instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiscardAndActivateTest(DiscardReason reason) {
LifecycleUnit* background_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
LifecycleUnit* foreground_lifecycle_unit = nullptr;
CreateTwoTabs(true /* focus_tab_strip */, &background_lifecycle_unit,
&foreground_lifecycle_unit);
content::WebContents* initial_web_contents =
tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, true));
background_lifecycle_unit->Discard(reason);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
TransitionFromPendingDiscardToDiscardedIfNeeded(reason,
background_lifecycle_unit);
EXPECT_NE(initial_web_contents, tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0));
EXPECT_FALSE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
EXPECT_CALL(tab_observer_, OnDiscardedStateChange(testing::_, false));
tab_strip_model_->ActivateTabAt(0, true);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&tab_observer_);
EXPECT_EQ(LifecycleUnitState::ACTIVE,
background_lifecycle_unit->GetState());
EXPECT_TRUE(tab_strip_model_->GetWebContentsAt(0)
->GetController()
.GetPendingEntry());
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 1 | 10,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeRenderMessageFilter::OpenChannelToExtensionOnUIThread(
int source_process_id, int source_routing_id,
int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& target_extension_id,
const std::string& channel_name) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->message_service()->
OpenChannelToExtension(
source_process_id, source_routing_id, receiver_port_id,
source_extension_id, target_extension_id, channel_name);
}
Commit Message: Disable tcmalloc profile files.
BUG=154983
TBR=darin@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161048 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int indexedvalidate(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *values, int num_comps)
{
int code, integer;
float fraction;
ref hival;
os_ptr op = osp;
if (num_comps < 1)
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
if (!r_has_type(op, t_integer) && !r_has_type(op, t_real))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
code = array_get(imemory, space, 2, &hival);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (*values > hival.value.intval)
*values = (float)hival.value.intval;
if (*values < 0)
*values = 0;
/* The PLRM says 'If it is a real number, it is rounded to the nearest integer
* but in fact Acrobat simply floors the value.
*
* KAS 29/08/2017 the comment above is incorrect, at least for recent versions of Acrobat.
* In addition the PDF 2.0 specification states that real numbers should be rounded to
* the nearest integer (0.5 rounds up) and if it is outside 0->hival then it should
* be adjusted to the nearest value within that range (which is done above). The Quality
* Logic 2.0 FTS includes a test for this which Acrobat X fails.
*/
integer = (int)floor(*values);
fraction = *values - integer;
if (fraction >= 0.5)
*values = (float)(integer + 1);
else
*values = (float)integer;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 21,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderProcessImpl::~RenderProcessImpl() {
#ifndef NDEBUG
webkit_glue::CheckForLeaks();
#endif
GetShutDownEvent()->Signal();
ClearTransportDIBCache();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: relay_crypt(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell, cell_direction_t cell_direction,
crypt_path_t **layer_hint, char *recognized)
{
relay_header_t rh;
tor_assert(circ);
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(recognized);
tor_assert(cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN ||
cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT);
if (cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN) {
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { /* We're at the beginning of the circuit.
* We'll want to do layered decrypts. */
crypt_path_t *thishop, *cpath = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->cpath;
thishop = cpath;
if (thishop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Relay cell before first created cell? Closing.");
return -1;
}
do { /* Remember: cpath is in forward order, that is, first hop first. */
tor_assert(thishop);
if (relay_crypt_one_payload(thishop->b_crypto, cell->payload, 0) < 0)
return -1;
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
if (rh.recognized == 0) {
/* it's possibly recognized. have to check digest to be sure. */
if (relay_digest_matches(thishop->b_digest, cell)) {
*recognized = 1;
*layer_hint = thishop;
return 0;
}
}
thishop = thishop->next;
} while (thishop != cpath && thishop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Incoming cell at client not recognized. Closing.");
return -1;
} else { /* we're in the middle. Just one crypt. */
if (relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_crypto,
cell->payload, 1) < 0)
return -1;
}
} else /* cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT */ {
/* we're in the middle. Just one crypt. */
if (relay_crypt_one_payload(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_crypto,
cell->payload, 0) < 0)
return -1;
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
if (rh.recognized == 0) {
/* it's possibly recognized. have to check digest to be sure. */
if (relay_digest_matches(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_digest, cell)) {
*recognized = 1;
return 0;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 24,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct blk_mq_tags *blk_mq_init_rq_map(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set,
unsigned int hctx_idx)
{
struct blk_mq_tags *tags;
unsigned int i, j, entries_per_page, max_order = 4;
size_t rq_size, left;
tags = blk_mq_init_tags(set->queue_depth, set->reserved_tags,
set->numa_node,
BLK_MQ_FLAG_TO_ALLOC_POLICY(set->flags));
if (!tags)
return NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tags->page_list);
tags->rqs = kzalloc_node(set->queue_depth * sizeof(struct request *),
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY,
set->numa_node);
if (!tags->rqs) {
blk_mq_free_tags(tags);
return NULL;
}
/*
* rq_size is the size of the request plus driver payload, rounded
* to the cacheline size
*/
rq_size = round_up(sizeof(struct request) + set->cmd_size,
cache_line_size());
left = rq_size * set->queue_depth;
for (i = 0; i < set->queue_depth; ) {
int this_order = max_order;
struct page *page;
int to_do;
void *p;
while (left < order_to_size(this_order - 1) && this_order)
this_order--;
do {
page = alloc_pages_node(set->numa_node,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY | __GFP_ZERO,
this_order);
if (page)
break;
if (!this_order--)
break;
if (order_to_size(this_order) < rq_size)
break;
} while (1);
if (!page)
goto fail;
page->private = this_order;
list_add_tail(&page->lru, &tags->page_list);
p = page_address(page);
entries_per_page = order_to_size(this_order) / rq_size;
to_do = min(entries_per_page, set->queue_depth - i);
left -= to_do * rq_size;
for (j = 0; j < to_do; j++) {
tags->rqs[i] = p;
if (set->ops->init_request) {
if (set->ops->init_request(set->driver_data,
tags->rqs[i], hctx_idx, i,
set->numa_node)) {
tags->rqs[i] = NULL;
goto fail;
}
}
p += rq_size;
i++;
}
}
return tags;
fail:
blk_mq_free_rq_map(set, tags, hctx_idx);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 24,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int socket_close(int fd) {
#ifdef WIN32
return closesocket(fd);
#else
return close(fd);
#endif
}
Commit Message: common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 5,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct avl_table *create_t1_glyph_tree(char **glyph_names)
{
int i;
void **aa;
static struct avl_table *gl_tree;
gl_tree = avl_create(comp_t1_glyphs, NULL, &avl_xallocator);
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
if (glyph_names[i] != notdef &&
(char **) avl_find(gl_tree, &glyph_names[i]) == NULL) {
/*tex No |strdup| here, just point to the |glyph_names| array members. */
aa = avl_probe(gl_tree, &glyph_names[i]);
if (aa == NULL) {
/*tex Is this a problem? */
}
}
}
return gl_tree;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HeadlessWebContentsImpl::GetMainFrameRenderProcessId() const {
return web_contents()->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 10,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<gfx::Point>::Write(Message* m, const gfx::Point& p) {
m->WriteInt(p.x());
m->WriteInt(p.y());
}
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 15,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExecuteCodeInTabFunction::DidLoadFile(bool success,
const std::string& data) {
std::string function_name = name();
const extensions::Extension* extension = GetExtension();
if (success &&
function_name == TabsInsertCSSFunction::function_name() &&
extension != NULL &&
data.find(
extensions::MessageBundle::kMessageBegin) != std::string::npos) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ExecuteCodeInTabFunction::LocalizeCSS, this,
data,
extension->id(),
extension->path(),
extensions::LocaleInfo::GetDefaultLocale(extension)));
} else {
DidLoadAndLocalizeFile(success, data);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, bool init) {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 26,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jp2_cdef_dumpdata(jp2_box_t *box, FILE *out)
{
jp2_cdef_t *cdef = &box->data.cdef;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < cdef->numchans; ++i) {
fprintf(out,
"channo=%"PRIuFAST16"; type=%"PRIuFAST16"; assoc=%"PRIuFAST16"\n",
cdef->ents[i].channo, cdef->ents[i].type, cdef->ents[i].assoc);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 24,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: event_size_change( int delta )
{
status.ptsize += delta;
if ( status.ptsize < 64 * 1 )
status.ptsize = 1 * 64;
else if ( status.ptsize > MAXPTSIZE * 64 )
status.ptsize = MAXPTSIZE * 64;
FTDemo_Set_Current_Charsize( handle, status.ptsize, status.res );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 5,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool testToStringCharsRequiredHelper(const wchar_t * text) {
UriParserStateW state;
UriUriW uri;
state.uri = &uri;
int res = uriParseUriW(&state, text);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
int charsRequired;
if (uriToStringCharsRequiredW(&uri, &charsRequired) != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
wchar_t * buffer = new wchar_t[charsRequired + 1];
if (uriToStringW(buffer, &uri, charsRequired + 1, NULL) != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return false;
}
if (uriToStringW(buffer, &uri, charsRequired, NULL) == 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return false;
}
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return true;
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 17,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce)
{
int ret;
INIT_BUF(tb);
store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND);
store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE);
store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP);
ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
*handle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET);
memcpy(nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t)],
TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 17,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Tab::OnMouseDragged(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
controller_->ContinueDrag(this, event);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 23,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::ExtensionDevToolsClientHost(
Profile* profile,
DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
scoped_refptr<const Extension> extension,
const Debuggee& debuggee)
: profile_(profile),
agent_host_(agent_host),
extension_(std::move(extension)),
last_request_id_(0),
infobar_(nullptr),
detach_reason_(api::debugger::DETACH_REASON_TARGET_CLOSED),
extension_registry_observer_(this) {
CopyDebuggee(&debuggee_, debuggee);
g_attached_client_hosts.Get().insert(this);
extension_registry_observer_.Add(ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_));
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_APP_TERMINATING,
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::SyncSelectionIfRequired() {
WebFrame* frame = webview()->focusedFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
string16 text;
size_t offset;
ui::Range range;
if (pepper_delegate_.IsPluginFocused()) {
pepper_delegate_.GetSurroundingText(&text, &range);
offset = 0; // Pepper API does not support offset reporting.
} else {
size_t location, length;
if (!webview()->caretOrSelectionRange(&location, &length))
return;
range = ui::Range(location, location + length);
if (webview()->textInputType() != WebKit::WebTextInputTypeNone) {
if (location > kExtraCharsBeforeAndAfterSelection)
offset = location - kExtraCharsBeforeAndAfterSelection;
else
offset = 0;
length = location + length - offset + kExtraCharsBeforeAndAfterSelection;
WebRange webrange = WebRange::fromDocumentRange(frame, offset, length);
if (!webrange.isNull())
text = WebRange::fromDocumentRange(frame, offset, length).toPlainText();
} else {
offset = location;
text = frame->selectionAsText();
range.set_end(range.start() + text.length());
}
}
if (selection_text_offset_ != offset ||
selection_range_ != range ||
selection_text_ != text) {
selection_text_ = text;
selection_text_offset_ = offset;
selection_range_ = range;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SelectionChanged(routing_id_, text, offset, range));
}
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fdctrl_handle_version(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
/* Controller's version */
fdctrl->fifo[0] = fdctrl->version;
fdctrl_set_fifo(fdctrl, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void irias_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
spin_unlock_irq(&irias_objects->hb_spinlock);
}
Commit Message: irda: validate peer name and attribute lengths
Length fields provided by a peer for names and attributes may be longer
than the destination array sizes. Validate lengths to prevent stack
buffer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_create_file(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_file *file)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_apdu apdu;
const struct sc_acl_entry *entry = NULL;
unsigned char sbuf[0x100];
size_t sbuf_len;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_print_cache(card);
if (file->type != SC_FILE_TYPE_WORKING_EF)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "Creation of the file with of this type is not supported");
sbuf_len = iasecc_fcp_encode(card, file, sbuf + 2, sizeof(sbuf)-2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, sbuf_len, "FCP encode error");
sbuf[0] = IASECC_FCP_TAG;
sbuf[1] = sbuf_len;
if (card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_df) {
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(card->cache.current_df, SC_AC_OP_CREATE);
if (!entry)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND, "iasecc_create_file() 'CREATE' ACL not present");
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_create_file() 'CREATE' method/reference %X/%X", entry->method, entry->key_ref);
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_create_file() create data: '%s'", sc_dump_hex(sbuf, sbuf_len + 2));
if (entry->method == SC_AC_SCB && (entry->key_ref & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_SM)) {
rv = iasecc_sm_create_file(card, entry->key_ref & IASECC_SCB_METHOD_MASK_REF, sbuf, sbuf_len + 2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "iasecc_create_file() SM create file error");
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, &file->path, NULL);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
}
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, 0xE0, 0, 0);
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = sbuf_len + 2;
apdu.lc = sbuf_len + 2;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "iasecc_create_file() create file error");
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, &file->path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Cannot select newly created file");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *skip(const char *in) {while (in && *in && (unsigned char)*in<=32) in++; return in;}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 6,543 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init sched_init(void)
{
int i, j;
unsigned long alloc_size = 0, ptr;
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
alloc_size += 2 * nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
alloc_size += 2 * nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
alloc_size += num_possible_cpus() * cpumask_size();
#endif
if (alloc_size) {
ptr = (unsigned long)kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_NOWAIT);
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
root_task_group.se = (struct sched_entity **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
root_task_group.cfs_rq = (struct cfs_rq **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED */
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
root_task_group.rt_se = (struct sched_rt_entity **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
root_task_group.rt_rq = (struct rt_rq **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif /* CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED */
#ifdef CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
per_cpu(load_balance_mask, i) = (void *)ptr;
ptr += cpumask_size();
}
#endif /* CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK */
}
init_rt_bandwidth(&def_rt_bandwidth,
global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
init_dl_bandwidth(&def_dl_bandwidth,
global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
init_defrootdomain();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
init_rt_bandwidth(&root_task_group.rt_bandwidth,
global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
#endif /* CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED */
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED
list_add(&root_task_group.list, &task_groups);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root_task_group.children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root_task_group.siblings);
autogroup_init(&init_task);
#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED */
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct rq *rq;
rq = cpu_rq(i);
raw_spin_lock_init(&rq->lock);
rq->nr_running = 0;
rq->calc_load_active = 0;
rq->calc_load_update = jiffies + LOAD_FREQ;
init_cfs_rq(&rq->cfs);
init_rt_rq(&rq->rt, rq);
init_dl_rq(&rq->dl, rq);
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
root_task_group.shares = ROOT_TASK_GROUP_LOAD;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list);
/*
* How much cpu bandwidth does root_task_group get?
*
* In case of task-groups formed thr' the cgroup filesystem, it
* gets 100% of the cpu resources in the system. This overall
* system cpu resource is divided among the tasks of
* root_task_group and its child task-groups in a fair manner,
* based on each entity's (task or task-group's) weight
* (se->load.weight).
*
* In other words, if root_task_group has 10 tasks of weight
* 1024) and two child groups A0 and A1 (of weight 1024 each),
* then A0's share of the cpu resource is:
*
* A0's bandwidth = 1024 / (10*1024 + 1024 + 1024) = 8.33%
*
* We achieve this by letting root_task_group's tasks sit
* directly in rq->cfs (i.e root_task_group->se[] = NULL).
*/
init_cfs_bandwidth(&root_task_group.cfs_bandwidth);
init_tg_cfs_entry(&root_task_group, &rq->cfs, NULL, i, NULL);
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED */
rq->rt.rt_runtime = def_rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime;
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->leaf_rt_rq_list);
init_tg_rt_entry(&root_task_group, &rq->rt, NULL, i, NULL);
#endif
for (j = 0; j < CPU_LOAD_IDX_MAX; j++)
rq->cpu_load[j] = 0;
rq->last_load_update_tick = jiffies;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
rq->sd = NULL;
rq->rd = NULL;
rq->cpu_power = SCHED_POWER_SCALE;
rq->post_schedule = 0;
rq->active_balance = 0;
rq->next_balance = jiffies;
rq->push_cpu = 0;
rq->cpu = i;
rq->online = 0;
rq->idle_stamp = 0;
rq->avg_idle = 2*sysctl_sched_migration_cost;
rq->max_idle_balance_cost = sysctl_sched_migration_cost;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->cfs_tasks);
rq_attach_root(rq, &def_root_domain);
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_COMMON
rq->nohz_flags = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL
rq->last_sched_tick = 0;
#endif
#endif
init_rq_hrtick(rq);
atomic_set(&rq->nr_iowait, 0);
}
set_load_weight(&init_task);
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&init_task.preempt_notifiers);
#endif
/*
* The boot idle thread does lazy MMU switching as well:
*/
atomic_inc(&init_mm.mm_count);
enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, current);
/*
* Make us the idle thread. Technically, schedule() should not be
* called from this thread, however somewhere below it might be,
* but because we are the idle thread, we just pick up running again
* when this runqueue becomes "idle".
*/
init_idle(current, smp_processor_id());
calc_load_update = jiffies + LOAD_FREQ;
/*
* During early bootup we pretend to be a normal task:
*/
current->sched_class = &fair_sched_class;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
zalloc_cpumask_var(&sched_domains_tmpmask, GFP_NOWAIT);
/* May be allocated at isolcpus cmdline parse time */
if (cpu_isolated_map == NULL)
zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpu_isolated_map, GFP_NOWAIT);
idle_thread_set_boot_cpu();
#endif
init_sched_fair_class();
scheduler_running = 1;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ask_char(char *ret, const char *replies, const char *fmt, ...) {
int r;
assert(ret);
assert(replies);
assert(fmt);
for (;;) {
va_list ap;
char c;
bool need_nl = true;
if (colors_enabled())
fputs(ANSI_HIGHLIGHT, stdout);
putchar('\r');
va_start(ap, fmt);
vprintf(fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (colors_enabled())
fputs(ANSI_NORMAL, stdout);
fflush(stdout);
r = read_one_char(stdin, &c, DEFAULT_ASK_REFRESH_USEC, &need_nl);
if (r < 0) {
if (r == -ETIMEDOUT)
continue;
if (r == -EBADMSG) {
puts("Bad input, please try again.");
continue;
}
putchar('\n');
return r;
}
if (need_nl)
putchar('\n');
if (strchr(replies, c)) {
*ret = c;
return 0;
}
puts("Read unexpected character, please try again.");
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255 | 0 | 6,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip6_tnl_bucket(struct ip6_tnl_net *ip6n, struct ip6_tnl_parm *p)
{
struct in6_addr *remote = &p->raddr;
struct in6_addr *local = &p->laddr;
unsigned h = 0;
int prio = 0;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(remote) || !ipv6_addr_any(local)) {
prio = 1;
h = HASH(remote) ^ HASH(local);
}
return &ip6n->tnls[prio][h];
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 16,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fcrypt_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
const struct fcrypt_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct {
__be32 l, r;
} X;
memcpy(&X, src, sizeof(X));
F_ENCRYPT(X.l, X.r, ctx->sched[0xf]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.r, X.l, ctx->sched[0xe]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.l, X.r, ctx->sched[0xd]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.r, X.l, ctx->sched[0xc]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.l, X.r, ctx->sched[0xb]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.r, X.l, ctx->sched[0xa]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.l, X.r, ctx->sched[0x9]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.r, X.l, ctx->sched[0x8]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.l, X.r, ctx->sched[0x7]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.r, X.l, ctx->sched[0x6]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.l, X.r, ctx->sched[0x5]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.r, X.l, ctx->sched[0x4]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.l, X.r, ctx->sched[0x3]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.r, X.l, ctx->sched[0x2]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.l, X.r, ctx->sched[0x1]);
F_ENCRYPT(X.r, X.l, ctx->sched[0x0]);
memcpy(dst, &X, sizeof(X));
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip_mc_validate_source(struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
u8 tos, struct net_device *dev,
struct in_device *in_dev, u32 *itag)
{
int err;
/* Primary sanity checks. */
if (!in_dev)
return -EINVAL;
if (ipv4_is_multicast(saddr) || ipv4_is_lbcast(saddr) ||
skb->protocol != htons(ETH_P_IP))
return -EINVAL;
if (ipv4_is_loopback(saddr) && !IN_DEV_ROUTE_LOCALNET(in_dev))
return -EINVAL;
if (ipv4_is_zeronet(saddr)) {
if (!ipv4_is_local_multicast(daddr) &&
ip_hdr(skb)->protocol != IPPROTO_IGMP)
return -EINVAL;
} else {
err = fib_validate_source(skb, saddr, 0, tos, 0, dev,
in_dev, itag);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::HasFocus() const {
return gtk_widget_is_focus(view_.get());
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t UTF8ToUTF16(const unsigned char *utf8,wchar_t *utf16)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
if (utf16 != (wchar_t *) NULL)
{
register wchar_t
*q;
wchar_t
c;
/*
Convert UTF-8 to UTF-16.
*/
q=utf16;
for (p=utf8; *p != '\0'; p++)
{
if ((*p & 0x80) == 0)
*q=(*p);
else
if ((*p & 0xE0) == 0xC0)
{
c=(*p);
*q=(c & 0x1F) << 6;
p++;
if ((*p & 0xC0) != 0x80)
return(0);
*q|=(*p & 0x3F);
}
else
if ((*p & 0xF0) == 0xE0)
{
c=(*p);
*q=c << 12;
p++;
if ((*p & 0xC0) != 0x80)
return(0);
c=(*p);
*q|=(c & 0x3F) << 6;
p++;
if ((*p & 0xC0) != 0x80)
return(0);
*q|=(*p & 0x3F);
}
else
return(0);
q++;
}
*q++=(wchar_t) '\0';
return((size_t) (q-utf16));
}
/*
Compute UTF-16 string length.
*/
for (p=utf8; *p != '\0'; p++)
{
if ((*p & 0x80) == 0)
;
else
if ((*p & 0xE0) == 0xC0)
{
p++;
if ((*p & 0xC0) != 0x80)
return(0);
}
else
if ((*p & 0xF0) == 0xE0)
{
p++;
if ((*p & 0xC0) != 0x80)
return(0);
p++;
if ((*p & 0xC0) != 0x80)
return(0);
}
else
return(0);
}
return((size_t) (p-utf8));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/576
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 25,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct page *get_read_data_page(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index,
int op_flags, bool for_write)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct dnode_of_data dn;
struct page *page;
struct extent_info ei;
int err;
struct f2fs_io_info fio = {
.sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode),
.type = DATA,
.op = REQ_OP_READ,
.op_flags = op_flags,
.encrypted_page = NULL,
};
if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return read_mapping_page(mapping, index, NULL);
page = f2fs_grab_cache_page(mapping, index, for_write);
if (!page)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (f2fs_lookup_extent_cache(inode, index, &ei)) {
dn.data_blkaddr = ei.blk + index - ei.fofs;
goto got_it;
}
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, NULL, NULL, 0);
err = get_dnode_of_data(&dn, index, LOOKUP_NODE);
if (err)
goto put_err;
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
if (unlikely(dn.data_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto put_err;
}
got_it:
if (PageUptodate(page)) {
unlock_page(page);
return page;
}
/*
* A new dentry page is allocated but not able to be written, since its
* new inode page couldn't be allocated due to -ENOSPC.
* In such the case, its blkaddr can be remained as NEW_ADDR.
* see, f2fs_add_link -> get_new_data_page -> init_inode_metadata.
*/
if (dn.data_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR) {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!PageUptodate(page))
SetPageUptodate(page);
unlock_page(page);
return page;
}
fio.new_blkaddr = fio.old_blkaddr = dn.data_blkaddr;
fio.page = page;
err = f2fs_submit_page_bio(&fio);
if (err)
goto put_err;
return page;
put_err:
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 4,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *itoa_r(intptr_t i, char *buf, size_t sz, int base, size_t padding) {
size_t n = 1;
if (n > sz)
return NULL;
if (base < 2 || base > 16) {
buf[0] = '\000';
return NULL;
}
char *start = buf;
uintptr_t j = i;
if (i < 0 && base == 10) {
j = -i;
if (++n > sz) {
buf[0] = '\000';
return NULL;
}
*start++ = '-';
}
char *ptr = start;
do {
if (++n > sz) {
buf[0] = '\000';
return NULL;
}
*ptr++ = "0123456789abcdef"[j % base];
j /= base;
if (padding > 0)
padding--;
} while (j > 0 || padding > 0);
*ptr = '\000';
while (--ptr > start) {
char ch = *ptr;
*ptr = *start;
*start++ = ch;
}
return buf;
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int _object_init(zval *arg ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
return _object_init_ex(arg, zend_standard_class_def ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RootWindow::ReleaseCapture(Window* window) {
if (capture_window_ != window)
return;
SetCapture(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 17,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API int r_bin_list_plugin(RBin *bin, const char* name, int json) {
RListIter *it;
RBinPlugin *bp;
RBinXtrPlugin *bx;
r_list_foreach (bin->plugins, it, bp) {
if (!r_str_cmp (name, bp->name, strlen (name))) {
continue;
}
return r_bin_print_plugin_details (bin, bp, json);
}
r_list_foreach (bin->binxtrs, it, bx) {
if (!r_str_cmp (name, bx->name, strlen (name))) {
continue;
}
return r_bin_print_xtrplugin_details (bin, bx, json);
}
eprintf ("cannot find plugin %s\n", name);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputHandler::sendLearnTextDetails(const WTF::String& string)
{
Vector<wchar_t> wcharString;
if (!convertStringToWcharVector(string, wcharString) || wcharString.isEmpty())
return;
m_webPage->m_client->inputLearnText(wcharString.data(), wcharString.size());
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 24,407 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ipmi_si_remove_by_data(int addr_space, enum si_type si_type,
unsigned long addr)
{
/* remove */
struct smi_info *e, *tmp_e;
mutex_lock(&smi_infos_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(e, tmp_e, &smi_infos, link) {
if (e->io.addr_type != addr_space)
continue;
if (e->io.si_type != si_type)
continue;
if (e->io.addr_data == addr)
cleanup_one_si(e);
}
mutex_unlock(&smi_infos_lock);
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 29,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mm_update_next_owner(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
struct task_struct *c, *g, *p = current;
retry:
/*
* If the exiting or execing task is not the owner, it's
* someone else's problem.
*/
if (mm->owner != p)
return;
/*
* The current owner is exiting/execing and there are no other
* candidates. Do not leave the mm pointing to a possibly
* freed task structure.
*/
if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) <= 1) {
mm->owner = NULL;
return;
}
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
/*
* Search in the children
*/
list_for_each_entry(c, &p->children, sibling) {
if (c->mm == mm)
goto assign_new_owner;
}
/*
* Search in the siblings
*/
list_for_each_entry(c, &p->real_parent->children, sibling) {
if (c->mm == mm)
goto assign_new_owner;
}
/*
* Search through everything else, we should not get here often.
*/
for_each_process(g) {
if (g->flags & PF_KTHREAD)
continue;
for_each_thread(g, c) {
if (c->mm == mm)
goto assign_new_owner;
if (c->mm)
break;
}
}
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
/*
* We found no owner yet mm_users > 1: this implies that we are
* most likely racing with swapoff (try_to_unuse()) or /proc or
* ptrace or page migration (get_task_mm()). Mark owner as NULL.
*/
mm->owner = NULL;
return;
assign_new_owner:
BUG_ON(c == p);
get_task_struct(c);
/*
* The task_lock protects c->mm from changing.
* We always want mm->owner->mm == mm
*/
task_lock(c);
/*
* Delay read_unlock() till we have the task_lock()
* to ensure that c does not slip away underneath us
*/
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
if (c->mm != mm) {
task_unlock(c);
put_task_struct(c);
goto retry;
}
mm->owner = c;
task_unlock(c);
put_task_struct(c);
}
Commit Message: fix infoleak in waitid(2)
kernel_waitid() can return a PID, an error or 0. rusage is filled in the first
case and waitid(2) rusage should've been copied out exactly in that case, *not*
whenever kernel_waitid() has not returned an error. Compat variant shares that
braino; none of kernel_wait4() callers do, so the below ought to fix it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Fixes: ce72a16fa705 ("wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 15,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintPreviewDialogController* PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance() {
if (!g_browser_process)
return nullptr;
return g_browser_process->print_preview_dialog_controller();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 3,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void methodWithEnforceRangeUInt16Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "methodWithEnforceRangeUInt16", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(unsigned, value, toUInt16(info[0], EnforceRange, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->methodWithEnforceRangeUInt16(value);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 1,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoLoseContextCHROMIUM(GLenum current, GLenum other) {
MarkContextLost(GetContextLostReasonFromResetStatus(current));
group_->LoseContexts(GetContextLostReasonFromResetStatus(other));
reset_by_robustness_extension_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantCopyInto(int child_id,
const base::FilePath& dir) {
GrantPermissionsForFile(child_id, dir, COPY_INTO_FILE_GRANT);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nf_tables_commit_release(struct nft_trans *trans)
{
switch (trans->msg_type) {
case NFT_MSG_DELTABLE:
nf_tables_table_destroy(&trans->ctx);
break;
case NFT_MSG_DELCHAIN:
nf_tables_chain_destroy(trans->ctx.chain);
break;
case NFT_MSG_DELRULE:
nf_tables_rule_destroy(&trans->ctx, nft_trans_rule(trans));
break;
case NFT_MSG_DELSET:
nft_set_destroy(nft_trans_set(trans));
break;
}
kfree(trans);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 5,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reset_output_levels(void)
{
int j;
memset(info_levels, 0, sizeof info_levels);
memset(debug_levels, 0, sizeof debug_levels);
for (j = 0; j < COUNT_INFO; j++)
info_words[j].priority = DEFAULT_PRIORITY;
for (j = 0; j < COUNT_DEBUG; j++)
debug_words[j].priority = DEFAULT_PRIORITY;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sandbox_if_up(Bridge *br) {
assert(br);
if (!br->configured)
return;
char *dev = br->devsandbox;
net_if_up(dev);
if (br->arg_ip_none == 1); // do nothing
else if (br->arg_ip_none == 0 && br->macvlan == 0) {
if (br->ipsandbox == br->ip) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %d.%d.%d.%d is interface %s address.\n", PRINT_IP(br->ipsandbox), br->dev);
exit(1);
}
assert(br->ipsandbox);
if (arg_debug)
printf("Configuring %d.%d.%d.%d address on interface %s\n", PRINT_IP(br->ipsandbox), dev);
net_config_interface(dev, br->ipsandbox, br->mask, br->mtu);
arp_announce(dev, br);
}
else if (br->arg_ip_none == 0 && br->macvlan == 1) {
if (br->ipsandbox == 0)
br->ipsandbox = arp_assign(dev, br); //br->ip, br->mask);
else {
if (br->ipsandbox == br->ip) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %d.%d.%d.%d is interface %s address.\n", PRINT_IP(br->ipsandbox), br->dev);
exit(1);
}
uint32_t rv = arp_check(dev, br->ipsandbox);
if (rv) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: the address %d.%d.%d.%d is already in use.\n", PRINT_IP(br->ipsandbox));
exit(1);
}
}
if (arg_debug)
printf("Configuring %d.%d.%d.%d address on interface %s\n", PRINT_IP(br->ipsandbox), dev);
net_config_interface(dev, br->ipsandbox, br->mask, br->mtu);
arp_announce(dev, br);
}
if (br->ip6sandbox)
net_if_ip6(dev, br->ip6sandbox);
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 19,228 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_timeout(int dummy) /* {{{ */
{
if (zend_on_timeout) {
#ifdef ZEND_SIGNALS
/*
We got here because we got a timeout signal, so we are in a signal handler
at this point. However, we want to be able to timeout any user-supplied
shutdown functions, so pretend we are not in a signal handler while we are
calling these
*/
SIGG(running) = 0;
#endif
zend_on_timeout(EG(timeout_seconds));
}
zend_error_noreturn(E_ERROR, "Maximum execution time of %pd second%s exceeded", EG(timeout_seconds), EG(timeout_seconds) == 1 ? "" : "s");
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 6,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_associnfo(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
struct sctp_assocparams assocparams;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_assocparams))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&assocparams, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, assocparams.sasoc_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && assocparams.sasoc_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
/* Set the values to the specific association */
if (asoc) {
if (assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt != 0) {
__u32 path_sum = 0;
int paths = 0;
struct list_head *pos;
struct sctp_transport *peer_addr;
list_for_each(pos, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
peer_addr = list_entry(pos,
struct sctp_transport,
transports);
path_sum += peer_addr->pathmaxrxt;
paths++;
}
/* Only validate asocmaxrxt if we have more then
* one path/transport. We do this because path
* retransmissions are only counted when we have more
* then one path.
*/
if (paths > 1 &&
assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt > path_sum)
return -EINVAL;
asoc->max_retrans = assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt;
}
if (assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life != 0) {
asoc->cookie_life.tv_sec =
assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life / 1000;
asoc->cookie_life.tv_usec =
(assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life % 1000)
* 1000;
}
} else {
/* Set the values to the endpoint */
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt != 0)
sp->assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt =
assocparams.sasoc_asocmaxrxt;
if (assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life != 0)
sp->assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life =
assocparams.sasoc_cookie_life;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextureManager::TextureInfo::Ref TextureManager::CreateDefaultAndBlackTextures(
GLenum target,
GLuint* black_texture) {
static uint8 black[] = {0, 0, 0, 255};
bool needs_initialization = (target != GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES);
bool needs_faces = (target == GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP);
GLuint ids[2];
glGenTextures(arraysize(ids), ids);
for (unsigned long ii = 0; ii < arraysize(ids); ++ii) {
glBindTexture(target, ids[ii]);
if (needs_initialization) {
if (needs_faces) {
for (int jj = 0; jj < GLES2Util::kNumFaces; ++jj) {
glTexImage2D(GLES2Util::IndexToGLFaceTarget(jj), 0, GL_RGBA, 1, 1, 0,
GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, black);
}
} else {
glTexImage2D(target, 0, GL_RGBA, 1, 1, 0, GL_RGBA,
GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, black);
}
}
}
glBindTexture(target, 0);
++num_unrenderable_textures_;
TextureInfo::Ref default_texture = TextureInfo::Ref(
new TextureInfo(this, ids[1]));
SetInfoTarget(default_texture, target);
if (needs_faces) {
for (int ii = 0; ii < GLES2Util::kNumFaces; ++ii) {
SetLevelInfo(
default_texture, GLES2Util::IndexToGLFaceTarget(ii),
0, GL_RGBA, 1, 1, 1, 0, GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, true);
}
} else {
if (needs_initialization) {
SetLevelInfo(default_texture,
GL_TEXTURE_2D, 0, GL_RGBA, 1, 1, 1, 0,
GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, true);
} else {
SetLevelInfo(
default_texture, GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES, 0,
GL_RGBA, 1, 1, 1, 0, GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, true);
}
}
*black_texture = ids[0];
return default_texture;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: STDMETHODIMP UrlmonUrlRequest::OnStartBinding(DWORD reserved,
IBinding* binding) {
DCHECK_EQ(thread_, base::PlatformThread::CurrentId());
binding_ = binding;
if (pending_) {
response_headers_ = GetHttpHeadersFromBinding(binding_);
DCHECK(!response_headers_.empty());
}
return S_OK;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UpdateStyleAndLayoutTree() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
HTMLFrameOwnerElement::PluginDisposeSuspendScope suspend_plugin_dispose;
ScriptForbiddenScope forbid_script;
if (!View() || !IsActive())
return;
if (View()->ShouldThrottleRendering())
return;
if (!NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate()) {
if (Lifecycle().GetState() < DocumentLifecycle::kStyleClean) {
Lifecycle().AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kInStyleRecalc);
Lifecycle().AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kStyleClean);
}
return;
}
if (InStyleRecalc())
return;
CHECK(Lifecycle().StateAllowsTreeMutations());
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN1("blink,devtools.timeline", "UpdateLayoutTree", "beginData",
InspectorRecalculateStylesEvent::Data(GetFrame()));
unsigned start_element_count = GetStyleEngine().StyleForElementCount();
probe::RecalculateStyle recalculate_style_scope(this);
DocumentAnimations::UpdateAnimationTimingIfNeeded(*this);
EvaluateMediaQueryListIfNeeded();
UpdateUseShadowTreesIfNeeded();
UpdateDistribution();
UpdateActiveStyle();
UpdateStyleInvalidationIfNeeded();
UpdateStyle();
NotifyLayoutTreeOfSubtreeChanges();
if (HoverElement() && !HoverElement()->GetLayoutObject() && GetFrame()) {
GetFrame()->GetEventHandler().DispatchFakeMouseMoveEventSoon(
MouseEventManager::FakeMouseMoveReason::kPerFrame);
}
if (focused_element_ && !focused_element_->IsFocusable())
ClearFocusedElementSoon();
GetLayoutViewItem().ClearHitTestCache();
DCHECK(!DocumentAnimations::NeedsAnimationTimingUpdate(*this));
unsigned element_count =
GetStyleEngine().StyleForElementCount() - start_element_count;
TRACE_EVENT_END1("blink,devtools.timeline", "UpdateLayoutTree",
"elementCount", element_count);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
AssertLayoutTreeUpdated(*this);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 12,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip6_dst_lookup_tail(struct sock *sk,
struct dst_entry **dst, struct flowi6 *fl6)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_OPTIMISTIC_DAD
struct neighbour *n;
struct rt6_info *rt;
#endif
int err;
if (*dst == NULL)
*dst = ip6_route_output(net, sk, fl6);
if ((err = (*dst)->error))
goto out_err_release;
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6->saddr)) {
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *) *dst;
err = ip6_route_get_saddr(net, rt, &fl6->daddr,
sk ? inet6_sk(sk)->srcprefs : 0,
&fl6->saddr);
if (err)
goto out_err_release;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_OPTIMISTIC_DAD
/*
* Here if the dst entry we've looked up
* has a neighbour entry that is in the INCOMPLETE
* state and the src address from the flow is
* marked as OPTIMISTIC, we release the found
* dst entry and replace it instead with the
* dst entry of the nexthop router
*/
rt = (struct rt6_info *) *dst;
rcu_read_lock_bh();
n = __ipv6_neigh_lookup_noref(rt->dst.dev, rt6_nexthop(rt, &fl6->daddr));
err = n && !(n->nud_state & NUD_VALID) ? -EINVAL : 0;
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
if (err) {
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
struct flowi6 fl_gw6;
int redirect;
ifp = ipv6_get_ifaddr(net, &fl6->saddr,
(*dst)->dev, 1);
redirect = (ifp && ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC);
if (ifp)
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
if (redirect) {
/*
* We need to get the dst entry for the
* default router instead
*/
dst_release(*dst);
memcpy(&fl_gw6, fl6, sizeof(struct flowi6));
memset(&fl_gw6.daddr, 0, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
*dst = ip6_route_output(net, sk, &fl_gw6);
if ((err = (*dst)->error))
goto out_err_release;
}
}
#endif
return 0;
out_err_release:
if (err == -ENETUNREACH)
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(net, NULL, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
dst_release(*dst);
*dst = NULL;
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::OnPaymentWebAppIconDownloadAndDecoded(
const GURL& method_manifest_url,
const GURL& web_app_manifest_url,
const SkBitmap& icon) {
number_of_web_app_icons_to_download_and_decode_--;
if (icon.drawsNothing()) {
WarnIfPossible(
"Failed to download or decode installable payment app's icon for web "
"app manifest " +
web_app_manifest_url.spec() + ".");
} else {
std::map<GURL, std::unique_ptr<WebAppInstallationInfo>>::iterator it =
installable_apps_.find(method_manifest_url);
DCHECK(it != installable_apps_.end());
DCHECK(url::IsSameOriginWith(GURL(it->second->sw_scope),
web_app_manifest_url));
it->second->icon = std::make_unique<SkBitmap>(icon);
}
FinishCrawlingPaymentAppsIfReady();
}
Commit Message: [Payments] Restrict just-in-time payment handler to payment method domain and its subdomains
Bug: 853937
Change-Id: I148b3d96950a9d90fa362e580e9593caa6b92a36
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1132116
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ganggui Tang <gogerald@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573911}
CWE ID: | 0 | 2,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlCtxtUseOptionsInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int options, const char *encoding)
{
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(-1);
if (encoding != NULL) {
if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) encoding);
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_RECOVER) {
ctxt->recovery = 1;
options -= XML_PARSE_RECOVER;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_RECOVER;
} else
ctxt->recovery = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD) {
ctxt->loadsubset = XML_DETECT_IDS;
options -= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
} else
ctxt->loadsubset = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_DTDATTR) {
ctxt->loadsubset |= XML_COMPLETE_ATTRS;
options -= XML_PARSE_DTDATTR;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_DTDATTR;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOENT) {
ctxt->replaceEntities = 1;
/* ctxt->loadsubset |= XML_DETECT_IDS; */
options -= XML_PARSE_NOENT;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NOENT;
} else
ctxt->replaceEntities = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC) {
ctxt->pedantic = 1;
options -= XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC;
} else
ctxt->pedantic = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS) {
ctxt->keepBlanks = 0;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = xmlSAX2IgnorableWhitespace;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS;
} else
ctxt->keepBlanks = 1;
if (options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID) {
ctxt->validate = 1;
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOWARNING)
ctxt->vctxt.warning = NULL;
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOERROR)
ctxt->vctxt.error = NULL;
options -= XML_PARSE_DTDVALID;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_DTDVALID;
} else
ctxt->validate = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOWARNING) {
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOWARNING;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOERROR) {
ctxt->sax->error = NULL;
ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOERROR;
}
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (options & XML_PARSE_SAX1) {
ctxt->sax->startElement = xmlSAX2StartElement;
ctxt->sax->endElement = xmlSAX2EndElement;
ctxt->sax->startElementNs = NULL;
ctxt->sax->endElementNs = NULL;
ctxt->sax->initialized = 1;
options -= XML_PARSE_SAX1;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_SAX1;
}
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (options & XML_PARSE_NODICT) {
ctxt->dictNames = 0;
options -= XML_PARSE_NODICT;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NODICT;
} else {
ctxt->dictNames = 1;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOCDATA) {
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock = NULL;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOCDATA;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NOCDATA;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN;
options -= XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NONET) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NONET;
options -= XML_PARSE_NONET;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_COMPACT) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_COMPACT;
options -= XML_PARSE_COMPACT;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_OLD10;
options -= XML_PARSE_OLD10;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOBASEFIX) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NOBASEFIX;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOBASEFIX;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_HUGE;
options -= XML_PARSE_HUGE;
if (ctxt->dict != NULL)
xmlDictSetLimit(ctxt->dict, 0);
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_OLDSAX;
options -= XML_PARSE_OLDSAX;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_IGNORE_ENC) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_IGNORE_ENC;
options -= XML_PARSE_IGNORE_ENC;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_BIG_LINES) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_BIG_LINES;
options -= XML_PARSE_BIG_LINES;
}
ctxt->linenumbers = 1;
return (options);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 23,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(int) ap_getline(char *s, int n, request_rec *r, int fold)
{
char *tmp_s = s;
apr_status_t rv;
apr_size_t len;
apr_bucket_brigade *tmp_bb;
tmp_bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, r->connection->bucket_alloc);
rv = ap_rgetline(&tmp_s, n, &len, r, fold, tmp_bb);
apr_brigade_destroy(tmp_bb);
/* Map the out-of-space condition to the old API. */
if (rv == APR_ENOSPC) {
return n;
}
/* Anything else is just bad. */
if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
return -1;
}
return (int)len;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BpMemoryHeap::BpMemoryHeap(const sp<IBinder>& impl)
: BpInterface<IMemoryHeap>(impl),
mHeapId(-1), mBase(MAP_FAILED), mSize(0), mFlags(0), mOffset(0), mRealHeap(false)
{
}
Commit Message: Sanity check IMemory access versus underlying mmap
Bug 26877992
Change-Id: Ibbf4b1061e4675e4e96bc944a865b53eaf6984fe
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlInitParserCtxt(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
htmlSAXHandler *sax;
if (ctxt == NULL) return(-1);
memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(htmlParserCtxt));
ctxt->dict = xmlDictCreate();
if (ctxt->dict == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
sax = (htmlSAXHandler *) xmlMalloc(sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
if (sax == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
return(-1);
}
else
memset(sax, 0, sizeof(htmlSAXHandler));
/* Allocate the Input stack */
ctxt->inputTab = (htmlParserInputPtr *)
xmlMalloc(5 * sizeof(htmlParserInputPtr));
if (ctxt->inputTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 5;
ctxt->input = NULL;
ctxt->version = NULL;
ctxt->encoding = NULL;
ctxt->standalone = -1;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START;
/* Allocate the Node stack */
ctxt->nodeTab = (htmlNodePtr *) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(htmlNodePtr));
if (ctxt->nodeTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 10;
ctxt->node = NULL;
/* Allocate the Name stack */
ctxt->nameTab = (const xmlChar **) xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(xmlChar *));
if (ctxt->nameTab == NULL) {
htmlErrMemory(NULL, "htmlInitParserCtxt: out of memory\n");
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 0;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeMax = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->inputMax = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
return(-1);
}
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->nameMax = 10;
ctxt->name = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoTab = NULL;
ctxt->nodeInfoNr = 0;
ctxt->nodeInfoMax = 0;
if (sax == NULL) ctxt->sax = (xmlSAXHandlerPtr) &htmlDefaultSAXHandler;
else {
ctxt->sax = sax;
memcpy(sax, &htmlDefaultSAXHandler, sizeof(xmlSAXHandlerV1));
}
ctxt->userData = ctxt;
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
ctxt->wellFormed = 1;
ctxt->replaceEntities = 0;
ctxt->linenumbers = xmlLineNumbersDefaultValue;
ctxt->html = 1;
ctxt->vctxt.finishDtd = XML_CTXT_FINISH_DTD_0;
ctxt->vctxt.userData = ctxt;
ctxt->vctxt.error = xmlParserValidityError;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = xmlParserValidityWarning;
ctxt->record_info = 0;
ctxt->validate = 0;
ctxt->nbChars = 0;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->catalogs = NULL;
xmlInitNodeInfoSeq(&ctxt->node_seq);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 7,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct vm_area_struct *get_gate_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
#ifdef AT_SYSINFO_EHDR
return &gate_vma;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 10,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::NativeThemeUpdated(const ui::NativeTheme* theme) {
if (!initialized_)
return;
if (!handling_theme_changed_)
UserChangedTheme();
MaybeShowInvertBubbleView(this);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 10,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int path_is_under(struct path *path1, struct path *path2)
{
int res;
read_seqlock_excl(&mount_lock);
res = is_path_reachable(real_mount(path1->mnt), path1->dentry, path2);
read_sequnlock_excl(&mount_lock);
return res;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniformMatrix3x2fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
GLboolean transpose,
Vector<GLfloat>& value,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformMatrixParameters("uniformMatrix3x2fv", location,
transpose, value.data(), value.size(), 6,
src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->UniformMatrix3x2fv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (value.size() - src_offset)) / 6, transpose,
value.data() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void __sock_kfree_s(struct sock *sk, void *mem, int size,
const bool nullify)
{
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!mem))
return;
if (nullify)
kzfree(mem);
else
kfree(mem);
atomic_sub(size, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
}
Commit Message: net: avoid signed overflows for SO_{SND|RCV}BUFFORCE
CAP_NET_ADMIN users should not be allowed to set negative
sk_sndbuf or sk_rcvbuf values, as it can lead to various memory
corruptions, crashes, OOM...
Note that before commit 82981930125a ("net: cleanups in
sock_setsockopt()"), the bug was even more serious, since SO_SNDBUF
and SO_RCVBUF were vulnerable.
This needs to be backported to all known linux kernels.
Again, many thanks to syzkaller team for discovering this gem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
{
pgd_t *base = __va(read_cr3() & PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK);
pgd_t *pgd = base + pgd_index(address);
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
if (bad_address(pgd))
goto bad;
printk("PGD %lx ", pgd_val(*pgd));
if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
goto out;
pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
if (bad_address(pud))
goto bad;
printk("PUD %lx ", pud_val(*pud));
if (!pud_present(*pud) || pud_large(*pud))
goto out;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (bad_address(pmd))
goto bad;
printk("PMD %lx ", pmd_val(*pmd));
if (!pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_large(*pmd))
goto out;
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
if (bad_address(pte))
goto bad;
printk("PTE %lx", pte_val(*pte));
out:
printk("\n");
return;
bad:
printk("BAD\n");
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void net_enable_timestamp(void)
{
#ifdef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL
int wanted;
while (1) {
wanted = atomic_read(&netstamp_wanted);
if (wanted <= 0)
break;
if (atomic_cmpxchg(&netstamp_wanted, wanted, wanted + 1) == wanted)
return;
}
atomic_inc(&netstamp_needed_deferred);
schedule_work(&netstamp_work);
#else
static_key_slow_inc(&netstamp_needed);
#endif
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 22,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AMediaCodecActionCode_isTransient(int32_t actionCode) {
return (actionCode == ACTION_CODE_TRANSIENT);
}
Commit Message: Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 13,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cma_resolve_iw_route(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, int timeout_ms)
{
struct cma_work *work;
work = kzalloc(sizeof *work, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!work)
return -ENOMEM;
work->id = id_priv;
INIT_WORK(&work->work, cma_work_handler);
work->old_state = RDMA_CM_ROUTE_QUERY;
work->new_state = RDMA_CM_ROUTE_RESOLVED;
work->event.event = RDMA_CM_EVENT_ROUTE_RESOLVED;
queue_work(cma_wq, &work->work);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoActiveTexture(GLenum texture_unit) {
GLuint texture_index = texture_unit - GL_TEXTURE0;
if (texture_index >= group_->max_texture_units()) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum(
"glActiveTexture", texture_unit, "texture_unit");
return;
}
active_texture_unit_ = texture_index;
glActiveTexture(texture_unit);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::PropertiesAsJSON(JSONObject& json) const {
DisplayItem::PropertiesAsJSON(json);
json.SetString("scrollOffsetNode",
String::Format("%p", scroll_offset_node_.get()));
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 1 | 6,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_socket_sendto)
{
php_stream *stream;
zval *zstream;
long flags = 0;
char *data, *target_addr = NULL;
int datalen, target_addr_len = 0;
php_sockaddr_storage sa;
socklen_t sl = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs|ls", &zstream, &data, &datalen, &flags, &target_addr, &target_addr_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_from_zval(stream, &zstream);
if (target_addr_len) {
/* parse the address */
if (FAILURE == php_network_parse_network_address_with_port(target_addr, target_addr_len, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, &sl TSRMLS_CC)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to parse `%s' into a valid network address", target_addr);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
RETURN_LONG(php_stream_xport_sendto(stream, data, datalen, flags, target_addr ? &sa : NULL, sl TSRMLS_CC));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 21,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Object> ModuleSystem::Require(
const std::string& module_name) {
v8::Local<v8::String> v8_module_name;
if (!ToV8String(GetIsolate(), module_name, &v8_module_name))
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Object>();
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Value> value = RequireForJsInner(
v8_module_name);
if (value.IsEmpty() || !value->IsObject())
return v8::MaybeLocal<v8::Object>();
return handle_scope.Escape(value.As<v8::Object>());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 25,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform3fv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform3fv",
Program::kUniform3f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_BOOL_VEC3) {
GLsizei num_values = count * 3;
std::unique_ptr<GLint[]> temp(new GLint[num_values]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_values; ++ii) {
temp[ii] = static_cast<GLint>(value[ii] != 0.0f);
}
api()->glUniform3ivFn(real_location, count, temp.get());
} else {
api()->glUniform3fvFn(real_location, count,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 18,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct net_device *alloc_netdev_mqs(int sizeof_priv, const char *name,
unsigned char name_assign_type,
void (*setup)(struct net_device *),
unsigned int txqs, unsigned int rxqs)
{
struct net_device *dev;
size_t alloc_size;
struct net_device *p;
BUG_ON(strlen(name) >= sizeof(dev->name));
if (txqs < 1) {
pr_err("alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device with zero queues\n");
return NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
if (rxqs < 1) {
pr_err("alloc_netdev: Unable to allocate device with zero RX queues\n");
return NULL;
}
#endif
alloc_size = sizeof(struct net_device);
if (sizeof_priv) {
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of private area */
alloc_size = ALIGN(alloc_size, NETDEV_ALIGN);
alloc_size += sizeof_priv;
}
/* ensure 32-byte alignment of whole construct */
alloc_size += NETDEV_ALIGN - 1;
p = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_REPEAT);
if (!p)
p = vzalloc(alloc_size);
if (!p)
return NULL;
dev = PTR_ALIGN(p, NETDEV_ALIGN);
dev->padded = (char *)dev - (char *)p;
dev->pcpu_refcnt = alloc_percpu(int);
if (!dev->pcpu_refcnt)
goto free_dev;
if (dev_addr_init(dev))
goto free_pcpu;
dev_mc_init(dev);
dev_uc_init(dev);
dev_net_set(dev, &init_net);
dev->gso_max_size = GSO_MAX_SIZE;
dev->gso_max_segs = GSO_MAX_SEGS;
dev->gso_min_segs = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->napi_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->unreg_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->close_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->link_watch_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->adj_list.upper);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->adj_list.lower);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->all_adj_list.upper);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->all_adj_list.lower);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ptype_all);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->ptype_specific);
dev->priv_flags = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE | IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE_PERM;
setup(dev);
if (!dev->tx_queue_len) {
dev->priv_flags |= IFF_NO_QUEUE;
dev->tx_queue_len = 1;
}
dev->num_tx_queues = txqs;
dev->real_num_tx_queues = txqs;
if (netif_alloc_netdev_queues(dev))
goto free_all;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
dev->num_rx_queues = rxqs;
dev->real_num_rx_queues = rxqs;
if (netif_alloc_rx_queues(dev))
goto free_all;
#endif
strcpy(dev->name, name);
dev->name_assign_type = name_assign_type;
dev->group = INIT_NETDEV_GROUP;
if (!dev->ethtool_ops)
dev->ethtool_ops = &default_ethtool_ops;
nf_hook_ingress_init(dev);
return dev;
free_all:
free_netdev(dev);
return NULL;
free_pcpu:
free_percpu(dev->pcpu_refcnt);
free_dev:
netdev_freemem(dev);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 22,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SCTP_STATIC int sctp_setsockopt_connectx(struct sock* sk,
struct sockaddr __user *addrs,
int addrs_size)
{
sctp_assoc_t assoc_id = 0;
int err = 0;
err = __sctp_setsockopt_connectx(sk, addrs, addrs_size, &assoc_id);
if (err)
return err;
else
return assoc_id;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 24,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlinkTestRunner::ClearGeofencingMockProvider() {
content::ClearGeofencingMockProvider();
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 3,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LoginBigUserView* LockContentsView::CurrentBigUserView() {
if (opt_secondary_big_view_ && opt_secondary_big_view_->IsAuthEnabled()) {
DCHECK(!primary_big_view_->IsAuthEnabled());
return opt_secondary_big_view_;
}
return primary_big_view_;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HttpNetworkTransactionTest::PreconnectErrorResendRequestTest(
const MockWrite* write_failure,
const MockRead* read_failure,
bool use_spdy) {
HttpRequestInfo request;
request.method = "GET";
request.url = GURL("https://www.foo.com/");
request.traffic_annotation =
net::MutableNetworkTrafficAnnotationTag(TRAFFIC_ANNOTATION_FOR_TESTS);
TestNetLog net_log;
session_deps_.net_log = &net_log;
std::unique_ptr<HttpNetworkSession> session(CreateSession(&session_deps_));
SSLSocketDataProvider ssl1(ASYNC, OK);
SSLSocketDataProvider ssl2(ASYNC, OK);
if (use_spdy) {
ssl1.next_proto = kProtoHTTP2;
ssl2.next_proto = kProtoHTTP2;
}
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSSLSocketDataProvider(&ssl1);
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSSLSocketDataProvider(&ssl2);
spdy::SpdySerializedFrame spdy_request(spdy_util_.ConstructSpdyGet(
request.url.spec().c_str(), 1, DEFAULT_PRIORITY));
spdy::SpdySerializedFrame spdy_response(
spdy_util_.ConstructSpdyGetReply(NULL, 0, 1));
spdy::SpdySerializedFrame spdy_data(
spdy_util_.ConstructSpdyDataFrame(1, "hello", true));
const char kHttpRequest[] = "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: www.foo.com\r\n"
"Connection: keep-alive\r\n\r\n";
const char kHttpResponse[] = "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\n";
const char kHttpData[] = "hello";
std::vector<MockRead> data1_reads;
std::vector<MockWrite> data1_writes;
if (write_failure) {
ASSERT_FALSE(read_failure);
data1_writes.push_back(*write_failure);
data1_reads.push_back(MockRead(ASYNC, OK));
} else {
ASSERT_TRUE(read_failure);
if (use_spdy) {
data1_writes.push_back(CreateMockWrite(spdy_request));
} else {
data1_writes.push_back(MockWrite(kHttpRequest));
}
data1_reads.push_back(*read_failure);
}
StaticSocketDataProvider data1(data1_reads, data1_writes);
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSocketDataProvider(&data1);
std::vector<MockRead> data2_reads;
std::vector<MockWrite> data2_writes;
if (use_spdy) {
data2_writes.push_back(CreateMockWrite(spdy_request, 0, ASYNC));
data2_reads.push_back(CreateMockRead(spdy_response, 1, ASYNC));
data2_reads.push_back(CreateMockRead(spdy_data, 2, ASYNC));
data2_reads.push_back(MockRead(ASYNC, OK, 3));
} else {
data2_writes.push_back(
MockWrite(ASYNC, kHttpRequest, strlen(kHttpRequest), 0));
data2_reads.push_back(
MockRead(ASYNC, kHttpResponse, strlen(kHttpResponse), 1));
data2_reads.push_back(MockRead(ASYNC, kHttpData, strlen(kHttpData), 2));
data2_reads.push_back(MockRead(ASYNC, OK, 3));
}
SequencedSocketData data2(data2_reads, data2_writes);
session_deps_.socket_factory->AddSocketDataProvider(&data2);
session->http_stream_factory()->PreconnectStreams(1, request);
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
EXPECT_EQ(1, GetIdleSocketCountInSSLSocketPool(session.get()));
TestCompletionCallback callback;
HttpNetworkTransaction trans(DEFAULT_PRIORITY, session.get());
int rv = trans.Start(&request, callback.callback(), NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_IO_PENDING));
rv = callback.WaitForResult();
EXPECT_THAT(rv, IsOk());
LoadTimingInfo load_timing_info;
EXPECT_TRUE(trans.GetLoadTimingInfo(&load_timing_info));
TestLoadTimingNotReused(
load_timing_info,
CONNECT_TIMING_HAS_DNS_TIMES|CONNECT_TIMING_HAS_SSL_TIMES);
const HttpResponseInfo* response = trans.GetResponseInfo();
ASSERT_TRUE(response);
EXPECT_TRUE(response->headers);
if (response->was_fetched_via_spdy) {
EXPECT_EQ("HTTP/1.1 200", response->headers->GetStatusLine());
} else {
EXPECT_EQ("HTTP/1.1 200 OK", response->headers->GetStatusLine());
}
std::string response_data;
rv = ReadTransaction(&trans, &response_data);
EXPECT_THAT(rv, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(kHttpData, response_data);
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Huff_offsetReceive (node_t *node, int *ch, byte *fin, int *offset) {
bloc = *offset;
while (node && node->symbol == INTERNAL_NODE) {
if (get_bit(fin)) {
node = node->right;
} else {
node = node->left;
}
}
if (!node) {
*ch = 0;
return;
}
*ch = node->symbol;
*offset = bloc;
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 16,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ToggleBookmarkBarWhenVisible(content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
PrefService* prefs = user_prefs::UserPrefs::Get(browser_context);
const bool always_show =
!prefs->GetBoolean(bookmarks::prefs::kShowBookmarkBar);
prefs->SetBoolean(bookmarks::prefs::kShowBookmarkBar, always_show);
}
Commit Message: Prevent interpretating userinfo as url scheme when editing bookmarks
Chrome's Edit Bookmark dialog formats urls for display such that a
url of http://javascript:scripttext@host.com is later converted to a
javascript url scheme, allowing persistence of a script injection
attack within the user's bookmarks.
This fix prevents such misinterpretations by always showing the
scheme when a userinfo component is present within the url.
BUG=639126
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2368593002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#422467}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 22,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleHidePreview(const ListValue* /*args*/) {
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = static_cast<PrintPreviewUI*>(
web_ui()->GetController());
print_preview_ui->OnHidePreviewTab();
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mlist_free(struct mlist *mlist)
{
struct mlist *ml, *next;
if (mlist == NULL)
return;
ml = mlist->next;
for (ml = mlist->next; (next = ml->next) != NULL; ml = next) {
if (ml->map)
apprentice_unmap(ml->map);
free(ml);
if (ml == mlist)
break;
}
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response TargetHandler::GetTargetInfo(
const std::string& target_id,
std::unique_ptr<Target::TargetInfo>* target_info) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent_host(
DevToolsAgentHost::GetForId(target_id));
if (!agent_host)
return Response::InvalidParams("No target with given id found");
*target_info = CreateInfo(agent_host.get());
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GuestLanguageSetCallbackData::Callback(
const std::unique_ptr<GuestLanguageSetCallbackData>& self,
const locale_util::LanguageSwitchResult& result) {
input_method::InputMethodManager* manager =
input_method::InputMethodManager::Get();
scoped_refptr<input_method::InputMethodManager::State> ime_state =
manager->GetActiveIMEState();
std::vector<std::string> input_methods;
manager->GetInputMethodUtil()->GetFirstLoginInputMethodIds(
result.loaded_locale, ime_state->GetCurrentInputMethod(), &input_methods);
ime_state->ReplaceEnabledInputMethods(input_methods);
input_methods = manager->GetInputMethodUtil()->GetHardwareInputMethodIds();
for (size_t i = 0; i < input_methods.size(); ++i)
ime_state->EnableInputMethod(input_methods[i]);
const std::string locale_default_input_method =
manager->GetInputMethodUtil()->GetLanguageDefaultInputMethodId(
result.loaded_locale);
if (!locale_default_input_method.empty()) {
PrefService* user_prefs = self->profile->GetPrefs();
user_prefs->SetString(prefs::kLanguagePreviousInputMethod,
locale_default_input_method);
ime_state->EnableInputMethod(locale_default_input_method);
}
const std::vector<std::string>& login_input_methods =
manager->GetInputMethodUtil()->GetHardwareLoginInputMethodIds();
ime_state->ChangeInputMethod(login_input_methods[0],
false /* show_message */);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long do_mremap(unsigned long addr,
unsigned long old_len, unsigned long new_len,
unsigned long flags, unsigned long new_addr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
unsigned long charged = 0;
if (flags & ~(MREMAP_FIXED | MREMAP_MAYMOVE))
goto out;
if (addr & ~PAGE_MASK)
goto out;
old_len = PAGE_ALIGN(old_len);
new_len = PAGE_ALIGN(new_len);
/*
* We allow a zero old-len as a special case
* for DOS-emu "duplicate shm area" thing. But
* a zero new-len is nonsensical.
*/
if (!new_len)
goto out;
if (flags & MREMAP_FIXED) {
if (flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE)
ret = mremap_to(addr, old_len, new_addr, new_len);
goto out;
}
/*
* Always allow a shrinking remap: that just unmaps
* the unnecessary pages..
* do_munmap does all the needed commit accounting
*/
if (old_len >= new_len) {
ret = do_munmap(mm, addr+new_len, old_len - new_len);
if (ret && old_len != new_len)
goto out;
ret = addr;
goto out;
}
/*
* Ok, we need to grow..
*/
vma = vma_to_resize(addr, old_len, new_len, &charged);
if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(vma);
goto out;
}
/* old_len exactly to the end of the area..
*/
if (old_len == vma->vm_end - addr) {
/* can we just expand the current mapping? */
if (vma_expandable(vma, new_len - old_len)) {
int pages = (new_len - old_len) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (vma_adjust(vma, vma->vm_start, addr + new_len,
vma->vm_pgoff, NULL)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
mm->total_vm += pages;
vm_stat_account(mm, vma->vm_flags, vma->vm_file, pages);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) {
mm->locked_vm += pages;
mlock_vma_pages_range(vma, addr + old_len,
addr + new_len);
}
ret = addr;
goto out;
}
}
/*
* We weren't able to just expand or shrink the area,
* we need to create a new one and move it..
*/
ret = -ENOMEM;
if (flags & MREMAP_MAYMOVE) {
unsigned long map_flags = 0;
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
map_flags |= MAP_SHARED;
new_addr = get_unmapped_area(vma->vm_file, 0, new_len,
vma->vm_pgoff +
((addr - vma->vm_start) >> PAGE_SHIFT),
map_flags);
if (new_addr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
ret = new_addr;
goto out;
}
ret = security_file_mmap(NULL, 0, 0, 0, new_addr, 1);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = move_vma(vma, addr, old_len, new_len, new_addr);
}
out:
if (ret & ~PAGE_MASK)
vm_unacct_memory(charged);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid wrapping vm_pgoff in mremap()
The normal mmap paths all avoid creating a mapping where the pgoff
inside the mapping could wrap around due to overflow. However, an
expanding mremap() can take such a non-wrapping mapping and make it
bigger and cause a wrapping condition.
Noticed by Robert Swiecki when running a system call fuzzer, where it
caused a BUG_ON() due to terminally confusing the vma_prio_tree code. A
vma dumping patch by Hugh then pinpointed the crazy wrapped case.
Reported-and-tested-by: Robert Swiecki <robert@swiecki.net>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void skip_mem_dump(void)
{
skip_mem_check_final = true;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 6,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: juniper_parse_header(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, struct juniper_l2info_t *l2info)
{
const struct juniper_cookie_table_t *lp = juniper_cookie_table;
u_int idx, jnx_ext_len, jnx_header_len = 0;
uint8_t tlv_type,tlv_len;
uint32_t control_word;
int tlv_value;
const u_char *tptr;
l2info->header_len = 0;
l2info->cookie_len = 0;
l2info->proto = 0;
l2info->length = h->len;
l2info->caplen = h->caplen;
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 4);
l2info->flags = p[3];
l2info->direction = p[3]&JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN;
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) != JUNIPER_MGC_NUMBER) { /* magic number found ? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no magic-number found!"));
return 0;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) /* print direction */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%3s ", tok2str(juniper_direction_values, "---", l2info->direction)));
/* magic number + flags */
jnx_header_len = 4;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tJuniper PCAP Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(jnx_flag_values, "none", l2info->flags)));
/* extensions present ? - calculate how much bytes to skip */
if ((l2info->flags & JUNIPER_BPF_EXT ) == JUNIPER_BPF_EXT ) {
tptr = p+jnx_header_len;
/* ok to read extension length ? */
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
jnx_ext_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
jnx_header_len += 2;
tptr +=2;
/* nail up the total length -
* just in case something goes wrong
* with TLV parsing */
jnx_header_len += jnx_ext_len;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", PCAP Extension(s) total length %u", jnx_ext_len));
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], jnx_ext_len);
while (jnx_ext_len > JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD) {
tlv_type = *(tptr++);
tlv_len = *(tptr++);
tlv_value = 0;
/* sanity checks */
if (tlv_type == 0 || tlv_len == 0)
break;
if (tlv_len+JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD > jnx_ext_len)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Extension TLV #%u, length %u, value ",
tok2str(jnx_ext_tlv_values,"Unknown",tlv_type),
tlv_type,
tlv_len));
tlv_value = juniper_read_tlv_value(tptr, tlv_type, tlv_len);
switch (tlv_type) {
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_NAME:
/* FIXME */
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_MEDIATYPE:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_TTP_IFD_MEDIATYPE:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u)",
tok2str(juniper_ifmt_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
}
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_ENCAPS:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_TTP_IFL_ENCAPS:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u)",
tok2str(juniper_ifle_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
}
break;
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_IDX: /* fall through */
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFL_UNIT:
case JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_IFD_IDX:
default:
if (tlv_value != -1) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", tlv_value));
}
break;
}
tptr+=tlv_len;
jnx_ext_len -= tlv_len+JUNIPER_EXT_TLV_OVERHEAD;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t-----original packet-----\n\t"));
}
if ((l2info->flags & JUNIPER_BPF_NO_L2 ) == JUNIPER_BPF_NO_L2 ) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no-L2-hdr, "));
/* there is no link-layer present -
* perform the v4/v6 heuristics
* to figure out what it is
*/
ND_TCHECK2(p[jnx_header_len + 4], 1);
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p + jnx_header_len + 4,
l2info->length - (jnx_header_len + 4)) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no IP-hdr found!"));
l2info->header_len=jnx_header_len+4;
return 0; /* stop parsing the output further */
}
l2info->header_len = jnx_header_len;
p+=l2info->header_len;
l2info->length -= l2info->header_len;
l2info->caplen -= l2info->header_len;
/* search through the cookie table and copy values matching for our PIC type */
while (lp->s != NULL) {
if (lp->pictype == l2info->pictype) {
l2info->cookie_len += lp->cookie_len;
switch (p[0]) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->cookie_type = LS_COOKIE_ID;
l2info->cookie_len += 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->cookie_type = AS_COOKIE_ID;
l2info->cookie_len = 8;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MFR
/* MFR child links don't carry cookies */
if (l2info->pictype == DLT_JUNIPER_MFR &&
(p[0] & MFR_BE_MASK) == MFR_BE_MASK) {
l2info->cookie_len = 0;
}
#endif
l2info->header_len += l2info->cookie_len;
l2info->length -= l2info->cookie_len;
l2info->caplen -= l2info->cookie_len;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s-PIC, cookie-len %u",
lp->s,
l2info->cookie_len));
if (l2info->cookie_len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], l2info->cookie_len);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", cookie 0x"));
for (idx = 0; idx < l2info->cookie_len; idx++) {
l2info->cookie[idx] = p[idx]; /* copy cookie data */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", p[idx]));
}
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) ND_PRINT((ndo, ": ")); /* print demarc b/w L2/L3*/
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p+l2info->cookie_len);
break;
}
++lp;
}
p+=l2info->cookie_len;
/* DLT_ specific parsing */
switch(l2info->pictype) {
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP
case DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR
case DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_MFR
case DLT_JUNIPER_MFR:
switch (l2info->cookie_type) {
case LS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[1];
l2info->proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
l2info->header_len += 2;
l2info->length -= 2;
l2info->caplen -= 2;
break;
case AS_COOKIE_ID:
l2info->bundle = (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info->cookie[6])>>3)&0xfff;
l2info->proto = (l2info->cookie[5])&JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MASK;
break;
default:
l2info->bundle = l2info->cookie[0];
break;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2
case DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2:
ND_TCHECK2(p[0], 4);
/* ATM cell relay control word present ? */
if (l2info->cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) {
control_word = EXTRACT_32BITS(p);
/* some control word heuristics */
switch(control_word) {
case 0: /* zero control word */
case 0x08000000: /* < JUNOS 7.4 control-word */
case 0x08380000: /* cntl word plus cell length (56) >= JUNOS 7.4*/
l2info->header_len += 4;
break;
default:
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "control-word 0x%08x ", control_word));
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN
case DLT_JUNIPER_GGSN:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1
case DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_PPP
case DLT_JUNIPER_PPP:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_CHDLC
case DLT_JUNIPER_CHDLC:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER
case DLT_JUNIPER_ETHER:
break;
#endif
#ifdef DLT_JUNIPER_FRELAY
case DLT_JUNIPER_FRELAY:
break;
#endif
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Unknown Juniper DLT_ type %u: ", l2info->pictype));
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "hlen %u, proto 0x%04x, ", l2info->header_len, l2info->proto));
return 1; /* everything went ok so far. continue parsing */
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|juniper_hdr], length %u", h->len));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 24,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int32_t AXTree::GetSetSize(const AXNode& node, const AXNode* ordered_set) {
if (ordered_set_info_map_.find(node.id()) == ordered_set_info_map_.end())
ComputeSetSizePosInSetAndCache(node, ordered_set);
return ordered_set_info_map_[node.id()].set_size;
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 4,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXTableCell::columnIndexRange(std::pair<unsigned, unsigned>& columnRange) {
if (!m_layoutObject || !m_layoutObject->isTableCell())
return;
LayoutTableCell* cell = toLayoutTableCell(m_layoutObject);
columnRange.first = cell->table()->absoluteColumnToEffectiveColumn(
cell->absoluteColumnIndex());
columnRange.second = cell->table()->absoluteColumnToEffectiveColumn(
cell->absoluteColumnIndex() + cell->colSpan()) -
columnRange.first;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 17,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_pcm_hw_constraint_step(struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime,
unsigned int cond,
snd_pcm_hw_param_t var,
unsigned long step)
{
return snd_pcm_hw_rule_add(runtime, cond, var,
snd_pcm_hw_rule_step, (void *) step,
var, -1);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 10,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::GrantPermissionsAndEnableExtension(
const Extension* extension) {
CHECK(extension);
RecordPermissionMessagesHistogram(
extension, "Extensions.Permissions_ReEnable");
GrantPermissions(extension);
extension_prefs_->SetDidExtensionEscalatePermissions(extension, false);
EnableExtension(extension->id());
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_TRACE(WebGLRenderingContextBase) {
visitor->Trace(context_group_);
visitor->Trace(bound_array_buffer_);
visitor->Trace(default_vertex_array_object_);
visitor->Trace(bound_vertex_array_object_);
visitor->Trace(current_program_);
visitor->Trace(framebuffer_binding_);
visitor->Trace(renderbuffer_binding_);
visitor->Trace(texture_units_);
visitor->Trace(extensions_);
CanvasRenderingContext::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 22,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sock_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg)
{
int err = security_socket_sendmsg(sock, msg,
msg_data_left(msg));
return err ?: sock_sendmsg_nosec(sock, msg);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 27,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltApplyOneTemplate(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
xmlNodePtr contextNode,
xmlNodePtr list,
xsltTemplatePtr templ ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
xsltStackElemPtr params)
{
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (list == NULL))
return;
CHECK_STOPPED;
if (params) {
/*
* This code should be obsolete - was previously used
* by libexslt/functions.c, but due to bug 381319 the
* logic there was changed.
*/
int oldVarsNr = ctxt->varsNr;
/*
* Push the given xsl:param(s) onto the variable stack.
*/
while (params != NULL) {
xsltLocalVariablePush(ctxt, params, -1);
params = params->next;
}
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, contextNode, list, templ);
/*
* Pop the given xsl:param(s) from the stack but don't free them.
*/
xsltLocalVariablePop(ctxt, oldVarsNr, -2);
} else
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, contextNode, list, templ);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 26,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct net *rtnl_link_get_net(struct net *src_net, struct nlattr *tb[])
{
struct net *net;
/* Examine the link attributes and figure out which
* network namespace we are talking about.
*/
if (tb[IFLA_NET_NS_PID])
net = get_net_ns_by_pid(nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_NET_NS_PID]));
else if (tb[IFLA_NET_NS_FD])
net = get_net_ns_by_fd(nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_NET_NS_FD]));
else
net = get_net(src_net);
return net;
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_multipath(struct multipath *m)
{
struct priority_group *pg, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(pg, tmp, &m->priority_groups, list) {
list_del(&pg->list);
free_priority_group(pg, m->ti);
}
kfree(m->hw_handler_name);
kfree(m->hw_handler_params);
mempool_destroy(m->mpio_pool);
kfree(m);
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum TIFFReadDirEntryErr TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeByteSshort(int16 value)
{
if ((value<0)||(value>0xFF))
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 21,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vrend_render_condition(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t handle,
bool condition,
uint mode)
{
struct vrend_query *q;
GLenum glmode = 0;
if (handle == 0) {
glEndConditionalRenderNV();
ctx->sub->cond_render_q_id = 0;
ctx->sub->cond_render_gl_mode = 0;
return;
}
q = vrend_object_lookup(ctx->sub->object_hash, handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_QUERY);
if (!q)
return;
switch (mode) {
case PIPE_RENDER_COND_WAIT:
glmode = GL_QUERY_WAIT;
break;
case PIPE_RENDER_COND_NO_WAIT:
glmode = GL_QUERY_NO_WAIT;
break;
case PIPE_RENDER_COND_BY_REGION_WAIT:
glmode = GL_QUERY_BY_REGION_WAIT;
break;
case PIPE_RENDER_COND_BY_REGION_NO_WAIT:
glmode = GL_QUERY_BY_REGION_NO_WAIT;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "unhandled condition %x\n", mode);
}
ctx->sub->cond_render_q_id = q->id;
ctx->sub->cond_render_gl_mode = glmode;
glBeginConditionalRender(q->id, glmode);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 28,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void update_rq_clock(struct rq *rq)
{
s64 delta;
lockdep_assert_held(&rq->lock);
if (rq->clock_skip_update & RQCF_ACT_SKIP)
return;
delta = sched_clock_cpu(cpu_of(rq)) - rq->clock;
if (delta < 0)
return;
rq->clock += delta;
update_rq_clock_task(rq, delta);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vbe_update_vgaregs(VGACommonState *s)
{
int h, shift_control;
if (!vbe_enabled(s)) {
/* vbe is turned off -- nothing to do */
return;
}
/* graphic mode + memory map 1 */
s->gr[VGA_GFX_MISC] = (s->gr[VGA_GFX_MISC] & ~0x0c) | 0x04 |
VGA_GR06_GRAPHICS_MODE;
s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MODE] |= 3; /* no CGA modes */
s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OFFSET] = s->vbe_line_offset >> 3;
/* width */
s->cr[VGA_CRTC_H_DISP] =
(s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_XRES] >> 3) - 1;
/* height (only meaningful if < 1024) */
h = s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_YRES] - 1;
s->cr[VGA_CRTC_V_DISP_END] = h;
s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] = (s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] & ~0x42) |
((h >> 7) & 0x02) | ((h >> 3) & 0x40);
/* line compare to 1023 */
s->cr[VGA_CRTC_LINE_COMPARE] = 0xff;
s->cr[VGA_CRTC_OVERFLOW] |= 0x10;
s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MAX_SCAN] |= 0x40;
if (s->vbe_regs[VBE_DISPI_INDEX_BPP] == 4) {
shift_control = 0;
s->sr_vbe[VGA_SEQ_CLOCK_MODE] &= ~8; /* no double line */
} else {
shift_control = 2;
/* set chain 4 mode */
s->sr_vbe[VGA_SEQ_MEMORY_MODE] |= VGA_SR04_CHN_4M;
/* activate all planes */
s->sr_vbe[VGA_SEQ_PLANE_WRITE] |= VGA_SR02_ALL_PLANES;
}
s->gr[VGA_GFX_MODE] = (s->gr[VGA_GFX_MODE] & ~0x60) |
(shift_control << 5);
s->cr[VGA_CRTC_MAX_SCAN] &= ~0x9f; /* no double scan */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 26,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SoundTriggerHwService::Module::unloadSoundModel(sound_model_handle_t handle)
{
ALOGV("unloadSoundModel() model handle %d", handle);
if (!captureHotwordAllowed()) {
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
AutoMutex lock(mLock);
return unloadSoundModel_l(handle);
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 6,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BookmarkManagerView::OnTreeViewSelectionChanged(
views::TreeView* tree_view) {
TreeModelNode* node = tree_view_->GetSelectedNode();
BookmarkTableModel* new_table_model = NULL;
BookmarkNode* table_parent_node = NULL;
bool is_search = false;
if (node) {
switch (tree_model_->GetNodeType(node)) {
case BookmarkFolderTreeModel::BOOKMARK:
table_parent_node = tree_model_->TreeNodeAsBookmarkNode(node);
new_table_model =
BookmarkTableModel::CreateBookmarkTableModelForFolder(
profile_->GetBookmarkModel(),
table_parent_node);
break;
case BookmarkFolderTreeModel::RECENTLY_BOOKMARKED:
new_table_model = BookmarkTableModel::CreateRecentlyBookmarkedModel(
profile_->GetBookmarkModel());
break;
case BookmarkFolderTreeModel::SEARCH:
is_search = true;
search_factory_.RevokeAll();
new_table_model = CreateSearchTableModel();
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
SetTableModel(new_table_model, table_parent_node, is_search);
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_iccprof_t *jas_iccprof_createfromclrspc(int clrspc)
{
jas_iccprof_t *prof;
switch (clrspc) {
case JAS_CLRSPC_SRGB:
prof = jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(jas_iccprofdata_srgb,
jas_iccprofdata_srgblen);
break;
case JAS_CLRSPC_SGRAY:
prof = jas_iccprof_createfrombuf(jas_iccprofdata_sgray,
jas_iccprofdata_sgraylen);
break;
default:
prof = 0;
break;
}
return prof;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 27,238 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.