text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae can achieve persistence through a Registry Run key.[174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0840
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Connection Enumeration
Adversaries may perform network connection enumeration to discover information about device communication patterns. If an adversary can inspect the state of a network connection with tools, such as Netstat, in conjunction with System Firmware, then th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1583.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Services
Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Contro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot writes data into the Registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Pniumj.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can bypass Windows UAC through either DLL hijacking, eventvwr, or appPaths.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0238
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxysvc
Proxysvc registers itself as a service on the victim’s machine to run as a standalone process.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.Consider applying SID Filtering to interforest trusts, such as forest trusts and external trusts, to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources. SID Filte... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a scheduled task.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0280
ATT&CK Technique Name:MirageFox
MirageFox is likely loaded via DLL hijacking into a legitimate McAfee binary.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0618
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIVEHANDS
FIVEHANDS can receive a command line argument to limit file encryption to specified directories.[22][23] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 New Ways of IPV6 Scanning
Nowadays, there are fewer and fewer IPv4 addresses, but IPv6 is popular because it has enough addresses. Assuming an attacker scans at a rate of 1 million hosts per second, it will take 500,000 years. So it seems that IPv6 is very secure, and the address scanning attack is ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data from a victim network. The group has specifically used credentials stolen through a spearphishing email to login to the DCCC network. The group has also leveraged default manufa... | secon |
title:botconf2015 Behavior-driven development in malware analysis
A daily task of malware analysts is the extraction of behaviors from malicious binaries. Such behaviors include domain generation algorithms, cryptographic algorithms or deinstallation routines. Ideally, this tedious task would be automated. So far scien... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Use Group Policy to disable screensavers if they are unnecessary.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron can be configured to automatically exfiltrate files under a specified directory.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can use parent PID spoofing to elevate privileges.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession has the ability to drop additional files to an infected machine.[374] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Reverse Engineering Compliance
A big part of reverse engineering is asking "how does this work?" That's usually a step on the way to asking "why does it work thatway?" or "how can I make this work for me?" And usually, we reverse machine code. But we can bring the same thinking to other things. We... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:RC Scripts
Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to m... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Message in a Broken Bottle: Exploring the Linux IPC Attack Surface
There might be some truth to the joke that "Linux" is what the systemd operating system used to be called. Systemd is one of several system services that run in userspace and communicate via IPC. You could almost imagine it as a micr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0285
ATT&CK Technique Name:OldBoot
OldBoot uses escalated privileges to modify the init script on the device's boot partition to maintain persistence.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE has the capability to enumerate files.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Mebromi
Trojan.Mebromi performs BIOS modification and can download and execute a file as well as protect itself from removal.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Suckfly
Suckfly used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.[61] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Dive Into Apple IO80211Family Vol. 2
At the Black Hat USA 2020 I presented a topic [1] related to the Apple IO80211Family, which discussed the architecture, attack surfaces, and numerous cases of kernel vulnerabilities for the Apple 80211 Wi-Fi kernel extensions. One and a half years have passed, a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet schedules a network job to execute two minutes after host infection.[167] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to use a Microsoft Outlook backdoor macro to communicate with its C2.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:The White Company
The White Company has checked the current date on the victim system.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has been loaded through a .wll extension added to the %APPDATA%\microsoft\word\startup\ repository.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic has used scheduled tasks to add persistence.[91] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Monitoring Surveillance Vendors: A Deep Dive into In-the-Wild Android Full Chains in 2021
Over the past 12 months, Google's TAG (Threat Analysis Group) and Android Security teams have discovered and analyzed several in-the-wild 1day/0day exploits by surveillance vendors. We will present in-the-wild... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0804
ATT&CK Technique Name:Human User Authentication
All field controllers should require users to authenticate for all remote or local management sessions. The authentication mechanisms should also support Account Use Policies, Password Policies, and User Account Management. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has renamed malware to GoogleUpdate.exe and WinRAR to jucheck.exe, RecordedTV.ms, teredo.tmp, update.exe, and msadcs1.exe.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has searched for SSH keys, Docker credentials, and Kubernetes service tokens.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has served fake updates via legitimate websites that have been compromised.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1220
ATT&CK Technique Name:XSL Script Processing
Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY has been observed using a Registry Run key.[207][208] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can discover specified filetypes and log files on a targeted system.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0150
ATT&CK Technique Name:POSHSPY
POSHSPY modifies timestamps of all downloaded executables to match a randomly selected file created prior to 2013.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell can gather the IP address from the victim's machine using the IP config command.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used port 444 when sending data about the system from the client to the server.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent Office applications from creating child processes and from writing potentially malicious executable content to disk. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad maintains a configuration block and virtual file system in the Registry.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon creates a new service named "ntssrv" to execute the payload. Newer versions create the "MaintenaceSrv" and "hdv_725x" services.[108][109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop of an infected host.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has been used to execute netstat -ano on a compromised host.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0275
ATT&CK Technique Name:UPPERCUT
UPPERCUT has the capability to gather the victim's current directory.[312] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has obtained free and publicly available tools including SingleFile and HTTrack to copy login pages of targeted organizations.[89][90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can determine the NetBios name and the IP addresses of targets machines including domain controllers.[57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has modules to interact with the Windows task scheduler.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used application shim databases for persistence.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a batch file that modified the COMSysApp service to load a malicious ipnet.dll payload and to load a DLL into the svchost.exe process.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Automatic Protocol Reverse Engineering
Protocol reverse engineering is the process of extracting the specification of a network protocol from a binary code that implements it. Extraction of protocol specification is useful in several security-related contexts, such as finding implementation bugs, de... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can decompress and decrypt DLLs and shellcode.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1566.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spearphishing via Service
Adversaries may send spearphishing messages via third-party services in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing via service is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit permissions associated with creating and modifying platform images or containers based on the principle of least privilege. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot can search a compromised host for specific files.[222] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has digitally signed malware and utilities to evade detection.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has embedded malicious code into websites to screen a potential victim's IP address and then exploit their browser if they are of interest.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can use the "Direct Reply" feature of Android to automatically reply to notifications with a message provided by C2.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can identify and use configured proxies in a compromised network for C2 communication.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can collect the username on the victim machine to send to C2.[198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0169
ATT&CK Technique Name:RawPOS
RawPOS installs itself as a service to maintain persistence.[101][102][103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can communicate with its C2 server via TCP over port 5200.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kasidet
Kasidet has the ability to initiate keylogging and screen captures.[84] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Money Doesn't Stink - Cybercriminal Business Insight of A New Android Botnet
In mid 2018, we discovered one of the largest reported Android banking botnets known to date, that we named Geost. It was discovered when we saw one of their botmasters logging in into one of their C&C servers while us... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Black Box is Dead. Long Live Black Box!
The number of logic attacks on ATMs continues to rise. Some of them involve a "black box," a device that is physically connected to the cash dispenser and sends commands to push out cash. Within five years of the first known black box attacks (starting from 20... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally, Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.[49][50][51][52]. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0950
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [5] Control flow integrity checking is an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0803
ATT&CK Technique Name:Block Command Message
Adversaries may block a command message from reaching its intended target to prevent command execution. In OT networks, command messages are sent to provide instructions to control system devices. A blocked command message can inhibit response functions from c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has used malware that will issue the command shutdown /r /t 1 to reboot a system after wiping its MBR.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 My Ticks Don't Lie: New Timing Attacks for Hypervisor Detection
Hypervisor detection is a pillar of sandbox evasion techniques. While hardware-assisted virtualization solutions are indispensable for scalable dynamic malware analysis, compared to bare-metal machines they all introduce timing discrep... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Manage the access control list for "Replicating Directory Changes" and other permissions associated with domain controller replication. [18] [19] Consider adding users to the "Protected Users" Active Directory security group. This can help limit the c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider used PsExec to leverage Windows Defender to disable scanning of all downloaded files and to restrict real-time monitoring.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can parse Outlook .pst files to extract e-mail addresses.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer downloads a shellcode payload from a remote C2 server and loads it into memory.[226] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deep Panda
Deep Panda has used regsvr32.exe to execute a server variant of Derusbi in victim networks.[16] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 When Machines Can't Talk: Security and Privacy Issues of Machine-to-Machine Data Protocols
Two popular machine-to-machine (M2M) protocols—MQTT & CoAP—are slowly forming the backbone of many IoT infrastructures, including critical industry environments. They are used to provide data connectivity for ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
If email delegation is not required, disable it. In Google Workspace this can be accomplished through the Google Admin console.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has queried the Registry to identify victim information.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to hook libc functions in order to hide the installed dropper and mining software in process lists.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector has been disguised as a legitimate service using the name PythonUpdateSrvc.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1070.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clear Command History
In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that use... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)
With a 19 year old vulnerability, we were able to sign a message with the private key of Facebook. We'll show how we found one of the oldest TLS vulnerabilities in products of 10 different vendors and how we practically exploited it on famous sites. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit permissions for creating new instances in accordance with least privilege. Organizations should limit the number of users within the organization with an IAM role that has administrative privileges, strive to reduce all permanent privileged role assign... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Enforce proxies and use dedicated servers for services such as DNS and only allow those systems to communicate over respective ports/protocols, instead of all systems within a network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used native APIs including GetModuleFileName, lstrcat, CreateFile, and ReadFile.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has harvested valid administrative credentials for lateral movement.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1481.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:One-Way Communication
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service channel as a means for sending commands to a compromised system without receiving return output. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 APTs Go Teleworking: The Rise of VPN Exploits
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, workforces rely even more on VPN technologies for remote access into private networks.Pulse Secure by Ivanti is a leading VPN technology. Enterprise VPN devices often are deployed at the intersection between trusted and untr... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Mobile Interconnect Threats: How Next-Gen Products May be Already Outdated
"Walled garden" used to be the security principle backing SS7 networks. This is no longer the case, and some attackers may benefit from access to these networks to leverage mobile network functions: geolocation, access to su... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch can monitor for removable drives being plugged into the compromised machine.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used compromised domain administrator credentials as part of their lateral movement.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can identify logged in users across the domain and views user sessions.[88][89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0540
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asacub
Asacub can collect various pieces of device network configuration information, such as mobile network operator.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY enables remote interaction and can obtain additional code over HTTPS GET and POST requests.[256][257][258] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.