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ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can enumerate specific files for encryption.[45][46][47][48][49][50][51][52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 used sticky-keys to obtain unauthenticated, privileged console access.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit’s infpub.dat file creates a scheduled task to launch a malicious executable.[25] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Selling 0-Days to Governments and Offensive Security Companies
Selling 0-days is a fascinating process that not a lot of people are familiar with. This talk will discuss a vulnerability brokerage company called Q-recon and provide a glimpse of how this market works. In the presentation the followin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has collected data and files from a compromised host.[49][172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can download a remote access tool, ShiftyBug, and inject into another process.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Detecting Malicious Cloud Account Behavior: A Look at the New Native Platform Capabilities
Until recently, major public cloud providers have offered relatively basic toolsets for identifying suspicious activity occurring inside customer accounts that may indicate a compromise. Some organizations ha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
If Shamoon cannot access shares using current privileges, it attempts access using hard coded, domain-specific credentials gathered earlier in the intrusion.[19][20] | secon |
title:botconf2018 How Much Should You Pay for your own Botnet ?
Cloud computing provides scalable and on-demand infrastructure, which seems to be the perfect way to host a botnet. This paper focuses on cloud-based botnets to perform legal DDoS resilience tests. We model the cost of such botnets and provide both technic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider modifying host firewall rules to prevent egress traffic from verclsid.exe. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0333
ATT&CK Technique Name:UBoatRAT
UBoatRAT checks for virtualization software such as VMWare, VirtualBox, or QEmu on the compromised machine.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1001.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Junk Data
Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwis... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic can retrieve the current content of the user clipboard.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can download text files with commands from an FTP server and exfiltrate data via email.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0109
ATT&CK Technique Name:WEBC2
Variants of WEBC2 achieve persistence by using DLL search order hijacking, usually by copying the DLL file to %SYSTEMROOT% (C:\WINDOWS\ntshrui.dll).[38] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 5G IMSI Catchers Mirage
IMSI catchers aka Stingrays aka fake base stations are well-known privacy threats to almost every mobile phone with SIM card connectivity (including iOS or Android-based) in the world. The cellular network generations such as 2G, 3G, and 4G are vulnerable to such almost unde... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Amadey
Amadey has overwritten registry keys for persistence.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be instructed to not grant applications unexpected or unnecessary permissions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has exploited CVE-2014-4076, CVE-2015-2387, CVE-2015-1701, CVE-2017-0263 to escalate privileges.[3][4][5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Blockchain Autopsies - Analyzing Ethereum Smart Contract Deaths
In the blockchain, contracts may be lost but are never forgotten. Over 1,500,000 Ethereum smart contracts have been created on the blockchain but under 7,000 unique contracts have value today. An even smaller fraction of those have sou... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0217
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHUTTERSPEED
SHUTTERSPEED can download and execute an arbitary executable.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can modify Registry values within HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\\Excel\Security\AccessVBOM\ to enable the execution of additional code.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer has set the run key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[46] | secon |
title:botconf2022 Operation GamblingPuppet: Analysis of a multivector and multiplatform campaign targeting online gambling customers
Despite being illegal in some countries, global online gambling industry growths steadily year after year, flourishing in current environment dominated by the global pandemic. This trend ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
A gh0st RAT variant has used rundll32 for execution.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0307
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.Agent.ao uses Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) for command and control.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has placed a malicious payload in %WINDIR%\SYSTEM32\oci.dll so it would be sideloaded by the MSDTC service.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1550.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Access Token
Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of lo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT schedules tasks to run malicious scripts at different intervals.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Configure SNMPv3 to use the highest level of security (authPriv) available.[2] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Level Up Your Security Mindset
We live in a world of constant change, so why is it the people who obsess about the latest and greatest are often the most resistant to change? Is security incompatible with modern environments in which it serves? On the other hand, just sprinkle some "quantum machine ... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Engineering Cybersecurity for a Nation: What Singapore is Learning from Cars and Sanitation
Defending a country is different from a corporate network. Singapore wants to be a Smart Nation and wants to shift the paradigm of cybersecurity in order to achieve that. Doing so will require us to challen... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Reverse Engineering the Tesla Battery Management System to increase Power Available
Tesla released the dual motor performance Model S in late 2014. At that time the vehicle came with "insane mode" acceleration and an advertised 0-60 time of 3.2 seconds. Later, in July of 2015, Tesla announced "Ludi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin uses a command prompt to run a PowerShell script from Excel.[70] To assist in establishing persistence, RogueRobin creates %APPDATA%\OneDrive.bat and saves the following string to it:powershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden -exec bypass -File "%APPDATA%\OneDrive.ps1... | secon |
title:botconf2016 Takedown client-server botnets the ISP-way
Botnet is currently a existing threat to Internet users around the world. Users can lose money, personal information if infected. Bonet takedown has been a pressing need of many organizations in the world: the FBI, the national governments, the Internet servi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used a script that ran WMI queries to check if a VM or sandbox was running, including VMWare and Virtualbox. The script would also call WMI to determine the number of cores allocated to the system; if less than two the script woul... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has used PowerShell commands to download additional files.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used malicious links to lure victims into downloading malware.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block processes created by PsExec from running. [2] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Alice in Kernel Land: Lessons Learned From the eBPF Rabbit Hole
Extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) is a technology that provides capabilities to programmers seeking to make use of kernel layer performance and functionality. Fundamentally, eBPF allows users to load programs into kernel space a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1067
ATT&CK Technique Name:FluBot
FluBot can send SMS phishing messages to other contacts on an infected device.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1606.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:SAML Tokens
An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate. The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the condition... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has distributed ransomware by backdooring software installers via a strategic web compromise of the site hosting Italian WinRAR.[9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic encrypts collected data using a public key framework before sending it over the C2 channel.[20] Some variants encrypt the collected data with AES and encode it with base64 before transmitting it to the C2 server.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Mobile OSes have implemented measures to make it more difficult to trick users into installing untrusted certificates and configurations. iOS 10.3 and higher add an additional step for users to install new trusted CA certificates and configuration profiles. On... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has the ability to search for files on the compromised host.[205] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot can collect files and information from a compromised host.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0460
ATT&CK Technique Name:Get2
Get2 has the ability to identify the computer name and Windows version of an infected host.[145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use Window admin shares (C$ and ADMIN$) for lateral movement.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet reduces the integrity level of objects to allow write actions.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to identify network settings on a compromised host.[75] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Message in a Broken Bottle: Exploring the Linux IPC Attack Surface
There might be some truth to the joke that "Linux" is what the systemd operating system used to be called. Systemd is one of several system services that run in userspace and communicate via IPC. You could almost imagine it as a mic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used valid accounts including shared between Managed Service Providers and clients to move between the two environments.[44][45][46][47] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Fuzzing and Breaking Security Functions of SIMATIC PLCs
<span style="font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-size:
10pt;">Siemens SIMATIC PLC is widely used in the world and accounts for a high proportion of the PLC market share, these PLCs are often used in critical infrastructure control scenarios... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic collects the OS version, hardware information, computer name, available system memory status, disk space information, and system and user language settings.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can enumerate Security Support Providers (SSPs) as well as utilize PowerSploit's Install-SSP and Invoke-Mimikatz to install malicious SSPs and log authentication events.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tarrask
Tarrask is able to create "hidden" scheduled tasks for persistence.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0555
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHEMISTGAMES
CHEMISTGAMES has utilized native code to decrypt its malicious payload.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 All Your GNN Models and Data Belong to Me
Many real-world data come in the form of graphs. Graph neural networks (GNNs), a new family of machine learning (ML) models, have been proposed to fully leverage graph data to build powerful applications. In particular, the inductive GNNs, which can generali... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has used AES encryption for C2 communication.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 AI Gone Rogue: Exterminating Deep Fakes Before They Cause Menace
The face: A crucial means of identity. But what if this crucial means of identity is stolen from you? Yes, this is happening and is termed as 'Deep fake.' Deep fake technology is an artificial intelligence based human image blending m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang backdoor RoyalDNS established persistence through adding a service called Nwsapagent.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0346
ATT&CK Technique Name:OceanSalt
OceanSalt can create a reverse shell on the infected endpoint using cmd.exe.[240] OceanSalt has been executed via malicious macros.[240] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used VBA and embedded macros in Word documents to execute malicious code.[79][80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner harvested system resources to mine cryptocurrency, using XMRig to mine Monero.[14] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Sneak into Your Room: Security Holes in the Integration and Management of Messaging Protocols on Commercial IoT Clouds
With the increasing popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT), many IoT clouds have emerged to help device manufacturers connect their devices to customers and offload the communic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT can launch a command shell interface for executing commands.[238] | secon |
title:botconf2022 Yara: Down the Rabbit Hole Without Slowing Down
Terry and John are two malware analysts working for an unnamed antivirus company. Terry has worked there for many years, and he is helping John, who started recently, to learn more about their work. John is starting to use Yara — an excellent tool for th... | secon |
title:botconf2014 Middle Income Malware Actors in Poland: VBKlip and Beyond
In the past year we have closely observed a new malware family attacking Polish online banking users. It utilized a simple observation: users tend not to check whether the text they copied is the one they pasted. Especially when that text is a ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has checked for the Google Updater process to ensure Goopy was loaded properly.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can identify the system time on a targeted host.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0491
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrongPity
StrongPity has the ability to hide the console window for its document search module from the user.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used Android backdoors that would send information and data from a victim's mobile device to the C2 servers.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy has included a program "ExeProtector", which monitors for the existence of GoldenSpy on the infected system and redownloads if necessary.[137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to enumerate Registry keys, including KEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt\strDataDir to search for a bitcoin wallet.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS will perform UAC bypass either through fodhelper.exe or eventvwr.exe.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to install several loadable kernel modules (LKMs) on infected machines.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle can save its configuration data as a RC4-encrypted Registry key under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\GameCon.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can enumerate processes on a target system.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely. (e.g. plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\ and dropped a shortcut in %STARTUP%.[181][182] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak stores a configuration files in the startup directory to automatically execute commands in order to persist across reboots.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 established persistence using Registry Run keys, both to execute PowerShell and VBS scripts as well as to execute their backdoor directly.[19][20][21] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Practical HTTP Header Smuggling: Sneaking Past Reverse Proxies to Attack AWS and Beyond
Web applications commonly rely on proxy servers adding, modifying, or filtering HTTP headers to pass information to back-end servers. Research in recent years has shown how flawed implementations of these action... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0107
ATT&CK Technique Name:Whitefly
Whitefly has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy has built in commands to identify a host’s IP address and find out other network configuration settings by viewing connected sessions.[184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0036
ATT&CK Technique Name:FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD stages data it copies from the local system or removable drives in the "%WINDIR%\$NtUninstallKB885884$\" directory.[35] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Scammers Who Scam Scammers, Hackers Who Hack Hackers: Exploring a Hidden Sub-economy on Cybercrime Forums and Marketplaces
It's no secret that criminal forums and marketplaces are crammed with nefarious activity. But behind all the initial access brokers, stolen data, and malware, there's a hidden,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can call ShellExecuteW to open the default browser on the URL localhost.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can stage files in a central location prior to exfiltration.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
During Operation Sharpshooter, a first-stage downloader installed Rising Sun to %Startup%\mssync.exe on a compromised host.[189] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used tools with the ability to search for files on a compromised host.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM has used PsExec to move laterally between hosts in the target network.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil sends exfiltrated data from the victims system using HTTPS POST messages sent to the C2 system. [6] [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE achieves persistence by creating a shortcut to itself in the CSIDL_STARTUP directory.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use LoadLibrary to attempt to execute GdiPlus.dll.[6] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.