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PSYOP 8.pdf | to win
genuine popular support and must therefore tolerate the
phenomenon. Then, too, government officials might have
believedthattheunderground pressallowed dissidents to vent
their frustrations ina relatively harmless manner so long as
opposition remained largelyconfined to therealmoftheory.
The underground press cri... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | out the restoration ofSolidarity (or other reforms), the
underground press as a wholeresigned itself to a long-term
struggle with the authorities.
Underground publishing reflected avariety ofpolitical trends,
from right-wing Polish conservatism to liberal democratic
socialism. However, nearly all publications shared so... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | national
issues.Violations ofhuman rights and the absence ofgenuine
democracy in Poland continued to bulk large in its reportage,
butit also devoted significant attention to economic affairs in
light of the chronic shortages and debt problems that plagued
the Poles. It reflected and encouraged debates over the extent t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | d media's increased coverage of international
questions such asUS-Soviet arms negotiations, Gorbachev's
apparent efforts at internal reform, and economic developments
in China. Despite glasnost and perestroika, however, the
underground media generally continued to criticize the Soviets
and praise the Americans.
The und... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ngs. Collectively called Radio Solidarity, such
transmissions first appeared on the airwaves duringApril
1982,after which theywere broadcast in several different cities.
Program content was necessarily limited, but broadcasts
usually addressed suchcurrent affairs as price hikes or the
significance,of historical anniver... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | on
Polish subjects produced by the Paris-based Videoknotakt
organization.Domestic productions, suchasfilmed interviews
with LechWalesa, also circulatedwidely. Governmentauthor-
ities attempted tosuppress this activity-primarily by confis-
cations atthe border-but the trade continued to flourish. The
underground also p... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e programs that promoted anticommunist
attitudes.
Despite various crackdowns by the authorities, the under-
ground media remained apart ofthe Polish sociopolitical
scene. Dissidents stood in a centuries-old tradition ofcon-
spiratorial information activity, and their eagerness to utilize
modern technology rendered itvi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | part ofUS doctrine.
TheuseofUS forces to achieve national strategicandtactical
security objectives is thebasisof PSYOP planning. Security
objectives include the influencing offriendly,neutral, and/or
enemy audiences to behave favorably or unobstructively
toward US national security.A psychological operationis any
oper... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | the press were to emphasize the cost of state-sponsored
terrorism, to damage terrorist operations, and to encourage
internal insurrection (New York Times, 5 May1986). 1 view the
US Libyan raid as strictly a psychological operation, an
operationplanned and carriedout to achieve a psychological
point of view.
An analysis... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | and others wouldbe a limited tactical air
strike.
" What was the psychological situation? The psychological
situation revealed that many nations, friendly, neutral, and
enemy, were not taking seriouslythe US concernabout state-
sponsored terrorism. Colonel Qadhafihad revealed himselfto
have mood swings and to be suscep... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tate-sponsored terrorism, (b) notice to
Qadhafi that his power was not absolute, (c) notice to
anti-Qadhafi forces in Libya that the currentactions ofLibya
could reap dire consequences for all, (d) a reduction in
terroristacts as Qadhafiandhis forces would be forced to
regroup, and (e) additional time to get otherWeste... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ofany promised Soviet military supportand
the fact that the Soviet Union andLibya didnot negotiate a
formal treaty pledgingMoscow to come to ColonelQadhafi's aid
demonstrates that the USSR wasnotwillingto back up Qadhafi
with more than words (Christian Science Monitor, 24 April
1986).
290
GOLDSTEIN
" There was a decli... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ervative Arab support.If they didn't help him, he might
destroy himselfand the Soviet foothold in theMiddle East.
Results ofthe raid amongneutralnations:
" Sixty-five percent of the French peoplesupportedtheUnited
States and were critical oftheirown government's nonsupport
(WashingtonPost, 24April 1986).
" Saudi Arabia... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rgency Arab summit meeting
resultedinIraq,Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia stating they
would be unable to attend.
Theraid's results amongfriends:
" There was strong support againstterrorismatthe Tokyo
Economic Summit.
" Europeanallies were persuaded to take basic concerted
action against terrorism-a blow for reason as ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | de no
majorradio, TV, or personal appearance for almost six
months. On the 16th anniversary ofhis expelling the US from
Wheelus Air Base,a major event in Libyato whichthe foreign
presswas invited to heara majorspeech, Qadhafi did not
appear. Fewer than2,000 attended. Videotapeswerepresented,
revealing an exhausted-look... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | way. He beganrelooking at Libyan effortsin Chadand Sudan.
Some senior Libyan leaders havetalked openlyabout a lower
Libyanprofile interrorism (Washington Post, 4 May 1986).
" The USraidforced Qadhafi to share power withthe four
members ofLibya's rulingRevolutionary Council (TuneMagazine,
23 June 1986).
" A summary ofse... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ld was to
some extentknownbefore the raid and should bejudged more
as action takenthanin words spoken. The European allies,
recipients ofmostterrorist actscarried out against the West,
are always fearful ofadditionalacts. Since the raid, there has
been unprecedented security and the sharing ofantiterrorist
information.... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ad been originally
planned as apsychological operation, the attack on Qadhafi's
personal dwelling wouldhave had to remain on the targetlist.
Butthe tactical airstrike wouldnot need to be as accurate in
a PSYOP mission. For example, the use ofsonic booms and
attacks on less-defended targets would most likely have
produc... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ta drug culture
that threatens to destroythe nation's social-political-economic
fabric. The waris being fought on both domestic and foreign
fronts againsta cultureofusers andproviders ofillegal drugs.
The national drug control strategy targets both supply and
demand. National policystatements by Congress in theAnti-
Dr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ofits most potent weapons: PSYOP. Ironically, the
US government believes it is important to bring other
psychological instruments on both domestic and foreign
fronts. Ifthis countryexpects toachieve victory over illegal
drugs, biases against the use ofUS military PSYOPshould be
recognized andputaside.
Is the nation tru... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | which
themilitary and PSYOParemost likely to become engaged.
The Threat Defined
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 221 of 1986
defines international drug trafficking as a national security
threat to theUnited States. With the signingof this directive,
the president placed illegal international drug trafficking... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | f illegal drugs. The
secretaryofdefensewastasked to manage military drug-related
activities, including plans, operations, intelligence support,
drug interdiction, training of foreign military counterparts, and
other related support.I
Even with the threat established, national policy andobjec-
tives were ambiguous at be... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s
declared war on drugs with the passing ofthe Anti-Drug
Abuse Actof 1988.3 This legislation established the National
Drug Control Program (NDCP) and created the Office of
National Drug ControlPolicy (ONDCP) within the Executive
Office ofthe President, effective January 1989.4 WilliamJ.
Bennettwas named director of OND... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ected the ONDCP director to set policies,
objectives, and priorities for the NDCP and to provide the
annual national drug control strategy for the president's
presentation to Congress by 1 February each year. Congress
required the strategy to includeboth long-range goals and
short-ternt (achievable within two years) me... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nates and monitors the implementation, execution, and
fulfillment ofthe program's policies, objectives, and priorities
by designated agencies. When agencies' policies fail to meet
the responsibilities required by the national drug control
strategy, the director notifies the agency head and directs that
measures be take... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ibitedfrom simultaneously holding other federal govern-
297
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
mentpositions.? The act recognized "themagnitude ofthe
illicit drugproblem and the threat it poses fto the] national
security ofthe United States."8 Disavowing proposals to
decriminalize drugs, the act wenton tosay that "legalization o... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ure, Health and Human Services,Interior, and Defense;
the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International
Development, the United StatesInformation Agency (USIA),
and the United States Postal Service. Those designated as
primaries for demand reduction activities include the depart-
ments ofHealthand Human Ser... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tegies in September 1989 and January 1990. These
documents served as the president's reports to Congress on
thestatus ofactivities and intentions ofthe National Drug
Control Program.ii
Priorto establishing the ONDCP, the Executive Office ofthe
President hadpromulgated the National Drug Strategy and
Implementation Plano... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | al, legal, security, economic, social, and
educational aspects. The threat was defined in terms ofdrug
type, production source, production increase, international
cartel control, use of high technology, increased violence, and
high-profit low-risk crime. 12 President George H.Bush, in a
September 1989 televised address... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ion to the 1989 NationalDrug Control
Strategy, the director acknowledged that the national policy as
articulated in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988-"it is the
declared policy of the United States Government to create a
Drug-Free America by 1995"1-3is admirable butunrealistic. 14
Bennett proposed in its place, "the high... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | arily
caused by addiction.) On boththe foreign and domestic fronts,
illegal drugs were cited as being imminently available; and the
problems were readily evident. Commenting on the need to put
realism into the national antidrug abusepolicy statement,
Bennett charged that ade facto policy vacuum existed. He said
it was ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | Drug Control Strategy was
more than mere restatementofthe 1988 plan. Unrealistic goals
were rewritten and validstrategies were reorganized. The 1989
document outlined the national priorities as: (1) the criminal
justicesystem, (2) treatmentprograms, (3) education, com-
munity, and business actions, (4) international in... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | . 18
The strategy recognized the contributions of a compre-
hensive information management program to the success of
the antidrug campaign. In Bennett's introduction of the
strategy, he expressed that coherent and coordinated policy-
making depended upon the timely sharing of information.
"Our national policy must be t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rug Control Strategy outlined
initiatives that targeted supply-side activities, no relevant
clear-cutpolicy statement on them was articulated. To remedy
this omission, Bennett stated in the 1990 report that "the
policy of the United States is to disrupt, to dismantle, and
ultimately to destroythe illegal market for dru... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | m. In addition,
the program's purpose was (1) to reduce to the maximum
degree possible illegal drug supply and availability, (2) to
provide treatmentfor users ofillegal drugs and to actively
discourage people from becoming involved with illegal drugs,
and (3) to provide robust enforcementofdrug laws by holding
traffick... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | agenda.22
Both supply anddemand aspects were targeted forattack by
thecriminal justice system throughactions to deter theuseof
illegaldrugs, todisrupt the trafficking network, andto arrest,
prosecute, and punish drug criminals. The 1990 strategy
reinforcedthe 1989 strategy, which called fordismantlingtraf-
ficking syst... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | national criminal organizations
that supportthe production, processing, transportation, and
distribution ofdrugstothe United States andto other nations.
Building on that strategy, the 1990 programs were aimed not
only at drug-producing, transit, and consumer countries, but
also toward nations stillexperiencing few orno... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | andBolivia) by enabling them to fightillegal
drug-producing anddrug-trafficking organizations in their
respective countries,
2. helpinglaw enforcement andmilitary structures ofthe
three countries to combat cocainetrade more effectively, and
3. incapacitating traffickingorganizations that operate in
the three countries... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ders, andgovernment officials to build
supportforUnited States and host country actionsto combat
drug production, trafficking, and consumption. "25 Receiving
policy guidance from theDepartment of State (DOS), theUSIA
(with support from other federal agencies) was assigned
responsibility forcoordinating and leading the ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | onal Drug Control Strategy included a
commitment to long-term research in the fields oftreatment,
education and prevention, criminal justice, and drug use.
302
KEIFER
Research provided a base ofknowledge for fighting the drug
problem and a foundation for future strategies. Research
projects included these:
1. developin... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ent and interdiction
capabilities; and
5. increasing research into drug treatment to emphasize com-
plications caused by addiction, acquiredimmunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), and pregnancy. 27
The intelligence agenda, designed to understand and fight
illegal drugs better, included acquisition, analysis, and
management o... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s included requiring DOD's intelligence com-
ponents to actively support the collection of foreign drug-related
intelligence requirements outlined in the NationalDrug Control
Strategy.28
To effectively manage the National Drug Control Program,
ONDCP established coordinating mechanisms, developed
report and study requir... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | oints ofcontact for responding to drug issues. Lead
agencies were designated to direct, coordinate, andprovide
expertise to specific activities. Management studies included
the Executive Reorganization Study, the Department ofJustice
Reorganization Report, the R&DFacilitiesPlan,and reports on
communications andautomate... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ers access tospecificfederal benefit
programs. Aprogramming and budgeting system was created
within ONDCP. Model legislation ondrug-free workplaces was
29
provided to state and local governments.
Information management initiatives-developing command,
control, communications, and intelligence networks-were
built onthe p... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | related tothe enforcementofdrug policy. 30
An Assessment
Both the president (NSDD 211, 1986) and Congress (Anti-
DrugAbuse Act, 1988) unambiguously articulated official
positions thatillegal drugs are a threat to national security.
They agreedthatthe political objective, elimination ofdemand
for and supply ofillegal dr... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rug culture-drug cartels and
drug users. The drug cartels cannot be likened to the con-
temporary economic entities; a cartel isa flexible system of
organizations involved in growing, producing, transporting,
distributing, selling, and money-laundering processes. High
profitability has provided them an immense resource... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | includingthe
War on Poverty waged by the Great Society during the 1960s.
Because thedrug problem transcends many cultural boun-
daries, care must be taken to consider relevant issues such as
social, health, safety, and economic factors, and to avoid
morality issues. In seeking international cooperation, the
perception ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | o support such
measures. The reasons for prohibition's failure must be
understood if history is not destined to repeat itself. Care must
also be taken inarguing against legalization toavoid the
pitfalls ofincomplete truths and invalid logic thatcannot
stand the tests ofintense scrutiny ortime.
305
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATI... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ould
not be
diminished.32
Appropriately, the legislation directed
attacks against both supply and demand ofillegal drugs.33 It
also stressed both counterforce and countervalue strategies.
With respect to one strategy thathas been suggested by some-
the legalization ofcertain drug offenses-Congress refused to
compromise... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | fCongress, but
the trafficking ofillegal narcotics isn't theirexclusive target.
Prevention and treatment programs for this legislation demand
side attention. Certification requirements focus on govern-
ments of countries in which drugs are produced and through
which they transit. Measures to break up money-laundering
s... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | sponsibilities. The
director has few immediately assigned resources and only
limited fiscal control. While Congress is expected to keep its
control over the purse, authorizing the director to manage the
306
KEIFER
distribution ofconfiscated assets/resources wouldprovide the
position withasignificantcarrotfor resolving ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | of
consequence must be resolved by the president or significant
others inthe Washington community. Further, few would
argue that the director's position holds stature equal to such
leaders asthe secretary ofstate, secretary ofdefense,attorney
general, ornational security advisor. Not aformal member of
the cabinet orth... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | illegal marketfor
drugs. The objectives and strategies formulatedbythe ONDCP
representasignificant step forward from the Just-Say-No!
domestic policy and interdictioninstruments ofthe Reagan
administration. Recognizing the complexity ofthe problem, the
strategy addresses supply and demand, domestic and foreign
arenas,... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | alidity ofthisposition; that the effects
ofthe drugs themselves, rather thantheir criminal status,
307
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
have accelerated and amplified social, economic, health, and
safety decay.
The strategy outlined inthe reports byONDCP has many
strong points. It statesthat one strategyalone willnotwin the
wa... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ransit rodtes for their products, and increasing rewards to
their couriers. By the sametoken, supply-side measures alone
can beunsuccessful.Aslong as drugs are available to tempt
people, aportion ofthe population will use them. Treatment
programs are extremely costlyand none has escaped problems
with recidivism. Incarc... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | information concerning
illegal drug use. Previous surveyswere conducted too infre-
quently andwereoflimited or irrelevant scope. Theylacked
sufficient scientific rigor tobe reliable measures. This was one
ofthe primary factors for understated program goals ofthe
initial strategy published in September 1989. Funding for... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | FER
Recognition ofthe need for international consensus is an
importantelement of the program. Not only are bilateral
agreements needed with drug production andtransitcountries
to help them fight theirinternal enemies, but worldwide
cooperation is also an instrumental part offinding a solution
to this global crisis. Cro... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | table titles) on both
domestic and foreign fronts. The success of information
strategies relies on communicating inunderstandable terms
theconsequences ofillegal drug activity. Some initiatives are
designed to persuade nonusers not to start, users to seek
treatment, and traffickers to cease theiractivities. Because
int... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | nd prevents potential fratricide. Anotably
missing committee is one to coordinate publicity, information,
education, diplomacy, and persuasion activities offederal,
state, and localagencies.
The strategyis notwithout its share ofweaknesses. Because
it is along-range program, it will test the national patience of
people... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | et compared to low-endestimates ofprofits
made by drug traffickers gives the impression that the
administration is stilltrying to win votes rather than the drug
war. This is particularly true becausefunding is dedicated to
supply-reduction measures. Less than one-fifth ofantidrug
funding goes to prevention and treatmen... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | port to raise the taxes needed to fund these programs,
resultswill have to be visible with high payoffs.
The inclusion ofmeasurable objectives is laudable,but the
selected objectives-withthe notedexception of drug availability
reduction-tend to measure only the demand side of the
program. While this helps to dissuade "... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | hinking but the truegoal,then half-hearted
measures will fail in the long run.
Bringing the military into the counternarcotics strategywas
an expedientdecision for thepolitical leadership, butone the
military leadership looked upon with skepticism.The political
sidesaw it as a way of putting defense dollars toa tangibl... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | t's
fiscal authority for 1990, Congress dedicated $450 million to
counterdrugactivities.39 This funding included $28 million for
R&D projects and $40 million for catchallexpenses defined as
additional support to the Officefor Drug Control Policy.4o. 41
The bulkofthespending authority, $182 million,42 was to
support int... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | w more cost-effectiveness than interdiction
responsibilities whennetworks are completed and figures
come in.
If national objectives in the war against illegal drugs are
met, the achievement will ultimately bea psychological one.
Activities mustbe carried out on both domestic and foreign
fronts. Theymusttarget both supp... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | gress established the requirement for the Office of
National Drug Control Policy toactivate a program topublicize
the penalties for violating the legislation.44 Agencyturfbattles
during WorldWarIIand the American cultural distrust ofthe
psychological instrument led to prohibitions against the
USIA's communicating direc... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | eaped. Successes must be underscored and
punctuated, letting others know that alternatives exist and
that consequences are in storeforunacceptable behavior.
Co-opting thesupport of nongovernmentspecial interest
groups is anotherpotential role forthe psychological instrument.
Informing the public of the harm illegal dru... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rcise irresponsiblemanagement ofprecursor materials
might cause them to rethink their motives for profit andto
tighten controlmechanisms.
The top echelon ofthe cartel structure is not invulnerable to
psychological inducements. For all their wealth, they are
virtualprisoners, unable to attain status or to travel any
app... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | een nations.45 Because the drug
culture hasno national identity andbecause compromise has
been determined unacceptable, diplomacy would seem to be
limited to securing international cooperation from nations
predisposed to strong antidrug policies. The goal is to convince
people nottouse illegal drugs, to convince cartel... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ompare
health and safety, sociological, and economic factors upon
which illegal drugs areclaimed to have an impact, comparing
states and nations that have and have not decriminalized
drugs. This type ofresearch should then establish a mechanism
to control the impact ofthe criminal status of drugs.Emotional
appeals will... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he is notwilling to back up or
promises he can't keep. Credibility is ideally established
through performance of actions that serve as examples of what
may be yetto come. This performance establishes both
capability and resolve. If the government seeks to alienate
cartels from their surrounding populaces by promising t... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | they are to be induced to get out of the drug-trafficking
business.
Wherethen does the US military PSYOP community fit into
the equation? First and foremost by ensuring that the actions
ofDOD (maritime and aerial interdiction and detection;
monitoring and developing C3 networks) are favorably
313
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIO... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | s can
conduct seminars on the value of psychological operations, train
their contemporaries, and participate in bilateral exercises to
hone skills. For those countries whose enforcementagencies are
civilian, US military forces can support USIA programs of
assistance.
Direct measures to communicate withforeign civilian ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | dimension will be a
significant factor. Military PSYOP resources can contribute to
achievement of the national objectives, but only ifthey are
allowed to be used. To that end, institutional biases will have
to bebroken. Ironically, such a breakingof biases is apsycho-
logical phenomenon. This process will include overc... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | he instrument and how it helps them to
implement policy.48 The public, hesays, "mustbe educated on
what these activities are and how they contribute to functioning
ofthe government."49 Withinthe military community, education
on the psychological dimension needs to be expanded. In
314
(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)(cid:9)... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ning curricula. Select members ofthe media should
beinvited to attend military orientation courses.
Bennett resignedfrom his position as director, commenting
that he had accomplished what he had set out to do.
Acknowledging that the warwas not yet won, heoffered that
indicators wereshowing greatpromise.50 His abrupt de... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | to which
the military PSYOP community has much tooffer. The sooner
political and military leaders recognize this, thesooner the
problem will be resolved.
Notes
1. Betac Corporation, DepartmentofDefense CounterdrugBaseline Re-
port(21 July 1989), 2-10 through 2-11.
2. Carlvon Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael H... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | title1, sec. 4801, 102 Stat. 4294.
9. Ibid.,Title V, Subtitle A, sec. 5011, 102 Stat. 4296.
10. Ibid.,TitleV,Subtitle F, sec. 5251, 102 Stat. 4310.
315
(cid:9)(cid:9)
PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS
11. Ibid., TitleI, Subtitle A, sec. 1003, 102Stat.4182.
12. Ibid., TitleI, Subtitle A, sec. 1005, 102Star.4185-86.
13. Public Law... |
PSYOP 8.pdf |
23. Ibid., 12-27.
24. Ibid., 51.
25. Ibid., 59.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 74-81.
28. Ibid., 82-85.
29. Ibid., 107-16.
30. Ibid., 123-28.
31. One hundredeighty-seven pages detailing everything from American
Indian cultural exceptions to penaltiesfortheuse offirearmsinconjunction
with acriminaldrug offense.
32. Congressional... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ticsandForeignPolicy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1974).
37. ONDCP 1990 Strategy, respective 10 and 50 percentreductions in
drug availability, 120.
38. ONDCP1990 Strategy, 107-16.
39. Defense Authorization Act for 1990-1991, 103 Stat. 1562, Public
Law 101-89,29November 1989, TitleXII; andPublic Law 101-65,... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | rsten Holbraad
(Leicaster,U.K.: LeicasterUniversity Press, 1978), 27.
46.From premises outlined by Dyer in chap.2.
47. Dyer claims they "cannotmake thenecessarydecisions . . . only
explainand interpretthem," 213.
48. Ibid., 187-90.
49. Ibid., 199.
50. The price of cocaine hadrisen sharply and street supplies were
down.... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e.The conflictends, atleast temporarily,
when one side makes the decision that there is more to be
gained-or less to be lost by allowing the antagonistto prevail.
The side that desists has simply lostthe will to continue the
conflict.
An adversary's will can beeroded and broken ina number of
ways: by militaryforce (the... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ommander shouldaccomplishthe mission
inthe mostexpeditious fashion and atminimum human cost.
The termpsychological warfare (psywar), for all its short-
comings, succeeds in combining two meaningful subjects,
both as old as man. Certainly, it is better than psychological
operations which, as my mentor Paul Linebarger on... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | force of vastlysuperior
strength. The Midianites were encamped in preparation for
decisive assault on the morrow. But Gideon had an
inspiration: Since the basic fightingunit ofall armies in the
thirteenth century B.C. was a 100-manformation, each with
one trumpeter and one torch bearer, he reckoned he could
create the... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | . The Midianites were startledout oftheir
sleep andtheirwits.They fought among themselves, then gave
up andretreated. (The Hebrew chronicler gives credit for this
to theLordl)
Gideon's deceptionis notan isolated example, as anyserious
studentofancientmilitaryhistory can confirm. Psychological
warfareseeksto persuade by... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | of communication
designed toaffect theminds, emotions,andactionsof agiven
groupfora specific purpose. This is preciselythe aim ofwhat
we see on the television screen at all-too-frequent intervals-a
field of endeavor in which theUnited States is preeminent.
So, psychological warfare is really not allthat esoteric or
my... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ed
rules ofcounting made his message credible; and the lightand
noise ensured that the message was received. To be sure, it
is rarely that easy; or as quickly mounted; or as clearly
measurable.
The American View of Psychological Warfare
The psychologicalweapon has never been accepted as aper-
manent instrument ofnation... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ntial differences within the executive branch about the
valueandpropriety of this genre of activities. These differences
precluded the enunciation ofan integrating doctrine and the
necessary coordination ofdepartmental programs. In greater
part, however, the failure to implement was due to the
American character,which ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | self. Butwhile psychological
operations inthe two worldwars (particularlytheBritishin
World WarI) provided important support, they were not
321
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
crucial to the final outcome. Those conflicts were waged
militarily,with politicaland psychologicalassistance.
Wars ofnational liberation reverse the w... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | l structure; the strong
motivation ofall ranks; the abilityto find concealmentwithin
the civil population; and identification with one or more
popularcauses.
Past Experience in Counterinsurgency
The wars ofnational liberation that have erupted in the
third world over the past four decades document thecrucial
role of th... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e imaginative employ-
ment ofpsychologicalwarfare, strategically andtactically.The
charismatic and insightful Secretary ofNational Defense,
RamonMagsaysay (who waslater to become president), and a
small cadre of exceptionally gifted US advisors, achieved
spectacular success in arresting the momentum of the insur-
gency... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | e government. He
also recognized thatthe soldier was the most visible symbol of
government in the countryside and that the government would
bejudged by the actions of its soldiers.
As afirstorder ofbusiness, therefore, Magsaysay setabout
reindoctrinating theentire Philippine army. Itsmultiple roles
were protector ofthe... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | c sort. Finally, Magsaysay established
a "hotline" to his immediate office for complaints about troop
malperformance and a staffto immediately investigate those
complaints inthe field, convincing one and all that he was
serious aboutmaking the army a crediblesymbol ofgood and
caringgovernment.
Every effort was made to ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ed surrenderees (and even those
who hadbeen captured) the wherewithalto start life anew for
selfandfamily: substantial acreageinaresettlement area and
a loan of building materials, tools, food, and seed. This pro-
gram stimulated many surrenders, butits indirect effect was
even greater. Much of thepopulation had suppor... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | tening hostilities within the guerrilla ranks. Accompany-
ingthese majorprograms were more specifically targeted
initiatives: appeals from mothers to their guerrilla sons;
rumors to destroythe credibilityofthose politicians whowere
deliberately obstructingthe Magsaysay programs; widespread
distribution ofposters exposi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | re to the success of the Philippine
counterinsurgency campaign? One is that Magsaysay hadhis
priorities right. In most thirdworld countries,the soldier in
the field is the embodiment ofthe government. His conduct
will determine the nature of the relationship between the
population and the government inrural areas. The ... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | ion;
3. psywar programs carefullytailored to theattitudes and
needs of the groups atwhom targeted; and
324
STILWELL
4. quality advisors with the professional competence,
empathy, and passion for anonymityto gain and maintain
access to thedecisionmakers.
No one spent anytime attempting to define boundaries of,or
respons... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | fficerin Hanoi during the prisoner of warexchange
negotiations in 1973. Summers made the point that the
American army had neverbeen bested in battle to which the
response was "Quite true,but thatis totally irrelevant." The
communists' political and psychological campaigns were
decisive-on the international scene, withi... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | th theimpact of modern mass
communications (history's first televised war); the lack of
psychological/ political actions tocondition audiences and
establish contextfor majormilitary activities as,forexample,
the invasion ofCambodia; inability to erasethe perception that
it was ourwar, not a South Vietnamese war; and in... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | of psychological warfare and its
role therein, and with a military educational system that failed
to inculcate in all ranks the fundamental tenets of
counterinsurgency.
This evaluation in no way denigrates the dedication ofthe
JUSPAO leadership and members. And, in all fairness, even
programs of heightened impact would... |
PSYOP 8.pdf | licit in a more numerous, better
organized, more deeply imbedded, and more highly motivated
opposition.
" Unlike in the Philippines, psywar personnel in Vietnam
did not have direct and continuing access to the top political
and military leadership orto the high-level planners. A number
offirst-class research projects, ... |
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