text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has embedded links to malicious downloads in e-mails.[103][104] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Industroyer2: Sandworm's Cyberwarfare Targets Ukraine's Power Grid Again
Industroyer2 – a new version of the only malware to ever trigger electricity blackouts – was deployed in Ukraine amidst the ongoing Russian invasion. Like in 2016 with the original Industroyer, the aim of this recent c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies for master passwords.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu can be configured to have commands relayed over a peer-to-peer network of infected hosts if some of the hosts do not have Internet access.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can take a screenshot of the target machine and save it to a file.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1474
ATT&CK Technique Name:Supply Chain Compromise
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can execute the command code do_upload to send files to C2.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Notifications
Adversaries may collect data within notifications sent by the operating system or other applications. Notifications may contain sensitive data such as one-time authentication codes sent over SMS, email, or other mediums. In the case of Credential Access, advers... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0667
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chrommme
Chrommme can enumerate the IP address of a compromised host.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has infected victims using watering holes.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. [6] [7] [5] [8] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Hunting for Bugs, Catching Dragons
While browser and plugin exploits are frequent, it's less common to see exploits affecting targets without scripting capabilities. Are these worth attacking? How do we proceed? How do we identify valid entry points and bugs? This talk will cover some research done... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Derusbi
Derusbi has used unencrypted HTTP on port 443 for C2.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Provide an alternative method for sending critical report messages to operators, this could include using radio/cell communication to obtain messages from field technicians that can locally obtain telemetry and status data. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0326
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedDrop
RedDrop exfiltrates details of the victim device operating system and manufacturer.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be taught that Device Administrator permissions are very dangerous, and very few applications need it. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 The Next Arms Race
The Internet is not supposed to have borders, but it does. Countries fight and spy on each other on the Internet every day. So, borders still exist on the Internet, and almost all countries are investing into offensive use of cyber power. The new weapons they are developing are... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:netsh
netsh can be used to set up a proxy tunnel to allow remote host access to an infected host.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Use of proper Identity and Access Management (IAM) with Role Based Access Control (RBAC) policies to limit actions administrators can perform and provide a history of administrative actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a VBS script to facilitate lateral tool transfer. The VBS script was used to copy ICS-specific payloads with the following command: cscript C:\Backinfo\ufn.vbs C:\Backinfo\101.dll C... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Internal Server Error: Exploiting Inter-Process Communication in SAP's HTTP Server
More than 400,000 organizations, including 90% of Fortune 500 companies, rely on SAP's software to keep their business up and running. At the core of every SAP deployment is the Internet Communication Manager (ICM), ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can load DLLs through vulnerable legitimate executables.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy utilizes valid user and administrator credentials, in addition to creating new administrator accounts to maintain presence. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can collect the system's computer name and also has the capability to collect information on the processor, memory, OS, and video card from the system.[12][13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1021.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 SirenJack: Cracking a 'Secure' Emergency Warning Siren System
SirenJack is a vulnerability that was found to affect radio-controlled emergency warning siren systems from ATI Systems. It allows a bad actor, with a $30 handheld radio and a laptop, to set off all sirens in a deployment. Hackers can tr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit user access to system utilities such as 'systemctl' or 'systemd-run' to users who have a legitimate need. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete used multiple compiled Python scripts on the victim’s system. Machete's main backdoor Machete is also written in Python.[28][25][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0552
ATT&CK Technique Name:AdFind
AdFind can gather information about organizational units (OUs) and domain trusts from Active Directory.[5][6][7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet can propagate via removable media using an autorun.inf file or the CVE-2010-2568 LNK vulnerability.[25] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Behind the Scenes of Intel Security and Manageability Engine
Today low-level firmware vulnerabilities are becoming more a focus than in the past, mainly due to the nature of having highest privilege on the system and due to the advanced security protection and mitigation that exist in the host Opera... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 used the ipconfig /all command to gather the IP address from the system.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Squirrelwaffle
Squirrelwaffle has relied on users enabling malicious macros within Microsoft Excel and Word attachments.[220][221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 The Evil Alt-Ego: (ab)using HTTP Alternative Services
The HTTP Alternative Services header (Alt-Svc, RFC 7838) was introduced in 2013 by seasoned developers with "good intentions" in a bid to streamline load balancing, protocol optimizations, and client segmentation. It has been subsequently imple... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1588.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploits
Adversaries may buy, steal, or download exploits that can be used during targeting. An exploit takes advantage of a bug or vulnerability in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior to occur on computer hardware or software. Rather than developing their own e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot has C2 commands that can uninstall the app from the infected device.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. This may mitigate, or at least alleviate, the scope of AiTM activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch has automatically exfiltrated stolen files to Dropbox.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist has used HTTP GET and POST requests over port 443 for C2.[301] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0229
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orz
Orz has used Technet and Pastebin web pages for command and control.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file. Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Where 2 Worlds Collide: Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX
Over the past fifteen years there's been an uptick in "interesting" UNIX infrastructures being integrated into customers' existing AD forests. Whilst the threat models enabled by this should be quite familiar to anyone securing a heterogeneous ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
To contain the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from it.[... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can use IsDebuggerPresent to detect whether a debugger is present on a victim.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flame
Flame can record audio using any existing hardware recording devices.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use New-GPOImmediateTask to modify a GPO that will install and execute a malicious Scheduled Task/Job.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0279
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proton
Proton removes logs from /var/logs and /Library/logs.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Who Did It - How We Attributed Campaigns of a Cyber Mercenary
In this talk, we put a cyber mercenary into the spotlight. This cyber mercenary does not have a shiny brochure or office, but it advertises services in underground forums like Probiv. We will detail campaigns of this actor we track as "V... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Cyber Insurance 101 for CISO’s
This session provides a basic understanding of a cyber policy including market dynamics, coverage terms and conditions, and services included with the product. We also discuss the value a CISO can bring to the cyber insurance procurement process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can use a variant of the sysprep UAC bypass.[64] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Abusing CNC Technologies
CNC machines are largely used in production plants and constitute a critical asset for organizations globally. The strong push dictated by the Industry 4.0 paradigm led to the introduction of technologies for the wide connectivity of industrial equipment, including CNCs. As... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Conducting a Successful False Flag Cyber Operation (Blame it on China)
Cyber attribution is hard, really hard. But luckily for attackers, a new armchair analyst is born every minute. Given any high profile hack, Captain Attribution™ is sure to show up and tell you how obvious it is that {China|Ru... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0133
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nomadic Octopus
Nomadic Octopus has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments.[164][165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
When the peripheral output is written to, sequence C intercepts the output and ensures it is not written to the process image output. The output is the instructions the PLC sends to a device to change its operating behavior. By intercepting the peripheral output, Stuxnet pr... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 This is for the Pwners : Exploiting a WebKit 0-day in PlayStation 4
Despite an active console hacking community, only few public PlayStation 4 exploits have been released. The exposed WebKit-based browser is usually the entrypoint of a fullchain attack: from browser exploitation to kernel exploitati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT can enumerate device drivers located in the registry at HKLM\Software\WBEM\WDM.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0926
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation. [7] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Zombie POODLE, GOLDENDOODLE, and How TLSv1.3 Can Save Us All
HTTPS is the backbone for online privacy and commerce – yet, for two decades, the underlying TLS protocol received little more than a series of band-aid fixes. Rather than deprecating cryptographic techniques with known weakness, the TLS... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy has used Tor relays for Command and Control servers.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0535
ATT&CK Technique Name:Golden Cup
Golden Cup can record audio from the microphone and phone calls.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has established persistence by using the Registry option in PowerShell Empire to add a Run key.[90][84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon establishes persistence in the Startup folder.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Sakula calls cmd.exe to run various DLL files via rundll32 and also to perform file cleanup. Sakula also has the capability to invoke a reverse shell.[293] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 1
At the end of day one of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Chris Eng, Daniel Cuthbert, Marina Krotofil, and Natalie Silvanovich for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury has intercepted unencrypted private keys as well as private key pass-phrases.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android accesses the list of installed applications.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used SMB to copy files to and from target systems.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1564.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hidden Files and Directories
Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME can search directories for files on the victim’s machine.[311] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Hacking the Supply Chain – The Ripple20 Vulnerabilities Haunt Tens of Millions of Critical Devices
<span style="font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-size:
10pt;">This is the story of how we found and exploited a series of critical vulnerabilities (later named Ripple20) affecting tens or hundreds o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about users on remote hosts.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax can spawn a command shell, and execute native commands.[141][142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Consider using the host firewall to restrict file sharing communications such as SMB. [33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has renamed malware to legitimate names such as ESTCommon.dll or patch.dll.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses an RPC server that contains a file dropping routine and support for payload version updates for P2P communications within a victim network.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0243
ATT&CK Technique Name:DealersChoice
DealersChoice makes modifications to open-source scripts from GitHub and executes them on the victim’s machine.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has acquired domains related to their campaigns to act as distribution points and C2 channels.[40][41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0242
ATT&CK Technique Name:SynAck
SynAck lists all the keyboard layouts installed on the victim’s system using GetKeyboardLayoutList API and checks against a hardcoded language code list. If a match if found, SynAck sleeps for 300 seconds and then exits without encrypting files.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can enumerate the OS version and hostname of a targeted machine.[161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Find and eliminate path interception weaknesses in program configuration files, scripts, the PATH environment variable, services, and in shortcuts by surrounding PATH variables with quotation marks when functions allow for them. Be aware of the search order Windows uses for e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0848
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rogue Master
Adversaries may setup a rogue master to leverage control server functions to communicate with outstations. A rogue master can be used to send legitimate control messages to other control system devices, affecting processes in unintended ways. It may also be used to dis... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1587.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Malware
Adversaries may develop malware and malware components that can be used during targeting. Building malicious software can include the development of payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors (including backdoored images), packers, C2 protocols, and the creati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1602
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data from Configuration Repository
Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may al... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1553.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gatekeeper Bypass
Adversaries may modify file attributes and subvert Gatekeeper functionality to evade user prompts and execute untrusted programs. Gatekeeper is a set of technologies that act as layer of Apple’s security model to ensure only trusted applications are executed o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has exploited CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2014-1761, CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802 for execution.[52][53][54][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used scheduled tasks to maintain RDP backdoors.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0498
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cryptoistic
Cryptoistic can retrieve files from the local file system.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has run net localgroup to enumerate local groups.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Safeguarding UEFI Ecosystem: Firmware Supply Chain is Hard(coded)
The UEFI ecosystem is very complicated in terms of supply chain security where we have multiple parties involved in the firmware code development like Intel/AMD with its reference code, or AMI, Phoenix and Insyde with its core framew... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Industrial Remote Controller: Safety, Security, Vulnerabilities
Radio-frequency (RF) remote controllers are widely used in the manufacturing, construction, transportation, and many other industrial applications. Cranes, drillers, and miners, among others, are commonly equipped with RF remotes, wh... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can take screenshots of the victim’s machine.[186] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Europe 2018
At the close of this year's conference, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and members of the esteemed Black Hat Review Board for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:DnsSystem
DnsSystem can download files to compromised systems after receiving a command with the string downloaddd.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
NETEAGLE will attempt to detect if the infected host is configured to a proxy. If so, NETEAGLE will send beacons via an HTTP POST request; otherwise it will send beacons via UDP/6000.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0416
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDFSNIFFER
RDFSNIFFER hooks several Win32 API functions to hijack elements of the remote system management user-interface.[12] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.