input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
Implement network segmentation through V-LANs to limit the spread of malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Consider the deployment of Software Restriction Policy set to only allow the execution of approved software (application whitelisting). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Recommend the whitelisting of legitimate executable directories to prevent the execution of potentially malicious binaries. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Consider the use of two-factor authentication methods for accessing privileged root level accounts or systems. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Consider deploying a two-factor authentication through a hardened IPsec/VPN gateway with split-tunneling prohibited for secure remote access. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Deny direct Internet access, except through the use of proxies for Enterprise servers and workstations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Perform regular content filtering at the proxies or external firewall points of presence. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Also consider the deployment of an explicit versus transparent proxy policy. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Implement a Secure Socket Layer (SSL) inspection capability to inspect both ingress and egress encrypted network traffic for potential malicious activity. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Isolate network services, such as email and Web application servers by utilizing a secure multi-tenant virtualization technology. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This will limit the damage sustained from a compromise or attack of a single network component. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Implement best practice guidance and policy to restrict the use of non-Foundation assets for processing or accessing Foundation-controlled data or systems (e.g., working from home, or using a personal device while at the office). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is difficult to enforce corporate policies, detect intrusions, and conduct forensic analysis or remediate compromises on non-corporate owned devices. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Minimize network exposure for all control system devices. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Control system devices should not directly face the Internet. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Place control system networks behind firewalls, and isolate or air gap them from the business network. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
When remote access is required, use secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing that VPN is only as secure as the connected devices. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Industrial Control System (ICS) -CERT and US-CERT remind organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to taking defensive measures. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
N/A December 19, 2014: Initial Release | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have written about NetTraveler before HERE and HERE. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Earlier this year, we observed an uptick in the number of attacks against Uyghur and Tibetan supporters using an updated version of the NetTraveler backdoor. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Here's an example of a targeted spear-phishing e-mail directed at Uyghur activists in March 2014. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a targeted spear-phishing e-mail",
"start": 21,
"end": 53
},
{
"text": "Uyghur activists",
"start": 66,
"end": 82
},
{
"text": "March 2014",
"start": 86,
"end": 96
}
... | [] |
The e-mail has two attachments, a non-malicious JPG file and a 373 KB Microsoft Word .DOC file. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The e-mail",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "two attachments, a non-malicious JPG file and a 373 KB Microsoft Word .DOC file",
"start": 15,
"end": 94
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": ... | [] |
The .DOC | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
file, which in reality is a'' Single File Web Page'' container, also known as'' Web archive file'', appears to have been created on a system using Microsoft Office-Simplified Chinese. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It contains an exploit for the CVE-2012-0158 vulnerability, detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2012-0158.db. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If run on a vulnerable version of Microsoft Office, it drops the main module as'' net.exe'' (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Agent.lifr), which in turn installs a number of other files. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 52,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "the main module",
"start": 61,
"end": 76
},
{
"text": "'' net.exe''",
"start": 79,
"end": 91
},
{
"text": "a nu... | [] |
The main C & C module is dumped into''% SystemRoot% \system32\Windowsupdataney.dll'', (detected by Kaspersky as Trojan- Spy.Win32.TravNet.qfr). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The main C & C module",
"start": 0,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "''% SystemRoot% \\system32\\Windowsupdataney.dll''",
"start": 36,
"end": 84
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is dumped",
... | [] |
It is registered as a service (named'' Windowsupdata'') through a Windows Batch file named'' DOT.BAT'' (detected by Kaspersky Lab products as Trojan.BAT.Tiny.b): To make sure the malware isn't running multiple times, it uses the mutex'' SD2013 Is Running!'' to mark its presence in the system. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "a service (named'' Windowsupdata'')",
"start": 20,
"end": 55
},
{
"text": "a Windows Batch file named'' DOT.BAT''",
"start": 64,
"end... | [] |
Other known mutexes used by older and current variants include: The malware configuration file is written to the'' SYSTEM'' folder (as opposed to SYSTEM32) and has a slightly new format compared to'' older'' NetTraveler samples: For the record, here's what an older NetTraveler config file looks like: Obviously, the dev... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The malware configuration file",
"start": 64,
"end": 94
},
{
"text": "the'' SYSTEM'' folder (as opposed to SYSTEM32)",
"start": 109,
"end": 155
},
{
"text": "the developers behind NetTravel... | [] |
Luckily, the encryption is relatively simple to break. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The algorithm is as follows: Once decrypted, the new config looks like this: One can easily see the command-and-control (C & C) server in the screenshot above, which is'' uyghurinfo [.] com''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the command-and-control (C & C) server",
"start": 96,
"end": 134
},
{
"text": "'' uyghurinfo [.] com''",
"start": 168,
"end": 191
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is",
"start": 1... | [] |
We identified several samples using this new encryption scheme. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A list of all the extracted C & C servers can be found below: We recommend blocking all these hosts in your firewall. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This year, the actors behind NetTraveler celebrate 10 years of activity. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Although the earliest samples we have seen appear to have been compiled in 2005, there are certain indicators that point to 2004 as the year when their activity started. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For 10 years NetTraveler has been targeting various sectors, with a focus on diplomatic, government and military targets. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Most recently, the main focus of interest for cyber-espionage activities revolved around space exploration, nano-technology, energy production, nuclear power, lasers, medicine and communications. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The targeting of Uyghur and Tibetan activists remains a standard component of their activities and we can assume it will stay this way, perhaps for another 10 years. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It's friday afternoon, I had a bit of free time and stumbled across this tweet by PhysicalDrive0 (thx!) two hours ago and thought to give it a try to finally add a new article to this Blog (first of 2014): So, I went to Google to search for the domain of the Embassy of Greece Beijing and added the (allegedly) malicious... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It showed, that the functionality is obfuscated in some way, e.g. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
the function csfn (String paramString) decrypts all strings by'' removing'' the numbers of the string parameter: There are some other obfuscation techniques, but they are not important here. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Instead, the following deobfuscated code line in the function init () gives us an idea where the actual payload is located: We can also see, that the java package contains a file named pack, so we open 7-Zip and unpack the file. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A quick view with a PE viewer showed, that it is a x86 PE executable not even encrypted (SHA256: b832e4b5a4829c8df6de7b42c5cb32ef25b5ab59072b4c2a7838404cd0dd5e5f): So, I opened IDA Pro to take a quick look at the functionality. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Together with the strings of the executable, we get a brief idea of what the purpose of this malware is. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The important strings are as follows: Together with the output of IDA Pro, we can see that this malware uses the command line tool cmd.exe for adding several registry keys to Internet Explorer. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "this malware",
"start": 91,
"end": 103
},
{
"text": "several registry keys",
"start": 150,
"end": 171
},
{
"text": "Internet Explorer",
"start": 175,
"end": 192
}
... | [] |
It also tries to retrieve possible AntiVirus information by using the COM interface (dc12a687-737f-11cf-884d-00aa004b2e24-> IWbemLocator-> SELECT * FROM AntiVirusProduct). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "possible AntiVirus information",
"start": 26,
"end": 56
},
{
"text": "using the COM interface",
"start": 60,
"end": 83
}
],... | [] |
Furthermore, it makes use of the COM to launch an instance of Internet Explorer (d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e-00c04fc9e26e-> IWebBrowser2), supposedly to contact its C & C server. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 13,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "an instance of Internet Explorer",
"start": 47,
"end": 79
},
{
"text": "its C & C server",
"start": 157,
"end": 173
}
],
... | [] |
To verify this, we open up Wireshark and run the executable. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As a result, we get the following network information: Also, we see that it downloads some kind of data (Base64 encoded). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 73,
"end": 75
},
{
"text": "some kind of data",
"start": 86,
"end": 103
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "downloads",
"start": 76,
"end": 85
}
]
... | [] |
But first, we combine the C & C server and the HTTP request and open the URL in our favorite Browser: As you can see, there is a string named microsoft followed by Base64 encoded data. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Side note: Is there also a Linux equivalent? Next, we copy the Base64 encoded data and go to the following website to let us decode it into a file (because I had the feeling it's just another unencrypted executable): As a result, we get another executable (SHA256: a4863f44f48d1c4c050dd7baad767a86b348dd4d33924acf4e0a3cd... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Once again, it creates several registry entries with the help of the command line tool and creates an instance of the Internet Explorer (CoCreateInstance ()-> d30c1661-cdaf-11d0-8a3e- 00c04fc9e26e) for contacting the C & C server. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 12,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "several registry entries",
"start": 23,
"end": 47
},
{
"text": "the help of the command line tool",
"start": 53,
"end": 86
},... | [] |
This time, the network information is as follows: From the code we can see, that the sample has also the ability to encode/decode data from/to Base64. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the sample",
"start": 81,
"end": 91
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 130,
"end": 134
},
{
"text": "Base64",
"start": 143,
"end": 149
}
],
"action": [
{
... | [] |
The dynamic analysis showed the malware sample contacted the C & C server, but wasn't sending any URL parameters (id1, id2). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the malware sample",
"start": 28,
"end": 46
},
{
"text": "the C & C server",
"start": 57,
"end": 73
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "contacted",
"start": 47,
"end": 56
... | [] |
Also the server didn't respond ... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The files can be downloaded here: That's it, have a nice weekend ... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Most targeted attacks against organizations originate as spear-phish campaigns or watering hole style web driveby attacks. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Most targeted attacks against organizations",
"start": 0,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "spear-phish campaigns or watering hole style web driveby attacks",
"start": 57,
"end": 121
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
Within the last six months, Invincea has discovered and stopped targeted malvertizing attacks against specific companies -- particularly those in the Defense Industrial Base. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The combination of traditional cyber crime methods (malvertising) with targeted attacks against Defense industrials for theft of IP represents another development in the on-going blending of techniques from cyber crime and advanced threat actors with nation state agendas. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We are tracking an on-going campaign against US Defense companies under the code name Operation DeathClick. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Traditional malvertizing has been an effective but indiscriminate method cyber crime gangs use to compromise endpoints to perpetrate ad fraud, identity fraud, and banking credential theft. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "cyber crime gangs",
"start": 73,
"end": 90
},
{
"text": "ad fraud",
"start": 133,
"end": 141
},
{
"text": "identity fraud",
"start": 143,
"end": 157
},
{
... | [] |
In this new targeted variation of malvertizing, the perpetrators are attacking specific organizations by leveraging real- time ad bidding networks and micro-targeting techniques developed over the last decade in online advertising. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The objective of these micro-targeted attacks against the Defense sector is likely theft of Intellectual Property more than ad fraud and indicates motive and sophistication characteristic of advanced threat actors. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Since these attacks were blocked by Invincea prior to compromise of the machine or network, we can not confirm the specific IP the perpetrators are after–only the Tactics, Techniques, and Protocols (TTPs) used which we describe herein, similar to methods used to provide backdoor access and command and control over comp... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "methods",
"start": 247,
"end": 254
},
{
"text": "backdoor access and command and control over compromised networks",
"start": 271,
"end": 336
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "provide",
... | [] |
While we discovered these attacks across multiple Defense companies, we expect it will not be long, if not already, before other highly targeted segments including Federal, Financial Services, Manufacturing, and HealthCare are victimized with the same micro-targeted malvertising. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The campaign described here does not represent a single flaw, 0-day, or unpatched bug, but rather a significant development in the adversary's capabilities and strategy to leverage legitimate online advertising platforms on well-known ad supported websites via a technique called Real-Time Ad Bidding. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In other words, this problem will not be patched on Tuesday. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
UPDATE: We have updated this document to include a new section on a campaign of distributing CryptoWall ransomware via malvertising. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While the attack vector is the same, we believe this to be motivated by cybercrime rather than theft of IP from Defense companies. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Malvertising has seen meteoric rise in 2014. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Threat actors create a corporate front, advertise on commonly visited sites, then later switch out the landing pages for their ads to pages that host exploit kits, or simply create a temporary redirection from their usual content to the malicious landing page. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Threat actors",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "the landing pages for their ads",
"start": 99,
"end": 130
},
{
"text": "pages that host exploit kits",
"start": 134,
"end... | [] |
These exploit kits are hosted on compromised web servers across the world. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In other words, they leverage legitimate ad-supported popular websites together with compromised websites for hosting exploit landing pages, defeating black-listing techniques. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The lifetime of these ads and landing pages are measured in hours. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In the campaign described here, Operation DeathClick, traditional malvertising has been armed with a micro-targeting system using IP address ranges, geographically narrowed down to zip codes, and interests of the user (recorded in cookies) to target specific companies, company types, and user interests/preferences. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "traditional malvertising",
"start": 54,
"end": 78
},
{
"text": "a micro-targeting system using IP address ranges, geographically narrowed down to zip codes, and interests of the user (recorded in cookies)",
"start": 9... | [] |
They are employing the tactics of real-time ad bidding to guarantee malicious ad delivery to intended targets of the campaign–building on a decade of work in real-time analytics for online ad placement, but for nefarious purposes. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The threat actors redirect their ads for just minutes at a time and then abandon their exploit kit pages forever. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This means that list-based threat intelligence feeds are rendered ineffective. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The domains used do not appear in any proxy blacklist, and the malware droppers delivered by the exploit pages always employ different signatures, evading traditional network and endpoint detection technology. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Ad delivery networks today are not incentivized to address the problem in a credible manner as they derive revenue from the criminal enterprise, while not being held accountable. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Turning a blind eye to the problem is rewarded economically. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Meanwhile the perpetrators are able to use traditional malvertising and ad fraud bots to fund the criminal enterprise. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Without cooperation of ad networks to vet the advertisers working through front companies, this attack vector will go unchecked. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
And now, with the advent of real-time ad bidding, these threat actors have weaponized ad delivery networks to target victims based on: Real-time ad bidding allows advertisers, and by extension, adversaries, to micro-target ad delivery on an extremely granular basis. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "these threat actors",
"start": 50,
"end": 69
},
{
"text": "ad delivery networks",
"start": 86,
"end": 106
},
{
"text": "target victims",
"start": 110,
"end": 124
}
... | [] |
For example, oppressive regimes trying to gather intelligence on activist protests can deliver ads to people getting email from within a specific locality where they are protesting. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Today, it is commonplace for micro-targeting techniques to be used as part of the toolset in legitimate online advertising. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For instance, a defense contractor, trying to win a new omnibus contract, can deliver targeted ads to online news sites frequented by Government program personnel. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The latest software product release can be delivered to Windows users visiting PC Magazine's website. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A local car dealership can sense when someone is in the market for a new car and can deliver advertising to those users, based solely on browsing history. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Now advanced threat actors are able to target an organization directly via micro-targeted malvertising, based solely on their corporate network IP range. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "advanced threat actors",
"start": 4,
"end": 26
},
{
"text": "an organization",
"start": 46,
"end": 61
},
{
"text": "directly",
"start": 62,
"end": 70
},
{
... | [] |
Thus, it doesn't matter where in the world you point your web browser -- an online video poker room, a fantasy football club homepage, a Pakistani news homepage, or even checking your own webmail at a trusted email provider. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Those ad windows can and are being used to deliver malware if the bidding price is right. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Those ad windows",
"start": 0,
"end": 16
},
{
"text": "deliver malware",
"start": 43,
"end": 58
},
{
"text": "the bidding price is right",
"start": 62,
"end": 88
}
... | [] |
Recently, multiple US Defense/Aerospace contractors were targeted by a malvertising campaign. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "multiple US Defense/Aerospace contractors",
"start": 10,
"end": 51
},
{
"text": "a malvertising campaign",
"start": 69,
"end": 92
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "were targeted",
... | [] |
These contractors had deployed world-class enterprise security defense in depth approaches to protect their intellectual property. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
They had next generation firewalls that relied on threat intelligence feeds to do auto-blocking of known malicious sites. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
They had malware interception technology that relied on known bad hashes to prevent malicious downloads. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The multiple proxies in place subscribed to real time feeds of known bad URLs. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
They deployed AV at the gateways and on the endpoints. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
But in a two week period, these organizations were hit with dozens of micro-targeted malvertising attacks, each of which would have provided a beachhead for the threat actors from which to compromise the network, if successful. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "these organizations",
"start": 26,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "dozens of micro-targeted malvertising attacks",
"start": 60,
"end": 105
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "were hit",
"st... | [] |
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