mneb/malware-text-db · Datasets at Hugging Face

input stringlengths 1 785	output dict	schema listlengths 0 0
Police questioning revolved around Tweets that referred to Bahrain's King as a'' cursed one.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' Red Sky had earlier targeted other users with IP spy links shortened using the al9mood bit.ly account.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Red Sky", "start": 3, "end": 10 }, { "text": "other users", "start": 32, "end": 43 }, { "text": "IP spy links shortened using the al9mood bit.ly account", "start": 49, "end"...	[]
The attack on Jehad Abdulla is noteworthy, as the ac- count's activity aligned with communities typically critical of Bahrain's opposition.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, the account also directly crit- icized the King on occasion, in one case referring to him as'' weak'' and'' stingy.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' An account linked to al9mood sent Je- had Abdulla an IP spy link on 10/2/12 in a public message.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "An account linked to al9mood", "start": 3, "end": 31 }, { "text": "Je- had Abdulla", "start": 37, "end": 52 }, { "text": "an IP spy link", "start": 53, "end": 67 }, ...	[]
On 10/16/12, Salman Darwish was arrested for insulting the King using the Jehad Abdulla account.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
He was sentenced to one month in prison, partly on the basis of his confession.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Salman's father claims that police denied Salman food, drink, and medi- cal care.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Another account linked to al9mood targeted @YLUBH, the Twitter account of Yokogawa Union, a trade union at the Bahraini branch of a Japanese company.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
@YLUBH received at least three IP spy links in late 2012, sent via public Twitter mes sages.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "@YLUBH", "start": 0, "end": 6 }, { "text": "at least three IP spy links", "start": 16, "end": 43 }, { "text": "late 2012", "start": 47, "end": 56 } ], "action"...	[]
Yokogawa fired the leader of the trade union, Sami Ab- dulaziz Hassan, on 3/23/13.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
It later emerged that Sami was indeed the operator of the @YLUBH account, and that the police had called him in for questioning in relation to its tweets.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Use of embedded remote images: We identified several targets who received spoofed e-mails containing embedded remote images.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "several targets", "start": 45, "end": 60 }, { "text": "spoofed e-mails containing embedded remote images", "start": 74, "end": 123 } ], "action": [ { "text": "received", "st...	[]
Figure 2 shows two such cases, Maryam and Sayed Yousif.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The attacker sent the e-mails using ReadNotify.com, which records the user's IP address upon their mail client downloading the remote image.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The attacker", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "the e-mails", "start": 18, "end": 29 }, { "text": "ReadNotify.com", "start": 36, "end": 50 }, { "text"...	[]
While ReadNotify.com forbids spoofing in their TOS, the service has a vulnerability known to the attackers (and which we confirmed) that allows spoofing the From address by directly setting the parameters on a submission form on their website.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We have not found evidence suggesting this vulnerabil- ity is publicly known, but it appears clear that the attacker ex- ploited it, as the web form adds a X-Mai1er: RNwebmail header not added when sending through ReadNotify.com's other supported methods.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The header appeared in each e-mail the targets forwarded to us.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
When spoofing using this method, the original sender ad- dress still appears in X-Sender and other headers.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Accord- ing to these, the e-mails received by the targets all came from fatoomah85 @gmail.com.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
A link sent in one of these e- mails was connected to the al9mood bit.ly account.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In monitoring accounts connected to al9mood, we counted more than 200 IP spy links in Twitter messages and public Facebook posts.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Attackers often used (1) accounts of promi- nent or trusted but jailed individuals like'' Red Sky,'' (2) fake personas (e.g., attractive women or fake job seekers when tar- geting a labor union), or (3) impersonations of legitimate ac- counts.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Attackers", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "(1) accounts of promi- nent or trusted but jailed individuals like'' Red Sky,'' (2) fake personas (e.g., attractive women or fake job seekers when tar- geting a labor union), or ...	[]
In one particularly clever tactic, attackers exploited Twitter's default font, for example substituting a lowercase'' l'' with an uppercase'' I'' or switching vowels (e.g.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
from'' a'' to an'' e'') to create at-a-glance identical usernames.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In addition, malicious accounts tended to quickly delete IP spy tweets sent via (public) mentions, and frequently change profile names.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The use of RATs against the opposition has been a well- documented feature of the Syrian Civil War since the first re- ports were published in early 2012 [,,,,].	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The phenomenon is widespread, and in our experience, most mem- bers of the opposition know that some hacking is taking place.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
As summarized in Table 3, the attacks often include fake or ma- liciously packaged security tools; intriguing, or ideological, or movement-relevant content (e.g. lists of wanted persons).	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attacks", "start": 26, "end": 37 }, { "text": "fake or ma- liciously packaged security tools; intriguing, or ideological, or movement-relevant content (e.g. lists of wanted persons)", "start": 52, "end": 1...	[]
The seeding techniques and bait files suggest a good understanding of the opposition's needs, fears and behavior, coupled with ba- sic familiarity with off-the-shelf RATs.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In some cases attacks occur in a context that points to a more direct connection to one of the belligerents: the Syrian opposition has regularly ob- served that detainees' accounts begin seeding malware shortly after their arrest by government forces.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Researchers and security professionals have already profiled many of these RATs, including DarkComet [,], Black- shades Remote Controller, Xtreme RAT, njRAT, and ShadowTech.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Some are available for purchase by any- one, in contrast to'' government only'' FinSpy and RCS.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
For ex- ample, Xtreme RAT retails for e350, while a version of Black- shades lists for e40.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Others, like DarkComet, are free.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We have also observed cracked versions of these RATs on Arabic- language hacker forums, making them available with little ef- fort and no payment trail.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
While the RATs are cheaper and less sophisticated than FinSpy and RCS, they share the same ba- sic functionality, including screen capture, keylogging, remote monitoring of webcams and microphones, remote shell, and file exfiltration.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the same ba- sic functionality", "start": 82, "end": 112 }, { "text": "screen capture", "start": 124, "end": 138 }, { "text": "keylogging", "start": 140, "end": 150 },...	[]
In the most common attack sequence we observed, illus- trated with three examples in Figure 3, the attacker seeds mal- ware via private chat messages, posts in opposition-controlled social media groups, or e-mail.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attacker", "start": 95, "end": 107 }, { "text": "mal- ware", "start": 114, "end": 123 }, { "text": "private chat messages, posts in opposition-controlled social media groups, or e-mail"...	[]
These techniques often limit the world-visibility of malicious files and links, slowing their detection by common AV products.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "These techniques", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "their detection by common AV products", "start": 88, "end": 125 } ], "action": [ { "text": "slowing", "start": 80, ...	[]
Typically, targets receive either (1) a PE in a .zip or .rar, (2) a file download link, or (3) a link that will trigger a drive-by download.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "targets", "start": 11, "end": 18 }, { "text": "either (1) a PE in a .zip or .rar, (2) a file download link, or (3) a link that will trigger a drive-by download", "start": 27, "end": 139 } ], "act...	[]
The messages usually include text, often in Arabic, that attempts to persuade the target to execute the file or click the link.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The messages", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "text, often in Arabic, that attempts to persuade the target to execute the file or click the link", "start": 29, "end": 126 } ], "action": [ ...	[]
The first attacks in Figure 3 date to 2012, and use bait files with a DarkComet RAT payload.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The first attacks", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "bait files with a DarkComet RAT payload", "start": 52, "end": 91 } ], "action": [ { "text": "use", "start": 48, ...	[]
These attacks share the same C & C, 216.6.0.28, a Syrian IP address belonging to the Syr- ian Telecommunications Establishment, and publicly reported as a C & C of Syrian malware since February 2012.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "These attacks", "start": 0, "end": 13 }, { "text": "the same C & C, 216.6.0.28, a Syrian IP address belonging to the Syr- ian Telecommunications Establishment, and publicly reported as a C & C of Syrian malware since February...	[]
The first bait file presents to the victim as a PDF containing infor- mation about a planned uprising in Aleppo.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The first bait file", "start": 0, "end": 19 }, { "text": "the victim", "start": 32, "end": 42 }, { "text": "a PDF containing infor- mation about a planned uprising in Aleppo", "star...	[]
In fact the file is a Windows Screensaver (.scr	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the file", "start": 8, "end": 16 } ] } }	[]
) that masquerades as a PDF using Unicode RLO, rendering a name such as'' .fdp.scr	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "masquerades", "start": 7, "end": 18 } ], "modifier": [ { "text": "as", "start": 19, "end": 21 }, { "text": "using", "start": 28, "end": 33 } ], "entity...	[]
'' dis- play to the victim as'' .rcs.pdf	{ "entities": {} }	[]
.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' The second bait file is a dummy program containing DarkComet while masquerading as a Skype call encryption program, playing to opposition para- noia about government backdoors in common software.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The second bait file", "start": 3, "end": 23 }, { "text": "a Skype call encryption program", "start": 86, "end": 117 } ], "action": [ { "text": "masquerading", "start": 70, ...	[]
The third attack in Figure 3, observed in October 2013, entices tar- gets with e-mails purporting to contain or link to videos about the current conflict, infecting victims with Xtreme RAT, and using the C & C tn1.linkpc.net.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The third attack", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "tar- gets", "start": 64, "end": 73 }, { "text": "e-mails purporting to contain or link to videos about the current conflict", ...	[]
For seeding, the attackers typically use compromised ac- counts (including those of arrested individuals) or fake iden- tities masquerading as pro-opposition.	{ "entities": { "modifier": [ { "text": "For", "start": 0, "end": 3 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "seeding", "start": 4, "end": 11 }, { "text": "the attackers", "start": 13, "end": 26 }, { ...	[]
Our illustration shows in abstract terms the use of Victim A's account to seed mal- ware ('' Aleppo Plan'') via (say) Skype messages to Victim (s) Bn.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In the cases of Opp.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Member C and NGO Worker D (here, actual victims, not abstract), targeting was by e-mail from domains apparently belonging to opposition groups, in- dicating a potential compromise.	{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "targeting", "start": 64, "end": 73 } ], "modifier": [ { "text": "by", "start": 78, "end": 80 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "e-mail from domains apparently belonging to oppositi...	[]
One domain remains active, hosting a website of the Salafist Al-Nusra front, while the other appears dormant.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Opp. Member C received a malicious file as an e-mail attachment, while NGO Worker D was sent a shortened link (url [.] no/Uu5) to a download from a directory of Mrconstrucciones [.] net, a site that may have been com- promised.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Opp. Member C", "start": 0, "end": 13 }, { "text": "a malicious file", "start": 23, "end": 39 }, { "text": "an e-mail attachment", "start": 43, "end": 63 }, { ...	[]
Both attacks resulted in an Xtreme RAT infection.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Both attacks", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "an Xtreme RAT infection", "start": 25, "end": 48 } ], "action": [ { "text": "resulted", "start": 13, "end": 21 ...	[]
Interestingly, in the case of the fake Skype encryption the deception extended to a YouTube video from'' IT Se- curity Lab'' demonstrating the program's purported ca- pabilities, as well as a website promoting the tool, skype- encryption.sytes.net.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The attackers also constructed a ba- sic, faux GUI for their'' Encryption'' program (see Figure 4).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The fake GUI has a number of non-functional buttons like'' En- crypt'' and'' DeCrypt,'' which generate fake prompts.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
While dis- tracted by this meaningless interaction, the victim's machine is infected with DarkComet 3.3 [,].	{ "entities": { "modifier": [ { "text": "While", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "with", "start": 85, "end": 89 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "dis- tracted by this meaningless interaction", "start": 6, "en...	[]
Anecdotally, campaign volume appears to track significant events in the ongoing conflict.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
For example, campaigns dwin- dled and then rebounded within hours after Syria's 2012 Inter- net shutdown.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Similarly, activity observed by the authors also dwindled prior to expectation of US-led military action against Syrian government targets in September 2013.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Once this option appeared to be off the table, the volume of new samples and campaigns we observed again increased, includ- ing the recent targeting of NGO workers per Figure 3.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We are aware of only a negligible number of cases of the opposition using similar RATs against Syrian Government supporters, al- though evidence exists of other kinds of electronic attacks by third parties.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The logistics and activities of Syria's numerous opposition groups are intentionally concealed from public view to protect both their efficacy, and the lives of people participating in them.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Nevertheless, Syrian opposition members are generally familiar with stories off digital compro- mises of high-profile figures, including those entrusted with the most sensitive roles, as well as rank-and-file members.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Com- promise of operational security poses a documented threat to life both for victims of electronic compromise, and to family members and associates.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The Syrian conflict is ongoing, making it difficult to assem- ble comprehensive evidence of linkages between government actors and malware campaigns.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Moreover, many individuals whose identities have been compromised are in prison or oth- erwise disappeared, and thus unable to relate the evidence pre- sented to them during interrogation.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Still, strong circumstantial evidence links the use of RATs, phishing, and government ac- tivity, which we briefly summarize here: (1) many Syrians have recounted to journalists and the authors how interrogators con- fronted them with material from their computers.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
For example: The policeman told me,'' Do you remember when you were talking to your friend and you told him you had something wrong [sic] and paid a lot of money? At that time we were taking information from your laptop.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
'' (2) Syrian activists have supplied cases to international journal- ists, where arrests are quickly followed by the social me- dia accounts of detained individuals seeding malware to contact lists (Figure 3).	{ "entities": {} }	[]
(3) Finally, despite the notoriety of the attack campaigns, including mention of C & C IPs in international me- dia, the Syrian government has made no public statements about these campaigns nor acted to shut down the servers.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Beyond the ongoing challenges of attribution, these malware campaigns have a tangible impact on the Syrian opposition, and generally align with the interests of the Syrian government's propaganda operations.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The case of Abdul Razzaq Tlass, a leader in the Free Syrian Army, is illustrative of the potential uses of such campaigns.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
In 2012 a string of videos emerged showing Tlass sexting and engaged in lewd activity in front of a webcam.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
While he denied the videos, the harm to his rep- utation was substantial and he was eventually replaced.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
While the UAE has experienced no recent uprising or politi- cal unrest, it has nevertheless cracked down on its opposition, concurrent with the Arab Spring.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The first attacks we observed in the UAE involved a government-grade'' lawful interception'' trojan known as Re- mote Control System (RCS), sold by the Italian company Hack- ing Team.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The first attacks", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "a government-grade'' lawful interception'' trojan known as Re- mote Control System (RCS), sold by the Italian company Hack- ing Team", "start": 50, "end"...	[]
The associated C & C server indicated direct UAE government involvement.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Over time, we stopped receiving RCS samples from UAE targets, and instead observed a shift to the use of off-the-shelf RATs, and possible involvement of cyber-mercenary groups.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
However, poor attacker operational security .allowed	{ "entities": {} }	[]
us to link most observed attacks together.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
UAE activist Ahmed Mansoor (per Figure 5), impris- oned from April to November 2011 after signing an online pro- democracy petition, received an e-mail purportedly from'' Arabic Wikileaks'' in July 2012.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
He opened the associated at- tachment,'' veryimportant.doc,'' and saw what he described as'' scrambled letters''.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
He forwarded us the e-mail for investiga- tion.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The attachment exploited CVE-2010-3333, an RTF pars- ing vulnerability in Microsoft Office.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The document did not contain any bait content, and part of the malformed RTF that triggered the exploit was displayed in the document.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The exploit loaded shellcode that downloaded a second stage from ar-24.com, which in turn downloaded spyware from ar-24.com.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The exploit", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "shellcode", "start": 19, "end": 28 }, { "text": "a second stage", "start": 45, "end": 59 }, { "text": "...	[]
We denote this combination as the 3-Stage Ex- ploit Kit in Figure 5.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The C & C server also ran on ar-24.com.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The C & C server", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "ar-24.com", "start": 29, "end": 38 } ], "action": [ { "text": "ran", "start": 22, "end": 25 } ], ...	[]
When we ob- tained the sample in July 2012, ar-24.com resolved to an IP address on Linode, a hosting provider.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Three months later, it resolved to a UAE address belonging to the Royal Group, an organization linked to the UAE government; it is chaired by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al-Nayhan, a member of the UAE ruling family and a son of the founder of the UAE.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
Identification as RCS: We identified strings in memory that matched those in a Symantec analysis of RCS (also known as DaVinci or Crisis), a product of the Italian com- pany Hacking Team.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
We also located a structurally sim- ilar Word document via VirusTotal.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
The document used the same exploit and attempted to download a second stage from rcs-demo.hackingteam.it, which was unavailable at the time of testing.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The document", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "a second stage", "start": 61, "end": 75 }, { "text": "rcs-demo.hackingteam.it", "start": 81, "end": 104 } ], ...	[]
Analysis of capabilities: RCS has a suite of functionality largely similar to FinSpy.	{ "entities": {} }	[]
One difference was in the vectors used to install the spyware.	{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the vectors", "start": 22, "end": 33 }, { "text": "the spyware", "start": 50, "end": 61 } ], "action": [ { "text": "install", "start": 42, "end": 49 } ] ...	[]

Police questioning revolved around Tweets that referred to Bahrain's King as a'' cursed one.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

'' Red Sky had earlier targeted other users with IP spy links shortened using the al9mood bit.ly account.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Red Sky", "start": 3, "end": 10 }, { "text": "other users", "start": 32, "end": 43 }, { "text": "IP spy links shortened using the al9mood bit.ly account", "start": 49, "end"...

[]

The attack on Jehad Abdulla is noteworthy, as the ac- count's activity aligned with communities typically critical of Bahrain's opposition.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

However, the account also directly crit- icized the King on occasion, in one case referring to him as'' weak'' and'' stingy.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

'' An account linked to al9mood sent Je- had Abdulla an IP spy link on 10/2/12 in a public message.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "An account linked to al9mood", "start": 3, "end": 31 }, { "text": "Je- had Abdulla", "start": 37, "end": 52 }, { "text": "an IP spy link", "start": 53, "end": 67 }, ...

[]

On 10/16/12, Salman Darwish was arrested for insulting the King using the Jehad Abdulla account.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

He was sentenced to one month in prison, partly on the basis of his confession.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Salman's father claims that police denied Salman food, drink, and medi- cal care.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Another account linked to al9mood targeted @YLUBH, the Twitter account of Yokogawa Union, a trade union at the Bahraini branch of a Japanese company.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

@YLUBH received at least three IP spy links in late 2012, sent via public Twitter mes sages.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "@YLUBH", "start": 0, "end": 6 }, { "text": "at least three IP spy links", "start": 16, "end": 43 }, { "text": "late 2012", "start": 47, "end": 56 } ], "action"...

[]

Yokogawa fired the leader of the trade union, Sami Ab- dulaziz Hassan, on 3/23/13.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

It later emerged that Sami was indeed the operator of the @YLUBH account, and that the police had called him in for questioning in relation to its tweets.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Use of embedded remote images: We identified several targets who received spoofed e-mails containing embedded remote images.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "several targets", "start": 45, "end": 60 }, { "text": "spoofed e-mails containing embedded remote images", "start": 74, "end": 123 } ], "action": [ { "text": "received", "st...

[]

Figure 2 shows two such cases, Maryam and Sayed Yousif.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The attacker sent the e-mails using ReadNotify.com, which records the user's IP address upon their mail client downloading the remote image.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The attacker", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "the e-mails", "start": 18, "end": 29 }, { "text": "ReadNotify.com", "start": 36, "end": 50 }, { "text"...

[]

While ReadNotify.com forbids spoofing in their TOS, the service has a vulnerability known to the attackers (and which we confirmed) that allows spoofing the From address by directly setting the parameters on a submission form on their website.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

We have not found evidence suggesting this vulnerabil- ity is publicly known, but it appears clear that the attacker ex- ploited it, as the web form adds a X-Mai1er: RNwebmail header not added when sending through ReadNotify.com's other supported methods.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The header appeared in each e-mail the targets forwarded to us.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

When spoofing using this method, the original sender ad- dress still appears in X-Sender and other headers.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Accord- ing to these, the e-mails received by the targets all came from fatoomah85 @gmail.com.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

A link sent in one of these e- mails was connected to the al9mood bit.ly account.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

In monitoring accounts connected to al9mood, we counted more than 200 IP spy links in Twitter messages and public Facebook posts.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Attackers often used (1) accounts of promi- nent or trusted but jailed individuals like'' Red Sky,'' (2) fake personas (e.g., attractive women or fake job seekers when tar- geting a labor union), or (3) impersonations of legitimate ac- counts.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Attackers", "start": 0, "end": 9 }, { "text": "(1) accounts of promi- nent or trusted but jailed individuals like'' Red Sky,'' (2) fake personas (e.g., attractive women or fake job seekers when tar- geting a labor union), or ...

[]

In one particularly clever tactic, attackers exploited Twitter's default font, for example substituting a lowercase'' l'' with an uppercase'' I'' or switching vowels (e.g.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

from'' a'' to an'' e'') to create at-a-glance identical usernames.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

In addition, malicious accounts tended to quickly delete IP spy tweets sent via (public) mentions, and frequently change profile names.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The use of RATs against the opposition has been a well- documented feature of the Syrian Civil War since the first re- ports were published in early 2012 [,,,,].

{ "entities": {} }

[]

The phenomenon is widespread, and in our experience, most mem- bers of the opposition know that some hacking is taking place.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

As summarized in Table 3, the attacks often include fake or ma- liciously packaged security tools; intriguing, or ideological, or movement-relevant content (e.g. lists of wanted persons).

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attacks", "start": 26, "end": 37 }, { "text": "fake or ma- liciously packaged security tools; intriguing, or ideological, or movement-relevant content (e.g. lists of wanted persons)", "start": 52, "end": 1...

[]

The seeding techniques and bait files suggest a good understanding of the opposition's needs, fears and behavior, coupled with ba- sic familiarity with off-the-shelf RATs.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

In some cases attacks occur in a context that points to a more direct connection to one of the belligerents: the Syrian opposition has regularly ob- served that detainees' accounts begin seeding malware shortly after their arrest by government forces.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Researchers and security professionals have already profiled many of these RATs, including DarkComet [,], Black- shades Remote Controller, Xtreme RAT, njRAT, and ShadowTech.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Some are available for purchase by any- one, in contrast to'' government only'' FinSpy and RCS.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

For ex- ample, Xtreme RAT retails for e350, while a version of Black- shades lists for e40.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

Others, like DarkComet, are free.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

We have also observed cracked versions of these RATs on Arabic- language hacker forums, making them available with little ef- fort and no payment trail.

{ "entities": {} }

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While the RATs are cheaper and less sophisticated than FinSpy and RCS, they share the same ba- sic functionality, including screen capture, keylogging, remote monitoring of webcams and microphones, remote shell, and file exfiltration.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the same ba- sic functionality", "start": 82, "end": 112 }, { "text": "screen capture", "start": 124, "end": 138 }, { "text": "keylogging", "start": 140, "end": 150 },...

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In the most common attack sequence we observed, illus- trated with three examples in Figure 3, the attacker seeds mal- ware via private chat messages, posts in opposition-controlled social media groups, or e-mail.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the attacker", "start": 95, "end": 107 }, { "text": "mal- ware", "start": 114, "end": 123 }, { "text": "private chat messages, posts in opposition-controlled social media groups, or e-mail"...

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These techniques often limit the world-visibility of malicious files and links, slowing their detection by common AV products.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "These techniques", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "their detection by common AV products", "start": 88, "end": 125 } ], "action": [ { "text": "slowing", "start": 80, ...

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Typically, targets receive either (1) a PE in a .zip or .rar, (2) a file download link, or (3) a link that will trigger a drive-by download.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "targets", "start": 11, "end": 18 }, { "text": "either (1) a PE in a .zip or .rar, (2) a file download link, or (3) a link that will trigger a drive-by download", "start": 27, "end": 139 } ], "act...

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The messages usually include text, often in Arabic, that attempts to persuade the target to execute the file or click the link.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The messages", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "text, often in Arabic, that attempts to persuade the target to execute the file or click the link", "start": 29, "end": 126 } ], "action": [ ...

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The first attacks in Figure 3 date to 2012, and use bait files with a DarkComet RAT payload.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The first attacks", "start": 0, "end": 17 }, { "text": "bait files with a DarkComet RAT payload", "start": 52, "end": 91 } ], "action": [ { "text": "use", "start": 48, ...

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These attacks share the same C & C, 216.6.0.28, a Syrian IP address belonging to the Syr- ian Telecommunications Establishment, and publicly reported as a C & C of Syrian malware since February 2012.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "These attacks", "start": 0, "end": 13 }, { "text": "the same C & C, 216.6.0.28, a Syrian IP address belonging to the Syr- ian Telecommunications Establishment, and publicly reported as a C & C of Syrian malware since February...

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The first bait file presents to the victim as a PDF containing infor- mation about a planned uprising in Aleppo.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The first bait file", "start": 0, "end": 19 }, { "text": "the victim", "start": 32, "end": 42 }, { "text": "a PDF containing infor- mation about a planned uprising in Aleppo", "star...

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In fact the file is a Windows Screensaver (.scr

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "the file", "start": 8, "end": 16 } ] } }

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) that masquerades as a PDF using Unicode RLO, rendering a name such as'' .fdp.scr

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "masquerades", "start": 7, "end": 18 } ], "modifier": [ { "text": "as", "start": 19, "end": 21 }, { "text": "using", "start": 28, "end": 33 } ], "entity...

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'' dis- play to the victim as'' .rcs.pdf

{ "entities": {} }

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.

{ "entities": {} }

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'' The second bait file is a dummy program containing DarkComet while masquerading as a Skype call encryption program, playing to opposition para- noia about government backdoors in common software.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The second bait file", "start": 3, "end": 23 }, { "text": "a Skype call encryption program", "start": 86, "end": 117 } ], "action": [ { "text": "masquerading", "start": 70, ...

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The third attack in Figure 3, observed in October 2013, entices tar- gets with e-mails purporting to contain or link to videos about the current conflict, infecting victims with Xtreme RAT, and using the C & C tn1.linkpc.net.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The third attack", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "tar- gets", "start": 64, "end": 73 }, { "text": "e-mails purporting to contain or link to videos about the current conflict", ...

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For seeding, the attackers typically use compromised ac- counts (including those of arrested individuals) or fake iden- tities masquerading as pro-opposition.

{ "entities": { "modifier": [ { "text": "For", "start": 0, "end": 3 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "seeding", "start": 4, "end": 11 }, { "text": "the attackers", "start": 13, "end": 26 }, { ...

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Our illustration shows in abstract terms the use of Victim A's account to seed mal- ware ('' Aleppo Plan'') via (say) Skype messages to Victim (s) Bn.

{ "entities": {} }

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In the cases of Opp.

{ "entities": {} }

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Member C and NGO Worker D (here, actual victims, not abstract), targeting was by e-mail from domains apparently belonging to opposition groups, in- dicating a potential compromise.

{ "entities": { "action": [ { "text": "targeting", "start": 64, "end": 73 } ], "modifier": [ { "text": "by", "start": 78, "end": 80 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "e-mail from domains apparently belonging to oppositi...

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One domain remains active, hosting a website of the Salafist Al-Nusra front, while the other appears dormant.

{ "entities": {} }

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Opp. Member C received a malicious file as an e-mail attachment, while NGO Worker D was sent a shortened link (url [.] no/Uu5) to a download from a directory of Mrconstrucciones [.] net, a site that may have been com- promised.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Opp. Member C", "start": 0, "end": 13 }, { "text": "a malicious file", "start": 23, "end": 39 }, { "text": "an e-mail attachment", "start": 43, "end": 63 }, { ...

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Both attacks resulted in an Xtreme RAT infection.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "Both attacks", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "an Xtreme RAT infection", "start": 25, "end": 48 } ], "action": [ { "text": "resulted", "start": 13, "end": 21 ...

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Interestingly, in the case of the fake Skype encryption the deception extended to a YouTube video from'' IT Se- curity Lab'' demonstrating the program's purported ca- pabilities, as well as a website promoting the tool, skype- encryption.sytes.net.

{ "entities": {} }

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The attackers also constructed a ba- sic, faux GUI for their'' Encryption'' program (see Figure 4).

{ "entities": {} }

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The fake GUI has a number of non-functional buttons like'' En- crypt'' and'' DeCrypt,'' which generate fake prompts.

{ "entities": {} }

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While dis- tracted by this meaningless interaction, the victim's machine is infected with DarkComet 3.3 [,].

{ "entities": { "modifier": [ { "text": "While", "start": 0, "end": 5 }, { "text": "with", "start": 85, "end": 89 } ], "entity": [ { "text": "dis- tracted by this meaningless interaction", "start": 6, "en...

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Anecdotally, campaign volume appears to track significant events in the ongoing conflict.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

For example, campaigns dwin- dled and then rebounded within hours after Syria's 2012 Inter- net shutdown.

{ "entities": {} }

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Similarly, activity observed by the authors also dwindled prior to expectation of US-led military action against Syrian government targets in September 2013.

{ "entities": {} }

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Once this option appeared to be off the table, the volume of new samples and campaigns we observed again increased, includ- ing the recent targeting of NGO workers per Figure 3.

{ "entities": {} }

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We are aware of only a negligible number of cases of the opposition using similar RATs against Syrian Government supporters, al- though evidence exists of other kinds of electronic attacks by third parties.

{ "entities": {} }

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The logistics and activities of Syria's numerous opposition groups are intentionally concealed from public view to protect both their efficacy, and the lives of people participating in them.

{ "entities": {} }

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Nevertheless, Syrian opposition members are generally familiar with stories off digital compro- mises of high-profile figures, including those entrusted with the most sensitive roles, as well as rank-and-file members.

{ "entities": {} }

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Com- promise of operational security poses a documented threat to life both for victims of electronic compromise, and to family members and associates.

{ "entities": {} }

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The Syrian conflict is ongoing, making it difficult to assem- ble comprehensive evidence of linkages between government actors and malware campaigns.

{ "entities": {} }

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Moreover, many individuals whose identities have been compromised are in prison or oth- erwise disappeared, and thus unable to relate the evidence pre- sented to them during interrogation.

{ "entities": {} }

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Still, strong circumstantial evidence links the use of RATs, phishing, and government ac- tivity, which we briefly summarize here: (1) many Syrians have recounted to journalists and the authors how interrogators con- fronted them with material from their computers.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

For example: The policeman told me,'' Do you remember when you were talking to your friend and you told him you had something wrong [sic] and paid a lot of money? At that time we were taking information from your laptop.

{ "entities": {} }

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'' (2) Syrian activists have supplied cases to international journal- ists, where arrests are quickly followed by the social me- dia accounts of detained individuals seeding malware to contact lists (Figure 3).

{ "entities": {} }

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(3) Finally, despite the notoriety of the attack campaigns, including mention of C & C IPs in international me- dia, the Syrian government has made no public statements about these campaigns nor acted to shut down the servers.

{ "entities": {} }

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Beyond the ongoing challenges of attribution, these malware campaigns have a tangible impact on the Syrian opposition, and generally align with the interests of the Syrian government's propaganda operations.

{ "entities": {} }

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The case of Abdul Razzaq Tlass, a leader in the Free Syrian Army, is illustrative of the potential uses of such campaigns.

{ "entities": {} }

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In 2012 a string of videos emerged showing Tlass sexting and engaged in lewd activity in front of a webcam.

{ "entities": {} }

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While he denied the videos, the harm to his rep- utation was substantial and he was eventually replaced.

{ "entities": {} }

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While the UAE has experienced no recent uprising or politi- cal unrest, it has nevertheless cracked down on its opposition, concurrent with the Arab Spring.

{ "entities": {} }

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The first attacks we observed in the UAE involved a government-grade'' lawful interception'' trojan known as Re- mote Control System (RCS), sold by the Italian company Hack- ing Team.

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The associated C & C server indicated direct UAE government involvement.

{ "entities": {} }

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Over time, we stopped receiving RCS samples from UAE targets, and instead observed a shift to the use of off-the-shelf RATs, and possible involvement of cyber-mercenary groups.

{ "entities": {} }

[]

However, poor attacker operational security .allowed

{ "entities": {} }

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us to link most observed attacks together.

{ "entities": {} }

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UAE activist Ahmed Mansoor (per Figure 5), impris- oned from April to November 2011 after signing an online pro- democracy petition, received an e-mail purportedly from'' Arabic Wikileaks'' in July 2012.

{ "entities": {} }

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He opened the associated at- tachment,'' veryimportant.doc,'' and saw what he described as'' scrambled letters''.

{ "entities": {} }

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He forwarded us the e-mail for investiga- tion.

{ "entities": {} }

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The attachment exploited CVE-2010-3333, an RTF pars- ing vulnerability in Microsoft Office.

{ "entities": {} }

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The document did not contain any bait content, and part of the malformed RTF that triggered the exploit was displayed in the document.

{ "entities": {} }

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The exploit loaded shellcode that downloaded a second stage from ar-24.com, which in turn downloaded spyware from ar-24.com.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The exploit", "start": 0, "end": 11 }, { "text": "shellcode", "start": 19, "end": 28 }, { "text": "a second stage", "start": 45, "end": 59 }, { "text": "...

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We denote this combination as the 3-Stage Ex- ploit Kit in Figure 5.

{ "entities": {} }

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The C & C server also ran on ar-24.com.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The C & C server", "start": 0, "end": 16 }, { "text": "ar-24.com", "start": 29, "end": 38 } ], "action": [ { "text": "ran", "start": 22, "end": 25 } ], ...

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When we ob- tained the sample in July 2012, ar-24.com resolved to an IP address on Linode, a hosting provider.

{ "entities": {} }

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Three months later, it resolved to a UAE address belonging to the Royal Group, an organization linked to the UAE government; it is chaired by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al-Nayhan, a member of the UAE ruling family and a son of the founder of the UAE.

{ "entities": {} }

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Identification as RCS: We identified strings in memory that matched those in a Symantec analysis of RCS (also known as DaVinci or Crisis), a product of the Italian com- pany Hacking Team.

{ "entities": {} }

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We also located a structurally sim- ilar Word document via VirusTotal.

{ "entities": {} }

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The document used the same exploit and attempted to download a second stage from rcs-demo.hackingteam.it, which was unavailable at the time of testing.

{ "entities": { "entity": [ { "text": "The document", "start": 0, "end": 12 }, { "text": "a second stage", "start": 61, "end": 75 }, { "text": "rcs-demo.hackingteam.it", "start": 81, "end": 104 } ], ...

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Analysis of capabilities: RCS has a suite of functionality largely similar to FinSpy.

{ "entities": {} }

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One difference was in the vectors used to install the spyware.

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