input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
This helps a buyer learn much more about a particular user and a particular impression, gain a smarter answer to the three essential questions and make a more data-driven decision. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This sounds like a great way to advertise if you are in the marketing industry. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Consider how granularly a person can be targeted if this service is used maliciously. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If not targeted by the desktop, how about on the mobile platform? Twitter's Tailored Audiences just got a little more tailored. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Advertisers can now augment their customer data using mobile advertising IDs and mobile phone numbers as a way to reach existing customers and increase audience size. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In essence, the move is an extension of Twitter's Tailored Audiences for CRM retargeting, which allows advertisers to use hashed non-PII email address to retarget existing customers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(email addresses are twitter IDs- so you could be targeted for ad delivery based on your account name or known phone number) Twitter also rolled out the ability to target lookalike audiences, a function that seems pretty similar to Facebook's tool of the same name. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Twitter's lookalike modeling uses a proprietary algorithm that examines modeled users looking for similarities related to behaviors, interests, location, demographic attributes and engagement patterns. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Twitter described its enhanced as'' part of improved targeting options to help advertisers reach additional users similar to their existing audiences. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
'' Tailored Audiences, Twitter's seeming answer to the Facebook Exchange (FBX), officially launched back in December after running retargeting and database matching tests in July. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Twitter has appeared to follow Facebook's lead with a number of its recent roll-outs, including site retargeting, CRM targeting and now retargeting via lookalike audiences. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(Facebook also makes it possible to target users by phone numbers through Custom Audiences. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
) Neustar does provide a real-time bidding ad exchange, but their real market is IP intelligence that they sell to other advertising networks for the purposes of better targeting specific users. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In Europe, laws require that advertising networks allow people to opt out of having tracking cookies, which is how many advertisers used to rely upon for ad campaign targeting. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
To get around this, Neustar perfected IP based targeting, which avoids cookies. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
They are able to build IP specific browsing profiles based on IP subnets. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In a blog post below, Neustar boasts about their direct to IP range and enterprise advertising. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
How can Neustar IP Intelligence target by IP? While IP intelligence has been around for many years, the ability to effectively target advertising by audience, based on IP is very new. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Neustar IP Intelligence is currently working with select DSP platforms to buy impressions off of the exchanges based on the IP address rather than cookies. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This has only been possible with the recent emergence of real time bidding (RTB). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The secret sauce is in understanding the IP and the methodology necessary for targeting ads appropriately against it. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Is an IP Address like a cookie? No, an IP address only identifies devices on a network. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The IP address does not contain any PII and does not track or store any consumer usage or behavioral information. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(But IP ranges are registered by IANA, and you can easily know who owns the ranges) Product Specific Questions Q1: How does the process work? The process works exactly like any advertising network. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Instead of buying inventory based on a cookie, Neustar is buying inventory based on an IP address. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We run the targeting specifics against our proprietary database and create a custom IP list to target against. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Neustar has set up relationships with partners that have built the functionality for this to work end-to-end for our advertisers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Neustar offers a full service ad network. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Brand marketers who wish to advertise using IP Audience Targeting can work directly with Neustar to determine custom IP placements, run campaigns, optimization, reporting and billing. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Much like any traditional online publisher or online ad network, Neustar manages the entire process. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
How does Neustar deliver its ads? We use industry standard methods for delivering our ads, but what makes our approach special is that we bake in the IP data before delivering the inventory with our network partners, which allows us to target display ad campaigns to a specific business or organization. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We obtain inventory from ad exchanges, but have our own ad server. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Zedo, blamed for recent malvertising via DoubleClick, say they are now trying to protect against malvertisers in this blog here. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Less than a week after this announcement, they published another blog post that describes how they can push advertising to specific platforms, devices, as well as specific markets and networks: Users can now target ads to a specific device when trafficking ads. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
An option for'' Device Targeting'' is now available under'' Targeting''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A creative targeted to a specific Device will serve only on that Device. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
All major manufacturers/models are supported by this feature. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If a creative is not targeted to any specific device than it will serve on all device. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Apart from device, a user can target various devices based on different categories. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
At any given point of time, a user can target multiple manufacturers and categories. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Apart from existing campaign reach report a user can now pull a reach report by creative. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The creative reach report is available along with all the existing parameters and can be pulled by month, week or day. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Creative reach report will show creative wise reach. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It will help to analyze how effective the reach of a creative was. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
To be clear, RTB networks are legitimate platforms for displaying ads on ad-supported websites. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
They enable micro-targeting of user's interest, delivering content that a viewer would likely want to see. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As we have detailed here, they can also be mis-appropriated unwittingly by malvertisers using these same tools and techniques to target companies with malware for persistent remote access in addition to traditional click fraud, phishing, and identity theft. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "malvertisers",
"start": 75,
"end": 87
},
{
"text": "these same tools and techniques",
"start": 94,
"end": 125
},
{
"text": "target companies with malware for persistent remote access",
... | [] |
Below are links to RTB providers to learn more. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Invincea has shown logs from a winning malvertising bid in the price range of 65 cents per impression. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
That is one ad, on one page, paid for by the malvertiser's account. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This implies that malvertisers have deep pockets, spending hundreds of dollars on ad impressions. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
So how do they get money to spend on these malicious campaigns? Invincea recently saw a malvertiser win a bid and delivered a Java exploit. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a malvertiser",
"start": 86,
"end": 99
},
{
"text": "a Java exploit",
"start": 124,
"end": 138
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "delivered",
"start": 114,
"end": 123
... | [] |
This exploit copied a fully functional version of Chrome into the Java cache directory, and that version of Chrome launched in the background and proceeded to visit websites and click on specific ad banners. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This exploit",
"start": 0,
"end": 12
},
{
"text": "a fully functional version of Chrome",
"start": 20,
"end": 56
},
{
"text": "the Java cache directory",
"start": 62,
"end":... | [] |
It is presumed that these ad banners paid revenue via referral bonuses to the malvertiser. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
By paying 65 cents to install a background web browser that does nothing but click fraud, the malvertiser is able to reap hundreds if not thousands of dollars in advertising referral income. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a background web browser",
"start": 30,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "click fraud",
"start": 77,
"end": 88
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "does",
"start": 60,
"end": 64
... | [] |
It is a pretty good return on investment, which in turn allows the malvertiser to fund his micro-targeted malvertising attack campaign. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is ironic, however, that click fraud is what is driving the prices of RTB advertising so high. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Malvertising is not only a danger to end users, but it is a danger to the advertising industry as well. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The image from Figure 14 below shows a log file of Chrome, in this instance, renamed Oajvliewxpge.exe, injected via Java to run in the background. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Invincea detected this attack and killed the infection attempt. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is one instance where the malvertiser wasted his 65 cents. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It should be noted that Invincea is uniquely capable of stopping this type of attack. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The introduction of Chrome as a browser, which is whitelisted by hash across the AV industry, would go unchecked by the AV and whitelisting applications industry. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In this instance, the host was almost converted to a click-fraud bot. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the host",
"start": 18,
"end": 26
},
{
"text": "a click-fraud bot",
"start": 51,
"end": 68
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "was almost converted",
"start": 27,
"end": 47
... | [] |
But the malware delivery could have been intended for data exfiltration, banking Trojans, or any other more insidious purpose. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the malware delivery",
"start": 4,
"end": 24
},
{
"text": "data exfiltration",
"start": 54,
"end": 71
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "been intended",
"start": 36,
"end":... | [] |
The ability for advertisers and malvertisers to automatically redirect to self-hosted ad content or exploit pages is driving RTB malvertising. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Invincea has witnessed a rash of exploit kits and landing pages hosted on: In most instances, the landing pages are preconfigured with the exploit kit. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the landing pages",
"start": 94,
"end": 111
},
{
"text": "the exploit kit",
"start": 135,
"end": 150
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "are preconfigured",
"start": 112,
"e... | [] |
The malvertiser creates the redirection in his normal ad prior to raising his bids to winning levels. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Once several victims are confirmed, those malicious landing pages have the content erased, and the automatic redirection removed to serve'' normal'' ads again. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Figures 17 through 21 in the following are screenshots from Invincea's Threat Management console from various RTB-based malvertising incidents with highlighted URLs for malvertising delivered via RTB ad bidding. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "malvertising",
"start": 169,
"end": 181
},
{
"text": "RTB ad bidding",
"start": 196,
"end": 210
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "delivered",
"start": 182,
"end": 191
... | [] |
In September and October of 2014, Invincea saw a sharp spike of malvertising delivering CryptoWall ransomware attacks via Real Time Ad Bidding. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "malvertising",
"start": 64,
"end": 76
},
{
"text": "CryptoWall ransomware attacks",
"start": 88,
"end": 117
},
{
"text": "Real Time Ad Bidding",
"start": 122,
"end": 142
... | [] |
We observed Real Time Ad bidding platforms, including OpenX, GoogleAds, Yahoo, AOL, and first-impression.com, fall victim to the ransomware malvertising scheme by unwittingly delivering the CryptoWall 2.0 ransomware ads. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Real Time Ad bidding platforms, including OpenX, GoogleAds, Yahoo, AOL, and first-impression.com",
"start": 12,
"end": 108
},
{
"text": "the CryptoWall 2.0 ransomware ads",
"start": 186,
"end": 219
}
... | [] |
Ransomware is a particularly pernicious form of malware that fully encrypts the victim's disk and data files, including remote storage, then demands payment of anywhere from $300 to $1000 in return for the decryption key. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Ransomware",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "the victim's disk and data files, including remote storage",
"start": 76,
"end": 134
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "encrypts",
... | [] |
Users are held hostage from their own work, pictures, personal, and proprietary material. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
To learn more about the scourage of ransomware, see this blog. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Based on analysis of Invincea logs in would-be victims targeted by these ads, we have insight into the attacker that is delivering the malicious ads. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attacker",
"start": 99,
"end": 111
},
{
"text": "the malicious ads",
"start": 131,
"end": 148
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is delivering",
"start": 117,
"end": 13... | [] |
According to Invincea analysis of ads delivered from first- impression.com, winning ad bids ranging from as low as 30 cents and as high as $1.70, were delivered by a block of unique identifiers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is highly likely that the same attackers are using other RTB ad platforms. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This campaign matches the characteristics described by Proofpoint in its blog in terms of the exploitation methods. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Legitimate ad copy is stolen, 3rd party ad networks used to distribute malware, and popular ad- supported websites displaying the malicious ads that exploit unsuspecting visitors with drive-by web exploits. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "3rd party ad networks",
"start": 30,
"end": 51
},
{
"text": "distribute malware",
"start": 60,
"end": 78
},
{
"text": "the malicious ads",
"start": 126,
"end": 143
},
... | [] |
Merely visiting any ad-supported site may result in a CryptoWall ransomware infection. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "visiting any ad-supported site",
"start": 7,
"end": 37
},
{
"text": "a CryptoWall ransomware infection",
"start": 52,
"end": 85
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "result",
"start":... | [] |
Cryptowall 2.0 utilizes the TOR network to hide its communications, but it quickly encrypts all local files on the disk, and demands bitcoin payment to unlock the files. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Cryptowall 2.0",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "the TOR network",
"start": 24,
"end": 39
},
{
"text": "hide its communications",
"start": 43,
"end": 66
},
{... | [] |
Many companies have fallen prey to this attack over the past few months, making this one of the most successful Ransomware campaigns to date. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Below is a typical Cryptowall 2 infection as seen in the Invincea Management Server logs. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This winning ad placement ran on sports.yahoo.com–an Alexa Top 4 rated site. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Highlighted in order in Figure 22 is the common filename of obupdat.exe, which has ever changing hashes, followed by the TOR port, and the 3rd party ad platform of first-impression.com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Analysis (Original report): Timeline Analysis (Original Report): Below in Figure 23 is the timeline of the Tor connections and SSL connections employed by CryptoWall. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In addition, you can see the ransom note being written to disk on an infected machine in the audit logs in Figure 24. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the ransom note",
"start": 25,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "disk",
"start": 58,
"end": 62
},
{
"text": "an infected machine",
"start": 66,
"end": 85
}
],
"action": ... | [] |
Figure 25 shows the winning malvertising bid via RTB ad delivery from first-impression.com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Items highlighted in the URL below is userid, and the winning bid price to place malvertising of Cryptowall on sports.yahoo.com, which is 60 cents. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "place",
"start": 75,
"end": 80
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "malvertising of Cryptowall",
"start": 81,
"end": 107
},
{
"text": "sports.yahoo.com",
"start": 111,
"end":... | [] |
In Figure 26 below, we show the unique identifiers for the userID and campaigns to deliver CryptoWall malware that were blocked and audited by Invincea, including the websites that delivered the ads via a third-party ad network over the past month. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
To reiterate, neither the websites listed here, nor the 3rd party ad network, necessarily was aware of the malicious ads they were serving to the website visitors. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is likely they were not aware without ad screening technology. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In each event above, Invincea blocked an attempt to infect an endpoint with Cryptowall 2.0 and prevented CryptoWall from encrypting the user's file system and holding it hostage. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Had the user not been running Invincea, the attack would likely have been successful, and the only way the user would have had to recover the encrypted files would be to pay the attacker the ransom. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is an effective ransom technique, and one that is paying off well for the attackers, who use the income from the attacks to purchase Real Time Ad Bids on RTB networks to infect more users. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Most RTB ad providers allow for advertisers to host their own ad content. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This allows advertisers to directly collect web impression data of who is hitting which ads, from where, by which IPs, which user- agent strings, and just about anything else you could log about a website visit. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In addition, the advertising network doesn't have to utilize their own disk space to host the image files, the flash videos or other online content. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
RTB networks simply do the auctioneering and redirection to the winning content. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.