input stringlengths 1 785 | output dict | schema listlengths 0 0 |
|---|---|---|
If VM is detected the process instantly terminates. | {
"entities": {
"modifier": [
{
"text": "If",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
}
],
"entity": [
{
"text": "VM is detected",
"start": 3,
"end": 17
},
{
"text": "the process",
"start": 18,
"end": 29
}
],
... | [] |
Next the malware submits collected information to the C & C server using HTTP GET request and the following URL format: http: // < C2DOMAIN > /bin/readi.php? a1=% STEPID% & a2=% HOSTID% & a3=% SYSINFO% & a4=% AVSOFTID%, where% C2DOMAIN% is one of the following C & C domains:% STEPID% is special text string indicating s... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the malware",
"start": 5,
"end": 16
},
{
"text": "collected information",
"start": 25,
"end": 46
},
{
"text": "the C & C server",
"start": 50,
"end": 66
},
{
... | [] |
This string varies depending on the local system language and may be one of the following:% HOSTID% is a special value generated from local network card MAC address;% SYSINFO% is a string with general system information (please see description above) ;% AVSOFTID% is a string that contains indexes of AV software names i... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Igfxext.exe can download a file and drop it to% APPDATA% \microsoft\dis- play\ctfmon.exe (md5= e8bfb82b0dd5cef46116d61f62c25060). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Igfxext.exe",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "a file",
"start": 25,
"end": 31
},
{
"text": "it",
"start": 41,
"end": 43
},
{
"text": "% APPDATA% \\mi... | [] |
After execution, the downloaded file drops SMAGENT.EXE (md5 0306f9ae- 7786570139f78e78bc940597) to% APPDATA% \MICROSOFT\DISPLAY and ex- ecutes it. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the downloaded file",
"start": 17,
"end": 36
},
{
"text": "SMAGENT.EXE (md5 0306f9ae- 7786570139f78e78bc940597)",
"start": 43,
"end": 95
},
{
"text": "% APPDATA% \\MICROSOFT\\DISPLAY",
... | [] |
This component is a virus, and is used to selectively infiltrate into other computers via USB or network shares. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This component",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "other computers",
"start": 70,
"end": 85
},
{
"text": "USB",
"start": 90,
"end": 93
},
{
"text": "ne... | [] |
A large number of files are detected by Kaspersky Lab scanners as Virus.Win32. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Pioneer.dx. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
These files are all legitimate files that have been infected by another Darkhotel component. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These files",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "another Darkhotel component",
"start": 64,
"end": 91
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "been infected",
"start": 47,
"end"... | [] |
All of these infected files drop a 63kb self injecting compo- nent. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "All of these infected files",
"start": 0,
"end": 27
},
{
"text": "a 63kb self injecting compo- nent",
"start": 33,
"end": 66
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "drop",
"start": 28,
... | [] |
This malware is 63kb in size. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is bound to a variety of other software packages that vary in name, but the host package is consistently detected as'' Virus.Win32. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Pioneer.dx''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The igfxext.exe component is dropped to disk and run. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The igfxext.exe component",
"start": 0,
"end": 25
},
{
"text": "disk",
"start": 40,
"end": 44
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is dropped",
"start": 26,
"end": 36
}... | [] |
It spawns an- other suspended process with its own igfxext.exe image, but decrypts a smaller 32kb executable (cf1319d94f33380622ba000b7d8ad6e9, TrojanDownloader. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "an- other suspended process",
"start": 10,
"end": 37
},
{
"text": "its own igfxext.exe image",
"start": 43,
"end": 68
}
],
... | [] |
Win32.Agent.xwge) from its .data | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
section in memory with a simple xor 0xbb. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The running process overwrites the igfxext.exe image in the suspended process with this smaller chunk of code. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The running process",
"start": 0,
"end": 19
},
{
"text": "the igfxext.exe image",
"start": 31,
"end": 52
},
{
"text": "the suspended process",
"start": 56,
"end": 77
}... | [] |
It then resumes the thread in the new process. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This smaller code section maintains similar functionality to the'' worm'' compo- nent: Host package files detected as'' Virus.Win32.Pioneer.dx'' are infected legitimate files, that do not have any selfpropagation routines. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Host package files detected as'' Virus.Win32.Pioneer.dx''",
"start": 87,
"end": 144
},
{
"text": "infected legitimate files",
"start": 149,
"end": 174
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "ar... | [] |
It is signed with the familiar'''' digital certificate. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This sample is started by code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This sample",
"start": 0,
"end": 11
},
{
"text": "code running within svchost.exe on WinXP SP3",
"start": 26,
"end": 70
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is started",
"start": 12,... | [] |
It drops a keylogger. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "a keylogger",
"start": 9,
"end": 20
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "drops",
"start": 3,
"end": 8
}
]
}
} | [] |
The debug path inside: The dropper above maintains, drops and installs this kernel mode keylogger: Likely, it was developed as a part of a midtolate 2009 project: This driver package is built to look like a legitimate low level Microsoft system device. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The dropper above",
"start": 23,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "this kernel mode keylogger",
"start": 71,
"end": 97
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "maintains, drops and installs",
"sta... | [] |
It is installed as a system kernel driver'' Ndiskpro'' service, described as a'' Microcode Update Device''. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "a system kernel driver'' Ndiskpro'' service",
"start": 19,
"end": 62
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "is installed",
"start": 3,
"... | [] |
It is somewhat surprising that there is no rootkit functionality hiding this service: When loaded, the NDISKPRO.SYS driver hooks both INT 0x01 and INT 0xff, and retrieves keystroke data directly from port 0x60, the motherboard keyboard con- troller itself. | {
"entities": {
"action": [
{
"text": "loaded",
"start": 91,
"end": 97
},
{
"text": "hooks",
"start": 123,
"end": 128
},
{
"text": "retrieves",
"start": 161,
"end": 170
}
],
"entity": [
{
... | [] |
Here we see the local port variables assigned values And here, the ports are directly being read with READPORTUCHAR (0x64) and then READPORTUCHAR (0x60): It buffers, then communicates the data to the running user mode component. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This component then encrypts and writes the retrieved values ondisk to a ran- domly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This component",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "the retrieved values ondisk",
"start": 40,
"end": 67
},
{
"text": "a ran- domly named .tmp, file like ffffz07131101.tmp",
"start... | [] |
This file is located in the same directory as the original dropper, which maintains persistence across reboots with a simple addition to the HKCU run key. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the original dropper",
"start": 46,
"end": 66
},
{
"text": "persistence",
"start": 84,
"end": 95
},
{
"text": "reboots",
"start": 103,
"end": 110
},
{
"t... | [] |
Here is debug output demonstrating this component's data retrieval when the letter'' D'' is repeatedly pressed on the keyboard. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Keyscan make and break codes are'' 0x20'' and'' 0xA0'' and for the key press and key release for the'' D'' key. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The'' 0x1D'' value from port 0x64 that you see below is basically an indication that the output buffer is full and the keyboard is locked, so it is safe for the driver to access the key value in port 0x60: These debug messages and code style are duplicates of what chpie posted in the past. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This keylogger module encrypts and stores gathered data in a log file, as men- tioned previously. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This keylogger module",
"start": 0,
"end": 21
},
{
"text": "gathered data",
"start": 42,
"end": 55
},
{
"text": "a log file",
"start": 59,
"end": 69
}
],
"acti... | [] |
Its encryption algorithm is similar to RC4. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Interesting part is that the module randomly generates the key and stores it in an unexpected place: in the middle of the log file name. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Hence, the numeric part of the filename is used as a seed for the pseudorandom number generator. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Rand function is statically linked to insure same results on different computers. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Here is the commented RC4 encryption code: | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We believe we're seeing an evolution and development in Iranian-based cyber activity. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In years past, Iranian actors primarily committed politically-motivated website defacement and DDoS attacks. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Iranian actors",
"start": 15,
"end": 29
},
{
"text": "DDoS attacks",
"start": 95,
"end": 107
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "committed",
"start": 40,
"end": 49
}
... | [] |
More recently, however, suspected Iranian actors have destroyed data on thousands of computers with the Shamoon virus, and they have penetrated the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is used by the U.S. Navy worldwide. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "suspected Iranian actors",
"start": 24,
"end": 48
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 64,
"end": 68
},
{
"text": "thousands of computers",
"start": 72,
"end": 94
},
{
... | [] |
In this report, we document the activities of the Ajax Security Team, a hacking group believed to be operating from Iran. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Members of this group have accounts on popular Iranian hacker forums such as ashiyane [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] org and shabgard [. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
] org, and they have engaged in website defacements under the group name'' AjaxTM'' since 2010. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
By 2014, the Ajax Security Team had transitioned from performing defacements (their last defacement was in December 2013) to malware-based espionage, using a methodology consistent with other advanced persistent threat actors in this region. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It is unclear if the Ajax Security Team operates in isolation or if they are a part of a larger coordinated effort. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Ajax Security Team itself uses malware tools that do not appear to be publicly available. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have seen this group leverage varied social engineering tactics as a means to lure their targets into infecting themselves with malware. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "this group",
"start": 13,
"end": 23
},
{
"text": "varied social engineering tactics",
"start": 33,
"end": 66
},
{
"text": "their targets",
"start": 86,
"end": 99
},
... | [] |
Although we have not observed the use of exploits as a means to infect victims, members of the Ajax Security Team have previously used publicly available exploit code in web site defacement operations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In sum, FireEye has recently observed the Ajax Security Team conducting multiple cyber espionage operations against companies in the defense industrial base (DIB) within the Unites States, as well as targeting local Iranian users of anti-censorship technologies that bypass Iran's Internet filtering system. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The transition from patriotic hacking to cyber espionage is not an uncommon phenomenon. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
It typically follows an increasing politicization within the hacking community, particularly around geopolitical events. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This is followed by increasing links between the hacking community and the state, particularly military and/or intelligence organizations. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In the late 1990's and early 2000's, a similar transition occurred within the Chinese hacking community. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
During that time period, the Chinese hacking community engaged in website defacements and denial of service attacks in conjunction with incidents such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the collision of a U.S. spy plane and a Chinese military plane in 2001, and the Japanese Prime Mini... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the Chinese hacking community",
"start": 25,
"end": 54
},
{
"text": "denial of service attacks",
"start": 90,
"end": 115
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "engaged",
"start": 55,
... | [] |
Around this time a significant shift in philosophy began to take place. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Members of the Chinese hacking community that participated in such attacks soon found that transitioning to cyber espionage was more rewarding-both in terms of developing a more advanced skill set as well as in monetary remuneration. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
One group known as NCPH (Network Crack Program Hacker), whose founding member'' Wicked/Withered Rose'' was a patriotic hacker, made the transition to cyber espionage by founding a'' hacker-for-hire'' group that simultaneously developed an association with the Chinese military. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The group began developing zero-day exploits, rootkits and remote access tools (RATs) -using them in attacks against a variety of targets including the U.S. Department of Defense. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
(One of this group's associates,'' whg'', is still active and is believed to have developed one variant of the PlugX/SOGU malware. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
) The rationale behind this transition within the Chinese hacking community is nicely summed up in a message by the'' Honker Union of China'' to its members in 2010: What benefit can hacking a Web page bring our country and the people? It is only a form of emotional catharsis, please do not launch any pointless attacks... | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In Iran, the hacking community appears to be undergoing a similar transformation. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
While a variety of Iranian hacker groups had engaged in politically motivated website defacements, the emergence of the'' Iranian Cyber Army'' in 2009 demonstrated'' a concentrated effort to promote the Iranian government's political narrative online''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
They targeted, among others, news organizations, opposition websites and social media. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This marked the beginning of a large- scale cyber offensive against the perceived enemies of the Iranian government. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
Foreign news and opposition websites are routinely blocked in Iran, as are the tools that allow users in Iran to bypass these restrictions. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
One of the key stakeholders in Iran's Internet censorship program is the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), under which the Basij paramilitary organization operates. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
The Basij formed the Basij Cyber Council and actively recruits hackers in order to develop both defensive and offensive cyber capabilities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
There is increasing evidence to suggest that the hacker community in Iran is engaged in a transition from politically motivated defacements and denial of service attacks to cyber espionage activities. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This model is consistent with the Basij's recruitment of paramilitary volunteer hackers to'' engage in less complex hacking or infiltration operations'' leaving the more technical operations to entities over which they have increasingly direct control. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
As such, the capabilities of threat actors operating from Iran have traditionally been considered limited. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
However, the'' Shamoon'' attacks, which wiped computers in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, indicate an improvement in capabilities. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the'' Shamoon'' attacks",
"start": 9,
"end": 32
},
{
"text": "computers in Saudi Arabia and Qatar",
"start": 46,
"end": 81
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "wiped",
"start": 40,
... | [] |
And unsurprisingly, Iran has reportedly increased its efforts to improve offensive capabilities after being targeted by Stuxnet and Flame. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
We have observed the Ajax Security Team use a variety of vectors to lure targets into installing malicious software and/or revealing login credentials. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the Ajax Security Team",
"start": 17,
"end": 39
},
{
"text": "targets",
"start": 73,
"end": 80
},
{
"text": "installing malicious software and/or revealing login credentials",
"star... | [] |
These attack vectors include sending email, private messages via social media, fake login pages, and the propagation of anti-censorship software that has been infected with malware. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "These attack vectors",
"start": 0,
"end": 20
},
{
"text": "sending email, private messages via social media, fake login pages, and the propagation of anti-censorship software that has been infected with malware",
"sta... | [] |
During our investigation, we discovered that these attackers sent targeted emails, as well as private messages through social media. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "these attackers",
"start": 45,
"end": 60
},
{
"text": "targeted emails, as well as private messages",
"start": 66,
"end": 110
},
{
"text": "social media",
"start": 119,
"end... | [] |
For example, the attackers targeted companies in the DIB using a fake conference page as a lure to trick targets into installing malicious software. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 13,
"end": 26
},
{
"text": "companies in the DIB",
"start": 36,
"end": 56
},
{
"text": "a fake conference page as a lure to trick targets into installing malicious ... | [] |
The attackers registered the domain'' aeroconf2014 [.] org'' in order to impersonate the IEEE Aerospace conference-the conference's actual domain is aeroconf.org-and sent out an email with the following information: The email encouraged users to visit a fake conference website owned by the attackers: Upon visiting the ... | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "the domain'' aeroconf2014 [.] org''",
"start": 25,
"end": 60
},
{
"text": "impersonate the IEEE Aerospace conference",
"start": 7... | [] |
The attackers have also used phishing attacks, in which they set up Web pages to emulate various services that require security credentials. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "phishing attacks",
"start": 29,
"end": 45
},
{
"text": "they",
"start": 56,
"end": 60
},
{
"text": "W... | [] |
The attackers tailored these login pages for specific targets in the DIB and spoofed a variety of services such as Outlook Web Access and VPN login pages. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The attackers",
"start": 0,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "these login pages",
"start": 23,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "specific targets in the DIB",
"start": 45,
"end": 72
},
... | [] |
If users attempt to login through these fake Web pages, the attackers collect their login credentials. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "the attackers",
"start": 56,
"end": 69
},
{
"text": "their login credentials",
"start": 78,
"end": 101
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "collect",
"start": 70,
"end": 77
... | [] |
All Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Iran are required to implement filtering technology that censors access to content which the Iranian government deems unacceptable. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
This content includes categories such as pornography and political opposition. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In response to these restrictions, Iranians have been increasingly using software that bypasses such filtering technology. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
To counter anti-censorship efforts, Iran has attempted to block the use of certain software tools. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
In 2012, researchers found that an anti-censorship tool that is primarily used by Internet users in Iran was bundled with malware and redistributed. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "an anti-censorship tool that is primarily used by Internet users in Iran",
"start": 32,
"end": 104
},
{
"text": "malware",
"start": 122,
"end": 129
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "was b... | [] |
Our investigation found that malware-laden versions of legitimate anti-censorship software, such as Psiphon and Ultrasurf, were distributed to users Iran and Persian speaking people around the world. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "malware-laden versions of legitimate anti-censorship software, such as Psiphon and Ultrasurf",
"start": 29,
"end": 121
},
{
"text": "users Iran and Persian speaking people around the world",
"start": 143,
"end... | [] |
We have observed the Ajax Security Team use a malware family that they identify simply as'Stealer'. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
They deliver this malware as a malicious executable (dropper). | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "They",
"start": 0,
"end": 4
},
{
"text": "this malware",
"start": 13,
"end": 25
},
{
"text": "a malicious executable (dropper)",
"start": 29,
"end": 61
}
],
"a... | [] |
The executable is a CAB extractor that drops the implant IntelRS.exe. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The executable",
"start": 0,
"end": 14
},
{
"text": "the implant IntelRS.exe",
"start": 45,
"end": 68
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "drops",
"start": 39,
"end": 44
... | [] |
This implant, in turn, drops various other components into C:\Documents and Settings\ {USER} \Application Data\IntelRapidStart\. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "This implant",
"start": 0,
"end": 12
},
{
"text": "various other components",
"start": 29,
"end": 53
},
{
"text": "C:\\Documents and Settings\\ {USER} \\Application Data\\IntelRapidStart\\"... | [] |
The following files are written to disk in this location: The IntelRS.exe is written in .NET | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "The following files",
"start": 0,
"end": 19
},
{
"text": "disk",
"start": 35,
"end": 39
},
{
"text": "this location",
"start": 43,
"end": 56
}
],
"action": [
... | [] |
and is aptly named'' Stealer'', as it has various data collection modules. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "it",
"start": 35,
"end": 37
},
{
"text": "various data collection modules",
"start": 42,
"end": 73
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "has",
"start": 38,
"end": 41
}
... | [] |
It drops and launches AppTransferWiz.dll via the following command: 110 is an ordinal that corresponds to'' StartBypass'' export in AppTransferWiz.dll. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "It",
"start": 0,
"end": 2
},
{
"text": "AppTransferWiz.dll",
"start": 22,
"end": 40
},
{
"text": "the following command",
"start": 45,
"end": 66
}
],
"action":... | [] |
Data exfiltration is conducted over FTP by AppTransferWiz.dll, which acts as an FTP client. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "Data exfiltration",
"start": 0,
"end": 17
},
{
"text": "FTP",
"start": 36,
"end": 39
},
{
"text": "AppTransferWiz.dll",
"start": 43,
"end": 61
}
],
"action": [... | [] |
This DLL is written in Delphi. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
There is code to exfiltrate data over HTTP POST as well, but it is unused. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "code",
"start": 9,
"end": 13
},
{
"text": "data",
"start": 28,
"end": 32
},
{
"text": "HTTP POST",
"start": 38,
"end": 47
}
],
"action": [
{
"tex... | [] |
We also found incomplete code that would perform SFTP and SMTP exfiltration, which could be completed in a future version. | {
"entities": {
"entity": [
{
"text": "incomplete code",
"start": 14,
"end": 29
},
{
"text": "SFTP and SMTP exfiltration",
"start": 49,
"end": 75
}
],
"action": [
{
"text": "perform",
"start": 41,
"end": ... | [] |
State is maintained between the stealer component IntelRS.exe and the FTP component AppTransferWiz.DLL using a file from the FTP server'' sqlite3.dll'', as well as a global atom'' SQLiteFinish''. | {
"entities": {}
} | [] |
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