text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT has the ability to enumerate the Wide Area Network (WAN) IP through requests to ip-api[.]com, freegeoip[.]net, or api[.]ipify[.]org observed with user-agent string Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; rv:48.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/48.0.[191] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/AdDisplay.Ashas
Android/AdDisplay.Ashas has checked to see how many apps are installed, and specifically if Facebook or FB Messenger are installed.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon established persistence by setting the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\load registry key to point to its executable.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 used -W Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows by setting the WindowStyle parameter to hidden. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used Systeminfo to gather system information.[385] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0399
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pallas
Pallas retrieves a list of all applications installed on the device.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. | secon |
title:botconf2019 Zen: a Complex Campaign of Harmful Android Apps
Android malware authors go to great lengths to come up with increasingly clever ways to monetise their apps. The author (or a group) presented during my talk shows quite the range, from simply repacking apps with a bespoke advertising SDK to writing a so... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used dead drop resolvers on two separate tech community forums for their KEYPLUG Windows-version backdoor; notably APT41 updated the community forum posts frequently with new dead drop resolvers during the campaign.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to discover drive information on the infected host.[307] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker's PowerShell script can decode and decrypt multiple layers of obfuscation, leading to the Netwalker DLL being loaded into memory.[157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Install-SSP Persistence module can be used to establish by installing a SSP DLL.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has used a combination of symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA) encryption to encrypt files. Files have been encrypted with their own AES key and given a file extension of .RYK. Encrypted directories have had a ransom note of RyukReadMe.txt written to the directory.[81][38... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon scans the C-class subnet of the IPs on the victim's interfaces.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker has used sc.exe to create a new service for the VirtualBox driver.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0303
ATT&CK Technique Name:MazarBOT
MazarBOT can intercept two-factor authentication codes sent by online banking apps.[32] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 The Battle Against the Billion-Scale Internet Underground Industry: Advertising Fraud Detection and Defense
Advertising is the main profit model of internet companies; the annual industry scale of global internet advertising has reached hundreds of billions of dollars. In fact, internet advertising... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can send files from a victim's machine to Dropbox.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape has decrypted the password of the C2 server with a simple byte by byte XOR. Siloscape also writes both an archive of Tor and the unzip binary to disk from data embedded within the payload using Visual Studio’s Resource Manager.[214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
One of Dtrack can hide in replicas of legitimate programs like OllyDbg, 7-Zip, and FileZilla.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has set up custom DNS servers to send commands to compromised hosts via TXT records.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and remediate Privilege Escalation vectors so only authorized administrators can create scheduled tasks on remote systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa has used RSA and AES-CBC encryption algorithm to encrypt a list of targeted file extensions.[66] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 From Dead Data to Digestion: Extracting Windows Fibers for Your Digital Forensics Diet
Windows Fibers are a lesser known optional component of Windows. They are being adopted by attackers as a non-traditional way to execute code and sidestep EDR telemetry sources. Not only this but Fibers are being ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Access Removal
Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound malware has used a PowerShell command to check the victim system architecture to determine if it is an x64 machine. Other malware has obtained the OS version, UUID, and computer/host name to send to the C2 server.[218][219][220] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0349
ATT&CK Technique Name:LaZagne
LaZagne can perform credential dumping from memory to obtain account and password information.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0427
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickMo
TrickMo can detect if it is running on a rooted device or an emulator.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Healthscare – An Insider's Biopsy of Healthcare Application Security
Healthcare security teams are in a tough spot. While the provider industry is taking security seriously, they are at the mercy of the software vendors who provide the healthcare organizations with the data delivery, processin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can determine the Windows version and computer name on a compromised host.[386][387] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1597.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Intel Vendors
Adversaries may search private data from threat intelligence vendors for information that can be used during targeting. Threat intelligence vendors may offer paid feeds or portals that offer more data than what is publicly reported. Although sensitive detai... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin uses WMI to check BIOS version for VBOX, bochs, qemu, virtualbox, and vm to check for evidence that the script might be executing within an analysis environment. [46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has utilized multiple techniques to bypass UAC.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard can execute files on remote machines using DCOM.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used malware to decrypt encrypted CAB files.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used Right-to-Left Override to deceive victims into executing several strains of malware.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik can use Accessibility Services to disable Google Play Protect.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly used the command query user on victim hosts.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clop
Clop has used built-in API functions such as WNetOpenEnumW(), WNetEnumResourceW(), WNetCloseEnum(), GetProcAddress(), and VirtualAlloc().[54][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy uses netstat -aon to gather network connection information.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.[199] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist can collect the username on a targeted system.[135] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Breaking the IIoT: Hacking industrial Control Gateways
Industrial control gateways connect most of the critical infrastructure surrounding us to the centralized management systems: From power grids (transformer stations, solar fields), city infrastructure (traffic lights, tunnel control systems) to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can collect passwords stored in web browers, including Internet Explorer, Edge, Chrome, and Naver Whale.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can use thread injection to inject shellcode into the process of security software.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can use TLS to encrypt its C2 channel.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
A module in Prikormka collects information about the paths, size, and creation time of files with specific file extensions, but not the actual content of the file.[237] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can use Invoke-TokenManipulation for manipulating tokens.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use GetProcAddress to help delete malicious strings from memory.[141] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer can use supplied user credentials to execute processes and stop services.[36] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Non-Intrusive Vulnerability Localization and Hotpatching for Industrial Control Systems
Over the years, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) manufacturers have started embracing extensive system library support provided by control logic development software, easing the development process. Furthermore... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke steals user files from removable media with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak checks the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings for proxy configurations information.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound used various social media channels (such as LinkedIn) as well as messaging services (such as WhatsApp) to spearphish victims.[8][9][10] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Afternoon Break
Afternoon Break will be served in the following areas for Briefings pass holders.Bay View Court North Corridor (North Convention Center)Bay View Court South Corridor (North Convention Center)Breakers Registration Corridor, Lagoon Corridor (Level 2)South Seas Foyer North, Jasmine Foy... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater decoded base64-encoded PowerShell commands using a VBS file.[153][154][155][156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can run set.bat, update.bat, cache.bat, bcd.bat, msrun.bat, and similar scripts.[218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, Sandworm Team blocked reporting messages by using malicious firmware to render communication devices inoperable. [2] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Keynote: Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas
Alejandro Mayorkas was sworn in as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security by President Biden on February 2, 2021. Mayorkas is the first Latino and immigrant confirmed to serve as Secretary of Homeland Security. He has led a distinguished 30-year career... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to capture keystrokes on an infected host.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0202
ATT&CK Technique Name:adbupd
adbupd contains a copy of the OpenSSL library to encrypt C2 traffic.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can enumerate information about a variety of cloud services, such as Office 365 and Sharepoint instances or OpenID Configurations.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER persists using a scheduled task that executes every minute.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has modified the Registry to perform multiple techniques through the use of Reg.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has used previously compromised administrative accounts to escalate privileges.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian has the ability to use /bin/sh to execute commands.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0927
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda checks processes on the system and if they meet the necessary requirements, it injects into that process.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Remote Memory-Deduplication Attacks
Cloud providers use memory deduplication to reduce the memory utilization of their systems. Memory deduplication merges memory pages with identical content and maps them under a copy-on-write semantic. Previous work showed that memory deduplication can be explo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has sent malicious Word OLE compound documents to victims.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0503
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrameworkPOS
FrameworkPOS can XOR credit card information before exfiltration.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local P... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent.btz
Agent.btz drops itself onto removable media devices and creates an autorun.inf file with an instruction to run that file. When the device is inserted into another system, it opens autorun.inf and loads the malware.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1059.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleScript
Adversaries may abuse AppleScript for execution. AppleScript is a macOS scripting language designed to control applications and parts of the OS via inter-application messages called AppleEvents. These AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or easily scripted ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 XMPP Stanza Smuggling or How I Hacked Zoom
XMPP is a popular instant messaging protocol based on XML that is used in messengers, online games and other applications. This talk will introduce a new way of attacking XMPP client software: XMPP stanza smuggling. More specifically, it will show how seemi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
The executable version of Helminth has a module to log keystrokes.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can create a cronjob for persistence if it determines it is on a Linux system.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:MiniDuke
MiniDuke can download additional encrypted backdoors onto the victim via GIF files.[294][263] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Suckfly
Suckfly used legitimate account credentials that they dumped to navigate the internal victim network as though they were the legitimate account owner.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ptrace System Calls
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can download additional malware plug-in modules and execute them on the victim’s machine.[490] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0207
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vasport
Vasport copies itself to disk and creates an associated run key Registry entry to establish.[273] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 You have No Idea Who Sent that Email: 18 Attacks on Email Sender Authentication
Our study demonstrates an unfortunate fact that even a conscientious security professional using a state-of-the-art email provider service like Gmail cannot with confidence readily determine, when receiving an email, wh... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Attacking Electric Motors for Fun and Profit
Electric motors (EMs) account for more than 40 percent of annual global electricity consumption and an estimated market size of $214 Billion by 2025. They drive autonomous vehicles and transportation systems, precisely control robotic movements in industr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be encouraged to be very careful with what applications they grant phone call-based permissions to. Further, users should not change their default call handler to applications they do not recognize. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two can take pictures with the device cameras.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 "We Are About to Land": How CloudDragon Turns a Nightmare Into Reality
On October 27th, 2020, the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency of the United States (CISA) jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense Cyber National Mission Force (C... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.[1] | secon |
title:botconf2020 Hunting the Quasar Family – How to Hunt a Malware Family
QuasarRAT is the most famous open source RAT project among many. Since xRAT (the predecessor of Quasar RAT) was released in 2014, many attackers have deployed this RAT in many attack campaigns. Particularly, they take advantage of the open sourc... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Legal Liability for IOT Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
There has been much discussion of "software liability," and whether new laws are needed to encourage or require safer software. My presentation will discuss how -- regardless of whether new laws are passed -- a tidal wave of litigation over defe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector can use an IronPython scripts to load a .NET injector to inject a payload into its own or a remote process.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream has the ability to clean traces of malware deployment.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1021.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:VNC
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB ("remote framebuffer") protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by r... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Zero - The Funniest Number in Cryptography
What is the funniest number in cryptography? 0. The reason is that for all x, x*0 = 0, i.e., the equation is always satisfied no matter what x is. This talk will explore crypto bugs in four BLS signatures' libraries (ethereum/py ecc, supranational/blst, h... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:SilverTerrier
SilverTerrier uses HTTP for C2 communications.[305] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors downloaded additional tools and files onto a compromised network.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0918
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Ensure users and user groups have appropriate permissions for their roles through Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls to prevent misuse. Implement user accounts for each individual that may access the repositories for role enforcement and non-repud... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has achieved persistence via scheduled tasks.[5] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.