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PSYOP 8.pdf | dation against key officials and military units,including
killing everyperson;
3. use ofpenetration agents to infiltrateand develop support
withinthe military and civil service;
4. use offamily ties and friendships to induce or coerce
military personnel and civil servants to desert, defect, or
covertly servethe VC;
5.t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | erealsoused topromote the cause.
US PSYOP objectives inthe Vietnam Warwere ill-fated from
the beginning, primarily because ofthe "foreign invader" image
ofthe United States. USpsychological operationswere used
simultaneously as a means ofachieving US foreign policy
goals and as a substitutecommunications toolfor the Re... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | mmunists. We must learn the values of.strategic,
operational, and tactical PSYOPfrorn this devastating
experience.
Notes
1. PhilipKatz,PSYOPand Communication Theory.
241
The Iraqi Propaganda
Network
MSgtRichard A.Blair, USAFR
Col FrankL. Goldstein,USAF
During the Persian GulfWar, Iraqhad considerable success
in mountin... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | govern-
mental entity, Saddam Hussein distributed propaganda duties
among many offices within the government and the Baath
Party. While most ofthese offices officially answered to the
Ministry ofCulture and Information (MCI), theywere actually
managed through informalchannels by the BaathParty, the
Revolutionary Comman... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | and began operating the Provisional Free Kuwait
Government Radio program. Theyalso implemented atleast
fiveadditional shortwave radio programs designed to undermine
the Saudi and Egyptian governments andthe morale ofArab
troops inthe Gulf. 1
243
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
OnceAllied coalition bombing commenced, the Iraqi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ailies in Iraq, the Arabic-language AlJUmhuriyah and
the English-language Baghdad Observer. The MinistryofDefense
alsopublished anArabic daily newspaper, AZ-Oadisiyah, and
otherministries and agencies ofthe governmentsponsored the
majority ofsome 12 weekly papers andmonthly magazines
published inIraq. Even where they d... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | io, and tele-
vision sources and disseminated reports by wiretosubscribers
around the world. The INA distributed its materialevenfurther
through itsparticipation in the Non-AlignedNewsAgencyPool,
a service oftheNon-Aligned Movementthatfacilitates the
sharing ofnews itemsamongmembernations.
Iraq alsocontrolledseveral ot... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Tunisia, Jordan,
Yemen, Mauritania, and Sudan to issue ajoint statement
endorsing the Iraqiposition and discussing ways ofbolstering
244
BLAIR/GOLDSTEIN
media cooperation to confront the intensive hostile media
campaignlaunched by the United States and its allies.
Additionally, Iraqtookadvantage ofeveryopportunity to
p... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s this simply took the
form ofissiling statementsin the name ofvarious groups or
individuals; for example, the children and vanguards ofIraq or
the American hostage Golden Johnson. More often, it
consisted of quoting pro-Iraqi statements elicitedfromvarious
amenable personalities such as Palestinian leaders George
Haba... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | at Iraq was censoring thesejournalists' reports, use of
this link tothe CNN network still greatly enhanced manyof
Iraq's propagandacampaign objectives.
Additionally, Iraqused covert methods toaccess outlets that
could not be influencedopenly or directly. Stories ofwide-
spread Iraqi bribery surfaced continuously throug... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | 245
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
the end of the crisis, several of these newspapers either closed
down orreduced operations. Itis uncertain whether Iraq gave
up this project due to budgetary reasons, lack ofdiscernible
positive results, oracombination of both.
Iraq's counterpropaganda efforts completed the network.
With so... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | INA carried a second long rejoindercomposed by Foreign
Minister Tariq Aziz. Bythe evening of the 12th, the editors of
every Iraqi daily paper had prepared, for publication in the
morning papers of the 13th, their own attacks on the speech.To
complete the cycle, INA then compiled a summary ofthe
newspapers' criticisms t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ns to obtain and retain the widest
possible mass audience.
By combining thesethree elements, Iraq not only made
significant contributions to its national objectives but also
created a powerfulforce multiplier. This multiplierpresented
the illusion that the Iraqi military capabilities and will to fight
were much stronge... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | HolyMeccaRadio," first
observed on 10August 1990; "Voice oftheEgyptofArabism," firstobserved
on 11 August 1990; "Voice ofthePeninsulaandtheArabian Gulf," imple-
mented on 29 August 1990; "Voice ofPeace," implementedon 11 September
1990;and "Voice ofArab Awakening," firstobserved on 13 October 1990.
2. Pakistaninewspape... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | pped on
Panama Defense Force and "Dignity Battalion" (DIGBAT)
positions, andthey heard tactical loudspeakers appealing to
enemyforces to ceaseresistance and surrender. Perhaps our
country's last television view ofPSYOPactivity in Panama was
that oftheloudspeaker in front ofthe Papal Nunciature blaring
heavy metalrock m... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | effective
and critical to success. Official and unofficial US military
circles said PSYOP wasa valuable force multiplier that had
inducedenemyforces to abandon their positionsor surrender,
thereby reducing loss oflife on both sides.
Less conspicuous was the bulk ofpsychological operations
during Just Cause. Most PSYOP... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ncy, which took place within six months after the
return of the last PSYOP elements from Panama. Operations
Desert Shield and Desert Storm employed PSYOP at anorder of
magnitude and effectiveness that many credit to the lessons
learned from Panama.
Recognizingthat much ofJust Cause and its complementary
civil-military ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ll success of the operation.
Panama contingency plans had been under development for
years prior to Just Cause. These contingencies were to range
from evacuation of US and third country nationals to full-scale
combat operations against Noriega, his Panama Defense
Forces (PDF), and (later) the DIGBAT goon squads. The la... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he following were key
concerns for this option:
" US casualties
" Panamanian civilian casualties
" Collateral damage
250
WALKO
" Delayin US troopwithdrawal
" Disinformation and hostilepropaganda
The five concerns were interrelated. Ifthe PDF offered
concerted resistance to US troops, casualties on both sides
wouldescal... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ofour operations.
Additional concerns for consolidation or reconstruction
operations included repairing thegovernment and economic
infrastructure and establishing afunctioning democracy.
Specific PSYOPmissions andrequirements were identified to
support contingency plansand address allthe aforementioned
concerns.
On th... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | d to each infantry battalion (Army
andMarine Corps) andeach SEAL battalion-equivalent par-
ticipating in the assault phase oftheoperation. This was
probably the highest loudspeaker-to-combat force ratio in the
historyofthe US military.
On thenational-strategic level, aPSYOPtaskforce wouldbe
formed, based upon the regio... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nd to foster support for US military operations
and efforts by the Panamanian government to restore law and
order.
Various prepackaged PSYOP materials-prerecorded TV,
radio, and loudspeaker tapes; radio and loudspeaker scripts;
music; and designs for printed leaflets and posters-were
developed from 1987 to 1989. These ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | n,often
during routing trips to Panama, the commander and other
members of his command visited many ofthe principal target
locations and identified potential production facilities-a pre-
caution against alate arrival of PSYOP productionequipment.
Facilitating this planning process was the fact that suc-
cessive I st PS... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | overall responsibility for
planning and commanding the operation. He took apersonal
interest in PSYOP, further enhancing theirplanning, coordi-
nation, and execution.
By March and April 1988,Noriega had increased provocative
actions against US forces in Panama, having sent harassment
patrols into the US-controlled Arr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | oudspeakerteams deployed as atactical detach-
ment with sufficient personnel, vehicles, radios, and speaker
systems to permit reconfiguration as five teams if the need
were to arise. As time dragged on, soldiers andequipment
were rotated to and from Panama to such a degree that
virtuallyevery battalionin the 4thPSYOP G... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | increasingly
frequent exercises conducted by US forces to reassert US
treaty rights. The loudspeaker teams not only effectively
employed prerecorded tapes which would also be useful later,
during the contingency; they prepared other announcements
on the spot. Theseencounters served as valuable trainingand
experience fo... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ncy and energized even greater attentiontothe contin-
gencyplanning process (including PSYOP planning and
preparation). From this pointforward, both the 1stPSYOPBn
commanderandthe 4thPSYOP Gp commanderspent increas-
ingtime inPanama, providing PSYOP planning expertise to
253
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
CINCSOUTH, his staff... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Noriega and his cronies
from power while leaving the PDF institution alone; under
these new conditions, it became increasingly clear that, in the
eventuality of,a contingency operation, the JTF would not be
able to operate within those limited US objectives. Therefore,
PSYOP materials that had been prepared prior to t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ducts were classified TOP SECRET-
SPECAT, they could only beproduced at night and on holidays
when noncleared soldiers were off duty and away from the
media production facility. Furthermore, this activity was
beginning to tie up personnel who were key to otherongoing
PSYOP activities in the USSOUTHCOM area of operation... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e, constituting the first official US broadcasts in Spanish
heard by the Panamanian population.
254
(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)
WALKO
After General Thurman's assumption of command on 30
September 1989, the failed coup attempt that shortly followed,
and General Stiner's designation as CJTF-South, conditions in
Panama continue... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ripts in English and
LfESSAGEt1Ut.10EllJ__CfIASE1
ATTUN7KN.ATILNnON.AT'ILNTK)N
EVERYONECLEARTTIEBUILDI7iC,. LAY
DOWNYOURWEAPONS. COMEOUT
ONEATATIMEWTTHYOURRANDSON
YOURHEADANDYOUWON'TGETHUP
THE BUILDING IS SURROUNDED.
MEa5Aal=NU1ACEfi 1. PlY$U
ATTENTION, ATTENTION,ATTENTION
EVER
5
Y
M
O
I
N
NU
E
T
I
E
N
S
T
T
H
O
E
L
B
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | S TiENENOUEMORIR, SUS5MRiUTOS
STARTED. EMPIE7AN AHOftA.
Source:1stPSYOPBattalion,USArmy
Figure 1. These bilingual booklets were carried bytactical PSYOP
loudspeaker teams, along with prerecorded tapes of the same
messages in Spanish. Notethe messages in the extract; UStroops did
notmincewords.
255
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIO... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | executed.Asitturned out,
thispredeployment would proveimportant to the success of
PSYOP inthe Panama contingency. Withthe exception ofthe
three loudspeaker teams already inPanama and the loud-
speaker teams accompanying the airborne and special
operations assault forces, the PSYOPTF would notarrive in
Panama until afte... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | d
otheractivities insupport ofinitial combatoperations-and with
goodeffect.
During the earlymorning of18 December 1989, two daysafter
the fatal shooting ofaUS servicemanand the harassment of
another and his wife by members ofthe PDF, the 20-man
advance JTF-South staffelement administratively and clan-
destinely deploye... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nama conducting his assumptionof
command property inventory), and the commander ofthe
256
WALKO
prepositionedAMradio broadcast team to notifythem that
Just Cause was to be executed on 20 December. The
commander then organized the element to function on a
24-hourbasis as his ministaff, interimPSYOPdevelopment cell,
andr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ntil
the PSYOP TIT arrived.Although envisioned to functiononlyfor
about the first 24 hours of the operation, it was this small
group whichplanned, coordinated, and ranpsychological
operations for thefirstthreedays ofthe contingency. Once the
remainderofthe PSYOPTIT hadcommenced operations, the
liaisonelementcontinuedas... |
PSYOP 8.pdf |
Panama. These broadcasts-all in Spanish-notified the
Panamanian population ofUS intent and advisedhow to avoid
accidentally becoming a casualty. (These were the "mysterious"
broadcasts that puzzledsome of the US mediain Panama.)
The TV channelused for broadcasts by Volant Solo was
Channel 2, the national channel comma... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | The broadcast facility was shut
down in such a manner as to enable prompt restoration of
capabilities once the US and new Panamanian government
were in full control of the situation.
The PSYOP element commenced activities by making use of
the same previously prepared scripts and recordings being
broadcast via Volant So... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | aged inthis process.
Fortunately, all were bilingual and thoroughly familiar with
the situation in Panama. Tapes of popular music were available
to maintain audience attention between announcements.
Safe conduct passes were prepared at and distributed by the
printing facilities at the main US military print plant at
Co... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | lity as a known entity. As
events proved, his reputation would be a valuable commodity,
not only as endorser on subsequent surrender appeals, but in
personally arrangingthe surrender of regional PDF garrisons
by telephone.
These first safe conduct passes were printed on newsprint.
Three hundred thousand of them could b... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | COWOALTu%IUGAAOEOCSGT<WYA(C1W[AAa0".
wlcvumlN:~aHArGulSUFI.an3.
cfPlxA1MARCA.IXPKPM
comAmowmarnwA3DaExwcryosew
PASAPORTEALALIBERTAO
SAFE CONDUCT PASS
THISPASStSFORUSEBYPOF, OIGMTYnATTAUON.AHOCOOEPAOIMEMBERS.
THE BEAREROFTHISPASS,UPON PRESfH7R(OITTOANYUS.autTARYuplaul, wtt.L
ZIE GUARANTEED SAFEPASSAGETO U.S.FACILMES TH... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ency had taken place during the rainy season, this
approach mightnot have worked verywellsince the newsprint
would have rapidly disintegrated on contact withwater. Had
heavier paper stock been used, however, the leaflets would
havetakenlonger to print and mighthave beentoo bulky and
heavyfor the small detachment tohand... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | in support
of US Marines at La Chorrera,a small village on the outskirts
ofPanama City and Howard AFB. The Marines had en-
counteredheavy resistancefrom PDF and DIGBAT members
for the first 24 hours.The Marines ceasedfire for the night.
Surrender appeals were then blared overloudspeakers as safe
passage leaflets were ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | unt offootage
already available when the main body of the PSYOP TFarrived
with organic camera teams and audiovisual production
capability. One copy of every cassette produced by the
JAVDET was delivered to the PSYOP TF.
The JAVDET's transportation asset were extremely limited,
but the PSYOP TF commander was able to mat... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | en the
case otherwise.
Immediately upon activation of the 10,000-watt AMPSYOP
radio station and commencement of the initial assaults on 20
December, the new president ofPanama, Guillermo Endara,
communicated with the Panamanian masses principally via
this station.AmongEndara's first announcements was the
promise that a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rived PSYOPTF commencedpreparation of numerous printed
leaflets andposters to convey information leadingnot only to the
rapid surrender ofPDF and DIGBAT personnel, buttotheir
turningin individualsand cached weapons as well.
Early in the operation, PSYOP soldiers supported civil
military operations, including thedisplac... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ems to
the camp administrators-members ofthe 96th CivilAffairs
Battalion.
Aprimary problem associated with the DP activity was
rumor control. By building rapport andestablishing infor-
mation programs with the DPs over time, PSYOP soldiers
established theircredibilityandwere ableto neutralize rumors
before they expande... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ter-serving as specialPSYOP
advisorand expeditor for GeneralThurman. The group com-
mander used the full range of media to convey public
information while soliciting cooperationand support from the
261
(cid:9)
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
ES TU DEBER
MASIMO QI;F SY PAGARA:
SISPORSUFICLENTE CANTIDAD BE MUNICION
$25PORGRANAD... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | r0aELGMAON.
<. gCIlE1w5MSTADCYlON13fX1^SwIfIORIDADFS.
COOPERACONTUGOBIERNOYAYUDAA
LASFUERZASARMADASESTADOUNIDENSES
UNIDOSALCANZAREMOSLA LEY, ELORDENY
LASEGURIDADPUBLICA
SINTONIZA A A.M. 1160
Source:tst PSYOPBattalion, USArmy
Figure 3. Aseries of posters and handbills advertised the reward
program for weapons. (Interest... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | 11.22
Source: 1 at PSYOP Battalion, US Army
Figure 4. Christmas cards were distributed during Just Causeto
enhance relations and rebuild national spirit; 10,000 ofthe first and
30,000 ofthe second weredistributed-mostly by hand and by heli-
copter drop.
263
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
military inidentifyingand apprehendin... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s,especially "wanted"
posters bearing photographs ofPDF and DIGBAT fugitives,
had to be printed anddistributed continuously because people
removedthem from walls to avoid identification, to keep as
souvenirs, or possibly take them home forstudy and future
reference.
Otherproducts focused on establishing a favorableimag... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | uctreview andapproval was
extended to thelevelofthe executive office ofthe Panamanian
government in order to reduce theprobability oferror. (A
classic example of such an error on the part of an enemy
occurred during Desert Shield/Storm when an Iraqi propa-
ganda announcerwarned US military personnel that their
wives we... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | orozal print plant. The workers atthe plant
264
(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)
WALKO
SE BUSCA
TTE CNEL LUIS A. CORDOBA
Exjefe official do intcligcncia. Ex-micmbro del
Conscjo Estrat6gico Militar CENT. Rcsponsablc por
el arresto do los oficialcs del G-2 cnvucltos en cl
golpe de rnarzo do... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | television announcements, not only
contributed tothe prompt identification and captureoffugitives but
also served to reassure the Panamanian populace that US forces were
actively seeking to round up those individuals most capable of
orchestrating retaliatoryactionsor restoringthe "old order."
265
(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ONGAITAN CPTBENJAMINSODS
ova.a-sr.raww.
LI- II InW6fmw 17-3613.974963 o L7-4346 iUeri>f~i6.afgolnf.-
u 4 e"&Igvl~ d" 1"u ymmu "qui 11-An. Ll.m 1--b- Prn app W.-
d. la 6arl.pa de dis.w.d 6""6S"A I- ~ emu-.
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9.r . wwit.- n.xu. eau
. .7.A7~
FA. A.w J.. 4..
a.. 4~ Co..r....,..
C-14AR.IIa onr w..m...
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PSYOP 8.pdf | .. u .. N . . A4" pSrL.
3erw o.r..o...i W.C.rts-
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Rw- N.a
M4M.i. A"w "'Y..".
Source: 1 st PSYOPBattalion, US Army
Figure 6. "Wanted" handbill
26 6
(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(c... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ar.-K11ao,In a1.eu.e<
<Gout .ad rru Mew FNea hTh
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S E .r - .. k .- w W RG ~. . l w- W J e I .. k 1 b " . I . p O.. . . . I " u o E, T f d I ,, , u n ,r"I"-" a E T W , r l e " . ~ e. . Y " K " C " o . l . -- " o e i a n . l k .. jI- w. p l . w K.u. " . . u ..- I 4 J7 .
.-'- J Et r I..b. ~ur E eee~Gee- M. G< 4 ". ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | " - OP . Md 11 d . n 1l I l m ef c - aq 7 u 7 n 7 l 4 t . m 5 o 3 . . " 13 w 7 .
i . " r . . n g r k .. . 1 a . . . . . W . . e . . I I « M . M . r . H . ' .. b I - W n b e . u . d l l . . i « . . M I . M w l " . J . . w .. " r . 1 . . un.6He" W .i«b w ,I.W a .I . k w 7 e l. 9N . H . . 1 Y . r«d , U ., " . LA C S O R N... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | .« b e 1 o Y .. M" ~ N H H" 1 « "
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SINTONIZA A A.M . 1160 rn... o..«m.w a.."«. n.l..n
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"rei... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Battalion,USArmy
Figure7. Notethatthis PSYOPnewspaper advertisestheradiostation
frequency, announcesarecent capture ofaPDFofficer,andprovides
telephonenumbersfor reporting locationsofarms,munitions, criminals,
andcriminal activities. Panamanianspicked up bundles ofthese
newspapersandsoldthem.
267
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIO... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Again, a problem
surfaced-according to the National Code ofPanama, the crest
was supposed to appear in a field ofgreen, and the proposed
posterwould have donejustthat. Unfortunately, the proposed
green was the color ofone party of the Panama coalition
government-one which was becoming increasinglyviewedby
Panama polit... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | y. It wasdisplayedon military vehicles and handed out by US
troops. Its objectives were to portray US-Panamanianteamwork and to
reduce perceptions of US forces as military invaders or occupiers.
Within days afterdisseminationcommenced, Panamanian commercial
vendorswere peddling T-shirts and other paraphernalia bearing ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | V andradio stations
back on the airinsupportofthe US andthenew government-
but only if they and their personnel would be escorted by US
soldiers or transportedunderguard while theirfacilities were
guarded by troops ofthe JTF. There existedconsiderable
concern forpossible terrorist acts by DIGBAT goons still at
large, i... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | By morning, most ofthe
commercial broadcasting crew had arrived, along with alarge
crowd ofPanamanians enthusiastically waving Panamanian
and US flags. They were celebrating the arrival ofUS troops
andthe "grand reopening" oftheirsingingchannel.
Thecommercial crews volunteeredto restoreoperations as
the PSYOP team temp... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | dcastmaterials prepared by thePSYOP TF,but also pre-
pared and broadcast excellent programs on their own. Their
269
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
programs supportedUS military forces andthe government of
Panama.
By 8January, the PSYOP TF had produced and dissemi-
natedover one million leaflets and handbills, 50,000 posters,... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | commanders.
Psychological operations figuredprominentlyin the successful
US efforts to flush Noriega out ofthe PapalNunciature, where
he had sought refuge. They played a significant role in
establishing thePanama Public Force-thenew police force
designed to replace the old PDF. PSYOP teams circulated
through Panama Ci... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | own, replaced by a PSYOP support elementcomprised
of48 personnel.
This element, consisting ofstay-behindPSYOPsoldiers from
Just Cause and a civilian analystfrom the 1st PSYOPBn,
provided PSYOP support to thenewlycreated Military Support
Group. This unit then provided US military support to the
government of Panama duri... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | HORARIO:0300-1800
MUMS
Source: 1stPSYOPBattalion,USArmy
Figure 9. One of many laterversions, this poster not only indicates
proceduresfor surrendering armsbut also identifiesturn-in locations
and their hours ofoperation. Subsequent versions left some ofthe
datablanksothat Special Forces soldiers inthecountryside could ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | izing the newly formed Panama Public Force
and Panamanian Police Force (PNP)-constituted principally
byformer members of the PDF.
" Gaining public support for the Public Force and PNP.
" Enhancing the effectiveness and prestige ofthe new
government.
" Neutralizing disinformation and hostile propaganda directed
against ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ionedfor Panama contingency operations
had been accomplished.
From beginning to end, PSYOPsupported all stated US
military and political objectives. During the initial stages of the
assault, PSYOP loudspeakers, leaflets, TV and radio announce-
ments successfully appealed for cessation of hostilities;
surrender of weapo... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | emergency relief activities while fostering an
272
WALKO
Source: 1stPSYOP Battalion, USArmy
Figure 10.ThePSYOP supportelementcoordinated directlywith JTF-
PM, ground forces, otherelementswithin the MSG, the Panamanian
government,and theUS Embassy.
atmosphere ofreturn to normalcy. Announcements via US
military PSYOP and... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | an orderly return ofcontrol to the host-nation
government, addressed major sanitation and health threats,
and continued militaryinformation programs. All ofthis
facilitated prompt return ofthe deployed US military personnel
to CONUS.
Finally, as a natural consequence ofthese accomplishments,
psychological operations a... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e obvious indicators of
success:
" surrender ofenemy forces after exposure to loudspeakers
and leaflets;
" immediate public response to posters, loudspeakers, and
TV/radio announcements, resulting in valuable information
and intelligence;
civiliancompliance withinstructionsconveyed viaPSYOP
media;
" virtual absence ofh... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | erextended the
capabilities ofthe commander to the extent thathe encountered
difficulty supervising and controlling the manydisparate and
geographically separated PSYOP elements and operations.
The requirement thatPSYOP TFsimultaneously provide
JTF staffsupport, control tactical assets, and develop and
disseminate PSYO... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | phase detracted from
274
WALKO
overall PSYOPTF performance during consolidation activities.
Theseteams should have reverted to adirect support status
under operational command ofthe PSYOP TF as soon as that
force had the ability to fully exercise that function. Unfor-
tunately, thatcapabilitydid not materialize until t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | YOP Gp and its subordinate units was
not optimally suited torequirements ofthe contingency.
Some ofthe "goodthings" that were either learned or rein-
forced are listed below.
" Early integration ofPSYOP into the contingency planning
process helped ensure overall success ofthe operation.
" Tactical loudspeaker teamscont... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ons andadvisoriesfrom US militaryPSYOP TV, AM
radio, and loudspeaker broadcasts.
" The workingrelationship thatthe 4th PSYOPGp commander
andthe 1st PSYOPBncommander enjoyed withtheXVIIIAirborne
Corpscommander and stag, and withCINCSOUTH and his staff
priortoJust Cause andPromote Liberty,undoubtedly resultedin a
degree ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | CONUS by the last 8th PSYOP Bn members ofthe
PSYOP Support Element-the 4th PSYOP Gp was provisionally
reorganized. Regionallyoriented battalions remained, but the
groupwas now organized according to anoperational concept
suitable for awide variety ofcontingencies.
The reorganized 4th's basic tenets:
" The 4th PSYOP Gp ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | d and control. The concept
provedso beneficial toboth the PSYOP TFand to CINCSOUTH
that itwas formalized.)
" ThePSYOPTIT would continue to be commanded by the
theaterPSYOP battalion commander, but with two other
PSYOPbattalion commandersworking forhim:
1. A tactical commander (the commander ofthe recon-
figured 9th PSY... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | d
to operate the samein peacetime as inwar, itwas presumed
thatoverall effectiveness ofcontingency PSYOP wouldimprove.
The opportunity tovalidate the new conceptpresented itself
sooner than anyone could have expected.Within one month
276
WALKO
after the 4thPSYOP Gp's reorganization, Iraqi forces invaded
Kuwait. When PS... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e indicators of success are pretty clear. In the author's
opinion, these successes are a tribute to the PSYOP soldiers,
civilians, anal airmen-pastand present-whose competence,
dedication, and ingenuity most certainly saved US and
Panamanian livesand contributed to mission success. Their
accomplishments have resulted i... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | vernmental
psychological operations in action. Drawing upon that
country's long tradition ofaconspiratorial press, dissidents
affiliated with the banned Solidarity trade union and other
organizations engaged in the large-scale production ofunder-
ground newsletters,leaflets, books, and otherprinted materials
designed t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | be described aspeacetime, non-
governmental PSYOP. This article places the Polish opposition's
PSYOPefforts withintheir historical context butfocuses onthe
period following the imposition ofmartial law (December 1981).
In particular, the analysis examines the type ofunderground
print materials produced, the means used... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | yconducted urbanguerrilla warfare; italsoorganized
anunderground press which contained manifestos directed at
279
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
Poles, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and Ukrainians. Although
this effort failed, it contributed to the maintenance of armed
resistance. The undergroundmediaplayed amuch greaterrole
du... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ment-in-exile issued a postage stamp in 1943-itselfa
form ofPSYOP-commemorating theundergroundpress (prasa
podziemna).
Armedresistance to foreign domination proved impractical
following the communist consolidation ofpower after World
War 11, butdissidentpsychological operations eventually came
to assume even greater im... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Worker (Robotnik). Dissidents also set
up an Independent Publishing House, better known by its
Polish acronym NOWA, whichproduced numerous literary
works and several periodicals. Despite periodic harassment by
the authorities, NOWA and similar illegal publishing enter-
prises prepared materials targeted at laborers, s... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | own, counseling
280
ORZELL
resistance inthe face ofwhat they termed government disin-
formation. The government's acceptance of the strikers'
"Twenty-one Demands" effectively extended legal recognition to
unofficial publishing activities. The subsequent "Gdansk
Agreement" obliged the regime "to respectfreedom ofspeech
... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | al targets of repression when the authorities
declared martial law on 13 December 1981.
Despite internment, arrests, and confiscations, the under-
ground press quickly reappeared andassumedan even greater
importance due to thefact ofdissatisfaction. Some activists
who were placed in internment camps in 1981-82 even
man... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | roups ofindividuals in larger cities and
towns whohad avoided capture. The importance of these
PSYOP efforts in dissident strategy became clear when
Solidarity's undergroundProvisional Coordinating Committee
issued a declaration in 1982, stressingthe need to "organize
the independent circulation of information" and the... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ofthe early
editions bore the simple yet historically significant title
Information Bulletin (BiuletynInformacyjny) and consisted of
one ortwo pages. As might be expected, the majorityofthese
materials wereprepared in Warsaw, Poznan, Wroclaw, Lodz,
and Gdansk. Press runs varied fromseveral hundred to over
10,000, depen... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | publications
ofother underground groups assumed somewhat greater
prominence after 1985, due atleastinpart to the increasingly
dim prospects for the union's revival.Nearlyall ofthesegroups
professed loyalty to Solidarity's ideals, butthey also expressed
avariety ofopinions that distinguish themfromthe Solidarity
mainstr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | aright-of-centergroupthat antedated Solidarity,
disseminated its strong critiques oftheregime through its
journals Independence (Niepodleglosc) and We Don't Want
Commies (Nie chcemy komuny). Further, publications targeted
at specific social groups such as teachers, universitystudents,
and medical workers also attained... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | shorter periodicals to longer
products, some activists called forrenewed emphasis on
journals. Much ofthe debate centered on the role of the
Consortium ofIndependent Publishers, agroup founded in
1986, which sought to promote greater cooperation and
minimize duplication within the underground media. Defenders
of the co... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | and other public protests. For example, activists
printed and distributed asmall leaflet announcingthe place
and time of a pro-Solidarity rallyin Warsaw scheduled for May
Day 1985. Leaflets were also used to alert the populace of the
time and frequency ofRadio Solidarity broadcasts. Still other
broadsheets were designe... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | opposition
produced a series ofstamps portraying dissident leaders such
asJacek Kuron and Adam Michnik. That same year, the
Solidarity organization in Krakow issued a stampin honor of
George Orwell. During 1986, dissidents printed a set of
stamps commemorating " 150 Years of the Underground Press
in Poland." In additio... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | picture in
placeofBenjamin Franklin's portrait.
The producers of underground publications faced a variety
ofobstacles. Dissidents understandably were reluctant to
discuss openly the details ofproduction and dissemination
techniques. Most individual publishing enterprises were
comprised ofsmall numbers of people who st... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e.
Funds to acquire and maintain equipment came from publi-
cation sales, but Solidarity sympathizers abroad also collected
financial assistance and madeit available. The dissemination
of underground publications necessarily involved significantly
large numbers of peopleand great risk. Once printed, copies
were reporte... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | fprinting supplies.
Stationery shops were required to record all purchases of more
than 1,000 sheets ofpaper. Agents ofthe Security Service
(SluzbaBezpieczenstwa) reportedly monitored such purchases
and penetrated several underground organizations. From time
to time, officials arrested individuals connectedwith disside... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | his campaign contained
a varietyof themes, one ofwhich posited that underground
publications were tools of the West-especially the United
States. Forexample, the official pressfrequently claimed that
US dollars were sent to the underground to fermentunrest in
Poland. Also, infrequent factual errors in the underground
m... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | derground publishers discovered and exposedsuch activities.
Despite governmental attempts to close them down, Poland's
undergroundmedia remained prodigious by East European
standards. True, the sheerextent ofunderground publishing
rendered it difficult for the regime tosuppress such activity
entirely, even ifPolishoffi... |
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