text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0254
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLAINTEE
PLAINTEE uses reg add to add a Registry Run key for persistence.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors discovered removable disks attached to a system.[33] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Fire & Ice: Making and Breaking macOS Firewalls
In the ever raging battle between malicious code and anti-malware tools, firewalls play an essential role. Many a malware has been generically thwarted thanks to the watchful eye of these products. However on macOS, firewalls are rather poorly understo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok uses AppleScript to create a login item for persistence.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1608.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drive-by Target
Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in Drive-by Compromise. In such cases, the user's... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has created a scheduled task that executes every hour to establish persistence.[83] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Finding a Needle in an Encrypted Haystack: Leveraging Cryptographic Abilities to Detect the Most Prevalent Attacks on Active Directory
Active Directory has always been a popular target for attackers, with a constant rise in attack tools attempting to compromise and abuse the main secret storage of t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0369
ATT&CK Technique Name:CoinTicker
CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist to establish persistence.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has signed code with self-signed certificates.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that allowed them to establish persistence by adding the following Registry key: "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SvcHost" /v COMSysApp /t REG_MULTI_SZ /d "COMSysApp" /f.[188] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used the service control manager on a remote system to disable services associated with security monitoring products.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter gathered the local proxy, domain, IP, routing tables, mac address, gateway, DNS servers, and DHCP status information from an infected host.[209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can identify the country code on a compromised host.[10] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Whose phone is in your pocket?
In later April we discovered an Android malware that used for installing backdoor with root priveleges on the devices. This malware is popular in Russia, India, Ukraine, Algeria, but the spread is not limited to this countries. Our research has revealed infection cases a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet injects an entire DLL into an existing, newly created, or preselected trusted process.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
The Winnti for Windows dropper can place malicious payloads on targeted systems.[480] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has masqueraded the svchost.exe process to exfiltrate data.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail can instruct the OS to execute an application without a dock icon or menu.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea adds Registry Run keys to achieve persistence.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0913
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Ensure that applications and devices do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely (e.g., plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage). [10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence attempts to get users to launch malicious attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.[216][217][218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda collects the OS version, system architecture, computer name, product ID, install date, and information on the keyboard mapping to determine the language used on the system.[410][411] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors has used WMI to execute commands.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1639.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and co... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 A Framework for Evaluating and Patching the Human Factor in Cybersecurity
Social engineering (SE) attacks have dramatically changed in recent years: They are no longer limited to PCs and they goes way beyond phishing. Despite those changes, current methods for evaluating the resilience of users to S... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.[97][98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser is capable of capturing keystrokes on victims.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can collect data from network drives and stage it for exfiltration.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto uses a hidden directory named .calisto to store data from the victim’s machine before exfiltration.[10][11] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Bypassing the Maginot Line: Remotely Exploit the Hardware Decoder on Smartphone
Though researchers have found lots of vulnerabilities in Stagefright framework for audio/video codecs on Android smartphones, all these vulnerabilities are in the software implementation of the AOSP. However, almost all ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has used ListPlanting to inject code into a trusted process.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon has been executed through a malicious JScript downloader.[15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0546
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharpStage
SharpStage has a persistence component to write a scheduled task for the payload.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29, used AUDITPOL to prevent the collection of audit logs.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Uncommon Sense: Detecting Exploits with Novel Hardware Performance Counters and ML Magic
In recent years, exploits like speculative execution, Rowhammer, and Return Oriented Programming (ROP) were detected using hardware performance counters (HPCs). But to date, only relatively simple and well-unde... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 executed file /bin/pwd in activity exploiting CVE-2019-19781 against Citrix devices.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has specifically targeted government agency employees with spearphishing e-mails.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rclone
Rclone can exfiltrate data to cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3, and MEGA.[23][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0684
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROADTools
ROADTools leverages valid cloud credentials to perform enumeration operations using the internal Azure AD Graph API.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tonto Team
Tonto Team abuses a legitimate and signed Microsoft executable to launch a malicious DLL.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used CVE-2015-1701 to access the SYSTEM token and copy it into the current process as part of privilege escalation.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0294
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShiftyBug
ShiftyBug is packed with at least eight publicly available exploits that can perform rooting.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 GOD MODE UNLOCKED - Hardware Backdoors in x86 CPUs
Complexity is increasing. Trust eroding. In the wake of Spectre and Meltdown, when it seems that things cannot get any darker for processor security, the last light goes out. This talk will demonstrate what everyone has long feared but never proven:... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1588.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Digital Certificates
Adversaries may buy and/or steal SSL/TLS certificates that can be used during targeting. SSL/TLS certificates are designed to instill trust. They include information about the key, information about its owner's identity, and the digital signature of an enti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto adds permissions and remote logins to all users.[4] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Charged by an Elephant – An APT Fabricating Evidence to Throw You In Jail
It's easy to forget the human cost of state-sponsored threats operating with impunity. While we often think of espionage, intellectual property theft, or financial gain as the objectives of these cyber operations, there's a f... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack can shutdown and reboot the victim machine.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:DCSrv
DCSrv can compare the current time on an infected host with a configuration value to determine when to start the encryption process.[31] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 How to Better Fuzz Windows 10 Directx Kernel at Present
DirectX is the engine that handles rendering on the Windows platform. Many outstanding people have made outstanding contributions in the research of DirectX. In this talk, I will share new research content of DirectX including the discovery of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS uses SMS for command and control.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0248
ATT&CK Technique Name:yty
yty has some basic anti-sandbox detection that tries to detect Virtual PC, Sandboxie, and VMware. [62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk has used cmd.exe to create a Registry entry to establish persistence.[292] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa has the capability to create and modify file timestamps.[36] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Breaking Firmware Trust From Pre-EFI: Exploiting Early Boot Phases
Vulnerabilities in System Management Mode (SMM) and more general UEFI applications/drivers (DXE) are receiving increased attention from security researchers. Over the last 9 months, the Binarly efiXplorer team disclosed 42 high-impa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:PinchDuke
PinchDuke gathers system configuration information.[274] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used compromised domains to host links targeted to specific phishing victims.[9][10][11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has distributed NotPetya by compromising the legitimate Ukrainian accounting software M.E.Doc and replacing a legitimate software update with a malicious one.[13][14][15] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Talent Need Not Apply: Tradecraft and Objectives of Job-themed APT Social Engineering
When a job offer looks too good to be true… it probably is. As the COVID-19 pandemic has led workers to rethink their careers and long-term goals, threat actors have exploited it as an opportunity to fulfill strat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear has used byte randomization to obscure its behavior.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole InvisiMole can identify proxy servers used by the victim and use them for C2 communication.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0471
ATT&CK Technique Name:build_downer
build_downer has the ability to add itself to the Registry Run key for persistence.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has used first-stage payloads that download additional malware from C2 servers.[138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can use a WebView with a fake log in site to capture banking credentials.[28] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Hiding Objects from Computer Vision by Exploiting Correlation Biases
In this study, we find that a correlation bias exists in major computer vision systems and exploit it to automatically craft adversarial images.Objects commonly found together in nature have a strong correlation with each other. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs to spread malware to connected removable USB drives on infected machines.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa used a payload that creates a hidden window.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae can create a service to establish persistence.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can use process hollowing to inject one of its trojans into another process.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can search for modifiable services that could be used for privilege escalation.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to identify the Internet Explorer (IE) version on an infected host.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has routines for exfiltration over SMTP, FTP, and HTTP.[2][3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROCKBOOT
ROCKBOOT is a Master Boot Record (MBR) bootkit that uses the MBR to establish persistence.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deploy Compromised Device Detection Method
Mobile security software can typically detect if a device has been rooted or jailbroken and can inform the user, who can then take appropriate action. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use process hollowing to execute its main payload.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0284
ATT&CK Technique Name:More_eggs
More_eggs has used a signed binary shellcode loader and a signed Dynamic Link Library (DLL) to create a reverse shell.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors have used gsecdump to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used whoami to collect system user information.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet modifies the Import Address Tables DLLs to hook specific APIs that are used to open project files. [2] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 TeamTNT: Explosive Cryptomining
Since the introduction of Amazon Web Services (AWS) there has been a steady migration from on-premise to cloud deployments. Misconfigured cloud services can be low-hanging fruit for an attacker. Palo Alto Networks found that Docker services were attacked about every ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has gathered employee email addresses, including personal accounts, for social engineering and initial access efforts.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 can run on a daily basis using a scheduled task.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI can collect the username from the victim’s machine.[91] | secon |
title:botconf2013 The power of a team work – Management of Dissecting a Fast Flux Botnet, OP-Kelihos “Unleashed”
“Facing a come-back Fast Flux (HLUX) botnet like Kelihos (Khelios) which was previously announced to be shutdown by big entities is not an easy task that can be done by a small group of people. A better unde... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0454
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cadelspy
Cadelspy has the ability to steal data from the clipboard.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team used malware to enumerate email settings, including usernames and passwords, from the M.E.Doc application.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has used batch scripts and scheduled tasks to delete critical system files.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used Registry run keys to establish persistence for the RTM Trojan and other tools, such as a modified version of TeamViewer remote desktop software.[228][229] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has leveraged rundll32.exe to execute malicious DLLs.[97][89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has copied and installed tools for operations once in the victim environment.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can utilize Invoke-DCOM to leverage remote COM execution for lateral movement.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT malware was designed and used to insert SUNBURST into software builds of the SolarWinds Orion IT management product.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rundll32
Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. Shared Modules), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false pos... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader has the ability to inject shellcode into a donor processes that is started in a suspended state. GuLoader has previously used RegAsm as a donor process.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used PowerShell for execution.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has established persistence through the creation of a cryptocurrency mining system service using systemctl.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0306
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a
Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakeInst.a uses Google Cloud Messaging (GCM) for command and control.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0635
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoomBox
BoomBox can execute an LDAP query to discover e-mail accounts for domain users.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0462
ATT&CK Technique Name:CARROTBAT
CARROTBAT has the ability to download a base64 encoded payload.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains an implementation of PsExec for remote execution.[46] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.