input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
It is this weakness in security that malvertisers are taking advantage of. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If ad networks were to switch to a model where all content is actually hosted by them (1st party hosting), in a cloud, then the risk of malvertising would drop dramatically. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The RubiconProject has a Seller's Cloud, which could be a security model for the RTB industry. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is inherently more secure way of hosting ad content. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Operation DeathClick is an active campaign to micro-target companies via malvertising in order to compromise their networks. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Operation DeathClick",
"start": 0,
"end": 20
},
{
"text": "companies",
"start": 59,
"end": 68
},
{
"text": "malvertising",
"start": 73,
"end": 85
},
{
"t... | [] |
Unfortunately, the micro-targeting malvertising technique evades almost all network controls and traditional endpoint anti-virus solutions. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the micro-targeting malvertising technique",
"start": 15,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "almost all network controls and traditional endpoint anti-virus solutions",
"start": 65,
"end": 138
}
],
"action"... | [] |
Invincea can protect users from this attack type among other targeted and opportunistic web-based threats. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For half the price of a candy bar, attackers have the unprecedented ability to deliver malware to you through your web browser simply because of your IP address space and your industry vertical. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "attackers",
"start": 35,
"end": 44
},
{
"text": "malware",
"start": 87,
"end": 94
},
{
"text": "you",
"start": 98,
"end": 101
},
{
"text": "your web brow... | [] |
Most of the attacks featured here were not detected by standard Anti-Virus because the malware hashes constantly change. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Most of the attacks featured here",
"start": 0,
"end": 33
},
{
"text": "standard Anti-Virus",
"start": 55,
"end": 74
},
{
"text": "the malware hashes constantly change",
"start": 83... | [] |
Web proxy blocking updates, even in real time, will not stop new malvertising landing pages that appear and disappear within minutes. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Intelligence feeds from the premier intelligence providers, based on hostname, IP, URL or domain will not be able to block malicious malvertisers quickly enough. | {
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} | [] |
Invincea protected users can simply browse and click anything online without fear of compromise or targeted malvertising attacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Non-Invincea users can attempt to OptOut of directed targeting where you can. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
European privacy laws for forcing most ad providers to offer the opt-out service; however, you often have to visit each ad provider individually to choose to opt out. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Note, that opting out merely places a blocking cookie in your browser. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This means that ad providers will not target or retarget based on cookies. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
But as shown above, the new targeted advertising is via IP intelligence. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
10/27: For clarification, Invincea has added additional notes in this version that the websites shown here and the 3rd party real-time ad networks are being used unwittingly and their resources misappropriated by malvertisers to target companies for persistent remote access, click fraud, and other nefarious activities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is not a reflection on these companies, nor the services they provide. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This paper highlights the problem for greater awareness so the industry collectively can combat this problem perhaps with more effective screening at the source prior to displaying ads. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice charged five Chinese nationals for economic espionage against U.S. corporations. | {
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} | [] |
The five known state actors are officers in Unit 61398 of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). | {
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} | [] |
In response, the Chinese government stated that the claims were'' absurd'' and based on'' fabricated facts''. | {
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} | [] |
China then went even further, stating'' The Chinese government, the Chinese military and their relevant personnel have never engaged or participated in cyber theft of trade secrets. | {
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} | [] |
'' We believe that organizations, be they governments or corporations, global or domestic, must keep up the pressure and hold China accountable until lasting change is achieved. | {
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} | [] |
Not only did the U.S. Government offer in its criminal indictment the foundation of evidence designed to prove China's culpability in electronic espionage, but also illustrated that the charges are only the tip of a very large iceberg. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Those reading the indictment should not conclude that the People's Republic of China (PRC) hacking campaign is limited to five soldiers in one military unit, or that they solely target the United States government and corporations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Rather, China's decade-long economic espionage campaign is massive and unrelenting. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Through widespread espionage campaigns, Chinese threat actors are targeting companies and governments in every part of the globe. | {
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} | [] |
At CrowdStrike, we see evidence of this activity first-hand as our services team conducts Incident Response investigations and responds to security breaches at some of the largest organizations around the world. | {
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} | [] |
We have first-hand insight into the billions of dollars of intellectual property systematically leaving many of the largest corporations-often times unbeknownst to their executives and boards of directors. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The campaign that is the subject of this report further points to espionage activity outside of Unit 61398, and reveals the activities of Unit 61486. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Unit 61486 is the 12th Bureau of the PLA's 3rd General Staff Department (GSD) and is headquartered in Shanghai, China. | {
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} | [] |
The CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking this particular unit since 2012, under the codename PUTTER PANDA, and has documented activity dating back to 2007. | {
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} | [] |
The report identifies Chen Ping, aka cpyy, and the primary location of Unit 61486. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This particular unit is believed to hack into victim companies throughout the world in order to steal corporate trade secrets, primarily relating to the satellite, aerospace and communication industries. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
With revenues totaling $189.2 billion in 2013, the satellite industry is a prime target for espionage campaigns that result in the theft of high-stakes intellectual property. | {
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} | [] |
While the gains from electronic theft are hard to quantify, stolen information undoubtedly results in an improved competitive edge, reduced research and development timetables, and insight into strategy and vulnerabilities of the targeted organization. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Parts of the PUTTER PANDA toolset and tradecraft have been previously documented, both by CrowdStrike, and in open source, where they are referred to as the MSUpdater group. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This report contains details on the tactics, tools, and techniques used by PUTTER PANDA, and provides indicators and signatures that can be leveraged by organizations to protect themselves against this activity. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Our Global Intelligence Team actively tracks and reports on more than 70 espionage groups, approximately half of which operate out of China and are believed to be tied to the Chinese government. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This report is part of our extensive intelligence library and was made available to our intelligence subscribers in April 2014, prior to the US Government's criminal indictment and China's subsequent refusal to engage in a constructive dialog. | {
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} | [] |
Targeted economic espionage campaigns compromise technological advantage, diminish global competition, and ultimately have no geographic borders. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We believe the U.S. Government indictments and global acknowledgment and awareness are important steps in the right direction. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In support of these efforts, we are making this report available to the public to continue the dialog around this ever-present threat. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
CrowdStrike has been tracking the activity of a cyber espionage group operating out of Shanghai, China, with connections to the People's Liberation Army Third General Staff Department (GSD) 12th Bureau Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) 61486, since 2012. | {
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} | [] |
The attribution provided in this report points to Chen Ping, aka cpyy (born on May 29, 1979), as an individual responsible for the domain registration for the Command and Control (C2) of PUTTER PANDA malware. | {
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} | [] |
In addition to cpyy, the report identifies the primary location of Unit 61486. | {
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} | [] |
PUTTER PANDA is a determined adversary group, conducting intelligence-gathering operations targeting the Government, Defense, Research, and Technology sectors in the United States, with specific targeting of the US Defense and European satellite and aerospace industries. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The PLA's GSD Third Department is generally acknowledged to be China's premier Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection and analysis agency, and the 12th Bureau Unit 61486, headquartered in Shanghai, supports China's space surveillance network. | {
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} | [] |
Domains registered by Chen Ping were used to control PUTTER PANDA malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These domains were registered to an address corresponding to the physical location of the Shanghai headquarters of 12th Bureau, specifically Unit 61486. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The report illuminates a wide set of tools in use by the actors, including several Remote Access Tools (RATs). | {
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"entity": [
{
"text": "a wide set of tools",
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},
{
"text": "the actors",
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"end": 63
},
{
"text": "several Remote Access Tools (RATs)",
"start": 75,
"end": 109
... | [] |
The RATs are used by the PUTTER PANDA actors to conduct intelligence-gathering operations with a significant focus on the space technology sector. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The RATs",
"start": 0,
"end": 8
},
{
"text": "the PUTTER PANDA actors",
"start": 21,
"end": 44
},
{
"text": "intelligence-gathering operations",
"start": 56,
"end": 89
... | [] |
This toolset provides a wide degree of control over a victim system and can provide the opportunity to deploy additional tools at will. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This toolset",
"start": 0,
"end": 12
},
{
"text": "a wide degree of control over a victim system",
"start": 22,
"end": 67
},
{
"text": "additional tools",
"start": 110,
"end... | [] |
They focus their exploits against popular productivity applications such as Adobe Reader and Microsoft Office to deploy custom malware through targeted email attacks. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "They",
"start": 0,
"end": 4
},
{
"text": "custom malware",
"start": 120,
"end": 134
},
{
"text": "targeted email attacks",
"start": 143,
"end": 165
}
],
"actio... | [] |
This report contains additional details on the tactics, tools, and techniques used by PUTTER PANDA, and provides indicators and signatures that can be leveraged by organizations to protect themselves against this activity. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
➔ Putter Panda is a cyber espionage actor that conducts operations from Shanghai, China, likely on behalf of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) 3rd General Staff Department 12th Bureau Unit 61486. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This unit is supports the space based signals intelligence (SIGINT) mission. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
➔ The 12th Bureau Unit 61486, headquartered in Shanghai, is widely accepted to be China's primary SIGINT collection and analysis agency, supporting China's space surveillance network. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
➔ This is a determined adversary group, conducting intelligence- gathering operations targeting the Government, Defense, Research, and Technology sectors in the United States, with specific targeting of space, aerospace, and communications. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
➔ They focus their exploits against popular productivity applications such as Adobe Reader and Microsoft Office to deploy custom malware through targeted email attacks. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "\u0007They",
"start": 2,
"end": 7
},
{
"text": "custom malware",
"start": 123,
"end": 137
},
{
"text": "targeted email attacks",
"start": 146,
"end": 168
}
],
... | [] |
➔ CrowdStrike identified Chen Ping, aka cpyy, a suspected member of the PLA responsible for procurement of the domains associated with operations conducted by Putter Panda. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
➔ The group has been operating since at least 2007 and has been observed heavily targeting the US Defense and European satellite and aerospace industries. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
➔ There is infrastructure overlap with Comment Panda, and evidence of interaction between actors tied to both groups. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
There are several pieces of evidence to indicate that the activity tracked by CrowdStrike as PUTTER PANDA is attributable to a set of actors based in China, operating on behalf of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Specifically, an actor known as cpyy (Chen Ping) appears to have been involved in a number of historical PUTTER PANDA campaigns, during which time he was likely working in Shanghai within the 12th Bureau, 3rd General Staff Department (GSD). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
PUTTER PANDA has several connections to actors and infrastructure tied to COMMENT PANDA, a group previously attributed to Unit 61398 of the PLA. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Although some of the domains used for command and control of the tools described later in this report appear to be legitimate sites that have been compromised in some way, many of them appear to have been originally registered by the operators. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "some of the domains",
"start": 9,
"end": 28
},
{
"text": "command and control of the tools described later in this report",
"start": 38,
"end": 101
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "used"... | [] |
Table 1 shows the domains that appear to have been registered by these actors, and the original email address used where known. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The most significant finding is that an actor known as cpyy appears to have registered a significant number of C2 domains. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This actor is discussed in the next section. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Many of the domains have had their registrant information changed, likely in an attempt to obfuscate the identity of the operators. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For instance, several domains originally registered by cpyy had their email address updated to van.dehaim @gmail.com around the end of 2009; for siseau.com the change occurred between July 2009 and November 2009, and for vssigma.com, the change occurred between August 2009 and December 2009. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Historical registrant information for anfoundation.us, rwchateau.com, and succourtion.org was not available prior to 2010, but it is likely that these domains were also originally registered to a personally attributable email account. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Similarly, several domains registered to mike.johnsonmj @yahoo.com have had their registrant email updated during March 2014 (see Table 2). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These registrant changes may indicate an increased awareness of operational security (OPSEC) from the PUTTER PANDA actors. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The recent changes to the domains shown in Table 2 may indicate that the operators are preparing new campaigns that make use of this infrastructure, or they are attempting to disassociate all these. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Although no attributable information was found on the email addresses associated with the domains described above (aside from cpyy and httpchen–see below), several other domains were found to have been registered by some of these addresses. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These are shown in Table 3, and may be used for command and control of PUTTER PANDA tools. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These",
"start": 0,
"end": 5
},
{
"text": "command and control of PUTTER PANDA tools",
"start": 48,
"end": 89
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "be used",
"start": 36,
"end... | [] |
domains from a single email address, perhaps due to OPSEC concerns or issues with the specific email account. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The subdomains associated with these domains via DNS records, along with some of the domain names themselves, point to some areas of interest for the PUTTER PANDA operators (see also Droppers in the following Technical Analysis section): • Space, satellite, and remote sensing technology (particularly within Europe); • ... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is likely that PUTTER PANDA will continue to attack targets of this nature in future intelligence- gathering operations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Based on passive DNS records, several PUTTER PANDA associated domains have resolved to IP address 100.42.216.230: Additionally, several subdomains of ujheadph.com resolved to this IP: Another subdomain of ujheadph.com has been observed in connection with distinctive traffic originating from the 3PARA RAT (described bel... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The decipherment.net domains resolved to this IP address from 11 October 2012 to at least 25 February 2013, and the botanict.com domain resolved from 11 October 2012 to 24 March 2013. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
During part of this timeframe (30 June 2012-30 October 2012), a domain associated with COMMENT PANDA resolved to this same IP address: login. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
aolon1ine.com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Additionally, for a brief period in April 2012, update8.firefoxupdata.com also resolved to this IP address. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The use of the same IP address during the same time suggests that there is perhaps some cooperation or shared resources between COMMENT PANDA and PUTTER PANDA. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Although not as conclusive as the links to COMMENT PANDA, IP address 31.170.110.163 was associated with VIXEN PANDA domain blog. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
strancorproduct.info from November to December 2013. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In February 2014, this IP address was also associated with PUTTER PANDA domain ske.hfmforum. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While not directly overlapping, this potential infrastructure link is interesting, as VIXEN PANDA has previously displayed TTPs similar to COMMENT PANDA (other CrowdStrike reporting describes VIXEN PANDA malware that extracts C2 commands embedded between delimiters in web content), and has extensively targeted European... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
11 Several email addresses have been associated with cpyy, who also appears to use the alternate handles cpiyy and cpyy.chen: The cpyy.net domain lists'' Chen Ping'' as the registrant name, which may be cpyy's real name, as this correlates with the initials'' cp'' in'' cpyy''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A personal blog for cpyy was found at http: //cpiyy.blog.163.com/. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The profile on this blog (shown in Figure 2 below) indicates that the user is male, was born on 25 May 1979, and works for the'' military/police'' (其他- 军人/警察). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This blog contains two postings in the'' IT'' category that indicate at least a passing interest in the topics of networking and programming. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A related CSDN profile for user cpiyy indicates that cpyy was working on or studying these topics in 2002 and 2003. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Another personal blog for cpyy (http: //www.tianya.cn/1569234/bbs) appears to have last been updated in 2007. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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