text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used PowerShell for execution and privilege escalation.[141][142][143][144][145] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Stealthily Access Your Android Phones: Bypass the Bluetooth Authentication
Every Android phone loves Bluetooth, a short-range wireless communication technology. We can find a large number of Bluetooth devices in any public place. Many of their security issues have been exposed before, such as BlueBo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can create a scheduled task to establish persistence.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Downdelph
Downdelph uses search order hijacking of the Windows executable sysprep.exe to escalate privileges.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet uses a Windows rootkit to mask its binaries and other relevant files.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0321
ATT&CK Technique Name:HummingWhale
HummingWhale generates revenue by displaying fraudulent ads and automatically installing apps. When victims try to close the ads, HummingWhale runs in a virtual machine, creating a fake ID that allows the perpetrators to generate revenue.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has the ability to rename its payload to ESTCommon.dll to masquerade as a DLL belonging to ESTsecurity.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk can use anti-disassembly and code transformation obfuscation techniques.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT gathers the username from the system.[157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can send collected data in JSON format to its C2 server.[128] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Portable Document Flaws 101
PDF is a document format on steroids. In this talk, we will dive deep into the PDF specification and reveal its less known, insecure features. We perform a systematic and in-depth analysis of the capabilities of malicious PDF documents leading to vulnerabilities in all m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can base64 encode and AES-128-CBC encrypt data prior to transmission.[336] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Screensaver
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. The Windo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete uses HTTP for Command & Control.[193][194][195] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can remotely exfiltrate sensitive information from a compromised AD FS server.[46] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Put in One Bug and Pop Out More: An Effective Way of Bug Hunting in Chrome
Bugs are rarely unique. Software with a growing system size typically involves multiple teams responsible for the development of numerous features. Considering the complexity of the codebase, there is a high probability that... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 firmWar: An Imminent Threat to the Foundation of Computing
The global IT supply chain is under a heavy spotlight, amidst covid-impacted production shortages, work-from-home policies, geopolitical tensions, and an overall re-balkanization of technology design and production. The 2020 SolarWinds att... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0852
ATT&CK Technique Name:Screen Capture
Adversaries may attempt to perform screen capture of devices in the control system environment. Screenshots may be taken of workstations, HMIs, or other devices that display environment-relevant process, device, reporting, alarm, or related data. These device display... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used tasklist /v to determine active process information.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can register a Windows service named CsPower as part of its execution chain, and a Windows service named clr_optimization_v2.0.51527_X86 to achieve persistence.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer has attempted to install itself as a service to maintain persistence.[24] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Your Trash Kernel Bug, My Precious 0-day
The advance of kernel fuzzing techniques significantly benefits the discovery of kernel bugs. According to our statistics on Syzbot, Syzkaller has already unveiled more than 2,000 kernel bug reports on Linux over the past two years. From the security analysts... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Doors of Durin: The Veiled Gate to Siemens S7 Silicon
Siemens is a leading provider of industrial automation components for critical infrastructures, and their S7 PLC series is one of the most widely used PLCs in the industry. In recent years, Siemens integrated various security measures into their ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda checks for running processes on the victim’s machine.[281] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can search for debugging tools on a compromised host.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
A backdoor used by APT29 created a Tor hidden service to forward traffic from the Tor client to local ports 3389 (RDP), 139 (Netbios), and 445 (SMB) enabling full remote access from outside the network and has also used TOR.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy executes the reg query command to obtain information in the Registry.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoisonIvy
PoisonIvy starts a rootkit from a malicious file dropped to disk.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0843
ATT&CK Technique Name:Program Download
Adversaries may perform a program download to transfer a user program to a controller. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0424
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triada
Triada can redirect ad banner URLs on websites visited by the user to specific ad URLs.[14][15] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Return to Sender - Detecting Kernel Exploits with eBPF
One of the fastest growing subsystems in the Linux Kernel is, without any doubt, eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter). Although eBPF initially targeted network monitoring and filtering use cases, its capabilities have been broadened over time... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can take a desktop screenshot and save the file into \ProgramData\Mail\MailAg\shot.png.[169][170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Container Orchestration Job
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a sp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.[87][88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used tools that are capable of obtaining credentials from saved mail.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use RC4 to encrypt C2 communications.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to use DLL side-loading for execution.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0169
ATT&CK Technique Name:RawPOS
New services created by RawPOS are made to appear like legitimate Windows services, with names such as "Windows Management Help Service", "Microsoft Support", and "Windows Advanced Task Manager".[59][60][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has deleted tmp and prefetch files during post compromise cleanup activities.[74] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 First Contact - Vulnerabilities in Contactless Payments
Introduced in 2007, contactless (NFC) payments have been used widely for a decade. Accounting for more than 40% of transactions globally, contactless payments are fast replacing cash and CHIP. Yet, contactless makes use of protocols much olde... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has been delivered as malicious email attachments.[42] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Operational Templates for State-Level Attack and Collective Defense of Countries
The veneer of modern civilization is thin and brittle. Given sufficient will, it is disturbingly easy to systematically dismantle the functions of government and the cohesion which binds society together. Armies are man... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia obfuscates the configuration with a custom Base64 and XOR.[213][214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Enable account restrictions to prevent login attempts, and the subsequent 2FA/MFA service requests, from being initiated from suspicious locations or when the source of the login attempts do not match the location of the 2FA/MFA smart device. Use conditional ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can set its Beacon payload to reach out to the C2 server on an arbitrary and random interval.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer has the ability to collect the hostname and OS information from an infected host.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has used HTTP POST requests to transmit data.[124][125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can start a VNC-based remote desktop server and tunnel the connection through the already established C2 channel.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 executed CHOPSTICK by using rundll32 commands such as rundll32.exe "C:\Windows\twain_64.dll". APT28 also executed a .dll for a first stage dropper using rundll32.exe. An APT28 loader Trojan saved a batch script that uses rundll32 to execute a DLL payload.[8][6][9][10][1... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 From Zero to Sixty: The Story of North Korea's Rapid Ascent to Becoming a Global Cyber Superpower
In a relatively short period of time, North Korea has evolved its offensive cyber capability from that of a fledgling nation to a global cyber superpower. Having shifted their focus from purely destruc... | secon |
title:botconf2014 Ad Fraud Botnets 101
In recent years ad fraud botnets have proven to be a significant threat to the online advertising industry, with their cost to advertisers being increasingly discussed in the press.In this talk we will give an overview of the online advertising industry, and we will describe how t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles has obtained and used tools such as Mimikatz and PsExec.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare has been named wuauclt.exe to appear as the legitimate Windows Update AutoUpdate Client.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer uses heavily obfuscated code in its Windows Notepad backdoor.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has modified data timestamps to mimic files that are in the same folder on a compromised host.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Keeping Secrets: Emerging Practice in Database Encryption
A wide gap exists between real-world attack scenarios and the implicit security guarantees of most popular databases, particularly around confidentiality of encrypted information. This talk will review the latest advances and breaks in datab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0315
ATT&CK Technique Name:DualToy
DualToy side loads malicious or risky apps to both Android and iOS devices via a USB connection.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can detect commonly used and generic virtualization platforms based primarily on drivers and file paths.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT has a plugin for keylogging.[155][156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used legitimate local admin account credentials.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can open a hidden menu when a specific phone number is called from the infected device.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Web Service
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a ne... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of group policy. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard was executed through an unsecure kubelet that allowed anonymous access to the victim environment.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer can exfiltrate data over actor-controlled C2 servers via HTTP or TCP.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0808
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Network Traffic
The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Everything has Changed in iOS 14, but Jailbreak is Eternal
iOS 14.0 was released on Sep 16, 2020, but people got their first real 14.x jailbreak after more than 5 months. In the past, every time Apple released a security update, there would soon be new vulnerabilities, and almost every version would... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used RAR to create password-protected archives of collected documents prior to exfiltration.[49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0171
ATT&CK Technique Name:Felismus
Felismus collects the current username and sends it to the C2 server.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 injects its malware variant, ROKRAT, into the cmd.exe process.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:SPACESHIP
SPACESHIP achieves persistence by creating a shortcut in the current user's Startup folder.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0187
ATT&CK Technique Name:Daserf
Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork apparently altered NDiskMonitor samples by adding four bytes of random letters in a likely attempt to change the file hashes.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0508
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ngrok
Ngrok can be used to proxy connections to machines located behind NAT or firewalls.[31][32] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Testing Your Organization's Social Media Awareness
The phishing landscape is rapidly changing, and in the last few years we have witnessed over a 10-fold increase in social media-based phishing. Yet social media sites have taken few steps to detect or block automated intelligence gathering on t... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Defeating a Secure Element with Multiple Laser Fault Injections
In 2020, we evaluated the Microchip ATECC508A Secure Memory circuit. We identified a vulnerability allowing an attacker to read a secret data slot using Single Laser Fault Injection. This was presented during Black Hat USA. Subsequently... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Holding on for Tonight: Addiction in InfoSec
Substance abuse is present in and affects all communities, even information security. This session will detail the relationship between stress, addiction, and relapse. Additionally, the speaker will discuss her experience with alcohol use disorder while ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0815
ATT&CK Technique Name:Watchdog Timers
System and process restarts should be performed when a timeout condition occurs. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-Factor Authentication
Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 The Cost of Complexity: Different Vulnerabilities While Implementing the Same RFC
Our presentation discusses a simple question: What is the security cost of complexity and ambiguity? We analyze this as measured in terms of vulnerable implementations.To explore this question, we analyzed a very spe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can obtain a list of users from an infected machine.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can wait 30 minutes before initiating contact with C2.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX can use API hashing and modify the names of strings to evade detection.[78][225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET identifies the macOS version and uses ioreg to determine serial number.[402] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 can temporarily store files in a hidden directory on the local host.[21] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Graph Convolutional Network-Based Suspicious Communication Pair Estimation for Industrial Control Systems
Whitelisting is considered an effective security monitoring method for networks used in industrial control systems, where the whitelists consist of observed tuples of the IP address of the serve... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0167
ATT&CK Technique Name:Matryoshka
Matryoshka can establish persistence by adding a Scheduled Task named "Microsoft Boost Kernel Optimization".[103][104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used batch scripts to enumerate users on a victim domain controller.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, Sandworm Team blocked command messages by using malicious firmware to render communication devices inoperable. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used has used Metasploit’s named-pipe impersonation technique to escalate privileges.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has used a macro to check that an ActiveDocument shape object in the lure message is present. If this object is not found, the macro will exit without downloading additional payloads.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro has contained an alarm that triggers every three minutes and timers for communicating with the C2.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use MSIExec to spawn multiple cmd.exe processes.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use tools that restrict program execution via application control by attributes other than file name for common operating system utilities that are needed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
An APT28 loader Trojan uses a cmd.exe and batch script to run its payload.[14] The group has also used macros to execute payloads.[15][16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYPLUG
KEYPLUG can use TCP and KCP (KERN Communications Protocol) over UDP for C2 communication.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA has generated non-human advertising impressions.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
During FunnyDream, the threat actors downloaded additional droppers and backdoors onto a compromised system.[188] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.