text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader adds a Registry Run key for persistence and adds a script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.[247] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0450
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHARPSTATS
SHARPSTATS has used base64 encoding and XOR to obfuscate PowerShell scripts.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used malicious documents to lure victims into allowing execution of PowerShell scripts.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0647
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turian
Turian can retrieve the internal IP address of a compromised host.[237] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a local user account.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer attempts to copy itself to remote machines on the network.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least privilege by limiting privileges of user accounts so only authorized accounts can modify and/or add server software components.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used malware that adds cryptocurrency miners as a service.[119] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Google Reimagined a Phone. It was Our Job to Red Team and Secure it.
Despite the large number of phone vendors, most Android devices are based on a relatively small subset of system on a chip (SoC) vendors. Google decided to break this pattern with the Pixel 6. From a security perspective, this mean... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has abused the PasswordChangeNotify to monitor for and capture account password changes.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0667
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chrommme
Chrommme can encrypt and store on disk collected data before exfiltration.[14] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 The Discovery of a Government Malware and an Unexpected Spy Scandal
In early 2019, we revealed the existence of a new intrusion software built and primarily used in Italy by the authorities. The company that created this software managed to stay under the radar for several years, until we identified... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has created rules in victims' Microsoft Outlook accounts to automatically delete emails containing words such as "hacked," "phish," and "malware" in a likely attempt to prevent organizations from communicating about their activities.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot injects itself into running instances of outlook.exe, iexplore.exe, or firefox.exe.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:AvosLocker
AvosLocker has used obfuscated API calls that are retrieved by their checksums.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to bypass UAC using a passuac.dll file.[21][22] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 A Deep Dive into Privacy Dashboard of Top Android Vendors
Most android vendors designed privacy dashboards before Android 12 to allow users to monitor sensitive behaviors of their installed apps, such as clipboard access, location collection, file operation, etc. However, we conducted comprehensive ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can disconnect previously connected remote drives.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can decode its payload prior to execution.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit remote user permissions if remote access is necessary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0326
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedDrop
RedDrop collects and exfiltrates information including IMEI, IMSI, MNC, MCC, nearby Wi-Fi networks, and other device and SIM-related info.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA551
TA551 has used encoded ASCII text for initial C2 communications.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
An APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent has the ability to enumerate files and directories on a compromised host.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Milan
Milan can use cmd.exe for discovery actions on a targeted system.[94] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0333
ATT&CK Technique Name:UBoatRAT
UBoatRAT checks for virtualization software such as VMWare, VirtualBox, or QEmu on the compromised machine.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Many vendors provide digitally signed operating system images to validate the integrity of the software used on their platform. Make use of this feature where possible in order to prevent and/or detect attempts by adversaries to compromise the system image. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0021
During C0021, the threat actors used SSL via TCP port 443 for C2 communications.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT lists the running processes on the system.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0138
ATT&CK Technique Name:Andariel
Andariel has downloaded additional tools and malware onto compromised hosts.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used environment variables and standard input (stdin) to obfuscate command-line arguments. FIN8 also obfuscates malicious macros delivered as payloads.[6][38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has the capability to kill any running analysis processes and AV software.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0390
ATT&CK Technique Name:SQLRat
SQLRat has created scheduled tasks in %appdata%\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\.[62] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Resting on Feet of Clay: Securely Bootstrapping OPC UA Deployments
While most protocols in industrial control systems (ICS) rarely implement security features, the OPC Foundation's Unified Architecture (OPC UA) promises security features such as authentication, authorization, integrity, and confide... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER includes a library that creates Modbus connections with a device to request its device ID.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 used a backdoor, QUICKRIDE, to communicate to the C2 server over HTTP and HTTPS.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0874
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hooking
Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for execution and privilege escalation means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Window... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has cleared event logs on compromised hosts.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has performed code obfuscation, including encoding payloads using Base64 and using a framework called "Dont-Kill-My-Cat (DKMC). APT32 also encrypts the library used for network exfiltration with AES-256 in CBC mode in their macOS backdoor.[25][26][27][28][29][30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 leveraged Sysmon to understand the processes, services in the organization.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT samples have been seen which hijack COM objects for persistence by replacing the path to shell32.dll in registry location HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\InprocServer32.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Bypassing NGAV for Fun and Profit
In this talk, we demonstrate the first methodological approach to "reverse engineer" a NGAV model and features without reversingthe product, and generate a PE malware that bypasses next generation anti-virus (NGAV) products (e.g., Cylance). Previous such attacks ag... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Set directory access controls to prevent file writes to the search paths for applications, both in the folders where applications are run from and the standard dylib folders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has created LNK files in the Startup folder to establish persistence.[276] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate has the ability to capture screenshots.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has used the NetUserEnum function to enumerate local accounts.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can create a link to itself in the Startup folder to automatically start itself upon system restart.[37][263] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1591.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Determine Physical Locations
Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be advised that applications generally do not require permission to send SMS messages. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1205
ATT&CK Technique Name:Traffic Signaling
Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0679
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious
Ferocious can run anti-sandbox checks using the Microsoft Excel 4.0 function GET.WORKSPACE to determine the OS version, if there is a mouse present, and if the host is capable of playing sounds.[20] | secon |
title:botconf2022 Detecting emerging malware on cloud before VirusTotal can see it
In this session, we will present our approach for detecting newly emerging malware on a cloud platform and predicting its behavior, and doing so before VirusTotal or any other 3rd party detection engine can report it.We will specifically... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has hidden code within Excel spreadsheets by turning the font color to white and splitting it across multiple cells.[262] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0222
ATT&CK Technique Name:CCBkdr
CCBkdr was added to a legitimate, signed version 5.33 of the CCleaner software and distributed on CCleaner's distribution site.[4][5][1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0347
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuditCred
AuditCred can inject code from files to other running processes.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet can access the victim’s webcam to take pictures.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE has the capability to create a reverse shell.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has used printf and file I/O loops to delay process execution as part of API hammering.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0646
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpicyOmelette
SpicyOmelette can identify the IP of a compromised system.[216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can execute the command code do_download to retrieve remote files from C2.[342] | secon |
title:botconf2022 mwdb: open source tools to build your malware analysis pipeline
During almost a decade of our malware analysis experience in cert.pl, we have tried many different approaches. Most of them failed but we have learned a lot about what works and what does not. Finally, after several years of development, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has modified registry keys for persistence, to enable credential caching for credential access, and to facilitate lateral movement via RDP.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can enumerate the current network connections of a host.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can identify the process that owns remote connections.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has installed a systemd service script to maintain persistence.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used legitimate web services including Pastebin, Dropbox, and GitHub for C2 communications.[8][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has attempted to transfer USBferry from an infected USB device by copying an Autorun function to the target machine.[26] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Achieving Linux Kernel Code Execution Through a Malicious USB Device
How robust is the security of a fully updated, widely used and locked-down Linux-based device without any known rooting methods? Where the only non-trusted code being executed is heavily sandboxed JavaScript? Which has almost no u... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, AvosLocker was disguised using the victim company name as the filename.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's CRYPTO module can create and export various types of authentication certificates.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany samples sometimes use common binary packers such as UPX and Aspack on top of a custom Delphi binary packer.[87][88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors obtained the password for the victim's password manager via a custom keylogger.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Security Updates
Security updates frequently contain patches to vulnerabilities that can be exploited for root access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth has used a scheduled task for persistence.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects a list of network shares with the command net share.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has created scheduled tasks that run a VBScript to execute a payload on victim machines.[119][120][121][122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT12
APT12 has used blogs and WordPress for C2 infrastructure.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0245
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADCALL
BADCALL collects the computer name and host name on the compromised system.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Users should be encouraged to be very careful with what applications they grant SMS access to. Further, users should not change their default SMS handler to applications they do not recognize.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot may use net view /domain to display hostnames of available systems on a network.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0323
ATT&CK Technique Name:Charger
Charger checks the local settings of the device and does not run its malicious logic if the device is located in Ukraine, Russia, or Belarus.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:WinMM
WinMM is usually configured with primary and backup domains for C2 communications.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
All field controllers should restrict operating mode changes to only required authenticated users (e.g., engineers, field technicians), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism. Further, physical mechanisms (e.g., keys) can also be use... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can inject a malicious DLL (PTASpy) into the AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService to backdoor Azure AD Pass-Through Authentication.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can use ImprovedReflectiveDLLInjection to deploy components.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has collected schemas and user accounts from systems running SQL Server.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0010
For C0010, UNC3890 actors staged malware on their infrastructure for direct download onto a compromised system.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has used a tool to steal credentials from installed web browsers including Microsoft Internet Explorer and Google Chrome.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0252
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brave Prince
Some Brave Prince variants have used South Korea's Daum email service to exfiltrate information, and later variants have posted the data to a web server via an HTTP post command.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
cron permissions are controlled by /etc/cron.allow and /etc/cron.deny. If there is a cron.allow file, then the user or users that need to use cron will need to be listed in the file. cron.deny is used to explicitly disallow users from using cron. If neither ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYPLUG
KEYPLUG has the ability to communicate over HTTP and WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the capability to create new instances. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1204.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Malicious Image
Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has created scheduled tasks to maintain persistence on a compromised host.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0410
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fysbis
Fysbis can collect information about running processes.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has used shell scripts to execute commands after installation and set persistence mechanisms.[4][5] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Page Cache Attacks: Microarchitectural Attacks on Flawless Hardware
In recent years, we have seen that optimizations in processors often enable new microarchitectural side channels. The severity of side-channel attacks varies widely, from small annoyances for which developers have to introduce wo... | secon |
Subsets and Splits
Top 100 EPUB Books
This query retrieves a limited set of raw data entries that belong to the 'epub_books' category, offering only basic filtering without deeper insights.