instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 64 129k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 30k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShouldUseCustomizedDefaultWallpaper() {
PrefService* pref_service = g_browser_process->local_state();
return !(pref_service->FindPreference(
prefs::kCustomizationDefaultWallpaperURL)->IsDefaultValue());
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 4,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp(BlockDriverState *bs,
const char *snapshot_id,
const char *name,
Error **errp)
{
int i, snapshot_index;
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot *sn;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int new_l1_bytes;
int ret;
assert(bs->read_only);
/* Search the snapshot */
snapshot_index = find_snapshot_by_id_and_name(bs, snapshot_id, name);
if (snapshot_index < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"Can't find snapshot");
return -ENOENT;
}
sn = &s->snapshots[snapshot_index];
/* Allocate and read in the snapshot's L1 table */
new_l1_bytes = sn->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t);
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_bytes, 512));
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 12,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplPriorityQueue, compare)
{
zval *a, *b;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "zz", &a, &b) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(spl_ptr_heap_zval_max_cmp(a, b, NULL TSRMLS_CC));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void check_clr_rcv_irq(struct smi_info *smi_info)
{
u8 enables = 0;
int rv;
rv = get_global_enables(smi_info, &enables);
if (!rv) {
if ((enables & IPMI_BMC_RCV_MSG_INTR) == 0)
/* Already clear, should work ok. */
return;
enables &= ~IPMI_BMC_RCV_MSG_INTR;
rv = set_global_enables(smi_info, enables);
}
if (rv < 0) {
dev_err(smi_info->io.dev,
"Cannot check clearing the rcv irq: %d\n", rv);
return;
}
if (rv) {
/*
* An error when setting the event buffer bit means
* clearing the bit is not supported.
*/
dev_warn(smi_info->io.dev,
"The BMC does not support clearing the recv irq bit, compensating, but the BMC needs to be fixed.\n");
smi_info->cannot_disable_irq = true;
}
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Mac_Read_sfnt_Resource( FT_Library library,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Long *offsets,
FT_Long resource_cnt,
FT_Long face_index,
FT_Face *aface )
{
FT_Memory memory = library->memory;
FT_Byte* sfnt_data;
FT_Error error;
FT_Long flag_offset;
FT_Long rlen;
int is_cff;
FT_Long face_index_in_resource = 0;
if ( face_index == -1 )
face_index = 0;
if ( face_index >= resource_cnt )
return FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource;
flag_offset = offsets[face_index];
error = FT_Stream_Seek( stream, flag_offset );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_READ_LONG( rlen ) )
goto Exit;
if ( rlen == -1 )
return FT_Err_Cannot_Open_Resource;
error = open_face_PS_from_sfnt_stream( library,
stream,
face_index,
0, NULL,
aface );
if ( !error )
goto Exit;
/* rewind sfnt stream before open_face_PS_from_sfnt_stream() */
if ( FT_Stream_Seek( stream, flag_offset + 4 ) )
goto Exit;
if ( FT_ALLOC( sfnt_data, (FT_Long)rlen ) )
return error;
error = FT_Stream_Read( stream, (FT_Byte *)sfnt_data, rlen );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
is_cff = rlen > 4 && !ft_memcmp( sfnt_data, "OTTO", 4 );
error = open_face_from_buffer( library,
sfnt_data,
rlen,
face_index_in_resource,
is_cff ? "cff" : "truetype",
aface );
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::DispatchBeforeUnloadEvent(ChromeClient& chrome_client,
bool is_reload,
bool& did_allow_navigation) {
if (!dom_window_)
return true;
if (!body())
return true;
if (ProcessingBeforeUnload())
return false;
BeforeUnloadEvent* before_unload_event = BeforeUnloadEvent::Create();
before_unload_event->initEvent(EventTypeNames::beforeunload, false, true);
load_event_progress_ = kBeforeUnloadEventInProgress;
const TimeTicks beforeunload_event_start = CurrentTimeTicks();
dom_window_->DispatchEvent(before_unload_event, this);
const TimeTicks beforeunload_event_end = CurrentTimeTicks();
load_event_progress_ = kBeforeUnloadEventCompleted;
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, beforeunload_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.BeforeUnloadDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
beforeunload_histogram.Count(
(beforeunload_event_end - beforeunload_event_start).InMicroseconds());
if (!before_unload_event->defaultPrevented())
DefaultEventHandler(before_unload_event);
enum BeforeUnloadDialogHistogramEnum {
kNoDialogNoText,
kNoDialogNoUserGesture,
kNoDialogMultipleConfirmationForNavigation,
kShowDialog,
kDialogEnumMax
};
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(EnumerationHistogram, beforeunload_dialog_histogram,
("Document.BeforeUnloadDialog", kDialogEnumMax));
if (before_unload_event->returnValue().IsNull()) {
beforeunload_dialog_histogram.Count(kNoDialogNoText);
}
if (!GetFrame() || before_unload_event->returnValue().IsNull())
return true;
if (!GetFrame()->HasBeenActivated()) {
beforeunload_dialog_histogram.Count(kNoDialogNoUserGesture);
AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kInterventionMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Blocked attempt to show a 'beforeunload' confirmation panel for a "
"frame that never had a user gesture since its load. "
"https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/5082396709879808"));
return true;
}
if (did_allow_navigation) {
beforeunload_dialog_histogram.Count(
kNoDialogMultipleConfirmationForNavigation);
AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kInterventionMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Blocked attempt to show multiple 'beforeunload' confirmation panels "
"for a single navigation."));
return true;
}
String text = before_unload_event->returnValue();
beforeunload_dialog_histogram.Count(
BeforeUnloadDialogHistogramEnum::kShowDialog);
if (chrome_client.OpenBeforeUnloadConfirmPanel(text, frame_, is_reload)) {
did_allow_navigation = true;
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 4,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::computeBorderBoxLogicalHeight(LayoutUnit height) const
{
LayoutUnit bordersPlusPadding = borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight();
if (style()->boxSizing() == CONTENT_BOX)
return height + bordersPlusPadding;
return max(height, bordersPlusPadding);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddScheme(const std::string& scheme) {
schemes_.insert(scheme);
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RemoteFrame::SetIsInert(bool inert) {
if (inert != is_inert_)
Client()->SetIsInert(inert);
is_inert_ = inert;
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 23,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SkipConditionalFeatureEntry(const FeatureEntry& entry) {
version_info::Channel channel = chrome::GetChannel();
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (!strcmp("mash", entry.internal_name) &&
channel == version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
return true;
}
if (!strcmp(ui_devtools::switches::kEnableUiDevTools, entry.internal_name) &&
channel == version_info::Channel::STABLE) {
return true;
}
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if ((!strcmp("data-reduction-proxy-lo-fi", entry.internal_name) ||
!strcmp("enable-data-reduction-proxy-lite-page", entry.internal_name)) &&
channel != version_info::Channel::BETA &&
channel != version_info::Channel::DEV &&
channel != version_info::Channel::CANARY &&
channel != version_info::Channel::UNKNOWN) {
return true;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!strcmp("enable-hdr", entry.internal_name) &&
base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::Version::WIN10) {
return true;
}
#endif // OS_WIN
if (!strcmp("dns-over-https", entry.internal_name) &&
chrome_browser_net::ShouldDisableDohForManaged()) {
return true;
}
if (flags::IsFlagExpired(entry.internal_name))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add feature and flag to enable incognito Chrome Custom Tabs
kCCTIncognito feature and flag are added to enable/disable incognito
Chrome Custom Tabs. The default is set to disabled.
Bug: 1023759
Change-Id: If32d256e3e9eaa94bcc09f7538c85e2dab53c589
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1911201
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714849}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InvokeTaskHelper(scoped_ptr<WebTask> task) : task_(task.Pass()) {}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int imap_tags_commit(struct Context *ctx, struct Header *hdr, char *buf)
{
struct Buffer *cmd = NULL;
char uid[11];
struct ImapData *idata = ctx->data;
if (*buf == '\0')
buf = NULL;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->ctx->rights, MUTT_ACL_WRITE))
return 0;
snprintf(uid, sizeof(uid), "%u", HEADER_DATA(hdr)->uid);
/* Remove old custom flags */
if (HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_remote)
{
cmd = mutt_buffer_new();
if (!cmd)
{
mutt_debug(1, "unable to allocate buffer\n");
return -1;
}
cmd->dptr = cmd->data;
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, "UID STORE ");
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, uid);
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, " -FLAGS.SILENT (");
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_remote);
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, ")");
/* Should we return here, or we are fine and we could
* continue to add new flags *
*/
if (imap_exec(idata, cmd->data, 0) != 0)
{
mutt_buffer_free(&cmd);
return -1;
}
mutt_buffer_free(&cmd);
}
/* Add new custom flags */
if (buf)
{
cmd = mutt_buffer_new();
if (!cmd)
{
mutt_debug(1, "fail to remove old flags\n");
return -1;
}
cmd->dptr = cmd->data;
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, "UID STORE ");
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, uid);
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, " +FLAGS.SILENT (");
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, buf);
mutt_buffer_addstr(cmd, ")");
if (imap_exec(idata, cmd->data, 0) != 0)
{
mutt_debug(1, "fail to add new flags\n");
mutt_buffer_free(&cmd);
return -1;
}
mutt_buffer_free(&cmd);
}
/* We are good sync them */
mutt_debug(1, "NEW TAGS: %d\n", buf);
driver_tags_replace(&hdr->tags, buf);
FREE(&HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_remote);
HEADER_DATA(hdr)->flags_remote = driver_tags_get_with_hidden(&hdr->tags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 23,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_buf_iodone_work(
struct work_struct *work)
{
struct xfs_buf *bp =
container_of(work, xfs_buf_t, b_iodone_work);
bool read = !!(bp->b_flags & XBF_READ);
bp->b_flags &= ~(XBF_READ | XBF_WRITE | XBF_READ_AHEAD);
if (read && bp->b_ops)
bp->b_ops->verify_read(bp);
if (bp->b_iodone)
(*(bp->b_iodone))(bp);
else if (bp->b_flags & XBF_ASYNC)
xfs_buf_relse(bp);
else {
ASSERT(read && bp->b_ops);
complete(&bp->b_iowait);
}
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_timer_gettime(timer_t timer_id, struct itimerspec64 *setting)
{
struct k_itimer *timr;
const struct k_clock *kc;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
timr = lock_timer(timer_id, &flags);
if (!timr)
return -EINVAL;
memset(setting, 0, sizeof(*setting));
kc = timr->kclock;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kc || !kc->timer_get))
ret = -EINVAL;
else
kc->timer_get(timr, setting);
unlock_timer(timr, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 24,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static zval *spl_array_read_dimension_ex(int check_inherited, zval *object, zval *offset, int type TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **ret;
if (check_inherited) {
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->fptr_offset_get) {
zval *rv;
if (!offset) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(offset);
} else {
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(offset);
}
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&object, Z_OBJCE_P(object), &intern->fptr_offset_get, "offsetGet", &rv, offset);
zval_ptr_dtor(&offset);
if (rv) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->retval);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(intern->retval);
ZVAL_ZVAL(intern->retval, rv, 1, 1);
return intern->retval;
}
return EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
}
}
ret = spl_array_get_dimension_ptr_ptr(check_inherited, object, offset, type TSRMLS_CC);
/* When in a write context,
* ZE has to be fooled into thinking this is in a reference set
* by separating (if necessary) and returning as an is_ref=1 zval (even if refcount == 1) */
if ((type == BP_VAR_W || type == BP_VAR_RW || type == BP_VAR_UNSET) && !Z_ISREF_PP(ret) && ret != &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr)) {
if (Z_REFCOUNT_PP(ret) > 1) {
zval *newval;
/* Separate */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(newval);
*newval = **ret;
zval_copy_ctor(newval);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(newval, 1);
/* Replace */
Z_DELREF_PP(ret);
*ret = newval;
}
Z_SET_ISREF_PP(ret);
}
return *ret;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 5,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rtsp_cmd_options(HTTPContext *c, const char *url)
{
/* rtsp_reply_header(c, RTSP_STATUS_OK); */
avio_printf(c->pb, "RTSP/1.0 %d %s\r\n", RTSP_STATUS_OK, "OK");
avio_printf(c->pb, "CSeq: %d\r\n", c->seq);
avio_printf(c->pb, "Public: %s\r\n",
"OPTIONS, DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, PAUSE");
avio_printf(c->pb, "\r\n");
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::opSetStrokeColorSpace(Object args[], int numArgs) {
Object obj;
GfxColorSpace *colorSpace;
GfxColor color;
state->setStrokePattern(NULL);
res->lookupColorSpace(args[0].getName(), &obj);
if (obj.isNull()) {
colorSpace = GfxColorSpace::parse(&args[0], this);
} else {
colorSpace = GfxColorSpace::parse(&obj, this);
}
obj.free();
if (colorSpace) {
state->setStrokeColorSpace(colorSpace);
out->updateStrokeColorSpace(state);
colorSpace->getDefaultColor(&color);
state->setStrokeColor(&color);
out->updateStrokeColor(state);
} else {
error(getPos(), "Bad color space (stroke)");
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: user_extension_get_property (User *user,
Daemon *daemon,
GDBusInterfaceInfo *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation)
{
const GDBusPropertyInfo *property = g_dbus_method_invocation_get_property_info (invocation);
g_autoptr(GVariant) value = NULL;
value = user_extension_get_value (user, interface, property);
if (value) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value (invocation, g_variant_new ("(v)", value));
}
else {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_error (invocation, G_DBUS_ERROR, G_DBUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS,
"Key '%s' is not set and has no default value",
property->name);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 13,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_krb5_string_attr(XDR *xdrs, krb5_string_attr *objp)
{
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->key))
return FALSE;
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->value))
return FALSE;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_DECODE &&
(objp->key == NULL || objp->value == NULL))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 megasas_get_frame_count(struct megasas_instance *instance,
u8 sge_count, u8 frame_type)
{
int num_cnt;
int sge_bytes;
u32 sge_sz;
u32 frame_count = 0;
sge_sz = (IS_DMA64) ? sizeof(struct megasas_sge64) :
sizeof(struct megasas_sge32);
if (instance->flag_ieee) {
sge_sz = sizeof(struct megasas_sge_skinny);
}
/*
* Main frame can contain 2 SGEs for 64-bit SGLs and
* 3 SGEs for 32-bit SGLs for ldio &
* 1 SGEs for 64-bit SGLs and
* 2 SGEs for 32-bit SGLs for pthru frame
*/
if (unlikely(frame_type == PTHRU_FRAME)) {
if (instance->flag_ieee == 1) {
num_cnt = sge_count - 1;
} else if (IS_DMA64)
num_cnt = sge_count - 1;
else
num_cnt = sge_count - 2;
} else {
if (instance->flag_ieee == 1) {
num_cnt = sge_count - 1;
} else if (IS_DMA64)
num_cnt = sge_count - 2;
else
num_cnt = sge_count - 3;
}
if (num_cnt > 0) {
sge_bytes = sge_sz * num_cnt;
frame_count = (sge_bytes / MEGAMFI_FRAME_SIZE) +
((sge_bytes % MEGAMFI_FRAME_SIZE) ? 1 : 0) ;
}
/* Main frame */
frame_count += 1;
if (frame_count > 7)
frame_count = 8;
return frame_count;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 29,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SendProgressNotifications(const GURL& url,
int num_total,
int num_complete) {
for (auto* frontend : hosts_to_notify_)
frontend->ProgressEventRaised(url, num_total, num_complete);
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::CheckSecurityForNodeVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_checkSecurityForNodeVoidMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::CheckSecurityForNodeVoidMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::setInputFilterEnabled(bool enabled) {
#if DEBUG_FOCUS
ALOGD("setInputFilterEnabled: enabled=%d", enabled);
#endif
{ // acquire lock
AutoMutex _l(mLock);
if (mInputFilterEnabled == enabled) {
return;
}
mInputFilterEnabled = enabled;
resetAndDropEverythingLocked("input filter is being enabled or disabled");
} // release lock
mLooper->wake();
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u32 h264bsdDecode(storage_t *pStorage, u8 *byteStrm, u32 len, u32 picId,
u32 *readBytes)
{
/* Variables */
u32 tmp, ppsId, spsId;
i32 picOrderCnt;
nalUnit_t nalUnit;
seqParamSet_t seqParamSet;
picParamSet_t picParamSet;
strmData_t strm;
u32 accessUnitBoundaryFlag = HANTRO_FALSE;
u32 picReady = HANTRO_FALSE;
/* Code */
ASSERT(pStorage);
ASSERT(byteStrm);
ASSERT(len);
ASSERT(readBytes);
/* if previous buffer was not finished and same pointer given -> skip NAL
* unit extraction */
if (pStorage->prevBufNotFinished && byteStrm == pStorage->prevBufPointer)
{
strm = pStorage->strm[0];
strm.pStrmCurrPos = strm.pStrmBuffStart;
strm.strmBuffReadBits = strm.bitPosInWord = 0;
*readBytes = pStorage->prevBytesConsumed;
}
else
{
tmp = h264bsdExtractNalUnit(byteStrm, len, &strm, readBytes);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("BYTE_STREAM");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
/* store stream */
pStorage->strm[0] = strm;
pStorage->prevBytesConsumed = *readBytes;
pStorage->prevBufPointer = byteStrm;
}
pStorage->prevBufNotFinished = HANTRO_FALSE;
tmp = h264bsdDecodeNalUnit(&strm, &nalUnit);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("NAL_UNIT");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
/* Discard unspecified, reserved, SPS extension and auxiliary picture slices */
if(nalUnit.nalUnitType == 0 || nalUnit.nalUnitType >= 13)
{
DEBUG(("DISCARDED NAL (UNSPECIFIED, REGISTERED, SPS ext or AUX slice)\n"));
return(H264BSD_RDY);
}
tmp = h264bsdCheckAccessUnitBoundary(
&strm,
&nalUnit,
pStorage,
&accessUnitBoundaryFlag);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("ACCESS UNIT BOUNDARY CHECK");
if (tmp == PARAM_SET_ERROR)
return(H264BSD_PARAM_SET_ERROR);
else
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
if ( accessUnitBoundaryFlag )
{
DEBUG(("Access unit boundary\n"));
/* conceal if picture started and param sets activated */
if (pStorage->picStarted && pStorage->activeSps != NULL)
{
DEBUG(("CONCEALING..."));
/* return error if second phase of
* initialization is not completed */
if (pStorage->pendingActivation)
{
EPRINT("Pending activation not completed");
return (H264BSD_ERROR);
}
if (!pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit)
{
pStorage->currImage->data =
h264bsdAllocateDpbImage(pStorage->dpb);
h264bsdInitRefPicList(pStorage->dpb);
tmp = h264bsdConceal(pStorage, pStorage->currImage, P_SLICE);
}
else
tmp = h264bsdConceal(pStorage, pStorage->currImage,
pStorage->sliceHeader->sliceType);
picReady = HANTRO_TRUE;
/* current NAL unit should be decoded on next activation -> set
* readBytes to 0 */
*readBytes = 0;
pStorage->prevBufNotFinished = HANTRO_TRUE;
DEBUG(("...DONE\n"));
}
else
{
pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit = HANTRO_FALSE;
}
pStorage->skipRedundantSlices = HANTRO_FALSE;
}
if (!picReady)
{
switch (nalUnit.nalUnitType)
{
case NAL_SEQ_PARAM_SET:
DEBUG(("SEQ PARAM SET\n"));
tmp = h264bsdDecodeSeqParamSet(&strm, &seqParamSet);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("SEQ_PARAM_SET");
FREE(seqParamSet.offsetForRefFrame);
FREE(seqParamSet.vuiParameters);
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
tmp = h264bsdStoreSeqParamSet(pStorage, &seqParamSet);
break;
case NAL_PIC_PARAM_SET:
DEBUG(("PIC PARAM SET\n"));
tmp = h264bsdDecodePicParamSet(&strm, &picParamSet);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("PIC_PARAM_SET");
FREE(picParamSet.runLength);
FREE(picParamSet.topLeft);
FREE(picParamSet.bottomRight);
FREE(picParamSet.sliceGroupId);
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
tmp = h264bsdStorePicParamSet(pStorage, &picParamSet);
break;
case NAL_CODED_SLICE_IDR:
DEBUG(("IDR "));
/* fall through */
case NAL_CODED_SLICE:
DEBUG(("SLICE HEADER\n"));
/* picture successfully finished and still decoding same old
* access unit -> no need to decode redundant slices */
if (pStorage->skipRedundantSlices)
return(H264BSD_RDY);
pStorage->picStarted = HANTRO_TRUE;
if (h264bsdIsStartOfPicture(pStorage))
{
pStorage->numConcealedMbs = 0;
pStorage->currentPicId = picId;
tmp = h264bsdCheckPpsId(&strm, &ppsId);
ASSERT(tmp == HANTRO_OK);
/* store old activeSpsId and return headers ready
* indication if activeSps changes */
spsId = pStorage->activeSpsId;
tmp = h264bsdActivateParamSets(pStorage, ppsId,
IS_IDR_NAL_UNIT(&nalUnit) ?
HANTRO_TRUE : HANTRO_FALSE);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("Param set activation");
pStorage->activePpsId = MAX_NUM_PIC_PARAM_SETS;
pStorage->activePps = NULL;
pStorage->activeSpsId = MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAM_SETS;
pStorage->activeSps = NULL;
pStorage->pendingActivation = HANTRO_FALSE;
if(tmp == MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR)
{
return H264BSD_MEMALLOC_ERROR;
}
else
return(H264BSD_PARAM_SET_ERROR);
}
if (spsId != pStorage->activeSpsId)
{
seqParamSet_t *oldSPS = NULL;
seqParamSet_t *newSPS = pStorage->activeSps;
u32 noOutputOfPriorPicsFlag = 1;
if(pStorage->oldSpsId < MAX_NUM_SEQ_PARAM_SETS)
{
oldSPS = pStorage->sps[pStorage->oldSpsId];
}
*readBytes = 0;
pStorage->prevBufNotFinished = HANTRO_TRUE;
if(nalUnit.nalUnitType == NAL_CODED_SLICE_IDR)
{
tmp =
h264bsdCheckPriorPicsFlag(&noOutputOfPriorPicsFlag,
&strm, newSPS,
pStorage->activePps,
nalUnit.nalUnitType);
}
else
{
tmp = HANTRO_NOK;
}
if((tmp != HANTRO_OK) ||
(noOutputOfPriorPicsFlag != 0) ||
(pStorage->dpb->noReordering) ||
(oldSPS == NULL) ||
(oldSPS->picWidthInMbs != newSPS->picWidthInMbs) ||
(oldSPS->picHeightInMbs != newSPS->picHeightInMbs) ||
(oldSPS->maxDpbSize != newSPS->maxDpbSize))
{
pStorage->dpb->flushed = 0;
}
else
{
h264bsdFlushDpb(pStorage->dpb);
}
pStorage->oldSpsId = pStorage->activeSpsId;
return(H264BSD_HDRS_RDY);
}
}
/* return error if second phase of
* initialization is not completed */
if (pStorage->pendingActivation)
{
EPRINT("Pending activation not completed");
return (H264BSD_ERROR);
}
tmp = h264bsdDecodeSliceHeader(&strm, pStorage->sliceHeader + 1,
pStorage->activeSps, pStorage->activePps, &nalUnit);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("SLICE_HEADER");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
if (h264bsdIsStartOfPicture(pStorage))
{
if (!IS_IDR_NAL_UNIT(&nalUnit))
{
tmp = h264bsdCheckGapsInFrameNum(pStorage->dpb,
pStorage->sliceHeader[1].frameNum,
nalUnit.nalRefIdc != 0 ?
HANTRO_TRUE : HANTRO_FALSE,
pStorage->activeSps->
gapsInFrameNumValueAllowedFlag);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("Gaps in frame num");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
}
pStorage->currImage->data =
h264bsdAllocateDpbImage(pStorage->dpb);
}
/* store slice header to storage if successfully decoded */
pStorage->sliceHeader[0] = pStorage->sliceHeader[1];
pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit = HANTRO_TRUE;
pStorage->prevNalUnit[0] = nalUnit;
h264bsdComputeSliceGroupMap(pStorage,
pStorage->sliceHeader->sliceGroupChangeCycle);
h264bsdInitRefPicList(pStorage->dpb);
tmp = h264bsdReorderRefPicList(pStorage->dpb,
&pStorage->sliceHeader->refPicListReordering,
pStorage->sliceHeader->frameNum,
pStorage->sliceHeader->numRefIdxL0Active);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("Reordering");
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
DEBUG(("SLICE DATA, FIRST %d\n",
pStorage->sliceHeader->firstMbInSlice));
tmp = h264bsdDecodeSliceData(&strm, pStorage,
pStorage->currImage, pStorage->sliceHeader);
if (tmp != HANTRO_OK)
{
EPRINT("SLICE_DATA");
h264bsdMarkSliceCorrupted(pStorage,
pStorage->sliceHeader->firstMbInSlice);
return(H264BSD_ERROR);
}
if (h264bsdIsEndOfPicture(pStorage))
{
picReady = HANTRO_TRUE;
pStorage->skipRedundantSlices = HANTRO_TRUE;
}
break;
case NAL_SEI:
DEBUG(("SEI MESSAGE, NOT DECODED"));
break;
default:
DEBUG(("NOT IMPLEMENTED YET %d\n",nalUnit.nalUnitType));
}
}
if (picReady)
{
h264bsdFilterPicture(pStorage->currImage, pStorage->mb);
h264bsdResetStorage(pStorage);
picOrderCnt = h264bsdDecodePicOrderCnt(pStorage->poc,
pStorage->activeSps, pStorage->sliceHeader, pStorage->prevNalUnit);
if (pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit)
{
if (pStorage->prevNalUnit->nalRefIdc)
{
tmp = h264bsdMarkDecRefPic(pStorage->dpb,
&pStorage->sliceHeader->decRefPicMarking,
pStorage->currImage, pStorage->sliceHeader->frameNum,
picOrderCnt,
IS_IDR_NAL_UNIT(pStorage->prevNalUnit) ?
HANTRO_TRUE : HANTRO_FALSE,
pStorage->currentPicId, pStorage->numConcealedMbs);
}
/* non-reference picture, just store for possible display
* reordering */
else
{
tmp = h264bsdMarkDecRefPic(pStorage->dpb, NULL,
pStorage->currImage, pStorage->sliceHeader->frameNum,
picOrderCnt,
IS_IDR_NAL_UNIT(pStorage->prevNalUnit) ?
HANTRO_TRUE : HANTRO_FALSE,
pStorage->currentPicId, pStorage->numConcealedMbs);
}
}
pStorage->picStarted = HANTRO_FALSE;
pStorage->validSliceInAccessUnit = HANTRO_FALSE;
return(H264BSD_PIC_RDY);
}
else
return(H264BSD_RDY);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 25,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PDFiumEngine::MouseDownState::MouseDownState(
const PDFiumPage::Area& area,
const PDFiumPage::LinkTarget& target)
: area_(area), target_(target) {
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 11,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_user_dscr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long dscr)
{
task->thread.dscr = dscr;
task->thread.dscr_inherit = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8Debugger::collectionEntries(v8::Local<v8::Context> context, v8::Local<v8::Object> object)
{
if (!enabled()) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> argv[] = { object };
v8::Local<v8::Value> entriesValue = callDebuggerMethod("getCollectionEntries", 1, argv).ToLocalChecked();
if (!entriesValue->IsArray())
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Array> entries = entriesValue.As<v8::Array>();
if (!markArrayEntriesAsInternal(context, entries, V8InternalValueType::kEntry))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
if (!entries->SetPrototype(context, v8::Null(m_isolate)).FromMaybe(false))
return v8::Undefined(m_isolate);
return entries;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 1 | 19,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::setMuted(bool muted) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "setMuted(" << (void*)this << ", " << boolString(muted)
<< ")";
if (m_muted == muted)
return;
bool wasAutoplayingMuted = isAutoplayingMuted();
bool wasPendingAutoplayMuted = m_autoplayVisibilityObserver && paused() &&
m_muted && isLockedPendingUserGesture();
if (UserGestureIndicator::processingUserGesture())
unlockUserGesture();
m_muted = muted;
scheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::volumechange);
if (wasAutoplayingMuted) {
if (isGestureNeededForPlayback()) {
pause();
m_autoplayUmaHelper->recordAutoplayUnmuteStatus(
AutoplayUnmuteActionStatus::Failure);
} else {
m_autoplayUmaHelper->recordAutoplayUnmuteStatus(
AutoplayUnmuteActionStatus::Success);
}
}
if (webMediaPlayer())
webMediaPlayer()->setVolume(effectiveMediaVolume());
if (wasPendingAutoplayMuted) {
m_autoplayVisibilityObserver->stop();
m_autoplayVisibilityObserver = nullptr;
}
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,511 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool should_load_proto(struct iptables_command_state *cs)
{
if (cs->protocol == NULL)
return false;
if (find_proto(cs->protocol, XTF_DONT_LOAD,
cs->options & OPT_NUMERIC, NULL) == NULL)
return true;
return !cs->proto_used;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 23,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void arm_dma_free(struct device *dev, size_t size, void *cpu_addr,
dma_addr_t handle, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
__arm_dma_free(dev, size, cpu_addr, handle, attrs, false);
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 13,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_split_extent(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path *path,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
int uninitialized;
int split_flag1, flags1;
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
uninitialized = ext4_ext_is_uninitialized(ex);
if (map->m_lblk + map->m_len < ee_block + ee_len) {
split_flag1 = split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT ?
EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0;
flags1 = flags | EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO;
if (uninitialized)
split_flag1 |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1 |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2;
err = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, path,
map->m_lblk + map->m_len, split_flag1, flags1);
}
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
path = ext4_ext_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, path);
if (IS_ERR(path))
return PTR_ERR(path);
if (map->m_lblk >= ee_block) {
split_flag1 = split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT ?
EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT : 0;
if (uninitialized)
split_flag1 |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT1;
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2)
split_flag1 |= EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNINIT2;
err = ext4_split_extent_at(handle, inode, path,
map->m_lblk, split_flag1, flags);
if (err)
goto out;
}
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
out:
return err ? err : map->m_len;
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 29,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint16_t smb1cli_req_mid(struct tevent_req *req)
{
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
if (state->smb1.mid != 0) {
return state->smb1.mid;
}
return SVAL(state->smb1.hdr, HDR_MID);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_port_add(struct ofproto *ofproto, struct netdev *netdev,
ofp_port_t *ofp_portp)
{
ofp_port_t ofp_port = ofp_portp ? *ofp_portp : OFPP_NONE;
int error;
error = ofproto->ofproto_class->port_add(ofproto, netdev);
if (!error) {
const char *netdev_name = netdev_get_name(netdev);
simap_put(&ofproto->ofp_requests, netdev_name,
ofp_to_u16(ofp_port));
error = update_port(ofproto, netdev_name);
}
if (ofp_portp) {
*ofp_portp = OFPP_NONE;
if (!error) {
struct ofproto_port ofproto_port;
error = ofproto_port_query_by_name(ofproto,
netdev_get_name(netdev),
&ofproto_port);
if (!error) {
*ofp_portp = ofproto_port.ofp_port;
ofproto_port_destroy(&ofproto_port);
}
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 5,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init early_alloc_pgt_buf(void)
{
unsigned long tables = INIT_PGT_BUF_SIZE;
phys_addr_t base;
base = __pa(extend_brk(tables, PAGE_SIZE));
pgt_buf_start = base >> PAGE_SHIFT;
pgt_buf_end = pgt_buf_start;
pgt_buf_top = pgt_buf_start + (tables >> PAGE_SHIFT);
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 1,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t srpt_tpg_enable_store(struct config_item *item,
const char *page, size_t count)
{
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg = to_tpg(item);
struct srpt_port *sport = container_of(se_tpg, struct srpt_port, port_tpg_1);
unsigned long tmp;
int ret;
ret = kstrtoul(page, 0, &tmp);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Unable to extract srpt_tpg_store_enable\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((tmp != 0) && (tmp != 1)) {
pr_err("Illegal value for srpt_tpg_store_enable: %lu\n", tmp);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tmp == 1)
sport->enabled = true;
else
sport->enabled = false;
return count;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 1,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
Stop();
GetPeerConnectionHandlers()->erase(this);
if (peer_connection_tracker_)
peer_connection_tracker_->UnregisterPeerConnection(this);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_10000(
"WebRTC.NumDataChannelsPerPeerConnection", num_data_channels_created_);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 8,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_ftrace_function_unregister(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct ftrace_ops *ops = &event->ftrace_ops;
int ret = unregister_ftrace_function(ops);
ftrace_free_filter(ops);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool tcp_skb_spurious_retrans(const struct tcp_sock *tp,
const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS) &&
tcp_tsopt_ecr_before(tp, tcp_skb_timestamp(skb));
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,588 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_append_ofp11_group_desc_reply(const struct ofputil_group_desc *gds,
const struct ovs_list *buckets,
struct ovs_list *replies,
enum ofp_version version)
{
struct ofpbuf *reply = ofpbuf_from_list(ovs_list_back(replies));
struct ofp11_group_desc_stats *ogds;
struct ofputil_bucket *bucket;
size_t start_ogds;
start_ogds = reply->size;
ofpbuf_put_zeros(reply, sizeof *ogds);
LIST_FOR_EACH (bucket, list_node, buckets) {
ofputil_put_ofp11_bucket(bucket, reply, version);
}
ogds = ofpbuf_at_assert(reply, start_ogds, sizeof *ogds);
ogds->length = htons(reply->size - start_ogds);
ogds->type = gds->type;
ogds->group_id = htonl(gds->group_id);
ofpmp_postappend(replies, start_ogds);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 27,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XvMCSurfaceInfo * XvMCListSurfaceTypes(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, int *num)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = xvmc_find_display(dpy);
xvmcListSurfaceTypesReply rep;
xvmcListSurfaceTypesReq *req;
XvMCSurfaceInfo *surface_info = NULL;
*num = 0;
XvMCCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
XvMCGetReq (ListSurfaceTypes, req);
req->port = port;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
if(rep.num > 0) {
if (rep.num < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo)))
surface_info = Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo));
if(surface_info) {
xvmcSurfaceInfo sinfo;
int i;
*num = rep.num;
for(i = 0; i < rep.num; i++) {
_XRead(dpy, (char*)&sinfo, sizeof(xvmcSurfaceInfo));
surface_info[i].surface_type_id = sinfo.surface_type_id;
surface_info[i].chroma_format = sinfo.chroma_format;
surface_info[i].max_width = sinfo.max_width;
surface_info[i].max_height = sinfo.max_height;
surface_info[i].subpicture_max_width =
sinfo.subpicture_max_width;
surface_info[i].subpicture_max_height =
sinfo.subpicture_max_height;
surface_info[i].mc_type = sinfo.mc_type;
surface_info[i].flags = sinfo.flags;
}
} else
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
}
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return surface_info;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 21,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionsData::HasAPIPermissionForTab(
int tab_id,
APIPermission::ID permission) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
if (active_permissions_unsafe_->HasAPIPermission(permission))
return true;
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
return tab_permissions && tab_permissions->HasAPIPermission(permission);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::RequestClearServerData() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (data_->scheduler())
data_->scheduler()->ScheduleClearUserData();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *dead_type)
{
struct key_restriction *keyres;
kenter("%x{%s}", keyring->serial, keyring->description ?: "");
/*
* keyring->restrict_link is only assigned at key allocation time
* or with the key type locked, so the only values that could be
* concurrently assigned to keyring->restrict_link are for key
* types other than dead_type. Given this, it's ok to check
* the key type before acquiring keyring->sem.
*/
if (!dead_type || !keyring->restrict_link ||
keyring->restrict_link->keytype != dead_type) {
kleave(" [no restriction gc]");
return;
}
/* Lock the keyring to ensure that a link is not in progress */
down_write(&keyring->sem);
keyres = keyring->restrict_link;
keyres->check = restrict_link_reject;
key_put(keyres->key);
keyres->key = NULL;
keyres->keytype = NULL;
up_write(&keyring->sem);
kleave(" [restriction gc]");
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int burl_normalize_2F_to_slash_fix (buffer *b, int qs, int i)
{
char * const s = b->ptr;
const int blen = (int)buffer_string_length(b);
const int used = qs < 0 ? blen : qs;
int j = i;
for (; i < used; ++i, ++j) {
s[j] = s[i];
if (s[i] == '%' && s[i+1] == '2' && s[i+2] == 'F') {
s[j] = '/';
i+=2;
}
}
if (qs >= 0) {
memmove(s+j, s+qs, blen - qs);
j += blen - qs;
}
buffer_string_set_length(b, j);
return qs;
}
Commit Message: [core] fix abort in http-parseopts (fixes #2945)
fix abort in server.http-parseopts with url-path-2f-decode enabled
(thx stze)
x-ref:
"Security - SIGABRT during GET request handling with url-path-2f-decode enabled"
https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2945
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 18,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostImpl::~RenderWidgetHostImpl() {
render_frame_metadata_provider_.RemoveObserver(this);
if (!destroyed_)
Destroy(false);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CompleteLoading() {
std::unique_ptr<BackgroundSnapshotController> snapshot_controller(
new BackgroundSnapshotController(base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get(),
offliner_.get(),
false /* RenovationsEnabled */));
offliner_->SetBackgroundSnapshotControllerForTest(
std::move(snapshot_controller));
offliner()->DocumentAvailableInMainFrame();
offliner()->DocumentOnLoadCompletedInMainFrame();
PumpLoop();
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zend_object_value pdo_row_new(zend_class_entry *ce TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_value retval;
retval.handle = zend_objects_store_put(NULL, (zend_objects_store_dtor_t)zend_objects_destroy_object, (zend_objects_free_object_storage_t)pdo_row_free_storage, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
retval.handlers = &pdo_row_object_handlers;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 8,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: node_is_possible_guard(const node_t *node)
{
/* The "GUARDS" set is all nodes in the nodelist for which this predicate
* holds. */
tor_assert(node);
return (node->is_possible_guard &&
node->is_stable &&
node->is_fast &&
node->is_valid &&
node_is_dir(node));
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawElements(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawElements& c) {
return DoDrawElements("glDrawElements",
false,
static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode),
static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count),
static_cast<GLenum>(c.type),
static_cast<int32>(c.index_offset),
0);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,555 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionApiTest::SetUpCommandLine(base::CommandLine* command_line) {
ExtensionBrowserTest::SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
test_data_dir_ = test_data_dir_.AppendASCII("api_test");
extensions::RegisterPathProvider();
PathService::Get(extensions::DIR_TEST_DATA, &shared_test_data_dir_);
shared_test_data_dir_ = shared_test_data_dir_.AppendASCII("api_test");
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableRendererBackgrounding);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 23,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnVideoAverageKeyframeDistanceUpdate() {
UpdateBackgroundVideoOptimizationState();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 18,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_ARRAY_METHOD(Array, asort, SPL_ARRAY_METHOD_MAY_USER_ARG) /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int ArrayObject::ksort([int $sort_flags = SORT_REGULAR ])
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void XMLHttpRequest::networkError()
{
genericError();
if (!m_uploadComplete) {
m_uploadComplete = true;
if (m_upload && m_uploadEventsAllowed)
m_upload->dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().errorEvent));
}
m_progressEventThrottle.dispatchEventAndLoadEnd(XMLHttpRequestProgressEvent::create(eventNames().errorEvent));
internalAbort();
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 23,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::HandleKeyboardEvent(content::WebContents* source,
const NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event) {
DevToolsWindow* devtools_window =
DevToolsWindow::GetInstanceForInspectedWebContents(source);
bool handled = false;
if (devtools_window)
handled = devtools_window->ForwardKeyboardEvent(event);
if (!handled)
window()->HandleKeyboardEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ||
len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
((void) buf);
ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vhost_scsi_ioctl(struct file *f,
unsigned int ioctl,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct vhost_scsi *vs = f->private_data;
struct vhost_scsi_target backend;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
u64 __user *featurep = argp;
u32 __user *eventsp = argp;
u32 events_missed;
u64 features;
int r, abi_version = VHOST_SCSI_ABI_VERSION;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &vs->vqs[VHOST_SCSI_VQ_EVT].vq;
switch (ioctl) {
case VHOST_SCSI_SET_ENDPOINT:
if (copy_from_user(&backend, argp, sizeof backend))
return -EFAULT;
if (backend.reserved != 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(vs, &backend);
case VHOST_SCSI_CLEAR_ENDPOINT:
if (copy_from_user(&backend, argp, sizeof backend))
return -EFAULT;
if (backend.reserved != 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint(vs, &backend);
case VHOST_SCSI_GET_ABI_VERSION:
if (copy_to_user(argp, &abi_version, sizeof abi_version))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case VHOST_SCSI_SET_EVENTS_MISSED:
if (get_user(events_missed, eventsp))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vs->vs_events_missed = events_missed;
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
return 0;
case VHOST_SCSI_GET_EVENTS_MISSED:
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
events_missed = vs->vs_events_missed;
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (put_user(events_missed, eventsp))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case VHOST_GET_FEATURES:
features = VHOST_SCSI_FEATURES;
if (copy_to_user(featurep, &features, sizeof features))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case VHOST_SET_FEATURES:
if (copy_from_user(&features, featurep, sizeof features))
return -EFAULT;
return vhost_scsi_set_features(vs, features);
default:
mutex_lock(&vs->dev.mutex);
r = vhost_dev_ioctl(&vs->dev, ioctl, argp);
/* TODO: flush backend after dev ioctl. */
if (r == -ENOIOCTLCMD)
r = vhost_vring_ioctl(&vs->dev, ioctl, argp);
mutex_unlock(&vs->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
}
Commit Message: vhost/scsi: potential memory corruption
This code in vhost_scsi_make_tpg() is confusing because we limit "tpgt"
to UINT_MAX but the data type of "tpg->tport_tpgt" and that is a u16.
I looked at the context and it turns out that in
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint(), "tpg->tport_tpgt" is used as an offset into
the vs_tpg[] array which has VHOST_SCSI_MAX_TARGET (256) elements so
anything higher than 255 then it is invalid. I have made that the limit
now.
In vhost_scsi_send_evt() we mask away values higher than 255, but now
that the limit has changed, we don't need the mask.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct redisCommand *lookupCommand(sds name) {
return dictFetchValue(server.commands, name);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 4,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFlexibleBox::layoutBlock(bool relayoutChildren)
{
ASSERT(needsLayout());
if (!relayoutChildren && simplifiedLayout())
return;
LayoutRepainter repainter(*this, checkForRepaintDuringLayout());
if (updateLogicalWidthAndColumnWidth())
relayoutChildren = true;
LayoutUnit previousHeight = logicalHeight();
setLogicalHeight(borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight() + scrollbarLogicalHeight());
{
LayoutStateMaintainer statePusher(*this, locationOffset());
m_numberOfInFlowChildrenOnFirstLine = -1;
RenderBlock::startDelayUpdateScrollInfo();
prepareOrderIteratorAndMargins();
ChildFrameRects oldChildRects;
appendChildFrameRects(oldChildRects);
layoutFlexItems(relayoutChildren);
RenderBlock::finishDelayUpdateScrollInfo();
if (logicalHeight() != previousHeight)
relayoutChildren = true;
layoutPositionedObjects(relayoutChildren || isDocumentElement());
computeRegionRangeForBlock(flowThreadContainingBlock());
repaintChildrenDuringLayoutIfMoved(oldChildRects);
computeOverflow(clientLogicalBottomAfterRepositioning());
}
updateLayerTransform();
updateScrollInfoAfterLayout();
repainter.repaintAfterLayout();
clearNeedsLayout();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fd_read_line (int fd)
{
return fd_read_hunk (fd, line_terminator, 128, FD_READ_LINE_MAX);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string ContentBrowserClient::GetAcceptLangs(BrowserContext* context) {
return std::string();
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_saved_cmdlines_buffer(struct saved_cmdlines_buffer *s)
{
kfree(s->saved_cmdlines);
kfree(s->map_cmdline_to_pid);
kfree(s);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 29,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: header_bytes(struct archive_read *a, size_t rbytes)
{
struct _7zip *zip = (struct _7zip *)a->format->data;
const unsigned char *p;
if (zip->header_bytes_remaining < rbytes)
return (NULL);
if (zip->pack_stream_bytes_unconsumed)
read_consume(a);
if (zip->header_is_encoded == 0) {
p = __archive_read_ahead(a, rbytes, NULL);
if (p == NULL)
return (NULL);
zip->header_bytes_remaining -= rbytes;
zip->pack_stream_bytes_unconsumed = rbytes;
} else {
const void *buff;
ssize_t bytes;
bytes = read_stream(a, &buff, rbytes, rbytes);
if (bytes <= 0)
return (NULL);
zip->header_bytes_remaining -= bytes;
p = buff;
}
/* Update checksum */
zip->header_crc32 = crc32(zip->header_crc32, p, (unsigned)rbytes);
return (p);
}
Commit Message: Issue #718: Fix TALOS-CAN-152
If a 7-Zip archive declares a rediculously large number of substreams,
it can overflow an internal counter, leading a subsequent memory
allocation to be too small for the substream data.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco
for reporting this issue.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 26,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebView::loadHtml(const QString& html, const QUrl& baseUrl, const QUrl& unreachableUrl)
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
if (unreachableUrl.isValid())
d->webPageProxy->loadAlternateHTMLString(html, baseUrl.toString(), unreachableUrl.toString());
else
d->webPageProxy->loadHTMLString(html, baseUrl.toString());
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataCache::GetResourceIdsOfExistingPinnedFiles(
std::vector<std::string>* resource_ids) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(resource_ids);
metadata_->Iterate(base::Bind(&CollectExistingPinnedFile, resource_ids));
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Destroy_Driver( FT_Driver driver )
{
FT_List_Finalize( &driver->faces_list,
(FT_List_Destructor)destroy_face,
driver->root.memory,
driver );
/* check whether we need to drop the driver's glyph loader */
if ( FT_DRIVER_USES_OUTLINES( driver ) )
FT_GlyphLoader_Done( driver->glyph_loader );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib1fv(GLuint index, const GLfloat* v) {
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo* info =
vertex_attrib_manager_->GetVertexAttribInfo(index);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glVertexAttrib1fv", "index out of range");
return;
}
VertexAttribManager::VertexAttribInfo::Vec4 value;
value.v[0] = v[0];
value.v[1] = 0.0f;
value.v[2] = 0.0f;
value.v[3] = 1.0f;
info->set_value(value);
glVertexAttrib1fv(index, v);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue WebGL2RenderingContextBase::getParameter(ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum pname) {
if (isContextLost())
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
switch (pname) {
case GL_SHADING_LANGUAGE_VERSION: {
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
"WebGL GLSL ES 3.00 (" +
String(ContextGL()->GetString(GL_SHADING_LANGUAGE_VERSION)) +
")");
}
case GL_VERSION:
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
"WebGL 2.0 (" + String(ContextGL()->GetString(GL_VERSION)) + ")");
case GL_COPY_READ_BUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, bound_copy_read_buffer_.Get());
case GL_COPY_WRITE_BUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, bound_copy_write_buffer_.Get());
case GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, framebuffer_binding_.Get());
case GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT:
return GetUnsignedIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_3D_TEXTURE_SIZE:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_ARRAY_TEXTURE_LAYERS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GC3D_MAX_CLIENT_WAIT_TIMEOUT_WEBGL:
return WebGLAny(script_state, kMaxClientWaitTimeout);
case GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_COMBINED_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS:
return GetInt64Parameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_COMBINED_UNIFORM_BLOCKS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_COMBINED_VERTEX_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS:
return GetInt64Parameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_ELEMENT_INDEX:
return GetInt64Parameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_ELEMENTS_INDICES:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_ELEMENTS_VERTICES:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_INPUT_COMPONENTS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_BLOCKS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_FRAGMENT_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_PROGRAM_TEXEL_OFFSET:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_SAMPLES:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_SERVER_WAIT_TIMEOUT:
return GetInt64Parameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_TEXTURE_LOD_BIAS:
return GetFloatParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_INTERLEAVED_COMPONENTS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_SEPARATE_ATTRIBS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_SEPARATE_COMPONENTS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_UNIFORM_BLOCK_SIZE:
return GetInt64Parameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_UNIFORM_BUFFER_BINDINGS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_VARYING_COMPONENTS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_VERTEX_OUTPUT_COMPONENTS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_VERTEX_UNIFORM_BLOCKS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MAX_VERTEX_UNIFORM_COMPONENTS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_MIN_PROGRAM_TEXEL_OFFSET:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_PACK_ROW_LENGTH:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_PACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_PACK_SKIP_ROWS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, bound_pixel_pack_buffer_.Get());
case GL_PIXEL_UNPACK_BUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, bound_pixel_unpack_buffer_.Get());
case GL_RASTERIZER_DISCARD:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_READ_BUFFER: {
GLenum value = 0;
if (!isContextLost()) {
WebGLFramebuffer* read_framebuffer_binding =
GetFramebufferBinding(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER);
if (!read_framebuffer_binding)
value = read_buffer_of_default_framebuffer_;
else
value = read_framebuffer_binding->GetReadBuffer();
}
return WebGLAny(script_state, value);
}
case GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, read_framebuffer_binding_.Get());
case GL_SAMPLER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, sampler_units_[active_texture_unit_].Get());
case GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_2D_ARRAY:
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture2d_array_binding_.Get());
case GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_3D:
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture3d_binding_.Get());
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_ACTIVE:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(
script_state,
transform_feedback_binding_->GetBoundTransformFeedbackBuffer());
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_BINDING:
if (!transform_feedback_binding_->IsDefaultObject()) {
return WebGLAny(script_state, transform_feedback_binding_.Get());
}
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case GL_TRANSFORM_FEEDBACK_PAUSED:
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_BINDING:
return WebGLAny(script_state, bound_uniform_buffer_.Get());
case GL_UNIFORM_BUFFER_OFFSET_ALIGNMENT:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_UNPACK_IMAGE_HEIGHT:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_UNPACK_ROW_LENGTH:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_IMAGES:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_PIXELS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_UNPACK_SKIP_ROWS:
return GetIntParameter(script_state, pname);
case GL_TIMESTAMP_EXT:
if (ExtensionEnabled(kEXTDisjointTimerQueryWebGL2Name)) {
return WebGLAny(script_state, 0);
}
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, "
"EXT_disjoint_timer_query_webgl2 not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
case GL_GPU_DISJOINT_EXT:
if (ExtensionEnabled(kEXTDisjointTimerQueryWebGL2Name)) {
return GetBooleanParameter(script_state, GL_GPU_DISJOINT_EXT);
}
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getParameter",
"invalid parameter name, "
"EXT_disjoint_timer_query_webgl2 not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
default:
return WebGLRenderingContextBase::getParameter(script_state, pname);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::HasPolicyFromSource(
ContentSecurityPolicyHeaderSource source) const {
for (const auto& policy : policies_) {
if (policy->HeaderSource() == source)
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 21,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Optional<download::DownloadEntry> DownloadManagerImpl::GetInProgressEntry(
download::DownloadItemImpl* download) {
return in_progress_manager_->GetInProgressEntry(download);
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 14,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_close(gx_device *dev)
{
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdf14_cleanup_parent_color_profiles (pdev);
if (pdev->ctx) {
pdf14_ctx_free(pdev->ctx);
pdev->ctx = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 21,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_mdat_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov)
{
avio_wb32(pb, 8); // placeholder for extended size field (64 bit)
ffio_wfourcc(pb, mov->mode == MODE_MOV ? "wide" : "free");
mov->mdat_pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size placeholder*/
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "mdat");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 17,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool VRDisplay::HasPendingActivity() const {
return GetExecutionContext() && HasEventListeners();
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | 0 | 9,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs_initiate_write(struct rpc_clnt *clnt,
struct nfs_write_data *data,
const struct rpc_call_ops *call_ops,
int how, int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = data->header->inode;
int priority = flush_task_priority(how);
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_argp = &data->args,
.rpc_resp = &data->res,
.rpc_cred = data->header->cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = clnt,
.task = &data->task,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = call_ops,
.callback_data = data,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC | flags,
.priority = priority,
};
int ret = 0;
/* Set up the initial task struct. */
NFS_PROTO(inode)->write_setup(data, &msg);
dprintk("NFS: %5u initiated write call "
"(req %s/%llu, %u bytes @ offset %llu)\n",
data->task.tk_pid,
inode->i_sb->s_id,
(unsigned long long)NFS_FILEID(inode),
data->args.count,
(unsigned long long)data->args.offset);
nfs4_state_protect_write(NFS_SERVER(inode)->nfs_client,
&task_setup_data.rpc_client, &msg, data);
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(task);
goto out;
}
if (how & FLUSH_SYNC) {
ret = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
if (ret == 0)
ret = task->tk_status;
}
rpc_put_task(task);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 12,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta;
bool useBackup = mMetadataType[portIndex] != kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
OMX_U8 *data = static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer());
if (useBackup) {
data = new (std::nothrow) OMX_U8[allottedSize];
if (data == NULL) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
memset(data, 0, allottedSize);
if (allottedSize != params->size()) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, BAD_VALUE, SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete[] data;
return BAD_VALUE;
}
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyToOmx */, false /* copyFromOmx */, data);
} else {
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyFromOmx */, false /* copyToOmx */, NULL);
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
allottedSize, data);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(
portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u(%zu)@%p", allottedSize, params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: OMXNodeInstance: sanity check portIndex.
Bug: 31385713
Change-Id: Ib91d00eb5cc8c51c84d37f5d36d6b7ca594d201f
(cherry picked from commit f80a1f5075a7c6e1982d37c68bfed7c9a611bb20)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _SSL_get_cert_info (struct cert_info *cert_info, SSL * ssl)
{
X509 *peer_cert;
EVP_PKEY *peer_pkey;
/* EVP_PKEY *ca_pkey; */
/* EVP_PKEY *tmp_pkey; */
char notBefore[64];
char notAfter[64];
int alg;
int sign_alg;
if (!(peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (ssl)))
return (1); /* FATAL? */
X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (peer_cert), cert_info->subject,
sizeof (cert_info->subject));
X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (peer_cert), cert_info->issuer,
sizeof (cert_info->issuer));
broke_oneline (cert_info->subject, cert_info->subject_word);
broke_oneline (cert_info->issuer, cert_info->issuer_word);
alg = OBJ_obj2nid (peer_cert->cert_info->key->algor->algorithm);
sign_alg = OBJ_obj2nid (peer_cert->sig_alg->algorithm);
ASN1_TIME_snprintf (notBefore, sizeof (notBefore),
X509_get_notBefore (peer_cert));
ASN1_TIME_snprintf (notAfter, sizeof (notAfter),
X509_get_notAfter (peer_cert));
peer_pkey = X509_get_pubkey (peer_cert);
safe_strcpy (cert_info->algorithm,
(alg == NID_undef) ? "Unknown" : OBJ_nid2ln (alg),
sizeof (cert_info->algorithm));
cert_info->algorithm_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits (peer_pkey);
safe_strcpy (cert_info->sign_algorithm,
(sign_alg == NID_undef) ? "Unknown" : OBJ_nid2ln (sign_alg),
sizeof (cert_info->sign_algorithm));
/* EVP_PKEY_bits(ca_pkey)); */
cert_info->sign_algorithm_bits = 0;
safe_strcpy (cert_info->notbefore, notBefore, sizeof (cert_info->notbefore));
safe_strcpy (cert_info->notafter, notAfter, sizeof (cert_info->notafter));
EVP_PKEY_free (peer_pkey);
/* SSL_SESSION_print_fp(stdout, SSL_get_session(ssl)); */
/*
if (ssl->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp) {
tmp_pkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(tmp_pkey, ssl->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
cert_info->rsa_tmp_bits = EVP_PKEY_bits (tmp_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(tmp_pkey);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "REMOTE SIDE DOESN'T PROVIDES ->peer_rsa_tmp\n");
*/
cert_info->rsa_tmp_bits = 0;
X509_free (peer_cert);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 10,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_sec_attr_from_acl(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file)
{
const sc_acl_entry_t *entry;
u8 sec_attr[SC_RTECP_SEC_ATTR_SIZE] = { 0 };
int r;
assert(card && card->ctx && file);
assert(!file->sec_attr && file->sec_attr_len == 0);
assert(1 + 6 < sizeof(sec_attr));
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_DELETE);
if (entry)
{
sec_attr[0] |= 0x40;
sec_attr[1 + 6] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF)
{
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_CREATE);
if (entry)
{
/* ATTR: Create DF/EF file */
sec_attr[0] |= 0x01;
sec_attr[1 + 0] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
/* ATTR: Create Internal EF (RSF) file */
sec_attr[0] |= 0x02;
sec_attr[1 + 1] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
}
else
{
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_READ);
if (entry)
{
sec_attr[0] |= 0x01;
sec_attr[1 + 0] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_WRITE);
if (entry)
{
sec_attr[0] |= 0x02;
sec_attr[1 + 1] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
entry = sc_file_get_acl_entry(file, SC_AC_OP_UPDATE);
if (entry)
{
/* rewrite if sec_attr[1 + 1] already set */
sec_attr[0] |= 0x02;
sec_attr[1 + 1] = to_sec_attr(entry->method, entry->key_ref);
}
}
/* FIXME: Find the best solution */
if (file->path.len == 2 && !memcmp(file->path.value, "\x3F\x00", 2))
{
/* ATTR: Put data */
sec_attr[0] |= 0x04;
sec_attr[1 + 2] = 1; /* so-pin reference */
}
r = sc_file_set_sec_attr(file, sec_attr, sizeof(sec_attr));
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 10,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::UpdateScrollbarTheme(
mojom::UpdateScrollbarThemeParamsPtr params) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
static_cast<WebScrollbarBehaviorImpl*>(
blink_platform_impl_->ScrollbarBehavior())
->set_jump_on_track_click(params->jump_on_track_click);
blink::WebScrollbarTheme::UpdateScrollbarsWithNSDefaults(
params->initial_button_delay, params->autoscroll_button_delay,
params->preferred_scroller_style, params->redraw,
params->button_placement);
is_elastic_overscroll_enabled_ = params->scroll_view_rubber_banding;
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 22,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int TCP_ECN_rcv_ecn_echo(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const struct tcphdr *th)
{
if (th->ece && !th->syn && (tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 24,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int generic_access_phys(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
void *buf, int len, int write)
{
resource_size_t phys_addr;
unsigned long prot = 0;
void __iomem *maddr;
int offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE-1);
if (follow_phys(vma, addr, write, &prot, &phys_addr))
return -EINVAL;
maddr = ioremap_prot(phys_addr, PAGE_SIZE, prot);
if (write)
memcpy_toio(maddr + offset, buf, len);
else
memcpy_fromio(buf, maddr + offset, len);
iounmap(maddr);
return len;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 19,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: create_filegen_node(
int filegen_token,
attr_val_fifo * options
)
{
filegen_node *my_node;
my_node = emalloc_zero(sizeof(*my_node));
my_node->filegen_token = filegen_token;
my_node->options = options;
return my_node;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 4,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageSerializer::serializeFrame(LocalFrame* frame)
{
ASSERT(frame->document());
Document& document = *frame->document();
KURL url = document.url();
if (!url.isValid() || url.protocolIsAbout()) {
url = urlForBlankFrame(frame);
}
if (m_resourceURLs.contains(url)) {
return;
}
if (document.isImageDocument()) {
ImageDocument& imageDocument = toImageDocument(document);
addImageToResources(imageDocument.cachedImage(), imageDocument.imageElement()->layoutObject(), url);
return;
}
WillBeHeapVector<RawPtrWillBeMember<Node>> serializedNodes;
String text;
if (!m_rewriteURLs.isEmpty()) {
LinkChangeSerializerMarkupAccumulator accumulator(this, document, serializedNodes, m_rewriteURLs, m_rewriteFolder);
text = serializeNodes<EditingStrategy>(accumulator, document, IncludeNode);
} else {
SerializerMarkupAccumulator accumulator(this, document, serializedNodes);
text = serializeNodes<EditingStrategy>(accumulator, document, IncludeNode);
}
CString frameHTML = document.encoding().normalizeAndEncode(text, WTF::EntitiesForUnencodables);
m_resources->append(SerializedResource(url, document.suggestedMIMEType(), SharedBuffer::create(frameHTML.data(), frameHTML.length())));
m_resourceURLs.add(url);
for (Node* node: serializedNodes) {
ASSERT(node);
if (!node->isElementNode())
continue;
Element& element = toElement(*node);
if (element.isStyledElement()) {
retrieveResourcesForProperties(element.inlineStyle(), document);
retrieveResourcesForProperties(element.presentationAttributeStyle(), document);
}
if (isHTMLImageElement(element)) {
HTMLImageElement& imageElement = toHTMLImageElement(element);
KURL url = document.completeURL(imageElement.getAttribute(HTMLNames::srcAttr));
ImageResource* cachedImage = imageElement.cachedImage();
addImageToResources(cachedImage, imageElement.layoutObject(), url);
} else if (isHTMLInputElement(element)) {
HTMLInputElement& inputElement = toHTMLInputElement(element);
if (inputElement.type() == InputTypeNames::image && inputElement.imageLoader()) {
KURL url = inputElement.src();
ImageResource* cachedImage = inputElement.imageLoader()->image();
addImageToResources(cachedImage, inputElement.layoutObject(), url);
}
} else if (isHTMLLinkElement(element)) {
HTMLLinkElement& linkElement = toHTMLLinkElement(element);
if (CSSStyleSheet* sheet = linkElement.sheet()) {
KURL url = document.completeURL(linkElement.getAttribute(HTMLNames::hrefAttr));
serializeCSSStyleSheet(*sheet, url);
ASSERT(m_resourceURLs.contains(url));
}
} else if (isHTMLStyleElement(element)) {
HTMLStyleElement& styleElement = toHTMLStyleElement(element);
if (CSSStyleSheet* sheet = styleElement.sheet())
serializeCSSStyleSheet(*sheet, KURL());
}
}
for (Frame* childFrame = frame->tree().firstChild(); childFrame; childFrame = childFrame->tree().nextSibling()) {
if (childFrame->isLocalFrame())
serializeFrame(toLocalFrame(childFrame));
}
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsSGI(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 2)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"\001\332",2) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void packet_flush_mclist(struct sock *sk)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_mclist *ml;
if (!po->mclist)
return;
rtnl_lock();
while ((ml = po->mclist) != NULL) {
struct net_device *dev;
po->mclist = ml->next;
dev = __dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), ml->ifindex);
if (dev != NULL)
packet_dev_mc(dev, ml, -1);
kfree(ml);
}
rtnl_unlock();
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebUIImpl* RenderFrameHostManager::GetNavigatingWebUI() const {
if (IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled()) {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_)
return speculative_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
} else {
if (pending_render_frame_host_)
return pending_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
}
return render_frame_host_->pending_web_ui();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t rtnl_link_get_size(const struct net_device *dev)
{
const struct rtnl_link_ops *ops = dev->rtnl_link_ops;
size_t size;
if (!ops)
return 0;
size = nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nlattr)) + /* IFLA_LINKINFO */
nla_total_size(strlen(ops->kind) + 1); /* IFLA_INFO_KIND */
if (ops->get_size)
/* IFLA_INFO_DATA + nested data */
size += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct nlattr)) +
ops->get_size(dev);
if (ops->get_xstats_size)
/* IFLA_INFO_XSTATS */
size += nla_total_size(ops->get_xstats_size(dev));
size += rtnl_link_get_slave_info_data_size(dev);
return size;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void svc_rdma_prep_reply_hdr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 24,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XineramaXvPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvPutImageReq);
PanoramiXRes *draw, *gc, *port;
Bool isRoot;
int result, i, x, y;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xvPutImageReq);
result = dixLookupResourceByClass((void **) &draw, stuff->drawable,
XRC_DRAWABLE, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (result != Success)
return (result == BadValue) ? BadDrawable : result;
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &gc, stuff->gc,
XRT_GC, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
result = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &port, stuff->port,
XvXRTPort, client, DixReadAccess);
if (result != Success)
return result;
isRoot = (draw->type == XRT_WINDOW) && draw->u.win.root;
x = stuff->drw_x;
y = stuff->drw_y;
FOR_NSCREENS_BACKWARD(i) {
if (port->info[i].id) {
stuff->drawable = draw->info[i].id;
stuff->port = port->info[i].id;
stuff->gc = gc->info[i].id;
stuff->drw_x = x;
stuff->drw_y = y;
if (isRoot) {
stuff->drw_x -= screenInfo.screens[i]->x;
stuff->drw_y -= screenInfo.screens[i]->y;
}
result = ProcXvPutImage(client);
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool blk_queue_flag_test_and_clear(unsigned int flag, struct request_queue *q)
{
unsigned long flags;
bool res;
spin_lock_irqsave(q->queue_lock, flags);
res = queue_flag_test_and_clear(flag, q);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(q->queue_lock, flags);
return res;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _goLine(char *l)
{
if (l == NULL || *l == '\0' || Currentbuf->currentLine == NULL) {
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_FORCE_REDRAW);
return;
}
Currentbuf->pos = 0;
if (((*l == '^') || (*l == '$')) && prec_num) {
gotoRealLine(Currentbuf, prec_num);
}
else if (*l == '^') {
Currentbuf->topLine = Currentbuf->currentLine = Currentbuf->firstLine;
}
else if (*l == '$') {
Currentbuf->topLine =
lineSkip(Currentbuf, Currentbuf->lastLine,
-(Currentbuf->LINES + 1) / 2, TRUE);
Currentbuf->currentLine = Currentbuf->lastLine;
}
else
gotoRealLine(Currentbuf, atoi(l));
arrangeCursor(Currentbuf);
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_FORCE_REDRAW);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 29,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcm_loop_check_demo_mode(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_put_tcp_session(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
struct task_struct *task;
write_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
if (--server->srv_count > 0) {
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return;
}
list_del_init(&server->tcp_ses_list);
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
server->tcpStatus = CifsExiting;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
cifs_fscache_release_client_cookie(server);
task = xchg(&server->tsk, NULL);
if (task)
force_sig(SIGKILL, task);
}
Commit Message: cifs: clean up cifs_find_smb_ses (try #2)
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int coroutine_fn iscsi_co_readv(BlockDriverState *bs,
int64_t sector_num, int nb_sectors,
QEMUIOVector *iov)
{
IscsiLun *iscsilun = bs->opaque;
struct IscsiTask iTask;
uint64_t lba;
uint32_t num_sectors;
if (!is_request_lun_aligned(sector_num, nb_sectors, iscsilun)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (bs->bl.max_transfer_length && nb_sectors > bs->bl.max_transfer_length) {
error_report("iSCSI Error: Read of %d sectors exceeds max_xfer_len "
"of %d sectors", nb_sectors, bs->bl.max_transfer_length);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (iscsilun->lbprz && nb_sectors >= ISCSI_CHECKALLOC_THRES &&
!iscsi_allocationmap_is_allocated(iscsilun, sector_num, nb_sectors)) {
int64_t ret;
int pnum;
BlockDriverState *file;
ret = iscsi_co_get_block_status(bs, sector_num, INT_MAX, &pnum, &file);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (ret & BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO && pnum >= nb_sectors) {
qemu_iovec_memset(iov, 0, 0x00, iov->size);
return 0;
}
}
lba = sector_qemu2lun(sector_num, iscsilun);
num_sectors = sector_qemu2lun(nb_sectors, iscsilun);
iscsi_co_init_iscsitask(iscsilun, &iTask);
retry:
if (iscsilun->use_16_for_rw) {
iTask.task = iscsi_read16_task(iscsilun->iscsi, iscsilun->lun, lba,
num_sectors * iscsilun->block_size,
iscsilun->block_size, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
iscsi_co_generic_cb, &iTask);
} else {
iTask.task = iscsi_read10_task(iscsilun->iscsi, iscsilun->lun, lba,
num_sectors * iscsilun->block_size,
iscsilun->block_size,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
iscsi_co_generic_cb, &iTask);
}
if (iTask.task == NULL) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
scsi_task_set_iov_in(iTask.task, (struct scsi_iovec *) iov->iov, iov->niov);
while (!iTask.complete) {
iscsi_set_events(iscsilun);
qemu_coroutine_yield();
}
if (iTask.task != NULL) {
scsi_free_scsi_task(iTask.task);
iTask.task = NULL;
}
if (iTask.do_retry) {
iTask.complete = 0;
goto retry;
}
if (iTask.status != SCSI_STATUS_GOOD) {
return iTask.err_code;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::Abort(int64_t transaction_id) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction =
connection_->GetTransaction(transaction_id);
if (!transaction)
return;
connection_->AbortTransaction(transaction);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 25,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalFrameClientImpl::CreateWorkerFetchContext() {
DCHECK(web_frame_->Client());
return web_frame_->Client()->CreateWorkerFetchContext();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 14,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ping_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct icmphdr *icmph = icmp_hdr(skb);
/* We assume the packet has already been checked by icmp_rcv */
pr_debug("ping_rcv(skb=%p,id=%04x,seq=%04x)\n",
skb, ntohs(icmph->un.echo.id), ntohs(icmph->un.echo.sequence));
/* Push ICMP header back */
skb_push(skb, skb->data - (u8 *)icmph);
sk = ping_lookup(net, skb, ntohs(icmph->un.echo.id));
if (sk) {
struct sk_buff *skb2 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
pr_debug("rcv on socket %p\n", sk);
if (skb2)
ping_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb2);
sock_put(sk);
return true;
}
pr_debug("no socket, dropping\n");
return false;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Missing sk_nulls_node_init() in ping_unhash().
If we don't do that, then the poison value is left in the ->pprev
backlink.
This can cause crashes if we do a disconnect, followed by a connect().
Tested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Reported-by: Wen Xu <hotdog3645@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 26,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_crl;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 11,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_pcm_lib_ioctl(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
unsigned int cmd, void *arg)
{
switch (cmd) {
case SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL1_INFO:
return 0;
case SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL1_RESET:
return snd_pcm_lib_ioctl_reset(substream, arg);
case SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL1_CHANNEL_INFO:
return snd_pcm_lib_ioctl_channel_info(substream, arg);
case SNDRV_PCM_IOCTL1_FIFO_SIZE:
return snd_pcm_lib_ioctl_fifo_size(substream, arg);
}
return -ENXIO;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 4,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexImage2D(uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const char* func_name = "glTexImage2D";
const volatile gles2::cmds::TexImage2D& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::TexImage2D*>(cmd_data);
TRACE_EVENT2("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexImage2D",
"width", c.width, "height", c.height);
texture_state_.tex_image_failed = true;
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLint internal_format = static_cast<GLint>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLenum type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.type);
uint32_t pixels_shm_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_id);
uint32_t pixels_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.pixels_shm_offset);
if (width < 0 || height < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "dimensions < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
PixelStoreParams params;
Buffer* buffer = state_.bound_pixel_unpack_buffer.get();
if (buffer) {
if (pixels_shm_id)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
if (buffer->GetMappedRange()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"pixel unpack buffer should not be mapped to client memory");
return error::kNoError;
}
params = state_.GetUnpackParams(ContextState::k2D);
} else {
if (!pixels_shm_id && pixels_shm_offset)
return error::kInvalidArguments;
params.alignment = state_.unpack_alignment;
}
uint32_t pixels_size;
uint32_t skip_size;
uint32_t padding;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizesES3(width, height, 1,
format, type,
params,
&pixels_size,
nullptr,
nullptr,
&skip_size,
&padding)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DCHECK_EQ(0u, skip_size);
const void* pixels;
if (pixels_shm_id) {
pixels = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
pixels_shm_id, pixels_shm_offset, pixels_size);
if (!pixels)
return error::kOutOfBounds;
} else {
pixels = reinterpret_cast<const void*>(pixels_shm_offset);
}
uint32_t num_pixels;
if (workarounds().simulate_out_of_memory_on_large_textures &&
(!SafeMultiplyUint32(width, height, &num_pixels) ||
(num_pixels >= 4096 * 4096))) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, func_name, "synthetic out of memory");
return error::kNoError;
}
TextureManager::DoTexImageArguments args = {
target, level, internal_format, width, height, 1, border, format, type,
pixels, pixels_size, padding,
TextureManager::DoTexImageArguments::kTexImage2D };
texture_manager()->ValidateAndDoTexImage(
&texture_state_, &state_, &framebuffer_state_, func_name, args);
ExitCommandProcessingEarly();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t adev_get_input_buffer_size(const struct audio_hw_device *dev,
const struct audio_config *config)
{
(void)dev;
/* NOTE: we default to built in mic which may cause a mismatch between what we
* report here and the actual buffer size
*/
return get_input_buffer_size(config->sample_rate,
config->format,
audio_channel_count_from_in_mask(config->channel_mask),
PCM_CAPTURE /* usecase_type */,
AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BUILTIN_MIC);
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 23,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void S_AL_UpdateEntityPosition( int entityNum, const vec3_t origin )
{
vec3_t sanOrigin;
VectorCopy( origin, sanOrigin );
S_AL_SanitiseVector( sanOrigin );
if ( entityNum < 0 || entityNum >= MAX_GENTITIES )
Com_Error( ERR_DROP, "S_UpdateEntityPosition: bad entitynum %i", entityNum );
VectorCopy( sanOrigin, entityList[entityNum].origin );
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 15,339 |
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