input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
One of the spearphishing mails we observed coming through the router network was this one, sent to an address under the gov.py (Government of Paraguay) domain. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "One of the spearphishing mails",
"start": 0,
"end": 30
},
{
"text": "the router network",
"start": 58,
"end": 76
},
{
"text": "an address under the gov.py (Government of Paraguay) domain",
... | [] |
There was no executable attachment in this mail, but instead a link shortened by the URL shortener service bit.ly, with the underlying link pointing to an IP address on a Dutch hosting service. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Clicking that link from a Windows PC only yielded a redirection to the BBC homepages, and using other devices did not give more data. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The bit.ly service does however provide information on the user creating the shortened link, and other links associated with this account. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In this case, the user was named nicolatesla53. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The nicolatesla53 account was created in July 2014. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
From Oct 24th to Nov 21st this user created nearly 10000 shortened links–we harvested 9990 unique ones. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Three IP addresses were used for these links: The links themselves were on this format: As far as we were able to tell, there were three main types of actioncode: We have no sample of the actual MMS phishing messages apparently being sent, but we can see the page served when a user clicks a spammed link. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is just a dialogue box asking for the password presumably included in the initial message, and the next stage likely involves download of malicious content. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We were in the middle of harvesting the servers for data on the various action codes when they all were abruptly taken offline; so our data on which mobile operators are targeted is not complete. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We managed to get 66 of a total of 190. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The ones we know of are shown below. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A full breakdown of mobile operators and related links is included in the appendix. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The composition of links created for the various mobile operators is quite interesting, as one can speculate that they represent amount of actual or planned attacks in different countries. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
With the top three operators being Vodafone, T- Mobile and Proximus (Belgacom) it seems these apparent phishing attacks are less focused on the Russian sphere than the previously discussed malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This map is not complete, though. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It represents only about 35% (66/190) of all mobile operators targeted and 66% (3152/4781) of all phishing links we managed to harvest. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In addition, some operators like Vodafone are global actors, so the map might show an unfair intensity in their HQ locations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The rest of the bit.ly links used the action codes 743 or 1024. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
And now things really get interesting. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
By using mobile device HTTP User-Agents we were able to trigger downloads of malware components from some of these links. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Accessing the link from an Android User-Agent initiated a download of an Android installer package named WhatsAppUpdate.apk. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Accessing the link from an Android User-Agent",
"start": 0,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "a download of an Android installer package named WhatsAppUpdate.apk",
"start": 56,
"end": 123
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
The package we analyzed was 1.2MB in size. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The apparent main purpose of this malware is to record phone call audio. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "this malware",
"start": 29,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "phone call audio",
"start": 55,
"end": 71
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "record",
"start": 48,
"end": 54
}
... | [] |
Recordings are stored as *.mp4 files, and uploaded to the attackers periodically. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Recordings",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "*.mp4 files",
"start": 25,
"end": 36
},
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 54,
"end": 67
},
{
"text": "... | [] |
The malware is able to collect a lot of other information, not all of which is actually used: Through the encrypted C & C protocol, the attackers can issue commands and binary updates to the malware. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The malware",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "a lot of other information",
"start": 31,
"end": 57
},
{
"text": "the encrypted C & C protocol",
"start": 102,
"end": 130
... | [] |
It uses a custom DAO/Database scheme which uses accounts belonging to the virtual community Live Journal (livejournal.com) as data stores. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Three such accounts were found hardcoded in the package: The accounts all state that they belong to Iranian users. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is very likely false. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The text in these posts starts first out in cleartext, but quickly turns into unreadable gibberish. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The HTML source code reveals that the encoded portion is encapsulated in blog-index tags: The three accounts contain different configuration blocks pointing to C & C servers apparently located in Poland, Germany and Russia, respectively. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "different configuration blocks",
"start": 117,
"end": 147
},
{
"text": "C & C servers apparently located in Poland, Germany and Russia, respectively",
"start": 160,
"end": 236
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
Based on registration data and folder configuration we believe these are legitimate but compromised Joomla servers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
And then an unexpected oddity shows up in the Java source: We were also able to download a similar malware sample (BrowserUpdate.apk) from one of the C & C servers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This sample used different online accounts for its DAO/database functionality, but is otherwise quite similar to the first. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Using an IOS User-Agent triggered the download of a Debian installer package, WhatsAppUpdate.deb, also 1.2Mb in size. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Using an IOS User-Agent",
"start": 0,
"end": 23
},
{
"text": "the download of a Debian installer package, WhatsAppUpdate.deb",
"start": 34,
"end": 96
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "tri... | [] |
This application impersonates a Cydia installer, and can only be installed on a jailbroken phone. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This application",
"start": 0,
"end": 16
},
{
"text": "a Cydia installer",
"start": 30,
"end": 47
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "impersonates",
"start": 17,
"end": 29
... | [] |
Once installed, it may collect These data are encrypted and uploaded to an FTP account which is taken from an encrypted configuration file named /usr/bin/cores. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 16,
"end": 18
},
{
"text": "These data",
"start": 31,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "an FTP account",
"start": 72,
"end": 86
}
],
"action": [
{
... | [] |
In this particular case, the FTP account is located on a legitimate (if struggling) hosting service in the UK. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In this case, there's another clue: The WhatsAppUpdate project seems derived from an earlier template named SkypeUpdate. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
By now, it came as no surprise when we triggered a download with a BlackBerry User-Agent. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The initial download was a Java Applications Descriptor, a text file designed for Over-The-Air installation of Java-based applications. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This JAD file contained the locations of the two Blackberry *.COD binaries which we then could download directly. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The application impersonates a settings utility. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The application",
"start": 0,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "a settings utility",
"start": 29,
"end": 47
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "impersonates",
"start": 16,
"end": 28
... | [] |
This collects: Collected data will be uploaded to a DynDNS domain currently hosted on a US webhosting service. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This",
"start": 0,
"end": 4
},
{
"text": "Collected data",
"start": 15,
"end": 29
},
{
"text": "a DynDNS domain currently hosted on a US webhosting service",
"start": 50,
"e... | [] |
Since these COD files are also compiled Java code, they are possible to decompile to original source code. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In a similar fashion to the Android version, we find interesting strings there. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This time they are in Arabic: The earliest sample of Inception-related malware we have been able to obtain, was submitted to us in June 2014. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, decoy document metadata shows that it was created late May. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The related cloud account was created just before that. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
An examination of the other documents associated with the attacks show that they have been created at a steady pace all through summer and autumn 2014 and attacks are still ongoing. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Of interest is also the attackers' activity patterns over the 24h cycle. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The main upload of new components to shares seems to be divided over two high–activity periods: 6:00 -10:00 UTC and 17:00-21:00 UTC. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
No uploads were seen between 23:00 and 05:00 UTC. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is however doubtful how indicative these timeframes are. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
To illustrate, we looked into another and more obscure timing factor: The timing of the AES InitVector random seeds. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A random seed is the initial value passed into a pseudo-randomizer function. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The malware uses the random output to create what is known as an InitVector-a starting point for the AES encryption/decryption function. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The code used in some of the DLLs indicate that the attackers tend to use the C time () function to generate random seeds. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This function returns values of granularity down to seconds. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Thus random seeds, and ultimately the InitVectors, are functions of these quite coarse units of time. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The encrypted files uploaded to the WebDAV shares come with their InitVectors stored at the end of the file. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The encrypted files",
"start": 0,
"end": 19
},
{
"text": "the WebDAV shares",
"start": 32,
"end": 49
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "uploaded",
"start": 20,
"end": 28
... | [] |
Since we know the time window to be within a few days of the upload time we were able to brute force the time values that would generate the corresponding InitVectors. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Thus, we were able to say to the second when the file was created–and most times were identified to be in the range 1500-2200 GMT. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Unfortunately, we had to reject these data. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The file creation times turned out to be hours after the files themselves were uploaded to the WebDAV share. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the files themselves",
"start": 53,
"end": 73
},
{
"text": "the WebDAV share",
"start": 91,
"end": 107
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "were uploaded",
"start": 74,
"end"... | [] |
Either the attackers' system clock is wrong or a fixed offset is added to the random seed. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Either way, the data can't be trusted; and shows that nothing can be taken at face value. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
On at least two occasions during our surveillance of the Inception framework, the malware downloaded something unexpected and wholly different from what we have discussed until now. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 78,
"end": 89
},
{
"text": "something unexpected and wholly different from what we have discussed until now",
"start": 101,
"end": 180
}
],
"action": [
{
"tex... | [] |
These files were downloaded as encrypted *.bin files from the accounts carter0648 and frogs6352. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These files",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "encrypted *.bin files",
"start": 31,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "the accounts carter0648 and frogs6352",
"start": 58,
"end": 95... | [] |
When decrypted, these turned out to be dropper packages containing one dropper executable clearly created for the Inception framework, and one other, very different executable. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "dropper packages",
"start": 39,
"end": 55
},
{
"text": "one dropper executable clearly created for the Inception framework, and one other, very different executable",
"start": 67,
"end": 175
}
],
... | [] |
This executable, (sccm.exe, md5 dd8790455109497d49c2fa2442cf16f7) is a classical Chinese APT implant. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is a downloader and remote shell program, designed to connect to a C & C server to interact with the attacker and/or download more malware. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "a downloader",
"start": 6,
"end": 18
},
{
"text": "remote shell program",
"start": 23,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "a ... | [] |
The C & C server in this case is ict32.msname.org. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The C & C server",
"start": 0,
"end": 16
},
{
"text": "ict32.msname.org",
"start": 33,
"end": 49
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is",
"start": 30,
"end": 32
}
... | [] |
When connecting to this server, sccm.exe issues the following request: This C & C domain is used by many other malwares related to sccm.exe; some of which share obvious connections to the Quarian malware family, a known APT intrusion tool. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "connecting",
"start": 5,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "is used",
"start": 89,
"end": 96
}
],
"modifier": [
{
"text": "to",
"start": 16,
"end": 18
}
],
"entit... | [] |
This development was unexpected for several reasons. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
First of all, it apparently breaks the strict, obfuscatory operational security built into the Inception framework. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Inception has the capacity to perform all steps needed for scouting out and exfiltrating data without resorting to traditional hosted command & control. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Inception",
"start": 0,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 89,
"end": 93
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "scouting",
"start": 59,
"end": 67
},
{
"... | [] |
By using a well-understood APT tool and a known malicious C & C domain name, the attackers permit much clearer attribution. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "using",
"start": 3,
"end": 8
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "a known malicious C & C domain name",
"start": 40,
"end": 75
},
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 77,
"end... | [] |
Another factor which is out of character is the coding style. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
All Inception-related malware is written using Visual Studio 2010. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The downloaded sccm.exe is written using Visual C++ 6; and has a PE header compile date of October 2010. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This date can be forged, and indeed, all Inception-related malware has some level of forgery in the compile dates. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, the sccm.exe compile date matches the Quarian developer toolset and coding style to a better degree than the other files distributed through Inception. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Then there is the C & C domain used. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the C & C domain",
"start": 14,
"end": 30
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "used",
"start": 31,
"end": 35
}
]
}
} | [] |
According to DomainTools.com the msname.org domain registration timed out September 27th 2014. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It was left inactive and was not renewed until Nov 12th. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This means that the attackers distributed malware that would be out of action for a long time (last distribution of sccm.exe was September 26th). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Because of all this we consider sccm.exe as an unreliable indicator. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is likely to be a red herring purposefully placed on shares where the attackers have seen signs of access by security researchers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
At one instance the attackers seem to have slipped up. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Instead of using their scheduled task, they apparently did something manually on a WebDAV share. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is visible because the request came from an apparent attacker IP, but used yet another User-Agent:'' gvfs/1.12.3''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Gvfs is the virtual filesystem for Gnome desktop. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The action on the account was abnormal as well; an apparent file upload: When WebDAV shares are mapped up as drives by the operating system, any action taken by the attacker follows the same pattern as on the attacker's local drive. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In the case above, it seems the attacker attempted to edit a new document, which by default is given the name'' Untitled document'' in Gnome. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This might indicate that the attacker's operating system language is Spanish. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Of course, Spanish is one of the world's most widespread languages, so one can not infer much from this. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
There is even a small possibility that the phenomenon is a pure artifact; for example that a Spanish-speaking researcher connected to the same account using the same Linux-based setup as the attackers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This attack system shares a number of properties that are somewhat similar with the Red October campaigns detailed by Kaspersky Labs in 2013. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
For more information about this see: The'' Red October'' Campaign-An Advanced Cyber Espionage Network Targeting Diplomatic and Government Agencies However, there are also clear differences. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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