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PSYOP 8.pdf | ally ineffective because most ofthe
Americans involved had no more appreciation of the political
and cultural realities ofVietnam than we did of Lebanon in
1983.
Prospects for the Future
Asthe decade ofthe sixties ended and that of the seventies
began, many observers believed that the United States would de-
velop a co... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | of statecraft
by the State Department and theUSIA than was the case in
1970.There has been scant modification of the long-held view
that the conduct of psychological operations isan exclusively
military task-appropriate in war, but deplorable in peace.The
recognition has not dawned that such activities are funda-
ment... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rected the revitalization of the armed
forces' capabilities to conduct such activities in support of
military operations in crisis and in war. Typically, the NSDD
did not establish any effective interagency mechanism for
orchestrating and coordinating the various international
communication capabilities.
Usingthe NSDD ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | :
I. JCS development of a comprehensive joint doctrine to
cover employment to strengthendeterrence, in crisis and in
war, as the foundation of the revitalization effort;
327
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
2. augmentation ofplanning capabilityonmajor combatant
command staffs;
3. functionalseparationofspecial and psychological... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e font for doctrine and
conceptualisation, for the direction of research and analysis,
for planning supportofthe unified and specified commanders,
and for assistance to the secretary and the chairman in
developing defense positions onnationalpsychological plans
and campaigns.
It will take much hard work and continued c... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | cy plans or external crises shortofdirect military
involvement.
Itis understoodthat the conceptofthe committee has been
approved in principle, but has not been activated due to the
strong reservations ofthe USIA. Conceivably, the congres-
sionallymandated Boardfor Low-Intensity Conflict atNational
Security Council (NSC... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | roup's planners and
its colleagues on the ground cantake muchcredit for the
improvements that were wroughtin the Salvadoran army.
Clearly, we areill-prepared forthepsychological dimensionof
the next major counterinsurgency thatwill engage the United
States. The guidelines for enhancing performance are the
majorlessons ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | an advisory role, either formally
orinformally. Theproportionsofcivilian and military advisors
must be aligned to the structure ofthe host government; and
while under the general supervision ofthe chiefs ofthe US
Diplomatic Missions, they must work with andfortheirforeign
colleagues.
Collectively, the US advisors must ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | lnerabilities. Thechallenge-
a cross-cultural one-to those advisors will be to help the
supportedgovernment shape and articulate value-based themes
towhich the population canrelate. They must then ensure
that all actions of the government and its personnel are
consistent with-and reinforce-those themes.
Asecond, closel... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ucture;
analysis of, and counters to, insurgent propaganda; andthe
offensive against the insurgents to confuse, confound,
exacerbate vulnerabilities, andinduce defections.
That sector aside, psychologicaloperations (how badly we
need other terminologyl) do nothave a separate compartment.
They may at times be apart ofpu... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | emented.
The complementary-usually crucial-task is tomultiply the
impact ofthose programs andunderscore the relevance of
those programs to national aspirations. Completion ofthis
task will require unceasing exploitation of every medium of
communication, from ensuring the proper deportment of
soldiers in face-to-face co... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ke
measures to counter-psychological and political warfare
waged against our policies with the intent to undermine them;
here,the cost of inaction is real andheavy.The starkfact is that
the American public,the media, and even thebureaucracy,
are generallyoblivious tothe scope andsophistication ofthis
genre.
330
STILWEL... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | mfighters that our own government backed.Aware-
ness that theintegrityofourown political and decision-making
base is underthreat should lead to actions that wouldexpose
and neutralize our adversaries' efforts. Hopefully, such aware-
ness will stimulate utilization ofpsychological and political
warfare initiatives to fu... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | lled the One-
Hundred-Hour War, recentlytook us through the continuum
ofthe policy process. Economic sanctions were appliedbya
world community united witha degree ofresolve seldom seen;
butbecause these actions take time,andtime favored Saddam
Hussein,they werenever giventhe opportunity to prove their
effectiveness. Th... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | power
played outtheirhands, two others came to the forefront. These
were the military and the psychological elements. These two
elements, working together, seemed to constitute our best
opportunity for apeaceful resolution; and after failing to
achieve a peaceful solution, these two elements worked
together to enable u... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | .
After a while, all wehad to do was steam a ship to the coast;
throughintimidation, we achieved our objective.
Turning now to the recent Gulf conflict, we hoped to per-
suade Saddam Hussein to unconditionally withdraw from
Kuwait through our military buildup in the Middle East.We
felt that qur recent excursions to Lib... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | addam and communi-
cated unity on the issue through strategic psychological
operations. Through theater PSYOP, wetried to convince him
that it wasn't worth the cost to fight for a losing cause. Unfor-
tunately, Saddam wasn't convinced; and neither were the
Tikritis who supported him.
The psychological dimension played ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | cal dimension plays an
important role in the achievement ofnational objectives. It
serves the same purpose, and can be likened to, the aggressive
marketing campaigns ofMadison Avenue; that is, to affect the
behavior ofa target audience. Where Madison Avenue sells
products and services, psychological operations sellidea... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ighest levels ofgovernmentnow recognize thatin any
decision on nationalpolicy there are psychological factors that
mustbe taken into account."3 He cited thepsychological
dimension's cutting across departmental boundaries as the
reason for an ongoing turfbattle between the Department of
Defense and the Departmentof Stat... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | erception by clarifying and repeating it. Edward N.
Luttwak says it is an important message-one that must be
communicated across the range ofsocial and economic
classes.?
Ronald D.McLaurin, authorof Military Propaganda:Psycho-
logical Warfare andOperations, says that the reasonfor much
ofAmerica's diplomacy andpolicy, ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | bjective is toconcentrate and optimize power. Otherthings
equal, a nation that can backupits policies with coercive force
holds a distinct advantage over less-capable nations. The
335
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
projection ofpoweris acentral concept ofinternational relations.
Luttwak states thatpower, the influence ofone ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | intensify these
measures, but it must be carefully crafted to preventcounter-
productive perceptions.
How,then, do psychological operations support strategic
militaryobjectives? The ability ofnations to gather information,
andto assess and interpret its relevance, isn't equal; what is
perceived can be quite disparate f... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | U.S. Approach, Bradley C. Hosmer, president ofthe National
Defense University, observed that "the negative connotations
in the Westofthe wordpropaganda suggest we havetreated
political war as incompatible with democratic values and
traditions." FrankR. Barnett, in the afterword to the same
book, expressed also that "so... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | t
psychological-political warfare is ablackart that can be morally
justified onlyunderthe mostextreme circumstances is aderivativeof
336
KEIFER
suchattitudes.That suchactivities necessarily involve misrepresen-
tation ordeception isin any case far from the truth. But even
assumingthat some suchelement is inseparable fr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf |
tions equate tothe BigLie,suggestive ofGoebbels and Hitler,
and that we should not use it." 14 The late Gen Richard G.
Stilwell, USA, Retired, provided commentson the institutional
reluctanceto consciously resort to perception for influencing
activities. "The psychological weapon (and the political premises
which gove... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | intensify
cultural biases ofthe public through implications thatunder-
handed objectives or purposes constitute the basis for such
activities. Henotes that claims ofdisinformation or public lies
are often attached to media comments on psychological
activities.
DrLord writes thatthe employment ofpsychological toolsis
fu... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nications technology.16
337
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
The Department of Defense doesn't escapeDr Lord's criticism
of institutional bias; he contends that, for reasons that are
both similar to and different from those ofState, military
leaders have likewise tended to overlook thevalue ofthe psycho-
logicaldimension, parti... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | icalcommunication, influence operations,
and international information. In his article "By Any Other
Name" in Perspectives (the magazine ofthe Psychological
Operations Association), ColThomas Taylor offeredthe title
"Perceptionand Deception," suggesting the acronym, P&D.I 8
Lt Gen Michael Carnes, director of the Joint ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | "topsoil" in terms ofdirt,filth, or
grime. And second, terms considered more acceptable-
politically and popularlyfail to aptly describe the activity. A
soldierin the battlefield making loudspeaker appeals to the
enemy is not performing "political communications" or
"international information."
Personally, I don'tfindt... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | c measures." 19 One ofhis premises states that this
discipline is a reflection offree will, a factor ofpublic opinion.
He's quick to point out, however, that this premise does not
applyin a totalitarian state. Dyer says the wayto overcome the
institutionalized bias is through education. I agree: Education,
coupledwith ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ses that nations came into beingwith thedecline
ofmedieval Christendomwhen man'sloyaltyshiftedto thestate (king) and
away from theestate (baron) andchurch (pope). He states the word nation
came into being at the end oftheFrench Revolution. Anationality was a
collective people with aconsciousnessof historic identity exp... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ePoliticalUtilityofArmedForces," in
Ronald D. McLaurin,ed., Military Propaganda, 2'75.
11. Referback to openingcomments on gunboatdiplomacy.
12. Luttwak, 267-68.
13. Dr Carnes Lord, "The PsychologicalDimensionin National Strategy,"
in Carnes Lord andFrankR. Barnett, ed., Political Warfare andPsychological
Operations:Re... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | d, 23-28.
17. Ibid., 27.
18. Thomas H.Taylor, "ByAny OtherName," Perspectives 5 (Spring
1989): 9.
19. Dyer, 194.
PSYOP in Desert Shield/
Desert Storm
Col FrankL. Goldstein,USAF
Col Daniel W. Jacobowitz, USAF, Retired
Understanding the role ofpsychological operations in the
Gulf War requires more thana glimpse of its co... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ed. Member
states, including the US, Egypt, United Kingdom, France, Italy,
SaudiArabia, and Kuwait, deployed forces and/or equipment.
Virtually the entire Western world-and a majority ofArab
nations-opposed Iraq. Americans at home overwhelmingly
came to the support of the president's actions (in contrast to
the domesti... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rated the power ofinternational broadcasting and
involved itself as a medium both to aid and to deter Iraqi
PSYOP plans. In true democraticmediatradition, the accumu-
lation of factual reporting allowed knowledgeable audiences to
correctly characterize Saddam's plans and behavior.
The Iraqipropaganda systemis pyramidal... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | aspect ofIraqipropaganda is theuseofreligious
wordsandphrases. The techniques ofIraqipropaganda during
the course ofthe crisis reflected the same style used by the
Iraqis beforetheGulf War. This campaign emphasized religious
symbolism, Arab nationalism, and praise ofSaddam Hussein.
These themel reflected Iraqi culture ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | in Kuwait had askedforIraqi
help.
b. Iraq is the champion ofoppressedArabs.
c. TheWest is depriving the Iraqi people of food and
medicine.
d. Iraqwill withdraw from Kuwait aftera shorttime. 2
Later, afifth objective-rationalizing the incorporationofKu-
wait as a permanentprovince ofIraq-was established.
TheMCIdistribut... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | wereplaced onthe type orcontent ofIraqi
propaganda.At no time did missing orcontraryfacts interfere
withIraqi operations. Ifneeded, documentation was simply
manufactured. In the Iraqi PSYOPsystem, few restrictions are
placed on efforts used to further an Iraqigoal. Furthermore,
their campaigns did not have tofollow any... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ion and military effort fromthe main
battlefield. The ever-present threat ofchemical warheads was
a major factor in his plan. According to Lt Gen Tom Kelly,
operations chieffor the Joint Chiefs ofStaff,the Scuds were
oflittle militarysignificance." Nevertheless, theyproduced
emotional and psychological effects. Althoug... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tion
tactical air efforts against the Scuds helped the Israelis
maintain their policy ofrestraint, while the technological
breakthrough ofPatriot missiles calmed both Israeli and Saudi
publics and further demonstrated coalition invincibility.
Tacticalmilitary response, basedon military competence and
technological supe... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | l and spontaneous
negative reaction ofalittle British boywhom Saddam tried to
convince of his good will. In this case the attempt to
manipulate Western media completely backfired, as repetition
ofthis scene throughout the Westernworldestablished public
opinionofthe true nature ofthe hostagesituation. Further, it
expose... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | behavior of the Iraqi
media escort personnel(who limited reporter access within the
site) conflicted with Iraqi claims. And when Western intelli-
gence analysts demonstrated that theclaimed bombing damage
to cultural facilities in Iraq (the bombing of whichis forbidden
by the accepted laws ofwar) hadin fact been faked... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | been effectivelystruck.
In addition, the televised appearance of downed coalition
pilots proved counterproductiveforIraq's objectives. Insteadof
convincing the coalition partners to acquiesce, aworldwide
audience was appalled by the battered physical condition of
the captives-and their orchestrated, mechanical admissio... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | pagandists attempted to mimic some of the successful
tactics used by the government of NorthVietnam. One ofthe
tactics employed was on-camerainterviews of captured
coalition pilots. The Iraqis thought that presenting these
interviews would stimulate the US public to call for the
withdrawal ofUS forces and the pursuit o... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | reets,
" put them on television with prepared questions and
answers,
" view the impact of the broadcasts through the Western
media, and
" disseminate broadcasts to media and determine their
impact.4
The initial problemthat Iraq faced was how to disseminate
theirproduct; the coalitionhaddamaged most ofIraq's television
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Western news
345
(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
agencies. The interviews ofthepilots were choreographed with
specific questions andanswers.
Interviewer: What's your opinion ofthis aggression against
Iraq?
Pilot: I thinkthis waris crazy andshould never have
happened. I condemnthis aggression against
peac... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | pilots inthis manners The world-
wide condemnation wasso overwhelming that the broadcasts,
which had begunon 20 January, ended on 24 January. On 25
January, the MCIannounced thatthe interviews ofcaptured
pilots would stop.
AnotherofSaddam's PSYOP efforts were the radiobroad-
caststoUS troops in thefield by "Baghdad Be... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | calleadership ofsurrounding Arab states.As previously
stated, the PSYOP effortsagainst the military forces ofthe
coalitionhad minimal effects. However, the PSYOPeffort
aimed by Iraq atcertain segments of the coalition countries
and surroundingArab nationswas notable.
Saddam's propaganda effort asa stress-inducing instr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | t George H. Bush,asthe mainopponent to
Saddam. Some ofthe keythemes used inthese campaigns:
The warwas really about access tooil.
The US was using the war asanexcuse for imperialism.
The US was propping upa corrupt governmentin Kuwait.
These attacks, targeted atthe populations ofGreat Britain,
Germany,France, Australia... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | The US would againbe divided over the war.
" Again, the poor and the minorities are fighting a warfor
the richand powerful.
Saddam Hussein's speeches were filled with images of certain
doom, Vietnam-style-body bags returning home by the
thousands, an enemy who could waitout the bombing tofight a
bloody ground war, and... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | down in thepaddyfields ofVietnam. (New Straits
Tunes, 13August 1990.)
It was clearfromthe beginning thatthe Persian Gulfconflict wouldnot
only beresolved inthe hot dunes ofthedesert, but also in the
347
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
quicksandofUS public opinion....Whilethepublic's reaction against
the US involvementinVietnam... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | k atanymoment. TheUnited States willbe in
danger ofsinkingintothe sand, asit once didintherice paddies of
Vietnam. (LaSuisse, 23 August 1990.)
There'sthe strongly-heldbelief that the [Vietnam] experience has
rendered America incapableof marshalling public supporttolaunch
anotherwar. (Itish Independent, 20 September 199... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | While Saddam himselfbelieved much ofhis propaganda, it
appears that most ofthe world did not. His biggestsuccesses
were in the Arab world; andeven in those countries, success
was neither significantnor complete on any issue. The
propaganda, in general, was far below the level of
sophistication of effective audiences. P... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | diers. First, the coalition efforts
348
GOLDSTEIN/JACOBOWITZ
were ofa more tactical nature (i.e.,focused on convincing Iraqi
troopsto surrender). Second, the combining ofPSYOPwiththe
airand groundcampaigns was intended toaffect both soldiers
and senior military leadership.
Tactical PSYOP inthe Persian Gulfproved effect... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | zations,
ranging from theater-level cellsto small, three-person teams
serving in direct support ofthe forward combatunits.8
Thefour operations showed different levels ofeffectiveness
as to their impact onthe Iraqi target audience. Table 1 lists
the efforts and the relative effectiveness resulting from the four
operatio... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ologicalOperations DuringOperationsDESERTSHIELD/STORM," SOJ9, 1992.
349
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
The fouroperations focused on the intended Iraqi audience
in concert witheffective air and ground campaigns.However,
because PSYOPhad been slighted in the theater operational
plan,this combination was notused at first. The ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ively. The
loudspeaker and EPW actions began in February with the
start of the groufid campaign and ended in March and April.
An important precept at work in the radio and leaflet
operations was reinforcement. Tactical PSYOP personnel
announced to Iraqi ground unitsthat abombing was to occur
at aspecified time and plac... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | (retransmissions made via
modified USAF C-130 aircraft) and three were ground radio
stations: "Voice of the Gulf," "Voice ofAmerica" (DOD-loaned
equipment), and "FreeKuwaiti People." According to now
declassified message sources, the radio stations were managed
and run almost exclusively by US Central Command
(USCENTC... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ABANDONYOUR EQUIPMENT, LEAVE YOUR
LOCATIONNOW, ANDSAVE YOURSELVES."
The relative effectiveness ofthese radio transmissions, in
terms of audience exposure, was approximately 58 percent
(versus zero forno transmissions). Thedegree ofpersuasiveness
relative to no transmissions was estimatedto be 46 percent.
Impact on surr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | icallyofoneor
two noncommissioned officers andan interpreteror communi-
cations specialist.
Loudspeaker teams broadcastmessages that had been
prepared and dubbed onto audiotapes and distributed to them
and other teams by the 4th PSYOP Group by wayof its
product dissemination battalion. Occasionally, a team would
ad-lib... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ofenterprising
loudspeaker teams. At leastone team induced a captured Iraqi
sergeant to make heartfelt appeals to his comrades across a
berm using thevery loudspeaker system that induced himto
surrender. 14 Feedback from some EPWs indicated that, while
351
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
"leaflets and radio showed us how to s... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he 101st
[AirborneDivision] hadn't done anything.
So the three of us gave it atry.We arranged for the Blackhawk
[helicopter] to ride us to thesite of thebunker andwebegandropping
surrender leaflets. Then we returned tobase andfoundthat nothing
hadhappened-no surrenders, no movement, nothing.
We tried something else. We... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tected, Iguess,by thethree Apaches and
oneBlackhawkwhopping aboveourheads andto ourright.He took off
immediately, sayinghe'dstay in contactby radio.
Thethreeofus were now on the ground.We were facing this enemy
bunker that Intelligence says has 20 enemy soldierswho mightbe
waiting to greet US. We picked up ourloudspeak... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he suddenly stoodstraight up andpushed the speakerhigh over
hishead [likesome kind ofstatue showingabig trophy toacrowdfar
away]. I told the other guy back with me watchingall this, our
communications man, to quit playingthetaped message andgo live,
andto keep doingit. Theguyhadjust gotten out oflanguage school,
so he... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e was landing topickusup sohe couldrefuel backat 101
division base. He was running reallow onfuel. Wedidn't see how
many Iraqis came out ofthatbunker, although wehad counted up to
about20ofthembeforewetookoff.
When wegot backtobase, the three ofus andour pilotbegan
receiving weirdcongratulations. We weren't surewhy. Se... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nIraqiforce.
Leaflet Drops
Leaflets and other forms ofprintPSYOPprovedespecially
effective. Ofthe targetedaudience-300,000-plus Iraqi troops-
approximately 98 percent ofthem read orwere otherwise
exposed to the 29 million leaflets dropped in the theater. Is
Many EPWs were found clutching leafletsin theirhands or
hiding... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | sychologically
and emotionally to visual means. Whether the leaflets' effec-
tiveness stemmed from psychological reasons orsimply from
the sheervolume ofleafletsthat descended onthe Iraqis daily
is open to interpretation. Weather conditions andlow leaflet
loss, combined with a generally effective theme, audience
353
PS... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the
format.19 PSYOP personnel later learned that the leaflets'
effectiveness would likely have been enhanced had design
consideration been given to the nonverbal, cultural cues that
were read by the Iraqis as subtext. 20
Ifthis concept (subtext in language) escaped orseemed vague
to designers and others at first, the a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | btextual
message transmitted bythe color red. Whenred ink was
included in leaflets, presumably for function or appeal, Iraqi
soldiers typically hesitated oravoided approaching a leaflet
sticking out from the sand nearby. They simply feared and
disdained red as asignal for danger.22
Whenever Iraqis read a leaflet that s... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the familiar
thought bubble of Western comic strips, he became thoroughly
confused. Unlike the English-speaking world and some other
cultures, Iraqi culture does not link bubbles, words, and
354
GOLDSTEIN/JACOBOWITZ
pictures.24 However, this technique had beenso internalized
by the leaflet designers, that they were un... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | . Iraqi
disdain fortruthfulness contrasted vividly with Western
punctiliousness in behavior and leaflet preparation. Coalition
determination to stick to truthful overtPSYOP, relying on
credible military performance to override minor cultural mis-
steps inmessage preparation, proved successful in inducing
thousands ofea... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | are.The failure
ofthe Iraqiplanwas partially engineeredby suchclever Yankeeairpirates
asLtJeffrey Zaun, who adapted the methods usedbyUS airmenand sailors
inthe Vietnam War.Zaunaugmented the battering ofhis faceand exagger-
ated his inappropriate behaviorto inform the world the Iraqis were
maltreating him. Whatismoream... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | amuel V.Wilson,USA, Retired
Ifpast events are indeedprologueto the future, thenunder-
standing the early nature and scope ofpsychological operations,
synthesizing the PSYOP lessons learned from historical
national policy planning and from strategic, tactical, and
operational PSYOP applications, can foreshadowevengreate... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ook to better understand the
importance that military PSYOP plays as a cost-effective,
force-multiplier instrumentofUS military and political power.
Such understanding is especiallynecessary today, given our
military budgetary constraints, the existing nuclear, biological,
and chemical threats, and our dynamic, complex... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ogical threat has diminishedwith the demise
ofthe Soviet Union, and that the US PSYOP focus should be
abated, need to take heed ofthevarious strategic and global
resurgencies and the Vietnam legacy presented inpartIV. One of
the most important reasons for the communist "ideo-military"
357
victory in Vietnam, for exampl... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | believe correctly that the PSYOP
weapon system, if employed properly, must precede, accom-
pany, and follow all military force employments while being
closely codrdinatedwithall agencies ofgovernment and while
being systematically integrated with US national security
policy and objectives throughout the spectrum ofconf... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y intelligence analyst
in the Reserve, is staffassistant to the senior military liaison
and defense advisor, United States InformationAgency,
Washington, D.C. He was recalled to active duty during the
Persian GulfWarto provideongoinganalysis ofIraqipsycho-
logical operations for Headquarters US Special Operations
Comma... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | PsychologicalOperations
and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations
Command. He holdsa PhDdegree in business. Colonel Findley
has been a regularspeaker at the USAF Special Operations
School and a guestinstructor at the Air University Center for
Professional Development. He previously won the PSYOP
Outsta... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ry attache,
Switzerland; acting director, Office of International Information,
State Department; advisor to Presidents Eisenhower,Kennedy,
andJohnson; and advisor/consultant to Vice PresidentNelson
Rockefeller.
Col Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, is dean, Education and
Research, Air Command and Staff College, Air University.... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | professor ofEuropeanstudies
at the Defense Intelligence College. He has taught history at
Campbell College and at Duke University, where he earned a
PhD degree inEuropean history. Colonel Gordon's interest in
psychological operations derived from three years as an
intelligence analystwith the 4th Psychological Operatio... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tions
360
Division, Combined Forces Command,Korea. After a tour in
the State Department, he served as director of Psychological
Operations in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as
director ofthe Center for Treaty Implementation, US Southern
Command, Panama. Hejoined the GulfWar AirPower Survey
team in 1991.
Wil... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | an Institute for Research. He has been a
psychological operations (PSYOP) instructor and lecturer at
the Army Special Warfare Center, a PSYOP officer at the
Department ofArmy, senior PSYOPofficer for US Army, Pacific,
and senior program manager for Development ofStrategic
Psychological Operations in Supportof Field Act... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ity ofOklahoma and is a
graduate of PSYOP courses instructed by the US AirForce and
Army, the British army, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation. Major Keifer's career has included experience in space
operations, audiovisual media production and management,
and public affairs.
Dr Carnes Lord earned PhD degrees ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rtment of Government and
Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, instructor in the
Department of Government at Dartmouth College, and lecturer
in the Departments of Classics and Political Science at Yale
University.
Ronald D., McLaurin is a research scientist, American Insti-
tute for Research. His previous posi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | director, Russian
Emigre Centerin Chicago.
Michael A. Morris is a fellow at the Canadian Institute of
International Affairs. He formerly served on the faculty at
Gallaudet University.
Laurence J. Orzell served as European branch chief, 6th
Psychological Operations Battalion, Ist Special Operations
Command, Fort Bragg,... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | is a graduate ofArmy Command and General Staff
College.
Col Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., USA, Retired, served three
combat tours with Special Forces units in SoutheastAsia and
held positions on the faculties ofArmy Command and General
Staff College and Army War College. Other assignments
include the Department of the Army S... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | itions throughout his
professional life. He was commandant ofcadets at the US
Military Academy, commander of the 1st Armored Division and
the 24thArmy Corps,Vietnam, and chiefofstaff for General
Westmoreland. As acivilian, the late General Stilwell served as
under secretary ofdefense for policy and chairman of the DOD
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Dennis P. Walko, USA, master parachutist and licensed
professional engineer, is chiefofthe Command Support and
Coordination Division, Directorate of Psychological Operations
and Civil Affairs, J-9, Headquarters US Special Operations
Command. Hehasserved in the Civil Affairs-PSYOP Exchange
Office to the Colombian Army ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | 1944North Burma
Campaign with "Merrill's Marauders," with the US Defense
Attache/Moscow, in Vietnam as associate director for field
operations at the US Agency for International Development
and, later, as US mission coordinator and minister-counselor
forthe US Embassy in Saigon. General Wilson has been
Special Forces ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | r on foreign technology, Los Alamos
National Laboratory; and senior consultant at the Betac
Corporation, Arlington, Virginia.
Lev Yudovich, born and educated in the USSR, emigrated in
1977 to the West. He is an international author of numerous
articles on Soviet political and military subjects. He was a
platoon and com... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | UDK: 355.45:004.738.5(497.7)
316.776.23:32.019.51(497.7)
DOI:10.20544/ICP.8.1.23.P22
BEYOND PROPAGANDA AND FAKE NEWS: ELEMENTS OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND INFORMATION
WARFARE
Aleksandar Peshev
Faculty of Security - Skopje
aleksandar.peshev@outlook.com
Abstract
The topic of “fake news” has been determined to be one ... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | tions,
and a specific approach in PsyOps that has been recorded in peacetime – information
warfare.
Keywords: psychological operations, information warfare, influence operations,
hybrid threats, manipulation, propaganda.
1. INTRODUCTION
Propaganda has been centered as the defining element of psychological operations,
u... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | l, we gain a more detailed understanding of the inner
workings of psychological operations. Following the principles of behaviorism, we can
propose a circular model for exerting influence over a targeted population.
Furthermore, the utilization of messaging aimed at eliciting desired behavior in
peacetime gives a broad... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | mation, malinformation, and
misinformation are less ambiguous and clearer. While traditional media and social networks
intensify their “hunt” for disinformation, the copious amounts of data that is collected about
individual users creates new means of controlling human behavior to the benefit of centers
of power.
233
2... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | ler, 1926).
Nearly 20 years later, the term “psychological operations” was used in an operation
plan created by the US navy captain Zacharias in 1945, aiming to facilitate the surrender of
Japan. Known in the security literature as the Zacharias broadcasts, the US captain proposed
the use of various forms of propaganda... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | stance among the civilian population and build
upon the reputation of legitimate authorities. The end goal of psychological operations is to
convince the enemy and the neutral sides of a conflict to take action that would benefit the
side (the country) that implements the operation. (Goldstein & Findley, 1996).
Linebar... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | as means of organized influence aiming to persuasion seems to be the
central element of all proposed definitions of psychological operations. Nacev notes that
generally, there is a distinction between three types of propaganda. The first type is white
propaganda, that is clearly attributed to a sponsor. Hence, the sou... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | uted. In this case, the audience can merely guess the source of the presented
information. The goal of grey propaganda is to support the positions of the sponsor in a way
that approximates official positions of legitimate authorities. The third type is black
propaganda. Same as grey propaganda, the source of the inform... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | e central element of psychological
operations, several key remarks can be extrapolated. The first remark is about the broad
definition of propaganda, that leaves unanswered questions about how the persuasion should
be organized and where it should be aimed: the most influential individual that shows
promise to establis... |
PSYOP 2.pdf | estions, one must consider the individual, as the
basic element of any targeted population.
2.2 Targets of manipulation
Psychological operations require the recognition and identification of personality
traits, as well as the positioning of an individual within the group that is targeted with
manipulation. Securing thi... |
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