input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
'' We believe that activists and journalists in such countries may experience harassment or consequences to life or liberty from government surveillance. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Finally, we do not explore potential defenses appropriate for protecting the target population in this work. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We believe that to do so in a sufficiently well-grounded, meaningful manner first requires developing an understanding of the targets' knowledge of security issues, their posture regarding how they currently protect themselves, and the resources (including potentially ed- ucation) that they can draw upon. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
To this end, we are now con- ducting (with IRB approval) in-depth interviews with potential targets along with systematic examination of their Internet de- vices in order to develop such an understanding. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In the past decades, a rich body of academic work has grown to document and understand government Internet censorship, in- cluding nationwide censorship campaigns like the Great Fire- wall of China [,,]. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Research on governmental Internet surveillance and activities like law-enforcement interception is a comparatively smaller area. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Some academic work looks at government use of devices to enable censorship, such as key- word blacklists for Chinese chat clients, or the Green Dam censorware that was to be deployed on all new computers sold in China. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We are aware of only limited previous work looking at advanced threat actors targeting activists with hack- ing, though this work has not always been able to establish ev- idence of government connections. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Platforms used by potential targets, such as GMail, Twitter, and Facebook increasingly make transport- layer encryption the default, obscuring communications from most network surveillance. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This use of encryption, along with the global nature of many social movements, and the role of diaspora groups, likely makes hacking increasingly attractive, especially to states who are unable to request or compel content from these platforms. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Indeed, the increasing use of encryption and the global nature of targets have both been cited by pur- veyors of'' lawful intercept'' trojans in their marketing materi- als [,]. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In one notable case in 2009, UAE telecom firm Eti- salat distributed a system update to its then 145,000 BlackBerry subscribers that contained spyware to read encrypted Black- Berry e-mail from the device. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The spyware was discovered when the update drastically slowed users' phones. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In con- trast to country-scale distribution, our work looks at this kind of pro-government and government-linked surveillance through highly targeted attacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The term APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) refers to a sophisticated cyber-attacker who persistently attempts to tar- get an individual or group. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Work outside the academic community tracking government cyberattacks typically falls under this umbrella. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
There has been significant work on APT outside the academic community, especially among se- curity professionals, threat intelligence companies, and human rights groups. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Much of this work has focused on suspected government-on-government or government-on-corporation cy- ber attacks [,]. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Meanwhile, a small but growing body of this research deals with attacks carried out by governments against opposition and activist groups operating within, as well as outside their borders. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
One of the most notable cases is GhostNet, a large-scale cyber espionage campaign against the Tibetan independence movement [,]. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Other work avoids drawing conclusions about the attackers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Our study is based on extensive analysis of malicious files and suspect communications relevant to the activities of targeted groups in Bahrain, Syria, and the UAE, as documented in Ta- ble 1. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A number of the attacks had significant real-world impli- cations, per Table 2. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In many cases, we keep our descriptions somewhat imprecise to avoid potential leakage of target identi- ties. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We began our work when contacted by individuals con- cerned that a government might have targeted them for cyber- attacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As we became more acquainted with the targeted com- munities, in some cases we contacted targeted groups directly; in others, we reached out to individuals with connections to tar- geted groups, who allowed us to examine their communications with the groups. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For Bahrain and Syria, the work encompassed 10,000s of e-mails and instant messages. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For the UAE, the vol- ume is several thousand communications. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This following sections outline recent targeted hacking cam- paigns in Bahrain, Syria and the UAE. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These cases have a com- mon theme: attacks against targets' computers and devices with malicious files and links. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In some cases the attackers employed expensive and'' government exclusive'' malware, while in other cases, attackers used cheap and readily available RATs. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 14,
"end": 27
},
{
"text": "expensive and'' government exclusive'' malware",
"start": 37,
"end": 83
},
{
"text": "attackers",
"start": 107,
"end": 1... | [] |
Across these cases we find that clever social engineering often plays a central role, which is strong evidence of a well-informed ad- versary. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "clever social engineering",
"start": 32,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "a central role",
"start": 70,
"end": 84
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "plays",
"start": 64,
"end": 69
... | [] |
We also, however, frequently find technical and op- erational errors by the attackers that enable us to link attacks to governments. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In general, the attacks we find are not well- detected by anti-virus programs. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attacks",
"start": 12,
"end": 23
},
{
"text": "anti-virus programs",
"start": 58,
"end": 77
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "are not well- detected",
"start": 32,
"en... | [] |
We have analyzed two attack campaigns in the context of Bahrain, where the government has been pursuing a crackdown against an Arab-Spring inspired uprising since 2/14/2011. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The first involved malicious e-mails containing FinSpy, a'' lawful intercept'' trojan sold exclusively to governments. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The first",
"start": 0,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "malicious e-mails containing FinSpy, a'' lawful intercept'' trojan sold exclusively to governments",
"start": 19,
"end": 117
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
The second involved specially crafted IP spy links and e-mails de- signed to reveal the IP addresses of operators of pseudonymous accounts. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The second",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "specially crafted IP spy links and e-mails",
"start": 20,
"end": 62
},
{
"text": "the IP addresses of operators of pseudonymous accounts",
... | [] |
Some individuals who apparently clicked on these links were later arrested, including Ali (cf. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
§1), whose click appears to have been used against him in court. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While both campaigns point back to the government, we have not as yet identified overlap between the campaigns; targets of FinSpy appeared to reside mainly outside Bahrain, whereas the IP spy links targeted those mainly inside the country. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We examine each campaign in turn. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Beginning in April 2012, the authors received 5 suspicious e-mails from US and UK-based activists and journalists working on Bahrain. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We found that some of the attachments contained a PE (.exe) file designed to appear as an image. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "some of the attachments",
"start": 14,
"end": 37
},
{
"text": "a PE (.exe) file designed to appear as an image",
"start": 48,
"end": 95
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "contained",
... | [] |
Their filenames contained a Uni- code right-to-left override (RLO) character, causing Windows to render a filename such as gpj.1bajaR.exe instead as exe.Rajab1.jpg. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Their filenames",
"start": 0,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "a Uni- code right-to-left override (RLO) character",
"start": 26,
"end": 76
},
{
"text": "Windows to render a filename such as gpj.1baj... | [] |
The other .rar files contained a Word document with an embedded ASCII-encoded PE file containing a custom macro set to automatically run upon document startup. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The other .rar files",
"start": 0,
"end": 20
},
{
"text": "a Word document with an embedded ASCII-encoded PE file",
"start": 31,
"end": 85
},
{
"text": "a custom macro set",
"start"... | [] |
Under default security settings, Office disables all unsigned macros, so that a user who opens the document will only see an informational message that the macro has been disabled. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Thus, this attack was apparently designed with the belief or hope that targets would have reduced security settings. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Identification as FinSpy: By running the sample using Windows Virtual PC, we found the following string in mem- ory: y: \lsvnbranches\finspyv4.01\finspyv2\. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This string suggests FinSpy, a product of Gamma Inter- national. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The executables used virtualized obfusca- tion, which appeared to be custom-designed. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The executables",
"start": 0,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "virtualized obfusca- tion",
"start": 21,
"end": 46
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "used",
"start": 16,
"end": 20
... | [] |
We de- vised a fingerprint for the obfuscater and located a structurally similar executable by searching a large malware database. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This executable contained a similar string, except it identi- fied itself as FinSpy v3.00, and attempted to connect to tiger.gamma-international.de, a domain registered to Gamma International GmbH. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This executable",
"start": 0,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "tiger.gamma-international.de, a domain registered to Gamma International GmbH",
"start": 119,
"end": 196
}
],
"action": [
{
"te... | [] |
Analysis of capabilities: We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C & C) server, including password cap- ture (from over 20 applications) and recording of screenshots, Skype chat, file transfers, and input from the computer's micro- phone and webcam. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the spyware",
"start": 40,
"end": 51
},
{
"text": "additional modules",
"start": 91,
"end": 109
},
{
"text": "a command & control (C & C) server",
"start": 115,
"end": 149
... | [] |
To exfiltrate data back to the C & C server, a module encrypts and writes it to disk in a special folder. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "exfiltrate",
"start": 3,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "encrypts",
"start": 54,
"end": 62
},
{
"text": "writes",
"start": 67,
"end": 73
}
],
"entity": [
{
... | [] |
The spyware period- ically probes this folder for files that match a certain naming convention, then sends them to the C & C server. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The spyware",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "this folder",
"start": 34,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "files that match a certain naming convention",
"start": 50,
"end": 94
... | [] |
It then over- writes the files, renames them several times, and deletes them, in an apparent effort to frustrate forensic analysis. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "the files",
"start": 21,
"end": 30
},
{
"text": "them",
"start": 40,
"end": 44
},
{
"text": "several times",
... | [] |
Analysis of encryption: Because the malware employed myriad known anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques, it thwarted our attempts to attach debuggers. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 32,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "myriad known anti-debugging and anti-analysis techniques",
"start": 53,
"end": 109
},
{
"text": "it",
"start": 111,
"end":... | [] |
Since it did not in- clude anti-VM code, we ran it in TEMU, an x86 emulator de- signed for malware analysis. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
TEMU captures instruction- level execution traces and provides support for taint-tracking. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We found that FinSpy encrypts data using a custom imple- mentation of AES-256-CBC. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "FinSpy",
"start": 14,
"end": 20
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 30,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "a custom imple- mentation of AES-256-CBC",
"start": 41,
"end": 81
}
],
... | [] |
The 32 byte AES key and 16 byte IV are generated by repeatedly reading the low-order-4-bytes of the Windows clock. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The 32 byte AES key and 16 byte IV",
"start": 0,
"end": 34
},
{
"text": "repeatedly reading the low-order-4-bytes of the Windows clock",
"start": 52,
"end": 113
}
],
"action": [
{
"... | [] |
The key and IV are encrypted using an em- bedded RSA-2048 public key, and stored in the same file as the data. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The key and IV",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "an em- bedded RSA-2048 public key",
"start": 35,
"end": 68
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "are encrypted",
"start": 15,
... | [] |
The private key presumably resides on the C & C server. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The weak AES keys make decryption of the data straightfor- ward. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We wrote a program that generally can find these keys in under an hour, exploiting the fact that many of the system clock readings occur within the same clock-update quantum. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In addition, FinSpy's AES code fails to encrypt the last block of data if less than the AES block size of 128 bits, leaving trail- ing plaintext. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Finally, FinSpy's wire protocol for C & C commu- nication uses the same type of encryption, and thus is subject to the same brute force attack on AES keys. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "FinSpy's wire protocol for C & C commu- nication",
"start": 9,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "the same type of encryption",
"start": 63,
"end": 90
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "uses",
... | [] |
While we suspect FinSpy's cryptographic deficiencies reflect bugs, it is also con- ceivable that the cryptography was deliberately weakened to facilitate one government monitoring the surveillance of oth- ers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
C & C server: The samples communicated with 77.69.140.194, which belongs to a subscriber of Batelco, Bahrain's main ISP. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The samples",
"start": 14,
"end": 25
},
{
"text": "77.69.140.194",
"start": 44,
"end": 57
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "communicated",
"start": 26,
"end": 38
}
... | [] |
Analyzing network traffic between our infected VM and the C & C server revealed that the server used a global IPID, which allowed us to infer server activity by its progression. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In response to our preliminary work an executive at Gamma told the press that Bahrain's FinSpy server was merely a proxy and the real server could have been anywhere, as part of a claim that the Bahrain FinSpy deployment could have been associ- ated with another government. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, a proxy would show gaps in a global IPID as it forwarded traffic; our frequent observation of strictly consecutive IPIDs thus contradicts this statement. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Exploitation of captured data: Since we suspected the spy- ware operator would likely seek to exploit captured credentials, particularly those associated with Bahraini activist organiza- tions, we worked with Bahrain Watch, an activist organization inside Bahrain. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Bahrain Watch established a fake login page on their website and provided us with a username and pass- word. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
From a clean VM, we logged in using these credentials, saving the password in Mozilla Firefox. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We then infected the VM with FinSpy and allowed it to connect to the Bahrain C & C server. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 48,
"end": 50
},
{
"text": "the Bahrain C & C server",
"start": 65,
"end": 89
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "connect",
"start": 54,
"end": 61
}
... | [] |
Bahrain Watch's website logs revealed a subsequent hit from 89.148.0.41-made however to the site's home- page, rather than its login page-coming shortly after we had infected the VM. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Decrypting packet captures of the spyware's activity, we found that our VM sent the password to the server exactly one minute earlier: The URL provided to the server did not include the path to the login page, which was inaccessible from the home- page. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This omission reflects the fact that the Firefox password database stores only domain names, not full login page URLs, for each password. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Repeating the experiment again yielded a hit from the same IP address within a minute. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We inspected Bahrain Watch's logs, which showed no subsequent (or previ- ous) activity from that address, nor any instances of the same User Agent string. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In an IP spy attack, the attacker aims to discover the IP address of a victim who is typically the opera- tor of a pseudonymous social media or e-mail account. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attacker",
"start": 21,
"end": 33
},
{
"text": "the IP address of a victim who is typically the opera- tor of a pseudonymous social media or e-mail account",
"start": 51,
"end": 158
}
],
"act... | [] |
The at- tacker sends the pseudonymous account a link to a webpage or an e-mail containing an embedded remote image, using one of many freely-available services. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The at- tacker",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "the pseudonymous account a link to a webpage or an e-mail containing an embedded remote image",
"start": 21,
"end": 114
},
{
"text": "on... | [] |
When the victim clicks on the link or opens the e-mail, their IP address is revealed to the at- tacker. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "their IP address",
"start": 56,
"end": 72
},
{
"text": "the at- tacker",
"start": 88,
"end": 102
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is revealed",
"start": 73,
"end": 84
... | [] |
The attacker then discovers the victim's identity from their ISP. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In one case we identified legal documents that pro- vided a circumstantial link between such a spy link and a sub- sequent arrest. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Figure 2 illustrates the larger ecosystem of these attacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The attackers appear to represent a single entity, as the activity all connects back to accounts that sent links shortened using a par- ticular user account al9mood on the bit.ly URL shortening service. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Recall Ali Faisal Al-Shufa (discussed in Section 1), who was accused of sending insulting tweets from an account @alkawarahnews (Al Kawarah News in Figure 2). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
An op- erator of the account forwarded us a suspicious private message sent to the Al Kawarah News Facebook account from Red Sky. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Red Sky was purportedly arrested on 10/17/12, was convicted of insulting the King on his Twitter account @RedSky446, and was sentenced to four months prison. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
When released, he found that the passwords for his Twitter, Facebook, and e-mail accounts had been changed, and did not know how to recover his accounts. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The message that Red Sky's account sent to Al Kawarah News included a link shortened using Google's goo.gl ser- vice. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We used the goo.gl API to access analytics for the link, finding that it unshortened to iplogger.org/25SX and was created on 12/8/12. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The link had received only one click, which came from Bahrain with the referrer www.facebook.com. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Ali's case files contained a request from the Public Prose- cution for information on an IP address that it had linked to Al Kawarah News about 22 hours after the link was created. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Court documents indicate that ISP data linked the IP address to Ali, and on this basis he was sentenced to one year in prison. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Red Sky also targeted M in Figure 2. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
M recalled click- ing on a link from Red Sky while using an Internet connec- tion from one of the houses in M's village. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The house was raided by police on 3/12/13, who were looking for the sub- scriber of the house's internet connection. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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