input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
The code is fully rewritten; there appears to be little code overlap, at least in the initial stage malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The coding style is different, with different solutions to programmatic problems, different use of exception handling, and different use of C++ classes. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It's hard to believe that the same programmers are responsible for the two code bases. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Red October malware contained linguistic markers that pointed towards Russian speaking attackers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
No such clues have been found in the Inception- related malware; there is a marked difference in the attention to detail and information leakage. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is certainly possible that the same people have organized both Inception and Red October, but there are no clear indications to this effect. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Windows-based malware in this paper generally contains very few noticeable strings apart from what is commonly found in software, and clearly randomized strings. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
What exists–like the word'' polymorphed'' in the early DLL versions-is standard English with few discerning features. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This changes a bit when we look at the mobile malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In the Android malware we find Hindi comments in the Java source code. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In the Iphone malware we find project paths referencing one'' JohnClerk'', and a few typos like'' conutry''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In one of the Blackberry binaries we find the string'' GodSaveTheQueen'', a rather blunt hint towards Britain, as well as Arabic log strings. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These and other indicators have led us to conclude that the Inception attackers are setting a new standard for deliberate disinformation and red herrings in a malware espionage operation. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Some clues might have been added by accident, but none of these indicators can be trusted in any way. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Thus we are not going to assume anything about who might be behind these attacks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The whole Inception setup shows signs of automation and seasoned programming. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The amount of layers used in this scheme to protect the payload of their attack seems excessively paranoid. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Not only is the initial DLL apparently polymorphed using some backend tool–the compile time stamps in the PE header are clearly forged, resources are removed so as not to give away any location information, and import tables are shuffled around, rendering import hashes (aka imphashes) useless. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the initial DLL",
"start": 12,
"end": 27
},
{
"text": "some backend tool",
"start": 57,
"end": 74
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "polymorphed",
"start": 39,
"end": 50
... | [] |
The names of the files both when dropped and their original names along with the callback directories, paths and mutexes used all seem to be dynamically generated. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The attackers utilize compromised embedded devices–typically routers- on the Internet as well as multiple dedicated hosting providers and VPN services to mask their identity from the cloud storage provider and others. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "compromised embedded devices–typically routers- on the Internet as well as multiple dedicated hosting providers and VPN services",
"start": 22,
"end": 150
... | [] |
The same router botnet is used as a spreading and management platform for attacks on mobile devices as well. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The same router botnet",
"start": 0,
"end": 22
},
{
"text": "a spreading and management platform for attacks on mobile devices",
"start": 34,
"end": 99
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "i... | [] |
This suggests that this a large campaign and we've only seeing the beginning of it. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Initially many of the targets were located in Russia or related to Russian interests, but as the campaign has evolved we have verified targets in countries all over the world. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is clear that this infrastructure model does not need to be applied solely against a few targets, or even need to be hosted at CloudMe. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The framework is generic, and will work as an attack platform for a multitude of purposes with very little modification. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The attribution indicators point in different directions and can't be given much weight. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These attacks can in theory be the creation of nation states or resourceful private entities-we consider it very unlikely that they are performed by one or just a few individuals. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
haarmannsi.cz sanygroup.co.uk ecolines.es blackberry-support.herokuapp.com (DynDNS) The following entities have helped in big and small ways. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Big thanks to all. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We also owe a big debt of gratitude to Ryan W. Smith of Blue Coat who helped us tremendously with the analysis of the mobile malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Downloaders, injectors, infostealers Example md5s of files detected with Kaspersky's Virus.Win32.Pioneer.dx and Symantec's Infostealer.Nemim! inf: To ensure only single instance of the module is running, the module verifies if system mutex named «132DF6E» exists. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "ensure",
"start": 150,
"end": 156
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "only single instance of the module is running",
"start": 157,
"end": 202
},
{
"text": "the module",
"start": 20... | [] |
If it exists the module exits, if not the module creates one. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The module implements a method to resist running in virtual environment. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The module",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "a method",
"start": 22,
"end": 30
},
{
"text": "resist running in virtual environment",
"start": 34,
"end": 71
}
]... | [] |
It gets CPU name and identifier from the registry at HKLM\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\ System\CentralProcessor\0 and collects IP and MAC addresses of local network adapters. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "CPU name and identifier",
"start": 8,
"end": 31
},
{
"text": "the registry at HKLM\\HARDWARE\\DESCRIPTION\\ System\\CentralProcessor\\0",
"st... | [] |
After that it compiles a string describing the system in the following format: « C P U:% CPUNAME% < br > Net card:% IP% (% MACADDR%) < br > ». | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Next it checks if this string contains one of the following substrings: If any of these strings is found, the module terminates. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
After that, there is a hardcoded value of 10, which delays further execution of the module for 10 seconds. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Then the module attempts to delete some other, prob- ably older, components which might be present on the system. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the module",
"start": 5,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "some other, prob- ably older, components which might be present on the system",
"start": 35,
"end": 112
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "... | [] |
The list of deleted files includes the following: The next is step is to check if current directory has a file named «U». | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "check",
"start": 73,
"end": 78
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "if current directory has a file named «U»",
"start": 79,
"end": 120
}
]
}
} | [] |
If not, the module proceeds with network communication routine. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
But if this file is found it does some additional checks. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If «U» file is older than 180 days, the module wipes the file. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the module",
"start": 36,
"end": 46
},
{
"text": "the file",
"start": 53,
"end": 61
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "wipes",
"start": 47,
"end": 52
}
]
}
} | [] |
If not, it triggers a special variable that makes module dormant and dis- ables further communication with C & C server. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "a special variable",
"start": 20,
"end": 38
},
{
"text": "module",
"start": 50,
"end": 56
},
{
"text": "dormant",
"start": 57,
"end": 64
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
After all, if the module is ready and allowed to communicate with C & C server it does that in the following manner. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
1. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The module connects to autolace.twilightparadox.com (or automachine. servequake.com) and issues a HTTP GET request with hardcoded UserAgent string: The server response should contain «DEXT87» string which is used to rec- ognize valid response. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The module",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "autolace.twilightparadox.com (or automachine. servequake.com)",
"start": 23,
"end": 84
},
{
"text": "a HTTP GET request",
"start": 9... | [] |
The malware locates «DEXT87» and reads the data appended to it. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The appended data should be an IP address in plaintext. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is used a real C & C IP address. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Reading stops when nondigit or dot symbol is found. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Here is an example of shortest possible valid server response: 2. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If the real C & C IP address is not valid the module may try to send identical request again but using a different HTTP path: If the C & C IP address is valid, the module issues another HTTP request: The server response can be one of the following: Where < DATASIZE > is a decimal integer that represents length of < DAT... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the module",
"start": 42,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "identical request",
"start": 69,
"end": 86
},
{
"text": "again",
"start": 87,
"end": 92
},
{
"text": "a... | [] |
Please note, that after receiving < DATA >, it is XORed with byte value 0x55 and saved to a disk in a file named «ctfmon.exe» (current directory is used). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 44,
"end": 46
},
{
"text": "byte value 0x55",
"start": 61,
"end": 76
},
{
"text": "a disk",
"start": 90,
"end": 96
},
{
"text": "a file nam... | [] |
Upon successful receiving of the file it is started in a new process. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This module is relatively large (455Kb) and comes as a part of WinRar SFX file that drops and starts the module from% APPDATA% \Microsoft\Display\DmaUp3. exe. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "WinRar SFX file",
"start": 63,
"end": 78
},
{
"text": "the module",
"start": 101,
"end": 111
},
{
"text": "% APPDATA% \\Microsoft\\Display\\DmaUp3. exe",
"start": 116,
"end"... | [] |
The main purpose of the module is to collect various secrets stored on a local system. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the module",
"start": 20,
"end": 30
},
{
"text": "various secrets stored on a local system",
"start": 45,
"end": 85
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "collect",
"start": 37,
... | [] |
This module is designed not to run on Windows with system default codepage set to Korean. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
From the very beginning this module checks if «bdagent.exe» process is running on current system. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "this module",
"start": 24,
"end": 35
},
{
"text": "if «bdagent.exe» process is running on current system",
"start": 43,
"end": 96
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "checks",
"start... | [] |
Bdagent.exe is a name for BitDefender Antivirus component. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
If it is running, it uses simple AV heuristics evasion technique. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 18,
"end": 20
},
{
"text": "simple AV heuristics evasion technique",
"start": 26,
"end": 64
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "uses",
"start": 21,
"end": 25
... | [] |
The code starts a thread that simulates keystrokes of ESC keyboard key and then shows a system modal message box. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The code",
"start": 0,
"end": 8
},
{
"text": "a thread that simulates keystrokes of ESC keyboard key and then shows a system modal message box",
"start": 16,
"end": 112
}
],
"action": [
{
... | [] |
Pushing ESC key closes the modal message box. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Right after that keystroke generation thread is terminated and the module continues normal execution as if «bdagent.exe» was not running. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "keystroke generation thread",
"start": 17,
"end": 44
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is terminated",
"start": 45,
"end": 58
}
]
}
} | [] |
Next the module makes sure only one instance of current code is running by checking if system mutex object named «920111215» exists. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the module",
"start": 5,
"end": 15
},
{
"text": "only one instance of current code is running",
"start": 27,
"end": 71
},
{
"text": "checking if system mutex object named «920111215» exists... | [] |
After that, the mod- ule collects information about current system which includes the following: If the module reveals that current System default codepage is 0412 (Korean) it terminates. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the mod- ule",
"start": 12,
"end": 24
},
{
"text": "information about current system which includes the following",
"start": 34,
"end": 95
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "collects",
... | [] |
There is one interesting specifics in Microsoft IntelliForms which reveals attack- er's interests. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
IntelliForms technology keeps login/password information in the registry in encrypted form. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, there is no clear information about the corre- sponding website which requires given login and password. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The only information Intelliforms offers about the place where given login/password should be used is a hash of the webpage URL. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
So far, the attackers can steal logins and pass- words but to understand where they are from they must guess the string which produced given hash. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 8,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "logins and pass- words",
"start": 32,
"end": 54
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "steal",
"start": 26,
"end": 31
... | [] |
They have implemented this logics in the malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
When IntelliForms information is stolen the malware tries to check the list of known login page URLs to recover the originating webpage address. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "IntelliForms information",
"start": 5,
"end": 29
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is stolen",
"start": 30,
"end": 39
}
]
}
} | [] |
Here is the list of URLs that are checked by the malware: The list of targeted services includes some local services specifically popular in: The module uses several simple XORbased algorithms to encrypt embedded string data. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The module",
"start": 142,
"end": 152
},
{
"text": "several simple XORbased algorithms",
"start": 158,
"end": 193
},
{
"text": "encrypt embedded string data",
"start": 197,
... | [] |
String encryption/decryption functions use the following keys: The module works with all Firefox versions prior to Mozilla Firefox 12.0. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Depend- ing on version of Firefox, it can read Firefox database directly to dump stored se- crets or utilize one Firefox libraries to access the configuration data. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In addition it makes use of the following Mozilla Firefox libraries depending on Firefox version: When stealing secrets from Firefox and Chrome it uses builtin SQLite library code. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "stealing",
"start": 103,
"end": 111
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "secrets",
"start": 112,
"end": 119
},
{
"text": "Firefox and Chrome",
"start": 125,
"end": 143
... | [] |
The module is linked with SQLite version 3.7.5 release candidate 2, release hash ed759d5a9edb3bba5f48f243df47be29e3fe8cd7 dated as 20110128 17:03:50. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
After stealing secrets from local system the malware executes some kind of embedded script. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "stealing",
"start": 6,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "executes",
"start": 53,
"end": 61
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "secrets",
"start": 15,
"end": 22
},
{
... | [] |
It is logging all actions to inform the operator what exactly was executed by this variant of the malware. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "all actions",
"start": 14,
"end": 25
},
{
"text": "inform the operator what exactly was executed by this variant of the malware",
"start": 29... | [] |
The result of this execution is appended to the stolen data and uploaded to the C & C server. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The result of this execution",
"start": 0,
"end": 28
},
{
"text": "the C & C server",
"start": 76,
"end": 92
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "uploaded",
"start": 64,
"end... | [] |
The module uploads all collected information to one of the following URLs via POST request: It's the first time we see .pn | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The module",
"start": 0,
"end": 10
},
{
"text": "all collected information",
"start": 19,
"end": 44
},
{
"text": "one of the following URLs",
"start": 48,
"end": 73
},... | [] |
domain used in malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This top level country code domain is quite exotic and is assigned to Pitcairn Islands, which is Overseas ter- ritory of the United Kingdom in the Pacific. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As of 2013 estimated population of Pitcairn Islands is only 56 people. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
An official .pn | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
domain costs $100/year from the registry, however .eu.pn | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
domains seem to be given away for free. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The malware uses fixed UserAgent string: The data is uploaded as a POST request binary in the following format: where < UserId > is hardcoded identifier (i.e. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The data",
"start": 42,
"end": 50
},
{
"text": "a POST request binary",
"start": 66,
"end": 87
},
{
"text": "the following format",
"start": 91,
"end": 111
}
],
... | [] |
«user2» in current sample) ; < UniqueMachineId > is a 32 characters long hex string which derived from net- work card MAC address; < EncryptionKey > is symmetrical encryption key used to encrypt < UserId > and < GeneralSysInfo > values. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The malware uses text protocol, which is why potentially binary values of < UserId > and < GeneralSysInfo > are ad- ditionally encoded using Base64 algorithm. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
< GeneralSysInfo > field contains only basic information about the system, i.e. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
: If the server reply contains a keyword «minmei» it continues sending additional in- formation. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 50,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "additional in- formation",
"start": 71,
"end": 95
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "sending",
"start": 63,
"end": 70
}
... | [] |
«Minmei» may be a reference to a popular Japanese anime and manga known as «The Super Dimension Fortress Macross». | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
A quote from Wikipedia: «Born in Yokohama Chinatown, Japan (though she is of partial Chinese descent) as Linn Minmei, Minmay moved in with her uncle Shaochin (少江) and aunt Feic- hun (慧中) on South Ataria Island in hopes of finding the path to fulfill her dream of becoming a star.» The trojan iterates through running pro... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The trojan",
"start": 281,
"end": 291
},
{
"text": "running processes",
"start": 309,
"end": 326
},
{
"text": "security software basing on executable filenames from the list below",
... | [] |
If the process is found it keeps a record of the software name using short AV Identifier string from the fol- lowing table of rules The malware uses a trick to evade running on a VMware. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The malware",
"start": 132,
"end": 143
},
{
"text": "running on a VMware",
"start": 166,
"end": 185
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "evade",
"start": 160,
"end": 165
... | [] |
First, it checks if cur- rent process is running in WOW64 environment. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 7,
"end": 9
},
{
"text": "if cur- rent process is running in WOW64 environment",
"start": 17,
"end": 69
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "checks",
"start": 10,
... | [] |
If yes it does additional port I/O specific to VMWare virtual machine (the VMware hypervisor port: 0x5658; VMware hypervisor magic value: 0x564D5868). | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Another method to detect VM en- vironment is to check local network adapter's IP address. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Another method",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "VM en- vironment",
"start": 25,
"end": 41
},
{
"text": "local network adapter's IP address",
"start": 54,
"end": 88
... | [] |
If it belongs to subnet 192.168.100. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
* then the malware believes it's running in a VM. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.