tools outside of the organization's security policies (such as rootkit removal tools) that have been abused to impair system defenses. Ensure that only approved security applicatio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
To use this technique remotely, an adversary must use it in conjunction with RDP. Ensure that Network Level Authentication is enabled to force the remote desktop session to authenticate before the session is created and the login screen displayed. It ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability use TCP to send or receive C2 packets.[54] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Abusing Azure Active Directory: From MFA Bypass to Listing Global Administrators
The majority of Fortune 500 organizations are using Azure Active Directory (Azure AD) as Identity and Access Management (IAM) solution. The high adoption rate makes Azure AD a lucrative target for threat actors, incl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has been executed through use of VBScripts.[103][104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates can track the device’s location.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has used the netstat -naop tcp command to display TCP connections on a victim's machine.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET saves a screen capture of the victim's system with a numbered filename and .jpg extension. Screen captures are taken at specified intervals based on the system. [179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY can exfiltrate collected information from the host to the C2 server.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
For C0018, the threat actors acquired a variety of open source tools, including Mimikatz, Sliver, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, AnyDesk, and PDQ Deploy.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has created a Registry Run key named Dropbox Update Setup to establish persistence for a malicious Python binary.[286] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster can use "stackstrings" for obfuscation.[110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1568.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fast Flux DNS
Adversaries may use Fast Flux DNS to hide a command and control channel behind an array of rapidly changing IP addresses linked to a single domain resolution. This technique uses a fully qualified domain name, with multiple IP addresses assigned to it which are sw... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Most embedded network devices support TACACS+ and/or RADIUS. Follow vendor prescribed best practices for hardening access control. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa can collect then exfiltrate files from the compromised system.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy uses PowerShell commands to download and execute payloads.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control configured to block execution of InstallUtil.exe if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0944
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Library Loading
Restrict the use of untrusted or unknown libraries, such as remote or unknown DLLs. | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.