instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::LaunchHomeUrl(const std::string& suffix,
LaunchHomeUrlCallback callback) {
if (url_prefix_.empty()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "No URL prefix.");
return;
}
GURL url(url_prefix_ + suffix);
if (!url.is_valid()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "Invalid URL.");
return;
}
arc::mojom::AppInstance* app_instance =
arc::ArcServiceManager::Get()
? ARC_GET_INSTANCE_FOR_METHOD(
arc::ArcServiceManager::Get()->arc_bridge_service()->app(),
LaunchIntent)
: nullptr;
if (!app_instance) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "ARC bridge not available.");
return;
}
app_instance->LaunchIntent(url.spec(), display::kDefaultDisplayId);
std::move(callback).Run(true, base::nullopt);
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void AppControllerImpl::LaunchHomeUrl(const std::string& suffix,
void AppControllerService::LaunchHomeUrl(const std::string& suffix,
LaunchHomeUrlCallback callback) {
if (url_prefix_.empty()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "No URL prefix.");
return;
}
GURL url(url_prefix_ + suffix);
if (!url.is_valid()) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "Invalid URL.");
return;
}
arc::mojom::AppInstance* app_instance =
arc::ArcServiceManager::Get()
? ARC_GET_INSTANCE_FOR_METHOD(
arc::ArcServiceManager::Get()->arc_bridge_service()->app(),
LaunchIntent)
: nullptr;
if (!app_instance) {
std::move(callback).Run(false, "ARC bridge not available.");
return;
}
app_instance->LaunchIntent(url.spec(), display::kDefaultDisplayId);
std::move(callback).Run(true, base::nullopt);
}
| 172,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static grub_err_t read_foo (struct grub_disk *disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, grub_size_t size, char *buf) {
if (disk != NULL) {
const int blocksize = 512; // unhardcode 512
int ret;
RIOBind *iob = disk->data;
if (bio) iob = bio;
ret = iob->read_at (iob->io, delta+(blocksize*sector),
(ut8*)buf, size*blocksize);
if (ret == -1)
return 1;
} else eprintf ("oops. no disk\n");
return 0; // 0 is ok
}
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static grub_err_t read_foo (struct grub_disk *disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, grub_size_t size, char *buf) {
if (!disk) {
eprintf ("oops. no disk\n");
return 1;
}
const int blocksize = 512; // TODO unhardcode 512
RIOBind *iob = disk->data;
if (bio) {
iob = bio;
}
//printf ("io %p\n", file->root->iob.io);
if (iob->read_at (iob->io, delta+(blocksize*sector), (ut8*)buf, size*blocksize) == -1) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,091 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct svc_rdma_req_map *svc_rdma_get_req_map(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
{
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map = NULL;
spin_lock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
if (list_empty(&xprt->sc_maps))
goto out_empty;
map = list_first_entry(&xprt->sc_maps,
struct svc_rdma_req_map, free);
list_del_init(&map->free);
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
out:
map->count = 0;
return map;
out_empty:
spin_unlock(&xprt->sc_map_lock);
/* Pre-allocation amount was incorrect */
map = alloc_req_map(GFP_NOIO);
if (map)
goto out;
WARN_ONCE(1, "svcrdma: empty request map list?\n");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | struct svc_rdma_req_map *svc_rdma_get_req_map(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
| 168,181 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ospf6_print_lshdr(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct lsa6_hdr *lshp, const u_char *dataend)
{
if ((const u_char *)(lshp + 1) > dataend)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(lshp->ls_type);
ND_TCHECK(lshp->ls_seq);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertising Router %s, seq 0x%08x, age %us, length %u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &lshp->ls_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&lshp->ls_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_age),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_length)-(u_int)sizeof(struct lsa6_hdr)));
ospf6_print_ls_type(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_type), &lshp->ls_stateid);
return (0);
trunc:
return (1);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14880/OSPFv3: Fix a bounds check
Need to test bounds check for the last field of the structure lsa6_hdr.
No need to test other fields.
Include Security working under the Mozilla SOS program had independently
identified this vulnerability in 2018 by means of code audit.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ospf6_print_lshdr(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct lsa6_hdr *lshp, const u_char *dataend)
{
if ((const u_char *)(lshp + 1) > dataend)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(lshp->ls_length); /* last field of struct lsa6_hdr */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Advertising Router %s, seq 0x%08x, age %us, length %u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &lshp->ls_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&lshp->ls_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_age),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_length)-(u_int)sizeof(struct lsa6_hdr)));
ospf6_print_ls_type(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&lshp->ls_type), &lshp->ls_stateid);
return (0);
trunc:
return (1);
}
| 169,834 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gplotGenCommandFile(GPLOT *gplot)
{
char buf[L_BUF_SIZE];
char *cmdstr, *plottitle, *dataname;
l_int32 i, plotstyle, nplots;
FILE *fp;
PROCNAME("gplotGenCommandFile");
if (!gplot)
return ERROR_INT("gplot not defined", procName, 1);
/* Remove any previous command data */
sarrayClear(gplot->cmddata);
/* Generate command data instructions */
if (gplot->title) { /* set title */
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set title '%s'", gplot->title);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->xlabel) { /* set xlabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set xlabel '%s'", gplot->xlabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->ylabel) { /* set ylabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set ylabel '%s'", gplot->ylabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Set terminal type and output */
if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PNG) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set terminal png; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set terminal postscript; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_EPS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE,
"set terminal postscript eps; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_LATEX) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set terminal latex; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set logscale x");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_Y ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "set logscale y");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
nplots = sarrayGetCount(gplot->datanames);
for (i = 0; i < nplots; i++) {
plottitle = sarrayGetString(gplot->plottitles, i, L_NOCOPY);
dataname = sarrayGetString(gplot->datanames, i, L_NOCOPY);
numaGetIValue(gplot->plotstyles, i, &plotstyle);
if (nplots == 1) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
} else {
if (i == 0)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else if (i < nplots - 1)
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else
snprintf(buf, L_BUF_SIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Write command data to file */
cmdstr = sarrayToString(gplot->cmddata, 1);
if ((fp = fopenWriteStream(gplot->cmdname, "w")) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return ERROR_INT("cmd stream not opened", procName, 1);
}
fwrite(cmdstr, 1, strlen(cmdstr), fp);
fclose(fp);
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119 | gplotGenCommandFile(GPLOT *gplot)
{
char buf[L_BUFSIZE];
char *cmdstr, *plottitle, *dataname;
l_int32 i, plotstyle, nplots;
FILE *fp;
PROCNAME("gplotGenCommandFile");
if (!gplot)
return ERROR_INT("gplot not defined", procName, 1);
/* Remove any previous command data */
sarrayClear(gplot->cmddata);
/* Generate command data instructions */
if (gplot->title) { /* set title */
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set title '%s'", gplot->title);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->xlabel) { /* set xlabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set xlabel '%s'", gplot->xlabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->ylabel) { /* set ylabel */
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set ylabel '%s'", gplot->ylabel);
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Set terminal type and output */
if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PNG) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set terminal png; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_PS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set terminal postscript; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_EPS) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE,
"set terminal postscript eps; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
} else if (gplot->outformat == GPLOT_LATEX) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set terminal latex; set output '%s'",
gplot->outname);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set logscale x");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
if (gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_Y ||
gplot->scaling == GPLOT_LOG_SCALE_X_Y) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "set logscale y");
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
nplots = sarrayGetCount(gplot->datanames);
for (i = 0; i < nplots; i++) {
plottitle = sarrayGetString(gplot->plottitles, i, L_NOCOPY);
dataname = sarrayGetString(gplot->datanames, i, L_NOCOPY);
numaGetIValue(gplot->plotstyles, i, &plotstyle);
if (nplots == 1) {
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
} else {
if (i == 0)
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, "plot '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else if (i < nplots - 1)
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s, \\",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
else
snprintf(buf, L_BUFSIZE, " '%s' title '%s' %s",
dataname, plottitle, gplotstylenames[plotstyle]);
}
sarrayAddString(gplot->cmddata, buf, L_COPY);
}
/* Write command data to file */
cmdstr = sarrayToString(gplot->cmddata, 1);
if ((fp = fopenWriteStream(gplot->cmdname, "w")) == NULL) {
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return ERROR_INT("cmd stream not opened", procName, 1);
}
fwrite(cmdstr, 1, strlen(cmdstr), fp);
fclose(fp);
LEPT_FREE(cmdstr);
return 0;
}
| 169,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Edition::~Edition()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Chapters::Edition::~Edition()
Chapters::Atom::~Atom() {}
unsigned long long Chapters::Atom::GetUID() const { return m_uid; }
const char* Chapters::Atom::GetStringUID() const { return m_string_uid; }
long long Chapters::Atom::GetStartTimecode() const { return m_start_timecode; }
long long Chapters::Atom::GetStopTimecode() const { return m_stop_timecode; }
long long Chapters::Atom::GetStartTime(const Chapters* pChapters) const {
return GetTime(pChapters, m_start_timecode);
}
| 174,466 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::PostErrorCallback(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothResult error) {
if (!base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(error_callback_, error))) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No TaskRunner.";
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void BluetoothDeviceChooserController::PostErrorCallback(
WebBluetoothResult error) {
if (!base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(error_callback_, error))) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No TaskRunner.";
}
}
| 172,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXLayoutObject::supportsARIADragging() const {
const AtomicString& grabbed = getAttribute(aria_grabbedAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(grabbed, "true") ||
equalIgnoringCase(grabbed, "false");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXLayoutObject::supportsARIADragging() const {
const AtomicString& grabbed = getAttribute(aria_grabbedAttr);
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(grabbed, "true") ||
equalIgnoringASCIICase(grabbed, "false");
}
| 171,906 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: hb_buffer_create (unsigned int pre_alloc_size)
{
hb_buffer_t *buffer;
if (!HB_OBJECT_DO_CREATE (hb_buffer_t, buffer))
return &_hb_buffer_nil;
if (pre_alloc_size)
hb_buffer_ensure(buffer, pre_alloc_size);
buffer->unicode = &_hb_unicode_funcs_nil;
return buffer;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | hb_buffer_create (unsigned int pre_alloc_size)
{
hb_buffer_t *buffer;
if (!HB_OBJECT_DO_CREATE (hb_buffer_t, buffer))
return &_hb_buffer_nil;
if (pre_alloc_size)
hb_buffer_ensure (buffer, pre_alloc_size);
buffer->unicode = &_hb_unicode_funcs_nil;
return buffer;
}
| 164,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftRaw::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mChannelCount;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftRaw::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mChannelCount;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,218 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Display::ShallowCopy(Display& rhs) const
{
rhs.m_string = m_string;
rhs.m_language = m_language;
rhs.m_country = m_country;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Display::ShallowCopy(Display& rhs) const
| 174,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IndexedDBCursor::~IndexedDBCursor() {
Close();
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fix Cursor UAF
If the connection is closed before we return a cursor, it dies in
IndexedDBCallbacks::IOThreadHelper::SendSuccessCursor. It's deleted on
the correct thread, but we also need to makes sure to remove it from its
transaction.
To make things simpler, we have the cursor remove itself from its
transaction on destruction.
R: pwnall@chromium.org
Bug: 728887
Change-Id: I8c76e6195c2490137a05213e47c635d12f4d3dd2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/526284
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#477504}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | IndexedDBCursor::~IndexedDBCursor() {
if (transaction_)
transaction_->UnregisterOpenCursor(this);
Close();
}
| 172,308 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_put_marker (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 4)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
} ;
} /* header_put_marker */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_put_marker (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 24) ;
} /* header_put_marker */
| 170,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool NormalPageArena::coalesce() {
if (m_promptlyFreedSize < 1024 * 1024)
return false;
if (getThreadState()->sweepForbidden())
return false;
ASSERT(!hasCurrentAllocationArea());
TRACE_EVENT0("blink_gc", "BaseArena::coalesce");
m_freeList.clear();
size_t freedSize = 0;
for (NormalPage* page = static_cast<NormalPage*>(m_firstPage); page;
page = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page->next())) {
Address startOfGap = page->payload();
for (Address headerAddress = startOfGap;
headerAddress < page->payloadEnd();) {
HeapObjectHeader* header =
reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(headerAddress);
size_t size = header->size();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(size < blinkPagePayloadSize());
if (header->isPromptlyFreed()) {
ASSERT(size >= sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
CHECK_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, size);
freedSize += size;
headerAddress += size;
continue;
}
if (header->isFree()) {
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, size < sizeof(FreeListEntry)
? size
: sizeof(FreeListEntry));
CHECK_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, size);
headerAddress += size;
continue;
}
ASSERT(header->checkHeader());
if (startOfGap != headerAddress)
addToFreeList(startOfGap, headerAddress - startOfGap);
headerAddress += size;
startOfGap = headerAddress;
}
if (startOfGap != page->payloadEnd())
addToFreeList(startOfGap, page->payloadEnd() - startOfGap);
}
getThreadState()->decreaseAllocatedObjectSize(freedSize);
ASSERT(m_promptlyFreedSize == freedSize);
m_promptlyFreedSize = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool NormalPageArena::coalesce() {
if (m_promptlyFreedSize < 1024 * 1024)
return false;
if (getThreadState()->sweepForbidden())
return false;
ASSERT(!hasCurrentAllocationArea());
TRACE_EVENT0("blink_gc", "BaseArena::coalesce");
m_freeList.clear();
size_t freedSize = 0;
for (NormalPage* page = static_cast<NormalPage*>(m_firstPage); page;
page = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page->next())) {
Address startOfGap = page->payload();
for (Address headerAddress = startOfGap;
headerAddress < page->payloadEnd();) {
HeapObjectHeader* header =
reinterpret_cast<HeapObjectHeader*>(headerAddress);
size_t size = header->size();
ASSERT(size > 0);
ASSERT(size < blinkPagePayloadSize());
if (header->isPromptlyFreed()) {
ASSERT(size >= sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, sizeof(HeapObjectHeader));
CHECK_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, size);
freedSize += size;
headerAddress += size;
continue;
}
if (header->isFree()) {
SET_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, size < sizeof(FreeListEntry)
? size
: sizeof(FreeListEntry));
CHECK_MEMORY_INACCESSIBLE(headerAddress, size);
headerAddress += size;
continue;
}
header->checkHeader();
if (startOfGap != headerAddress)
addToFreeList(startOfGap, headerAddress - startOfGap);
headerAddress += size;
startOfGap = headerAddress;
}
if (startOfGap != page->payloadEnd())
addToFreeList(startOfGap, page->payloadEnd() - startOfGap);
}
getThreadState()->decreaseAllocatedObjectSize(freedSize);
ASSERT(m_promptlyFreedSize == freedSize);
m_promptlyFreedSize = 0;
return true;
}
| 172,708 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
if (nla_len(rp) < ulen || xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen)
return -EINVAL;
if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: validate XFRM_MSG_NEWAE incoming ESN size harder
Kees Cook has pointed out that xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() is subject to
wrapping issues. To ensure we are correctly ensuring that the two ESN
structures are the same size compare both the overall size as reported
by xfrm_replay_state_esn_len() and the internal length are the same.
CVE-2017-7184
Signed-off-by: Andy Whitcroft <apw@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | static inline int xfrm_replay_verify_len(struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn,
struct nlattr *rp)
{
struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *up;
int ulen;
if (!replay_esn || !rp)
return 0;
up = nla_data(rp);
ulen = xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(up);
/* Check the overall length and the internal bitmap length to avoid
* potential overflow. */
if (nla_len(rp) < ulen ||
xfrm_replay_state_esn_len(replay_esn) != ulen ||
replay_esn->bmp_len != up->bmp_len)
return -EINVAL;
if (up->replay_window > up->bmp_len * sizeof(__u32) * 8)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
| 168,292 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0;
}
| 173,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void bta_hh_co_open(UINT8 dev_handle, UINT8 sub_class, tBTA_HH_ATTR_MASK attr_mask,
UINT8 app_id)
{
UINT32 i;
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev = NULL;
if (dev_handle == BTA_HH_INVALID_HANDLE) {
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Oops, dev_handle (%d) is invalid...",
__FUNCTION__, dev_handle);
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < BTIF_HH_MAX_HID; i++) {
p_dev = &btif_hh_cb.devices[i];
if (p_dev->dev_status != BTHH_CONN_STATE_UNKNOWN &&
p_dev->dev_handle == dev_handle) {
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Found an existing device with the same handle "
"dev_status = %d",__FUNCTION__,
p_dev->dev_status);
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: bd_addr = [%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:]", __FUNCTION__,
p_dev->bd_addr.address[0], p_dev->bd_addr.address[1], p_dev->bd_addr.address[2],
p_dev->bd_addr.address[3], p_dev->bd_addr.address[4]);
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: attr_mask = 0x%04x, sub_class = 0x%02x, app_id = %d",
__FUNCTION__, p_dev->attr_mask, p_dev->sub_class, p_dev->app_id);
if(p_dev->fd<0) {
p_dev->fd = open(dev_path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (p_dev->fd < 0){
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Error: failed to open uhid, err:%s",
__FUNCTION__,strerror(errno));
return;
}else
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: uhid fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
}
p_dev->hh_keep_polling = 1;
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = create_thread(btif_hh_poll_event_thread, p_dev);
break;
}
p_dev = NULL;
}
if (p_dev == NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < BTIF_HH_MAX_HID; i++) {
if (btif_hh_cb.devices[i].dev_status == BTHH_CONN_STATE_UNKNOWN) {
p_dev = &btif_hh_cb.devices[i];
p_dev->dev_handle = dev_handle;
p_dev->attr_mask = attr_mask;
p_dev->sub_class = sub_class;
p_dev->app_id = app_id;
p_dev->local_vup = FALSE;
btif_hh_cb.device_num++;
p_dev->fd = open(dev_path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
if (p_dev->fd < 0){
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Error: failed to open uhid, err:%s",
__FUNCTION__,strerror(errno));
return;
}else{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: uhid fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
p_dev->hh_keep_polling = 1;
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = create_thread(btif_hh_poll_event_thread, p_dev);
}
break;
}
}
}
if (p_dev == NULL) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Error: too many HID devices are connected", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
p_dev->dev_status = BTHH_CONN_STATE_CONNECTED;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Return device status %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->dev_status);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void bta_hh_co_open(UINT8 dev_handle, UINT8 sub_class, tBTA_HH_ATTR_MASK attr_mask,
UINT8 app_id)
{
UINT32 i;
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev = NULL;
if (dev_handle == BTA_HH_INVALID_HANDLE) {
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Oops, dev_handle (%d) is invalid...",
__FUNCTION__, dev_handle);
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < BTIF_HH_MAX_HID; i++) {
p_dev = &btif_hh_cb.devices[i];
if (p_dev->dev_status != BTHH_CONN_STATE_UNKNOWN &&
p_dev->dev_handle == dev_handle) {
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Found an existing device with the same handle "
"dev_status = %d",__FUNCTION__,
p_dev->dev_status);
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: bd_addr = [%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:%02X:]", __FUNCTION__,
p_dev->bd_addr.address[0], p_dev->bd_addr.address[1], p_dev->bd_addr.address[2],
p_dev->bd_addr.address[3], p_dev->bd_addr.address[4]);
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: attr_mask = 0x%04x, sub_class = 0x%02x, app_id = %d",
__FUNCTION__, p_dev->attr_mask, p_dev->sub_class, p_dev->app_id);
if(p_dev->fd<0) {
p_dev->fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(dev_path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC));
if (p_dev->fd < 0){
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Error: failed to open uhid, err:%s",
__FUNCTION__,strerror(errno));
return;
}else
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: uhid fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
}
p_dev->hh_keep_polling = 1;
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = create_thread(btif_hh_poll_event_thread, p_dev);
break;
}
p_dev = NULL;
}
if (p_dev == NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < BTIF_HH_MAX_HID; i++) {
if (btif_hh_cb.devices[i].dev_status == BTHH_CONN_STATE_UNKNOWN) {
p_dev = &btif_hh_cb.devices[i];
p_dev->dev_handle = dev_handle;
p_dev->attr_mask = attr_mask;
p_dev->sub_class = sub_class;
p_dev->app_id = app_id;
p_dev->local_vup = FALSE;
btif_hh_cb.device_num++;
p_dev->fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(dev_path, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC));
if (p_dev->fd < 0){
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Error: failed to open uhid, err:%s",
__FUNCTION__,strerror(errno));
return;
}else{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: uhid fd = %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->fd);
p_dev->hh_keep_polling = 1;
p_dev->hh_poll_thread_id = create_thread(btif_hh_poll_event_thread, p_dev);
}
break;
}
}
}
if (p_dev == NULL) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Error: too many HID devices are connected", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
p_dev->dev_status = BTHH_CONN_STATE_CONNECTED;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Return device status %d", __FUNCTION__, p_dev->dev_status);
}
| 173,430 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void Rp_test(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int opts;
Resub m;
re = js_toregexp(J, 0);
text = js_tostring(J, 1);
opts = 0;
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
if (re->last > strlen(text)) {
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
return;
}
if (re->last > 0) {
text += re->last;
opts |= REG_NOTBOL;
}
}
if (!js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, opts)) {
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = re->last + (m.sub[0].ep - text);
js_pushboolean(J, 1);
return;
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | static void Rp_test(js_State *J)
{
js_Regexp *re;
const char *text;
int result;
int opts;
Resub m;
re = js_toregexp(J, 0);
text = js_tostring(J, 1);
opts = 0;
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G) {
if (re->last > strlen(text)) {
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
return;
}
if (re->last > 0) {
text += re->last;
opts |= REG_NOTBOL;
}
}
result = js_regexec(re->prog, text, &m, opts);
if (result < 0)
js_error(J, "regexec failed");
if (result == 0) {
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = re->last + (m.sub[0].ep - text);
js_pushboolean(J, 1);
return;
}
if (re->flags & JS_REGEXP_G)
re->last = 0;
js_pushboolean(J, 0);
}
| 169,696 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
int copy = output_size - count;
if (avail < copy) copy = avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | png_inflate(png_structp png_ptr, const png_byte *data, png_size_t size,
png_bytep output, png_size_t output_size)
{
png_size_t count = 0;
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = (png_bytep)data; /* const_cast: VALID */
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = size;
while (1)
{
int ret, avail;
/* Reset the output buffer each time round - we empty it
* after every inflate call.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = png_ptr->zbuf;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = png_ptr->zbuf_size;
ret = inflate(&png_ptr->zstream, Z_NO_FLUSH);
avail = png_ptr->zbuf_size - png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
/* First copy/count any new output - but only if we didn't
* get an error code.
*/
if ((ret == Z_OK || ret == Z_STREAM_END) && avail > 0)
{
if (output != 0 && output_size > count)
{
png_size_t copy = output_size - count;
if ((png_size_t) avail < copy) copy = (png_size_t) avail;
png_memcpy(output + count, png_ptr->zbuf, copy);
}
count += avail;
}
if (ret == Z_OK)
continue;
/* Termination conditions - always reset the zstream, it
* must be left in inflateInit state.
*/
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
inflateReset(&png_ptr->zstream);
if (ret == Z_STREAM_END)
return count; /* NOTE: may be zero. */
/* Now handle the error codes - the API always returns 0
* and the error message is dumped into the uncompressed
* buffer if available.
*/
{
PNG_CONST char *msg;
if (png_ptr->zstream.msg != 0)
msg = png_ptr->zstream.msg;
else
{
#if defined(PNG_STDIO_SUPPORTED) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
char umsg[52];
switch (ret)
{
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
msg = "Buffer error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
msg = "Data error in compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
default:
msg = "Incomplete compressed datastream in %s chunk";
break;
}
png_snprintf(umsg, sizeof umsg, msg, png_ptr->chunk_name);
msg = umsg;
#else
msg = "Damaged compressed datastream in chunk other than IDAT";
#endif
}
png_warning(png_ptr, msg);
}
/* 0 means an error - notice that this code simple ignores
* zero length compressed chunks as a result.
*/
return 0;
}
}
| 171,061 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_add(PNG_CONST image_transform **this, unsigned int max,
png_uint_32 counter, char *name, size_t sizeof_name, size_t *pos,
png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
for (;;) /* until we manage to add something */
{
png_uint_32 mask;
image_transform *list;
/* Find the next counter value, if the counter is zero this is the start
* of the list. This routine always returns the current counter (not the
* next) so it returns 0 at the end and expects 0 at the beginning.
*/
if (counter == 0) /* first time */
{
image_transform_reset_count();
if (max <= 1)
counter = 1;
else
counter = random_32();
}
else /* advance the counter */
{
switch (max)
{
case 0: ++counter; break;
case 1: counter <<= 1; break;
default: counter = random_32(); break;
}
}
/* Now add all these items, if possible */
*this = &image_transform_end;
list = image_transform_first;
mask = 1;
/* Go through the whole list adding anything that the counter selects: */
while (list != &image_transform_end)
{
if ((counter & mask) != 0 && list->enable &&
(max == 0 || list->local_use < max))
{
/* Candidate to add: */
if (list->add(list, this, colour_type, bit_depth) || max == 0)
{
/* Added, so add to the name too. */
*pos = safecat(name, sizeof_name, *pos, " +");
*pos = safecat(name, sizeof_name, *pos, list->name);
}
else
{
/* Not useful and max>0, so remove it from *this: */
*this = list->next;
list->next = 0;
/* And, since we know it isn't useful, stop it being added again
* in this run:
*/
list->local_use = max;
}
}
mask <<= 1;
list = list->list;
}
/* Now if anything was added we have something to do. */
if (*this != &image_transform_end)
return counter;
/* Nothing added, but was there anything in there to add? */
if (!image_transform_test_counter(counter, max))
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_add(PNG_CONST image_transform **this, unsigned int max,
image_transform_add(const image_transform **this, unsigned int max,
png_uint_32 counter, char *name, size_t sizeof_name, size_t *pos,
png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
for (;;) /* until we manage to add something */
{
png_uint_32 mask;
image_transform *list;
/* Find the next counter value, if the counter is zero this is the start
* of the list. This routine always returns the current counter (not the
* next) so it returns 0 at the end and expects 0 at the beginning.
*/
if (counter == 0) /* first time */
{
image_transform_reset_count();
if (max <= 1)
counter = 1;
else
counter = random_32();
}
else /* advance the counter */
{
switch (max)
{
case 0: ++counter; break;
case 1: counter <<= 1; break;
default: counter = random_32(); break;
}
}
/* Now add all these items, if possible */
*this = &image_transform_end;
list = image_transform_first;
mask = 1;
/* Go through the whole list adding anything that the counter selects: */
while (list != &image_transform_end)
{
if ((counter & mask) != 0 && list->enable &&
(max == 0 || list->local_use < max))
{
/* Candidate to add: */
if (list->add(list, this, colour_type, bit_depth) || max == 0)
{
/* Added, so add to the name too. */
*pos = safecat(name, sizeof_name, *pos, " +");
*pos = safecat(name, sizeof_name, *pos, list->name);
}
else
{
/* Not useful and max>0, so remove it from *this: */
*this = list->next;
list->next = 0;
/* And, since we know it isn't useful, stop it being added again
* in this run:
*/
list->local_use = max;
}
}
mask <<= 1;
list = list->list;
}
/* Now if anything was added we have something to do. */
if (*this != &image_transform_end)
return counter;
/* Nothing added, but was there anything in there to add? */
if (!image_transform_test_counter(counter, max))
return 0;
}
}
| 173,619 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_word_rgb_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading raw-word-format PPM files with any maxval */
{
ppm_source_ptr source = (ppm_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPROW ptr;
register U_CHAR *bufferptr;
register JSAMPLE *rescale = source->rescale;
JDIMENSION col;
unsigned int maxval = source->maxval;
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->buffer_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
ptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
bufferptr = source->iobuffer;
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
register unsigned int temp;
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
CWE ID: CWE-125 | METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_word_rgb_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading raw-word-format PPM files with any maxval */
{
ppm_source_ptr source = (ppm_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPROW ptr;
register U_CHAR *bufferptr;
register JSAMPLE *rescale = source->rescale;
JDIMENSION col;
unsigned int maxval = source->maxval;
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->buffer_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
ptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
bufferptr = source->iobuffer;
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
register unsigned int temp;
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
temp = UCH(*bufferptr++) << 8;
temp |= UCH(*bufferptr++);
if (temp > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE);
*ptr++ = rescale[temp];
}
return 1;
}
| 169,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void *sock_poll_thread(void *arg)
{
struct pollfd pfds[MAX_POLL];
memset(pfds, 0, sizeof(pfds));
int h = (intptr_t)arg;
for(;;)
{
prepare_poll_fds(h, pfds);
int ret = poll(pfds, ts[h].poll_count, -1);
if(ret == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("poll ret -1, exit the thread, errno:%d, err:%s", errno, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if(ret != 0)
{
int need_process_data_fd = TRUE;
if(pfds[0].revents) //cmd fd always is the first one
{
asrt(pfds[0].fd == ts[h].cmd_fdr);
if(!process_cmd_sock(h))
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("h:%d, process_cmd_sock return false, exit...", h);
break;
}
if(ret == 1)
need_process_data_fd = FALSE;
else ret--; //exclude the cmd fd
}
if(need_process_data_fd)
process_data_sock(h, pfds, ret);
}
else {APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("no data, select ret: %d", ret)};
}
ts[h].thread_id = -1;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("socket poll thread exiting, h:%d", h);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void *sock_poll_thread(void *arg)
{
struct pollfd pfds[MAX_POLL];
memset(pfds, 0, sizeof(pfds));
int h = (intptr_t)arg;
for(;;)
{
prepare_poll_fds(h, pfds);
int ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(pfds, ts[h].poll_count, -1));
if(ret == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("poll ret -1, exit the thread, errno:%d, err:%s", errno, strerror(errno));
break;
}
if(ret != 0)
{
int need_process_data_fd = TRUE;
if(pfds[0].revents) //cmd fd always is the first one
{
asrt(pfds[0].fd == ts[h].cmd_fdr);
if(!process_cmd_sock(h))
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("h:%d, process_cmd_sock return false, exit...", h);
break;
}
if(ret == 1)
need_process_data_fd = FALSE;
else ret--; //exclude the cmd fd
}
if(need_process_data_fd)
process_data_sock(h, pfds, ret);
}
else {APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("no data, select ret: %d", ret)};
}
ts[h].thread_id = -1;
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("socket poll thread exiting, h:%d", h);
return 0;
}
| 173,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Segment::Segment(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long elem_start,
long long start,
long long size) :
m_pReader(pReader),
m_element_start(elem_start),
m_start(start),
m_size(size),
m_pos(start),
m_pUnknownSize(0),
m_pSeekHead(NULL),
m_pInfo(NULL),
m_pTracks(NULL),
m_pCues(NULL),
m_pChapters(NULL),
m_clusters(NULL),
m_clusterCount(0),
m_clusterPreloadCount(0),
m_clusterSize(0)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Segment::Segment(
| 174,438 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_remote_connection_destroy(gpointer user_data)
{
cib_client_t *client = user_data;
if (client == NULL) {
return;
}
crm_trace("Cleaning up after client disconnect: %s/%s",
crm_str(client->name), client->id);
if (client->id != NULL) {
if (!g_hash_table_remove(client_list, client->id)) {
crm_err("Client %s not found in the hashtable", client->name);
}
}
crm_trace("Destroying %s (%p)", client->name, user_data);
num_clients--;
crm_trace("Num unfree'd clients: %d", num_clients);
free(client->name);
free(client->callback_id);
free(client->id);
free(client->user);
free(client);
crm_trace("Freed the cib client");
if (cib_shutdown_flag) {
cib_shutdown(0);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_remote_connection_destroy(gpointer user_data)
{
cib_client_t *client = user_data;
int csock = 0;
if (client == NULL) {
return;
}
crm_trace("Cleaning up after client disconnect: %s/%s",
crm_str(client->name), client->id);
if (client->id != NULL) {
if (!g_hash_table_remove(client_list, client->id)) {
crm_err("Client %s not found in the hashtable", client->name);
}
}
crm_trace("Destroying %s (%p)", client->name, user_data);
num_clients--;
crm_trace("Num unfree'd clients: %d", num_clients);
if (client->remote_auth_timeout) {
g_source_remove(client->remote_auth_timeout);
}
if (client->encrypted) {
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (client->session) {
void *sock_ptr = gnutls_transport_get_ptr(*client->session);
csock = GPOINTER_TO_INT(sock_ptr);
if (client->handshake_complete) {
gnutls_bye(*client->session, GNUTLS_SHUT_WR);
}
gnutls_deinit(*client->session);
gnutls_free(client->session);
}
#endif
} else {
csock = GPOINTER_TO_INT(client->session);
}
client->session = NULL;
if (csock > 0) {
close(csock);
}
free(client->name);
free(client->callback_id);
free(client->id);
free(client->user);
free(client->recv_buf);
free(client);
crm_trace("Freed the cib client");
if (cib_shutdown_flag) {
cib_shutdown(0);
}
return;
}
| 166,147 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::WasShown() {
if (!host_->is_hidden())
return;
host_->WasShown();
if (!current_surface_ && host_->is_accelerated_compositing_active() &&
!released_front_lock_.get()) {
released_front_lock_ = GetCompositor()->GetCompositorLock();
}
AdjustSurfaceProtection();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
LPARAM lparam = reinterpret_cast<LPARAM>(this);
EnumChildWindows(ui::GetHiddenWindow(), ShowWindowsCallback, lparam);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::WasShown() {
if (!host_->is_hidden())
return;
host_->WasShown();
if (!current_surface_ && host_->is_accelerated_compositing_active() &&
!released_front_lock_.get()) {
released_front_lock_ = GetCompositor()->GetCompositorLock();
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
LPARAM lparam = reinterpret_cast<LPARAM>(this);
EnumChildWindows(ui::GetHiddenWindow(), ShowWindowsCallback, lparam);
#endif
}
| 171,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int write_empty_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned from, unsigned to,
int mode)
{
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
unsigned start, end, next, blksize;
sector_t block = page->index << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - inode->i_blkbits);
int ret;
blksize = 1 << inode->i_blkbits;
next = end = 0;
while (next < from) {
next += blksize;
block++;
}
start = next;
do {
next += blksize;
ret = needs_empty_write(block, inode);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
if (ret == 0) {
if (end) {
ret = __block_write_begin(page, start, end - start,
gfs2_block_map);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
ret = empty_write_end(page, start, end, mode);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
end = 0;
}
start = next;
}
else
end = next;
block++;
} while (next < to);
if (end) {
ret = __block_write_begin(page, start, end - start, gfs2_block_map);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
ret = empty_write_end(page, start, end, mode);
if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int write_empty_blocks(struct page *page, unsigned from, unsigned to,
| 166,215 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int btif_hl_select_wakeup(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_wakeup;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wakeup");
return send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static inline int btif_hl_select_wakeup(void){
char sig_on = btif_hl_signal_select_wakeup;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wakeup");
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(signal_fds[1], &sig_on, sizeof(sig_on), 0));
}
| 173,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
InitializeConfig();
SetMode(GET_PARAM(1));
set_cpu_used_ = GET_PARAM(2);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
InitializeConfig();
SetMode(encoding_mode_);
if (encoding_mode_ != ::libvpx_test::kRealTime) {
cfg_.g_lag_in_frames = 25;
cfg_.rc_end_usage = VPX_VBR;
} else {
cfg_.g_lag_in_frames = 0;
cfg_.rc_end_usage = VPX_CBR;
}
}
virtual void BeginPassHook(unsigned int /*pass*/) {
min_psnr_ = kMaxPSNR;
}
| 174,514 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::GetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(
int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data) {
print_preview_data_service()->GetDataEntry(preview_ui_addr_str_, index, data);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewUI::GetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(
int index,
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes>* data) {
print_preview_data_service()->GetDataEntry(id_, index, data);
}
| 170,834 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xdr_krb5_principal(XDR *xdrs, krb5_principal *objp)
{
int ret;
char *p = NULL;
krb5_principal pr = NULL;
static krb5_context context = NULL;
/* using a static context here is ugly, but should work
ok, and the other solutions are even uglier */
if (!context &&
kadm5_init_krb5_context(&context))
return(FALSE);
switch(xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (*objp) {
if((ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, *objp, &p)) != 0)
return FALSE;
}
if(!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &p))
return FALSE;
if (p) free(p);
break;
case XDR_DECODE:
if(!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &p))
return FALSE;
if (p) {
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, p, &pr);
if(ret != 0)
return FALSE;
*objp = pr;
free(p);
} else
*objp = NULL;
break;
case XDR_FREE:
if(*objp != NULL)
krb5_free_principal(context, *objp);
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | xdr_krb5_principal(XDR *xdrs, krb5_principal *objp)
{
int ret;
char *p = NULL;
krb5_principal pr = NULL;
static krb5_context context = NULL;
/* using a static context here is ugly, but should work
ok, and the other solutions are even uglier */
if (!context &&
kadm5_init_krb5_context(&context))
return(FALSE);
switch(xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (*objp) {
if((ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, *objp, &p)) != 0)
return FALSE;
}
if(!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &p))
return FALSE;
if (p) free(p);
break;
case XDR_DECODE:
if(!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &p))
return FALSE;
if (p) {
ret = krb5_parse_name(context, p, &pr);
if(ret != 0)
return FALSE;
*objp = pr;
free(p);
} else
*objp = NULL;
break;
case XDR_FREE:
if(*objp != NULL)
krb5_free_principal(context, *objp);
*objp = NULL;
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 166,790 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_gate_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
unsigned int gup_flags, struct vm_area_struct **vma,
struct page **page)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
int ret = -EFAULT;
/* user gate pages are read-only */
if (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE)
return -EFAULT;
if (address > TASK_SIZE)
pgd = pgd_offset_k(address);
else
pgd = pgd_offset_gate(mm, address);
BUG_ON(pgd_none(*pgd));
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
BUG_ON(p4d_none(*p4d));
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
BUG_ON(pud_none(*pud));
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
return -EFAULT;
VM_BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
if (pte_none(*pte))
goto unmap;
*vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
if (!page)
goto out;
*page = vm_normal_page(*vma, address, *pte);
if (!*page) {
if ((gup_flags & FOLL_DUMP) || !is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(*pte)))
goto unmap;
*page = pte_page(*pte);
/*
* This should never happen (a device public page in the gate
* area).
*/
if (is_device_public_page(*page))
goto unmap;
}
get_page(*page);
out:
ret = 0;
unmap:
pte_unmap(pte);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int get_gate_page(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
unsigned int gup_flags, struct vm_area_struct **vma,
struct page **page)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
int ret = -EFAULT;
/* user gate pages are read-only */
if (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE)
return -EFAULT;
if (address > TASK_SIZE)
pgd = pgd_offset_k(address);
else
pgd = pgd_offset_gate(mm, address);
BUG_ON(pgd_none(*pgd));
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
BUG_ON(p4d_none(*p4d));
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
BUG_ON(pud_none(*pud));
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
if (!pmd_present(*pmd))
return -EFAULT;
VM_BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
if (pte_none(*pte))
goto unmap;
*vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
if (!page)
goto out;
*page = vm_normal_page(*vma, address, *pte);
if (!*page) {
if ((gup_flags & FOLL_DUMP) || !is_zero_pfn(pte_pfn(*pte)))
goto unmap;
*page = pte_page(*pte);
/*
* This should never happen (a device public page in the gate
* area).
*/
if (is_device_public_page(*page))
goto unmap;
}
if (unlikely(!try_get_page(*page))) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto unmap;
}
out:
ret = 0;
unmap:
pte_unmap(pte);
return ret;
}
| 170,224 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Atom::Init()
{
m_string_uid = NULL;
m_uid = 0;
m_start_timecode = -1;
m_stop_timecode = -1;
m_displays = NULL;
m_displays_size = 0;
m_displays_count = 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Atom::Init()
| 174,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool DataReductionProxyConfig::IsFetchInFlight() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return warmup_url_fetcher_->IsFetchInFlight();
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bool DataReductionProxyConfig::IsFetchInFlight() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!warmup_url_fetcher_)
return false;
return warmup_url_fetcher_->IsFetchInFlight();
}
| 172,417 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mif_process_cmpt(mif_hdr_t *hdr, char *buf)
{
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
mif_cmpt_t *cmpt;
int id;
cmpt = 0;
tvp = 0;
if (!(cmpt = mif_cmpt_create())) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->tlx = 0;
cmpt->tly = 0;
cmpt->sampperx = 0;
cmpt->samppery = 0;
cmpt->width = 0;
cmpt->height = 0;
cmpt->prec = 0;
cmpt->sgnd = -1;
cmpt->data = 0;
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(buf))) {
goto error;
}
while (!(id = jas_tvparser_next(tvp))) {
switch (jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(mif_tags,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id) {
case MIF_TLX:
cmpt->tlx = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_TLY:
cmpt->tly = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_WIDTH:
cmpt->width = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_HEIGHT:
cmpt->height = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_HSAMP:
cmpt->sampperx = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_VSAMP:
cmpt->samppery = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_PREC:
cmpt->prec = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_SGND:
cmpt->sgnd = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_DATA:
if (!(cmpt->data = jas_strdup(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp)))) {
return -1;
}
break;
}
}
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
if (!cmpt->sampperx || !cmpt->samppery) {
goto error;
}
if (mif_hdr_addcmpt(hdr, hdr->numcmpts, cmpt)) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
if (cmpt) {
mif_cmpt_destroy(cmpt);
}
if (tvp) {
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-5221
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int mif_process_cmpt(mif_hdr_t *hdr, char *buf)
{
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
mif_cmpt_t *cmpt;
int id;
cmpt = 0;
tvp = 0;
if (!(cmpt = mif_cmpt_create())) {
goto error;
}
cmpt->tlx = 0;
cmpt->tly = 0;
cmpt->sampperx = 0;
cmpt->samppery = 0;
cmpt->width = 0;
cmpt->height = 0;
cmpt->prec = 0;
cmpt->sgnd = -1;
cmpt->data = 0;
if (!(tvp = jas_tvparser_create(buf))) {
goto error;
}
while (!(id = jas_tvparser_next(tvp))) {
switch (jas_taginfo_nonull(jas_taginfos_lookup(mif_tags,
jas_tvparser_gettag(tvp)))->id) {
case MIF_TLX:
cmpt->tlx = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_TLY:
cmpt->tly = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_WIDTH:
cmpt->width = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_HEIGHT:
cmpt->height = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_HSAMP:
cmpt->sampperx = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_VSAMP:
cmpt->samppery = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_PREC:
cmpt->prec = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_SGND:
cmpt->sgnd = atoi(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp));
break;
case MIF_DATA:
if (!(cmpt->data = jas_strdup(jas_tvparser_getval(tvp)))) {
return -1;
}
break;
}
}
if (!cmpt->sampperx || !cmpt->samppery) {
goto error;
}
if (mif_hdr_addcmpt(hdr, hdr->numcmpts, cmpt)) {
goto error;
}
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
return 0;
error:
if (cmpt) {
mif_cmpt_destroy(cmpt);
}
if (tvp) {
jas_tvparser_destroy(tvp);
}
return -1;
}
| 168,874 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InputDispatcher::enqueueDispatchEntryLocked(
const sp<Connection>& connection, EventEntry* eventEntry, const InputTarget* inputTarget,
int32_t dispatchMode) {
int32_t inputTargetFlags = inputTarget->flags;
if (!(inputTargetFlags & dispatchMode)) {
return;
}
inputTargetFlags = (inputTargetFlags & ~InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_MASK) | dispatchMode;
DispatchEntry* dispatchEntry = new DispatchEntry(eventEntry, // increments ref
inputTargetFlags, inputTarget->xOffset, inputTarget->yOffset,
inputTarget->scaleFactor);
switch (eventEntry->type) {
case EventEntry::TYPE_KEY: {
KeyEntry* keyEntry = static_cast<KeyEntry*>(eventEntry);
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = keyEntry->action;
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags = keyEntry->flags;
if (!connection->inputState.trackKey(keyEntry,
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction, dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags)) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ enqueueDispatchEntryLocked: skipping inconsistent key event",
connection->getInputChannelName());
#endif
delete dispatchEntry;
return; // skip the inconsistent event
}
break;
}
case EventEntry::TYPE_MOTION: {
MotionEntry* motionEntry = static_cast<MotionEntry*>(eventEntry);
if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_OUTSIDE) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_OUTSIDE;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_HOVER_EXIT) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_EXIT;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_HOVER_ENTER) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_ENTER;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_SLIPPERY_EXIT) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_CANCEL;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_SLIPPERY_ENTER) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_DOWN;
} else {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = motionEntry->action;
}
if (dispatchEntry->resolvedAction == AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_MOVE
&& !connection->inputState.isHovering(
motionEntry->deviceId, motionEntry->source, motionEntry->displayId)) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ enqueueDispatchEntryLocked: filling in missing hover enter event",
connection->getInputChannelName());
#endif
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_ENTER;
}
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags = motionEntry->flags;
if (dispatchEntry->targetFlags & InputTarget::FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags |= AMOTION_EVENT_FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED;
}
if (!connection->inputState.trackMotion(motionEntry,
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction, dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags)) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ enqueueDispatchEntryLocked: skipping inconsistent motion event",
connection->getInputChannelName());
#endif
delete dispatchEntry;
return; // skip the inconsistent event
}
break;
}
}
if (dispatchEntry->hasForegroundTarget()) {
incrementPendingForegroundDispatchesLocked(eventEntry);
}
connection->outboundQueue.enqueueAtTail(dispatchEntry);
traceOutboundQueueLengthLocked(connection);
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void InputDispatcher::enqueueDispatchEntryLocked(
const sp<Connection>& connection, EventEntry* eventEntry, const InputTarget* inputTarget,
int32_t dispatchMode) {
int32_t inputTargetFlags = inputTarget->flags;
if (!(inputTargetFlags & dispatchMode)) {
return;
}
inputTargetFlags = (inputTargetFlags & ~InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_MASK) | dispatchMode;
DispatchEntry* dispatchEntry = new DispatchEntry(eventEntry, // increments ref
inputTargetFlags, inputTarget->xOffset, inputTarget->yOffset,
inputTarget->scaleFactor);
switch (eventEntry->type) {
case EventEntry::TYPE_KEY: {
KeyEntry* keyEntry = static_cast<KeyEntry*>(eventEntry);
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = keyEntry->action;
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags = keyEntry->flags;
if (!connection->inputState.trackKey(keyEntry,
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction, dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags)) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ enqueueDispatchEntryLocked: skipping inconsistent key event",
connection->getInputChannelName());
#endif
delete dispatchEntry;
return; // skip the inconsistent event
}
break;
}
case EventEntry::TYPE_MOTION: {
MotionEntry* motionEntry = static_cast<MotionEntry*>(eventEntry);
if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_OUTSIDE) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_OUTSIDE;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_HOVER_EXIT) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_EXIT;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_HOVER_ENTER) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_ENTER;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_SLIPPERY_EXIT) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_CANCEL;
} else if (dispatchMode & InputTarget::FLAG_DISPATCH_AS_SLIPPERY_ENTER) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_DOWN;
} else {
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = motionEntry->action;
}
if (dispatchEntry->resolvedAction == AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_MOVE
&& !connection->inputState.isHovering(
motionEntry->deviceId, motionEntry->source, motionEntry->displayId)) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ enqueueDispatchEntryLocked: filling in missing hover enter event",
connection->getInputChannelName());
#endif
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction = AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_HOVER_ENTER;
}
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags = motionEntry->flags;
if (dispatchEntry->targetFlags & InputTarget::FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags |= AMOTION_EVENT_FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED;
}
if (dispatchEntry->targetFlags & InputTarget::FLAG_WINDOW_IS_PARTIALLY_OBSCURED) {
dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags |= AMOTION_EVENT_FLAG_WINDOW_IS_PARTIALLY_OBSCURED;
}
if (!connection->inputState.trackMotion(motionEntry,
dispatchEntry->resolvedAction, dispatchEntry->resolvedFlags)) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("channel '%s' ~ enqueueDispatchEntryLocked: skipping inconsistent motion event",
connection->getInputChannelName());
#endif
delete dispatchEntry;
return; // skip the inconsistent event
}
break;
}
}
if (dispatchEntry->hasForegroundTarget()) {
incrementPendingForegroundDispatchesLocked(eventEntry);
}
connection->outboundQueue.enqueueAtTail(dispatchEntry);
traceOutboundQueueLengthLocked(connection);
}
| 174,167 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AutoFillMetrics::Log(QualityMetric metric) const {
DCHECK(metric < NUM_QUALITY_METRICS);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("AutoFill.Quality", metric,
NUM_QUALITY_METRICS);
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void AutoFillMetrics::Log(QualityMetric metric) const {
void AutoFillMetrics::Log(QualityMetric metric,
const std::string& experiment_id) const {
DCHECK(metric < NUM_QUALITY_METRICS);
std::string histogram_name = "AutoFill.Quality";
if (!experiment_id.empty())
histogram_name += "_" + experiment_id;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(histogram_name, metric, NUM_QUALITY_METRICS);
}
| 170,652 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExtensionTtsController::ExtensionTtsController()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(method_factory_(this)),
current_utterance_(NULL),
platform_impl_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ExtensionTtsController::ExtensionTtsController()
| 170,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline signed short ReadProfileShort(const EndianType endian,
unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) ((buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[0]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned short) ((((unsigned char *) buffer)[0] << 8) |
((unsigned char *) buffer)[1]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static inline signed short ReadProfileShort(const EndianType endian,
unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned short
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned short) buffer[1] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[0];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned short) buffer[0] << 8;
value|=(unsigned short) buffer[1];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
| 169,946 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_open(spl_filesystem_object *intern, int use_include_path, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval tmp;
intern->type = SPL_FS_FILE;
php_stat(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, FS_IS_DIR, &tmp TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_LVAL(tmp)) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_LogicException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot use SplFileObject with directories");
return FAILURE;
}
intern->u.file.context = php_stream_context_from_zval(intern->u.file.zcontext, 0);
intern->u.file.stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(intern->file_name, intern->u.file.open_mode, (use_include_path ? USE_PATH : 0) | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, intern->u.file.context);
if (!intern->file_name_len || !intern->u.file.stream) {
if (!EG(exception)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot open file '%s'", intern->file_name_len ? intern->file_name : "");
}
intern->file_name = NULL; /* until here it is not a copy */
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
return FAILURE;
}
if (intern->u.file.zcontext) {
zend_list_addref(Z_RESVAL_P(intern->u.file.zcontext));
}
if (intern->file_name_len > 1 && IS_SLASH_AT(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len-1)) {
intern->file_name_len--;
}
intern->orig_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, strlen(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path));
intern->file_name = estrndup(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = estrndup(intern->u.file.open_mode, intern->u.file.open_mode_len);
/* avoid reference counting in debug mode, thus do it manually */
ZVAL_RESOURCE(&intern->u.file.zresource, php_stream_get_resource_id(intern->u.file.stream));
Z_SET_REFCOUNT(intern->u.file.zresource, 1);
intern->u.file.delimiter = ',';
intern->u.file.enclosure = '"';
intern->u.file.escape = '\\';
zend_hash_find(&intern->std.ce->function_table, "getcurrentline", sizeof("getcurrentline"), (void **) &intern->u.file.func_getCurr);
return SUCCESS;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int spl_filesystem_file_open(spl_filesystem_object *intern, int use_include_path, int silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval tmp;
intern->type = SPL_FS_FILE;
php_stat(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, FS_IS_DIR, &tmp TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_LVAL(tmp)) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_LogicException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot use SplFileObject with directories");
return FAILURE;
}
intern->u.file.context = php_stream_context_from_zval(intern->u.file.zcontext, 0);
intern->u.file.stream = php_stream_open_wrapper_ex(intern->file_name, intern->u.file.open_mode, (use_include_path ? USE_PATH : 0) | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, intern->u.file.context);
if (!intern->file_name_len || !intern->u.file.stream) {
if (!EG(exception)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot open file '%s'", intern->file_name_len ? intern->file_name : "");
}
intern->file_name = NULL; /* until here it is not a copy */
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
return FAILURE;
}
if (intern->u.file.zcontext) {
zend_list_addref(Z_RESVAL_P(intern->u.file.zcontext));
}
if (intern->file_name_len > 1 && IS_SLASH_AT(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len-1)) {
intern->file_name_len--;
}
intern->orig_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, strlen(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path));
intern->file_name = estrndup(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = estrndup(intern->u.file.open_mode, intern->u.file.open_mode_len);
/* avoid reference counting in debug mode, thus do it manually */
ZVAL_RESOURCE(&intern->u.file.zresource, php_stream_get_resource_id(intern->u.file.stream));
Z_SET_REFCOUNT(intern->u.file.zresource, 1);
intern->u.file.delimiter = ',';
intern->u.file.enclosure = '"';
intern->u.file.escape = '\\';
zend_hash_find(&intern->std.ce->function_table, "getcurrentline", sizeof("getcurrentline"), (void **) &intern->u.file.func_getCurr);
return SUCCESS;
} /* }}} */
| 167,075 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DOMWindow* CreateWindow(const String& url_string,
const AtomicString& frame_name,
const String& window_features_string,
LocalDOMWindow& calling_window,
LocalFrame& first_frame,
LocalFrame& opener_frame,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
LocalFrame* active_frame = calling_window.GetFrame();
DCHECK(active_frame);
KURL completed_url = url_string.IsEmpty()
? KURL(kParsedURLString, g_empty_string)
: first_frame.GetDocument()->CompleteURL(url_string);
if (!completed_url.IsEmpty() && !completed_url.IsValid()) {
UseCounter::Count(active_frame, WebFeature::kWindowOpenWithInvalidURL);
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kSyntaxError, "Unable to open a window with invalid URL '" +
completed_url.GetString() + "'.\n");
return nullptr;
}
WebWindowFeatures window_features =
GetWindowFeaturesFromString(window_features_string);
FrameLoadRequest frame_request(calling_window.document(),
ResourceRequest(completed_url), frame_name);
frame_request.SetShouldSetOpener(window_features.noopener ? kNeverSetOpener
: kMaybeSetOpener);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetFrameType(
WebURLRequest::kFrameTypeAuxiliary);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetRequestorOrigin(
SecurityOrigin::Create(active_frame->GetDocument()->Url()));
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetHTTPReferrer(
SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
active_frame->GetDocument()->GetReferrerPolicy(), completed_url,
active_frame->GetDocument()->OutgoingReferrer()));
bool has_user_gesture = UserGestureIndicator::ProcessingUserGesture();
bool created;
Frame* new_frame = CreateWindowHelper(
opener_frame, *active_frame, opener_frame, frame_request, window_features,
kNavigationPolicyIgnore, created);
if (!new_frame)
return nullptr;
if (new_frame->DomWindow()->IsInsecureScriptAccess(calling_window,
completed_url))
return window_features.noopener ? nullptr : new_frame->DomWindow();
if (created) {
FrameLoadRequest request(calling_window.document(),
ResourceRequest(completed_url));
request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(has_user_gesture);
new_frame->Navigate(request);
} else if (!url_string.IsEmpty()) {
new_frame->Navigate(*calling_window.document(), completed_url, false,
has_user_gesture ? UserGestureStatus::kActive
: UserGestureStatus::kNone);
}
return window_features.noopener ? nullptr : new_frame->DomWindow();
}
Commit Message: CSP now prevents opening javascript url windows when they're not allowed
spec: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate
which leads to: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#should-block-navigation-request
Bug: 756040
Change-Id: I5fd62ebfb6fe1d767694b0ed6cf427c8ea95994a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/632580
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497338}
CWE ID: | DOMWindow* CreateWindow(const String& url_string,
const AtomicString& frame_name,
const String& window_features_string,
LocalDOMWindow& calling_window,
LocalFrame& first_frame,
LocalFrame& opener_frame,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
LocalFrame* active_frame = calling_window.GetFrame();
DCHECK(active_frame);
KURL completed_url = url_string.IsEmpty()
? KURL(kParsedURLString, g_empty_string)
: first_frame.GetDocument()->CompleteURL(url_string);
if (!completed_url.IsEmpty() && !completed_url.IsValid()) {
UseCounter::Count(active_frame, WebFeature::kWindowOpenWithInvalidURL);
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
kSyntaxError, "Unable to open a window with invalid URL '" +
completed_url.GetString() + "'.\n");
return nullptr;
}
if (completed_url.ProtocolIsJavaScript() &&
opener_frame.GetDocument()->GetContentSecurityPolicy() &&
!ContentSecurityPolicy::ShouldBypassMainWorld(
opener_frame.GetDocument())) {
const int kJavascriptSchemeLength = sizeof("javascript:") - 1;
String script_source = DecodeURLEscapeSequences(completed_url.GetString())
.Substring(kJavascriptSchemeLength);
if (!opener_frame.GetDocument()
->GetContentSecurityPolicy()
->AllowJavaScriptURLs(nullptr, script_source,
opener_frame.GetDocument()->Url(),
OrdinalNumber())) {
return nullptr;
}
}
WebWindowFeatures window_features =
GetWindowFeaturesFromString(window_features_string);
FrameLoadRequest frame_request(calling_window.document(),
ResourceRequest(completed_url), frame_name);
frame_request.SetShouldSetOpener(window_features.noopener ? kNeverSetOpener
: kMaybeSetOpener);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetFrameType(
WebURLRequest::kFrameTypeAuxiliary);
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetRequestorOrigin(
SecurityOrigin::Create(active_frame->GetDocument()->Url()));
frame_request.GetResourceRequest().SetHTTPReferrer(
SecurityPolicy::GenerateReferrer(
active_frame->GetDocument()->GetReferrerPolicy(), completed_url,
active_frame->GetDocument()->OutgoingReferrer()));
bool has_user_gesture = UserGestureIndicator::ProcessingUserGesture();
bool created;
Frame* new_frame = CreateWindowHelper(
opener_frame, *active_frame, opener_frame, frame_request, window_features,
kNavigationPolicyIgnore, created);
if (!new_frame)
return nullptr;
if (new_frame->DomWindow()->IsInsecureScriptAccess(calling_window,
completed_url))
return window_features.noopener ? nullptr : new_frame->DomWindow();
if (created) {
FrameLoadRequest request(calling_window.document(),
ResourceRequest(completed_url));
request.GetResourceRequest().SetHasUserGesture(has_user_gesture);
new_frame->Navigate(request);
} else if (!url_string.IsEmpty()) {
new_frame->Navigate(*calling_window.document(), completed_url, false,
has_user_gesture ? UserGestureStatus::kActive
: UserGestureStatus::kNone);
}
return window_features.noopener ? nullptr : new_frame->DomWindow();
}
| 172,953 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void mkvparser::GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision)
{
major = 1;
minor = 0;
build = 0;
revision = 27;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void mkvparser::GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision)
| 174,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static gboolean nbd_negotiate_continue(QIOChannel *ioc,
GIOCondition condition,
void *opaque)
{
qemu_coroutine_enter(opaque);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static gboolean nbd_negotiate_continue(QIOChannel *ioc,
| 165,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
libettercap_init();
ef_globals_alloc();
select_text_interface();
libettercap_ui_init();
/* etterfilter copyright */
fprintf(stdout, "\n" EC_COLOR_BOLD "%s %s" EC_COLOR_END " copyright %s %s\n\n",
PROGRAM, EC_VERSION, EC_COPYRIGHT, EC_AUTHORS);
/* initialize the line number */
EF_GBL->lineno = 1;
/* getopt related parsing... */
parse_options(argc, argv);
/* set the input for source file */
if (EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file) {
yyin = fopen(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file, "r");
if (yyin == NULL)
FATAL_ERROR("Input file not found !");
} else {
FATAL_ERROR("No source file.");
}
/* no buffering */
setbuf(yyin, NULL);
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
/* load the tables in etterfilter.tbl */
load_tables();
/* load the constants in etterfilter.cnt */
load_constants();
/* print the message */
fprintf(stdout, "\n Parsing source file \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file);
fflush(stdout);
ef_debug(1, "\n");
/* begin the parsing */
if (yyparse() == 0)
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
else
fprintf(stdout, "\n\nThe script contains errors...\n\n");
/* write to file */
if (write_output() != E_SUCCESS)
FATAL_ERROR("Cannot write output file (%s)", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
ef_globals_free();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ret_value = 0;
libettercap_init();
ef_globals_alloc();
select_text_interface();
libettercap_ui_init();
/* etterfilter copyright */
fprintf(stdout, "\n" EC_COLOR_BOLD "%s %s" EC_COLOR_END " copyright %s %s\n\n",
PROGRAM, EC_VERSION, EC_COPYRIGHT, EC_AUTHORS);
/* initialize the line number */
EF_GBL->lineno = 1;
/* getopt related parsing... */
parse_options(argc, argv);
/* set the input for source file */
if (EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file) {
yyin = fopen(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file, "r");
if (yyin == NULL)
FATAL_ERROR("Input file not found !");
} else {
FATAL_ERROR("No source file.");
}
/* no buffering */
setbuf(yyin, NULL);
setbuf(stdout, NULL);
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
/* load the tables in etterfilter.tbl */
load_tables();
/* load the constants in etterfilter.cnt */
load_constants();
/* print the message */
fprintf(stdout, "\n Parsing source file \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->source_file);
fflush(stdout);
ef_debug(1, "\n");
/* begin the parsing */
if (yyparse() == 0)
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
else
fprintf(stdout, "\n\nThe script contains errors...\n\n");
/* write to file */
ret_value = write_output();
if (ret_value == -E_NOTHANDLED)
FATAL_ERROR("Cannot write output file (%s): the filter is not correctly handled.", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
else if (ret_value == -E_INVALID)
FATAL_ERROR("Cannot write output file (%s): the filter format is not correct. ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
ef_globals_free();
return 0;
}
| 168,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SecurityHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
if (enabled_ && host_)
AttachToRenderFrameHost();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SecurityHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void SecurityHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
if (enabled_ && host_)
AttachToRenderFrameHost();
}
| 172,765 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ims_pcu_parse_cdc_data(struct usb_interface *intf, struct ims_pcu *pcu)
{
const struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_desc;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
union_desc = ims_pcu_get_cdc_union_desc(intf);
if (!union_desc)
return -EINVAL;
pcu->ctrl_intf = usb_ifnum_to_if(pcu->udev,
union_desc->bMasterInterface0);
alt = pcu->ctrl_intf->cur_altsetting;
pcu->ep_ctrl = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
pcu->max_ctrl_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_ctrl);
pcu->data_intf = usb_ifnum_to_if(pcu->udev,
union_desc->bSlaveInterface0);
alt = pcu->data_intf->cur_altsetting;
if (alt->desc.bNumEndpoints != 2) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Incorrect number of endpoints on data interface (%d)\n",
alt->desc.bNumEndpoints);
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->ep_out = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_out(pcu->ep_out)) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"First endpoint on data interface is not BULK OUT\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->max_out_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_out);
if (pcu->max_out_size < 8) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Max OUT packet size is too small (%zd)\n",
pcu->max_out_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->ep_in = &alt->endpoint[1].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(pcu->ep_in)) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Second endpoint on data interface is not BULK IN\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->max_in_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_in);
if (pcu->max_in_size < 8) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Max IN packet size is too small (%zd)\n",
pcu->max_in_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | static int ims_pcu_parse_cdc_data(struct usb_interface *intf, struct ims_pcu *pcu)
{
const struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_desc;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
union_desc = ims_pcu_get_cdc_union_desc(intf);
if (!union_desc)
return -EINVAL;
pcu->ctrl_intf = usb_ifnum_to_if(pcu->udev,
union_desc->bMasterInterface0);
if (!pcu->ctrl_intf)
return -EINVAL;
alt = pcu->ctrl_intf->cur_altsetting;
pcu->ep_ctrl = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
pcu->max_ctrl_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_ctrl);
pcu->data_intf = usb_ifnum_to_if(pcu->udev,
union_desc->bSlaveInterface0);
if (!pcu->data_intf)
return -EINVAL;
alt = pcu->data_intf->cur_altsetting;
if (alt->desc.bNumEndpoints != 2) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Incorrect number of endpoints on data interface (%d)\n",
alt->desc.bNumEndpoints);
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->ep_out = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_out(pcu->ep_out)) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"First endpoint on data interface is not BULK OUT\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->max_out_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_out);
if (pcu->max_out_size < 8) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Max OUT packet size is too small (%zd)\n",
pcu->max_out_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->ep_in = &alt->endpoint[1].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(pcu->ep_in)) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Second endpoint on data interface is not BULK IN\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->max_in_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_in);
if (pcu->max_in_size < 8) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Max IN packet size is too small (%zd)\n",
pcu->max_in_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
| 167,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: InstallVerifyFrame::InstallVerifyFrame(const wxString& lDmodFilePath)
: InstallVerifyFrame_Base(NULL, wxID_ANY, _T(""))
{
mConfig = Config::GetConfig();
prepareDialog();
int flags = wxPD_AUTO_HIDE | wxPD_APP_MODAL | wxPD_REMAINING_TIME;
wxProgressDialog lPrepareProgress(_("Preparing"),
_("The D-Mod archive is being decompressed in a temporary file."), 100, this, flags);
BZip lBZip(lDmodFilePath);
mTarFilePath = lBZip.Extract(&lPrepareProgress);
if (mTarFilePath.Len() != 0)
{
Tar lTar(mTarFilePath);
lTar.ReadHeaders();
wxString lDmodDescription = lTar.getmDmodDescription();
"\n"
"The D-Mod will be installed in subdirectory '%s'."),
lTar.getInstalledDmodDirectory().c_str());
}
else
{
int lBreakChar = lDmodDescription.Find( '\r' );
if ( lBreakChar <= 0 )
{
lBreakChar = lDmodDescription.Find( '\n' );
}
mDmodName = lDmodDescription.SubString( 0, lBreakChar - 1 );
this->SetTitle(_("DFArc - Install D-Mod - ") + mDmodName);
}
mDmodDescription->SetValue(lDmodDescription);
mInstallButton->Enable(true);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | InstallVerifyFrame::InstallVerifyFrame(const wxString& lDmodFilePath)
: InstallVerifyFrame_Base(NULL, wxID_ANY, _T(""))
{
mConfig = Config::GetConfig();
prepareDialog();
int flags = wxPD_AUTO_HIDE | wxPD_APP_MODAL | wxPD_REMAINING_TIME;
wxProgressDialog lPrepareProgress(_("Preparing"),
_("The D-Mod archive is being decompressed in a temporary file."), 100, this, flags);
BZip lBZip(lDmodFilePath);
mTarFilePath = lBZip.Extract(&lPrepareProgress);
if (mTarFilePath.Len() != 0)
{
Tar lTar(mTarFilePath);
if (lTar.ReadHeaders() == 1) {
this->EndModal(wxID_CANCEL);
return;
}
wxString lDmodDescription = lTar.getmDmodDescription();
"\n"
"The D-Mod will be installed in subdirectory '%s'."),
lTar.getInstalledDmodDirectory().c_str());
}
else
{
int lBreakChar = lDmodDescription.Find( '\r' );
if ( lBreakChar <= 0 )
{
lBreakChar = lDmodDescription.Find( '\n' );
}
mDmodName = lDmodDescription.SubString( 0, lBreakChar - 1 );
this->SetTitle(_("DFArc - Install D-Mod - ") + mDmodName);
}
mDmodDescription->SetValue(lDmodDescription);
mInstallButton->Enable(true);
}
| 165,346 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
const Extension* extension) {
bool has_permission = extension && extension->HasAPIPermissionForTab(
GetTabId(contents), APIPermission::kTab);
return CreateTabValue(contents, tab_strip, tab_index,
has_permission ? INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS :
OMIT_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
const Extension* extension) {
DictionaryValue *result = CreateTabValue(contents, tab_strip, tab_index);
ScrubTabValueForExtension(contents, extension, result);
return result;
}
| 171,454 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 maj;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
/* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
interprocess_token);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return maj;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | iakerb_gss_export_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token)
{
OM_uint32 maj;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
/* We don't currently support exporting partially established contexts. */
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
maj = krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, &ctx->gssc,
interprocess_token);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return maj;
}
| 166,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: process_open(u_int32_t id)
{
u_int32_t pflags;
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY ||
(flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) {
verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
} else {
fd = open(name, flags, mode);
if (fd < 0) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);
if (handle < 0) {
close(fd);
} else {
send_handle(id, handle);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | process_open(u_int32_t id)
{
u_int32_t pflags;
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
if (readonly &&
((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ||
(flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) {
verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
} else {
fd = open(name, flags, mode);
if (fd < 0) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
} else {
handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);
if (handle < 0) {
close(fd);
} else {
send_handle(id, handle);
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
}
}
if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
| 167,715 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cdrom_ioctl_select_disc(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned long arg)
{
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROM_SELECT_DISC\n");
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC))
return -ENOSYS;
if (arg != CDSL_CURRENT && arg != CDSL_NONE) {
if ((int)arg >= cdi->capacity)
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* ->select_disc is a hook to allow a driver-specific way of
* seleting disc. However, since there is no equivalent hook for
* cdrom_slot_status this may not actually be useful...
*/
if (cdi->ops->select_disc)
return cdi->ops->select_disc(cdi, arg);
cd_dbg(CD_CHANGER, "Using generic cdrom_select_disc()\n");
return cdrom_select_disc(cdi, arg);
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int cdrom_ioctl_select_disc(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned long arg)
{
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering CDROM_SELECT_DISC\n");
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_SELECT_DISC))
return -ENOSYS;
if (arg != CDSL_CURRENT && arg != CDSL_NONE) {
if (arg >= cdi->capacity)
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* ->select_disc is a hook to allow a driver-specific way of
* seleting disc. However, since there is no equivalent hook for
* cdrom_slot_status this may not actually be useful...
*/
if (cdi->ops->select_disc)
return cdi->ops->select_disc(cdi, arg);
cd_dbg(CD_CHANGER, "Using generic cdrom_select_disc()\n");
return cdrom_select_disc(cdi, arg);
}
| 168,999 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HostCache::Set(const Key& key,
const Entry& entry,
base::TimeTicks now,
base::TimeDelta ttl) {
TRACE_EVENT0(kNetTracingCategory, "HostCache::Set");
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (caching_is_disabled())
return;
auto it = entries_.find(key);
if (it != entries_.end()) {
bool is_stale = it->second.IsStale(now, network_changes_);
RecordSet(is_stale ? SET_UPDATE_STALE : SET_UPDATE_VALID, now, &it->second,
entry);
entries_.erase(it);
} else {
if (size() == max_entries_)
EvictOneEntry(now);
RecordSet(SET_INSERT, now, nullptr, entry);
}
AddEntry(Key(key), Entry(entry, now, ttl, network_changes_));
}
Commit Message: Add PersistenceDelegate to HostCache
PersistenceDelegate is a new interface for persisting the contents of
the HostCache. This commit includes the interface itself, the logic in
HostCache for interacting with it, and a mock implementation of the
interface for testing. It does not include support for immediate data
removal since that won't be needed for the currently planned use case.
BUG=605149
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2943143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#481015}
CWE ID: | void HostCache::Set(const Key& key,
const Entry& entry,
base::TimeTicks now,
base::TimeDelta ttl) {
TRACE_EVENT0(kNetTracingCategory, "HostCache::Set");
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (caching_is_disabled())
return;
bool result_changed = false;
auto it = entries_.find(key);
if (it != entries_.end()) {
bool is_stale = it->second.IsStale(now, network_changes_);
AddressListDeltaType delta =
FindAddressListDeltaType(it->second.addresses(), entry.addresses());
RecordSet(is_stale ? SET_UPDATE_STALE : SET_UPDATE_VALID, now, &it->second,
entry, delta);
result_changed =
entry.error() == OK &&
(it->second.error() != entry.error() || delta != DELTA_IDENTICAL);
entries_.erase(it);
} else {
result_changed = true;
if (size() == max_entries_)
EvictOneEntry(now);
RecordSet(SET_INSERT, now, nullptr, entry, DELTA_DISJOINT);
}
AddEntry(Key(key), Entry(entry, now, ttl, network_changes_));
if (delegate_ && result_changed)
delegate_->ScheduleWrite();
}
| 172,009 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int _yr_scan_match_callback(
uint8_t* match_data,
int32_t match_length,
int flags,
void* args)
{
CALLBACK_ARGS* callback_args = (CALLBACK_ARGS*) args;
YR_STRING* string = callback_args->string;
YR_MATCH* new_match;
int result = ERROR_SUCCESS;
int tidx = callback_args->context->tidx;
size_t match_offset = match_data - callback_args->data;
match_length += callback_args->forward_matches;
if (callback_args->full_word)
{
if (flags & RE_FLAGS_WIDE)
{
if (match_offset >= 2 &&
*(match_data - 1) == 0 &&
isalnum(*(match_data - 2)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (match_offset + match_length + 1 < callback_args->data_size &&
*(match_data + match_length + 1) == 0 &&
isalnum(*(match_data + match_length)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
else
{
if (match_offset >= 1 &&
isalnum(*(match_data - 1)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (match_offset + match_length < callback_args->data_size &&
isalnum(*(match_data + match_length)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
}
if (STRING_IS_CHAIN_PART(string))
{
result = _yr_scan_verify_chained_string_match(
string,
callback_args->context,
match_data,
callback_args->data_base,
match_offset,
match_length);
}
else
{
if (string->matches[tidx].count == 0)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
callback_args->context->matching_strings_arena,
&string,
sizeof(string),
NULL));
}
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_allocate_memory(
callback_args->context->matches_arena,
sizeof(YR_MATCH),
(void**) &new_match));
new_match->data_length = yr_min(match_length, MAX_MATCH_DATA);
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
callback_args->context->matches_arena,
match_data,
new_match->data_length,
(void**) &new_match->data));
if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
new_match->base = callback_args->data_base;
new_match->offset = match_offset;
new_match->match_length = match_length;
new_match->prev = NULL;
new_match->next = NULL;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_scan_add_match_to_list(
new_match,
&string->matches[tidx],
STRING_IS_GREEDY_REGEXP(string)));
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int _yr_scan_match_callback(
uint8_t* match_data,
int32_t match_length,
int flags,
void* args)
{
CALLBACK_ARGS* callback_args = (CALLBACK_ARGS*) args;
YR_STRING* string = callback_args->string;
YR_MATCH* new_match;
int result = ERROR_SUCCESS;
int tidx = callback_args->context->tidx;
size_t match_offset = match_data - callback_args->data;
match_length += callback_args->forward_matches;
// make sure that match fits into the data.
assert(match_offset + match_length <= callback_args->data_size);
if (callback_args->full_word)
{
if (flags & RE_FLAGS_WIDE)
{
if (match_offset >= 2 &&
*(match_data - 1) == 0 &&
isalnum(*(match_data - 2)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (match_offset + match_length + 1 < callback_args->data_size &&
*(match_data + match_length + 1) == 0 &&
isalnum(*(match_data + match_length)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
else
{
if (match_offset >= 1 &&
isalnum(*(match_data - 1)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (match_offset + match_length < callback_args->data_size &&
isalnum(*(match_data + match_length)))
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
}
if (STRING_IS_CHAIN_PART(string))
{
result = _yr_scan_verify_chained_string_match(
string,
callback_args->context,
match_data,
callback_args->data_base,
match_offset,
match_length);
}
else
{
if (string->matches[tidx].count == 0)
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
callback_args->context->matching_strings_arena,
&string,
sizeof(string),
NULL));
}
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_allocate_memory(
callback_args->context->matches_arena,
sizeof(YR_MATCH),
(void**) &new_match));
new_match->data_length = yr_min(match_length, MAX_MATCH_DATA);
FAIL_ON_ERROR(yr_arena_write_data(
callback_args->context->matches_arena,
match_data,
new_match->data_length,
(void**) &new_match->data));
if (result == ERROR_SUCCESS)
{
new_match->base = callback_args->data_base;
new_match->offset = match_offset;
new_match->match_length = match_length;
new_match->prev = NULL;
new_match->next = NULL;
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_scan_add_match_to_list(
new_match,
&string->matches[tidx],
STRING_IS_GREEDY_REGEXP(string)));
}
}
return result;
}
| 168,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerDestroyed() {
DCHECK_NE(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
DCHECK(worker_host_);
state_ = WORKER_TERMINATED;
for (auto* inspector : protocol::InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
inspector->TargetCrashed();
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(nullptr, nullptr);
worker_host_ = nullptr;
agent_ptr_.reset();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerDestroyed() {
DCHECK_NE(WORKER_TERMINATED, state_);
DCHECK(worker_host_);
state_ = WORKER_TERMINATED;
for (auto* inspector : protocol::InspectorHandler::ForAgentHost(this))
inspector->TargetCrashed();
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions())
session->SetRenderer(-1, nullptr);
worker_host_ = nullptr;
agent_ptr_.reset();
}
| 172,790 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::internal)
return;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
protocol::DictionaryValue* headers =
state_->getObject(NetworkAgentState::kExtraRequestHeaders);
if (headers) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < headers->size(); ++i) {
auto header = headers->at(i);
String value;
if (header.second->asString(&value))
request.SetHTTPHeaderField(AtomicString(header.first),
AtomicString(value));
}
}
request.SetReportRawHeaders(true);
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kCacheDisabled, false)) {
if (LoadsFromCacheOnly(request) &&
request.GetRequestContext() != WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal) {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassCacheLoadOnlyFromCache);
} else {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassingCache);
}
request.SetShouldResetAppCache(true);
}
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kBypassServiceWorker, false))
request.SetServiceWorkerMode(WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kNone);
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info);
if (!host_id_.IsEmpty()) {
request.AddHTTPHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_DevTools_Emulate_Network_Conditions_Client_Id,
AtomicString(host_id_));
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequest(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info,
Resource::Type resource_type) {
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::internal)
return;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document &&
loader->GetSubstituteData().IsValid())
return;
protocol::DictionaryValue* headers =
state_->getObject(NetworkAgentState::kExtraRequestHeaders);
if (headers) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < headers->size(); ++i) {
auto header = headers->at(i);
String value;
if (header.second->asString(&value))
request.SetHTTPHeaderField(AtomicString(header.first),
AtomicString(value));
}
}
request.SetReportRawHeaders(true);
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kCacheDisabled, false)) {
if (LoadsFromCacheOnly(request) &&
request.GetRequestContext() != WebURLRequest::kRequestContextInternal) {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassCacheLoadOnlyFromCache);
} else {
request.SetCachePolicy(WebCachePolicy::kBypassingCache);
}
request.SetShouldResetAppCache(true);
}
if (state_->booleanProperty(NetworkAgentState::kBypassServiceWorker, false))
request.SetServiceWorkerMode(WebURLRequest::ServiceWorkerMode::kNone);
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type =
InspectorPageAgent::ToResourceType(resource_type);
WillSendRequestInternal(execution_context, identifier, loader, request,
redirect_response, initiator_info, type);
if (!host_id_.IsEmpty()) {
request.AddHTTPHeaderField(
HTTPNames::X_DevTools_Emulate_Network_Conditions_Client_Id,
AtomicString(host_id_));
}
}
| 172,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
{
int i;
BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL;
X509_ALGOR *xa = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL;
X509_ALGOR *xalg = NULL;
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED);
goto err;
}
break;
case NID_pkcs7_digest:
xa = p7->d.digest->md;
os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents);
break;
case NID_pkcs7_data:
break;
default:
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
goto err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | BIO *PKCS7_dataInit(PKCS7 *p7, BIO *bio)
{
int i;
BIO *out = NULL, *btmp = NULL;
X509_ALGOR *xa = NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *md_sk = NULL;
STACK_OF(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO) *rsk = NULL;
X509_ALGOR *xalg = NULL;
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
if (p7 == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_INVALID_NULL_POINTER);
return NULL;
}
/*
* The content field in the PKCS7 ContentInfo is optional, but that really
* only applies to inner content (precisely, detached signatures).
*
* When reading content, missing outer content is therefore treated as an
* error.
*
* When creating content, PKCS7_content_new() must be called before
* calling this method, so a NULL p7->d is always an error.
*/
if (p7->d.ptr == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_NO_CONTENT);
return NULL;
}
i = OBJ_obj2nid(p7->type);
p7->state = PKCS7_S_HEADER;
if (evp_cipher == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_CIPHER_NOT_INITIALIZED);
goto err;
}
break;
case NID_pkcs7_digest:
xa = p7->d.digest->md;
os = PKCS7_get_octet_string(p7->d.digest->contents);
break;
case NID_pkcs7_data:
break;
default:
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DATAINIT, PKCS7_R_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE);
goto err;
}
| 164,807 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AwContents::ScrollContainerViewTo(gfx::Vector2d new_value) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = java_ref_.get(env);
if (obj.is_null())
return;
Java_AwContents_scrollContainerViewTo(
env, obj.obj(), new_value.x(), new_value.y());
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void AwContents::ScrollContainerViewTo(gfx::Vector2d new_value) {
void AwContents::ScrollContainerViewTo(const gfx::Vector2d& new_value) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = java_ref_.get(env);
if (obj.is_null())
return;
Java_AwContents_scrollContainerViewTo(
env, obj.obj(), new_value.x(), new_value.y());
}
| 171,617 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnSSLCertificateError(
net::URLRequest* request,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool is_hsts_host) {
DCHECK(request);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
DCHECK(info);
GlobalRequestID request_id(info->GetChildID(), info->GetRequestID());
int render_process_id;
int render_view_id;
if(!info->GetAssociatedRenderView(&render_process_id, &render_view_id))
NOTREACHED();
SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
request_id, info->GetResourceType(), request->url(), render_process_id,
render_view_id, ssl_info, is_hsts_host);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnSSLCertificateError(
net::URLRequest* request,
const net::SSLInfo& ssl_info,
bool is_hsts_host) {
DCHECK(request);
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(request);
DCHECK(info);
GlobalRequestID request_id(info->GetChildID(), info->GetRequestID());
int render_process_id;
int render_view_id;
if(!info->GetAssociatedRenderView(&render_process_id, &render_view_id))
NOTREACHED();
SSLManager::OnSSLCertificateError(
AsWeakPtr(), request_id, info->GetResourceType(), request->url(),
render_process_id, render_view_id, ssl_info, is_hsts_host);
}
| 170,989 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Display::Init()
{
m_string = NULL;
m_language = NULL;
m_country = NULL;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Display::Init()
| 174,388 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev2_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
const u_char *vid;
int i, len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d vid=", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
vid = (const u_char *)(ext+1);
len = ntohs(e.len) - 4;
ND_TCHECK2(*vid, len);
for(i=0; i<len; i++) {
if(ND_ISPRINT(vid[i])) ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", vid[i]));
else ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
}
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev2_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
const u_char *vid;
int i, len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d vid=", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
vid = (const u_char *)(ext+1);
len = ntohs(e.len) - 4;
ND_TCHECK2(*vid, len);
for(i=0; i<len; i++) {
if(ND_ISPRINT(vid[i])) ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", vid[i]));
else ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
}
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,803 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GesturePoint::GesturePoint()
: first_touch_time_(0.0),
last_touch_time_(0.0),
last_tap_time_(0.0),
velocity_calculator_(kBufferedPoints) {
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | GesturePoint::GesturePoint()
: first_touch_time_(0.0),
last_touch_time_(0.0),
last_tap_time_(0.0),
velocity_calculator_(GestureConfiguration::buffered_points()) {
}
| 171,041 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SetPreviewDataForIndex(int index, const base::RefCountedBytes* data) {
if (index != printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX &&
index < printing::FIRST_PAGE_INDEX) {
return;
}
page_data_map_[index] = const_cast<base::RefCountedBytes*>(data);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void SetPreviewDataForIndex(int index, const base::RefCountedBytes* data) {
if (IsInvalidIndex(index))
return;
page_data_map_[index] = const_cast<base::RefCountedBytes*>(data);
}
| 170,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
{
int start = 0;
u32 prev_legacy, cur_legacy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
prev_legacy = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
cur_legacy = ps->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
if (!prev_legacy && cur_legacy)
start = 1;
memcpy(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels, &ps->channels,
sizeof(kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels));
kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags = ps->flags;
kvm_pit_load_count(kvm, 0, kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[0].count, start);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
{
int start = 0;
int i;
u32 prev_legacy, cur_legacy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
prev_legacy = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
cur_legacy = ps->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
if (!prev_legacy && cur_legacy)
start = 1;
memcpy(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels, &ps->channels,
sizeof(kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels));
kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags = ps->flags;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
kvm_pit_load_count(kvm, i, kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[i].count, start);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
return 0;
}
| 167,561 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _pyfribidi_log2vis (PyObject * self, PyObject * args, PyObject * kw)
{
PyObject *logical = NULL; /* input unicode or string object */
FriBidiParType base = FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL; /* optional direction */
const char *encoding = "utf-8"; /* optional input string encoding */
int clean = 0; /* optional flag to clean the string */
int reordernsm = 1; /* optional flag to allow reordering of non spacing marks*/
static char *kwargs[] =
{ "logical", "base_direction", "encoding", "clean", "reordernsm", NULL };
if (!PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords (args, kw, "O|isii", kwargs,
&logical, &base, &encoding, &clean, &reordernsm))
return NULL;
/* Validate base */
if (!(base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL ||
base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR || base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON))
return PyErr_Format (PyExc_ValueError,
"invalid value %d: use either RTL, LTR or ON",
base);
/* Check object type and delegate to one of the log2vis functions */
if (PyUnicode_Check (logical))
return log2vis_unicode (logical, base, clean, reordernsm);
else if (PyString_Check (logical))
return log2vis_encoded_string (logical, encoding, base, clean, reordernsm);
else
return PyErr_Format (PyExc_TypeError,
"expected unicode or str, not %s",
logical->ob_type->tp_name);
}
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | _pyfribidi_log2vis (PyObject * self, PyObject * args, PyObject * kw)
unicode_log2vis (PyUnicodeObject* string,
FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
{
int i;
int length = string->length;
FriBidiChar *logical = NULL; /* input fribidi unicode buffer */
FriBidiChar *visual = NULL; /* output fribidi unicode buffer */
FriBidiStrIndex new_len = 0; /* length of the UTF-8 buffer */
PyUnicodeObject *result = NULL;
/* Allocate fribidi unicode buffers
TODO - Don't copy strings if sizeof(FriBidiChar) == sizeof(Py_UNICODE)
*/
logical = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, length + 1);
if (logical == NULL) {
PyErr_NoMemory();
goto cleanup;
}
visual = PyMem_New (FriBidiChar, length + 1);
if (visual == NULL) {
PyErr_NoMemory();
goto cleanup;
}
for (i=0; i<length; ++i) {
logical[i] = string->str[i];
}
/* Convert to unicode and order visually */
fribidi_set_reorder_nsm(reordernsm);
if (!fribidi_log2vis (logical, length, &base_direction, visual,
NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
PyErr_SetString (PyExc_RuntimeError,
"fribidi failed to order string");
goto cleanup;
}
/* Cleanup the string if requested */
if (clean) {
length = fribidi_remove_bidi_marks (visual, length, NULL, NULL, NULL);
}
result = (PyUnicodeObject*) PyUnicode_FromUnicode(NULL, length);
if (result == NULL) {
goto cleanup;
}
for (i=0; i<length; ++i) {
result->str[i] = visual[i];
}
cleanup:
/* Delete unicode buffers */
PyMem_Del (logical);
PyMem_Del (visual);
return (PyObject *)result;
}
| 165,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssh_packet_set_compress_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r;
const u_char *inblob, *outblob;
size_t inl, outl;
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &inblob, &inl)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &outblob, &outl)) != 0)
goto out;
if (inl == 0)
state->compression_in_started = 0;
else if (inl != sizeof(state->compression_in_stream)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
} else {
state->compression_in_started = 1;
memcpy(&state->compression_in_stream, inblob, inl);
}
if (outl == 0)
state->compression_out_started = 0;
else if (outl != sizeof(state->compression_out_stream)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
} else {
state->compression_out_started = 1;
memcpy(&state->compression_out_stream, outblob, outl);
}
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ssh_packet_set_compress_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
| 168,654 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int bnep_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct bnep_connlist_req cl;
struct bnep_connadd_req ca;
struct bnep_conndel_req cd;
struct bnep_conninfo ci;
struct socket *nsock;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
switch (cmd) {
case BNEPCONNADD:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&ca, argp, sizeof(ca)))
return -EFAULT;
nsock = sockfd_lookup(ca.sock, &err);
if (!nsock)
return err;
if (nsock->sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED) {
sockfd_put(nsock);
return -EBADFD;
}
err = bnep_add_connection(&ca, nsock);
if (!err) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else
sockfd_put(nsock);
return err;
case BNEPCONNDEL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
return -EFAULT;
return bnep_del_connection(&cd);
case BNEPGETCONNLIST:
if (copy_from_user(&cl, argp, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = bnep_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &cl, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
case BNEPGETCONNINFO:
if (copy_from_user(&ci, argp, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
err = bnep_get_conninfo(&ci);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: bnep: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "device"
field is NULL terminated. This potentially leads to BUG() inside of
alloc_netdev_mqs() and/or information leak by creating a device with a name
made of contents of kernel stack.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int bnep_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct bnep_connlist_req cl;
struct bnep_connadd_req ca;
struct bnep_conndel_req cd;
struct bnep_conninfo ci;
struct socket *nsock;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
switch (cmd) {
case BNEPCONNADD:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&ca, argp, sizeof(ca)))
return -EFAULT;
nsock = sockfd_lookup(ca.sock, &err);
if (!nsock)
return err;
if (nsock->sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED) {
sockfd_put(nsock);
return -EBADFD;
}
ca.device[sizeof(ca.device)-1] = 0;
err = bnep_add_connection(&ca, nsock);
if (!err) {
if (copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else
sockfd_put(nsock);
return err;
case BNEPCONNDEL:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EACCES;
if (copy_from_user(&cd, argp, sizeof(cd)))
return -EFAULT;
return bnep_del_connection(&cd);
case BNEPGETCONNLIST:
if (copy_from_user(&cl, argp, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = bnep_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &cl, sizeof(cl)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
case BNEPGETCONNINFO:
if (copy_from_user(&ci, argp, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
err = bnep_get_conninfo(&ci);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ci, sizeof(ci)))
return -EFAULT;
return err;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
| 165,897 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: StorageHandler::IndexedDBObserver* StorageHandler::GetIndexedDBObserver() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!indexed_db_observer_) {
indexed_db_observer_ = std::make_unique<IndexedDBObserver>(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
static_cast<IndexedDBContextImpl*>(
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetIndexedDBContext()));
}
return indexed_db_observer_.get();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | StorageHandler::IndexedDBObserver* StorageHandler::GetIndexedDBObserver() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (!indexed_db_observer_) {
indexed_db_observer_ = std::make_unique<IndexedDBObserver>(
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
static_cast<IndexedDBContextImpl*>(
storage_partition_->GetIndexedDBContext()));
}
return indexed_db_observer_.get();
}
| 172,772 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void skel(const char *homedir, uid_t u, gid_t g) {
char *fname;
if (arg_zsh) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.zshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.zshrc", &s) == 0) {
if (is_link("/etc/skel/.zshrc")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid /etc/skel/.zshrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
if (copy_file("/etc/skel/.zshrc", fname) == 0) {
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.zshrc");
}
}
else { //
FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
fclose(fp);
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(fname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
}
free(fname);
}
else if (arg_csh) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.cshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.cshrc", &s) == 0) {
if (is_link("/etc/skel/.cshrc")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid /etc/skel/.cshrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
if (copy_file("/etc/skel/.cshrc", fname) == 0) {
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.cshrc");
}
}
else { //
/* coverity[toctou] */
FILE *fp = fopen(fname, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
fclose(fp);
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(fname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
}
free(fname);
}
else {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.bashrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.bashrc", &s) == 0) {
if (is_link("/etc/skel/.bashrc")) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid /etc/skel/.bashrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
if (copy_file("/etc/skel/.bashrc", fname) == 0) {
/* coverity[toctou] */
if (chown(fname, u, g) == -1)
errExit("chown");
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.bashrc");
}
}
free(fname);
}
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static void skel(const char *homedir, uid_t u, gid_t g) {
char *fname;
if (arg_zsh) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.zshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (is_link(fname)) { // stat on dangling symlinks fails, try again using lstat
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid %s file\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
if (stat("/etc/skel/.zshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file_as_user("/etc/skel/.zshrc", fname, u, g, 0644); // regular user
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.zshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else if (arg_csh) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.cshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (is_link(fname)) { // stat on dangling symlinks fails, try again using lstat
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid %s file\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
if (stat("/etc/skel/.cshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file_as_user("/etc/skel/.cshrc", fname, u, g, 0644); // regular user
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.cshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.bashrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (is_link(fname)) { // stat on dangling symlinks fails, try again using lstat
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid %s file\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
if (stat("/etc/skel/.bashrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file_as_user("/etc/skel/.bashrc", fname, u, g, 0644); // regular user
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.bashrc");
}
free(fname);
}
}
| 170,098 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FLAC__bool read_metadata_vorbiscomment_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__StreamMetadata_VorbisComment *obj, unsigned length)
{
FLAC__uint32 i;
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__bitreader_is_consumed_byte_aligned(decoder->private_->input));
/* read vendor string */
if (length >= 8) {
length -= 8; /* vendor string length + num comments entries alone take 8 bytes */
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_VORBIS_COMMENT_ENTRY_LENGTH_LEN == 32);
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_uint32_little_endian(decoder->private_->input, &obj->vendor_string.length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
if (obj->vendor_string.length > 0) {
if (length < obj->vendor_string.length) {
obj->vendor_string.length = 0;
obj->vendor_string.entry = 0;
goto skip;
}
else
length -= obj->vendor_string.length;
if (0 == (obj->vendor_string.entry = safe_malloc_add_2op_(obj->vendor_string.length, /*+*/1))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, obj->vendor_string.entry, obj->vendor_string.length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
obj->vendor_string.entry[obj->vendor_string.length] = '\0';
}
else
obj->vendor_string.entry = 0;
/* read num comments */
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_VORBIS_COMMENT_NUM_COMMENTS_LEN == 32);
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_uint32_little_endian(decoder->private_->input, &obj->num_comments))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
/* read comments */
if (obj->num_comments > 100000) {
/* Possibly malicious file. */
obj->num_comments = 0;
return false;
}
if (obj->num_comments > 0) {
if (0 == (obj->comments = safe_malloc_mul_2op_p(obj->num_comments, /*times*/sizeof(FLAC__StreamMetadata_VorbisComment_Entry)))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < obj->num_comments; i++) {
/* Initialize here just to make sure. */
obj->comments[i].length = 0;
obj->comments[i].entry = 0;
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_VORBIS_COMMENT_ENTRY_LENGTH_LEN == 32);
if (length < 4) {
obj->num_comments = i;
goto skip;
}
else
length -= 4;
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_uint32_little_endian(decoder->private_->input, &obj->comments[i].length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
if (obj->comments[i].length > 0) {
if (length < obj->comments[i].length) {
obj->num_comments = i;
goto skip;
}
else
length -= obj->comments[i].length;
if (0 == (obj->comments[i].entry = safe_malloc_add_2op_(obj->comments[i].length, /*+*/1))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
memset (obj->comments[i].entry, 0, obj->comments[i].length) ;
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, obj->comments[i].entry, obj->comments[i].length)) {
obj->num_comments = i;
goto skip;
}
obj->comments[i].entry[obj->comments[i].length] = '\0';
}
else
obj->comments[i].entry = 0;
}
}
else
obj->comments = 0;
}
skip:
if (length > 0) {
/* This will only happen on files with invalid data in comments */
if(!FLAC__bitreader_skip_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119 | FLAC__bool read_metadata_vorbiscomment_(FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__StreamMetadata_VorbisComment *obj, unsigned length)
{
FLAC__uint32 i;
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__bitreader_is_consumed_byte_aligned(decoder->private_->input));
/* read vendor string */
if (length >= 8) {
length -= 8; /* vendor string length + num comments entries alone take 8 bytes */
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_VORBIS_COMMENT_ENTRY_LENGTH_LEN == 32);
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_uint32_little_endian(decoder->private_->input, &obj->vendor_string.length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
if (obj->vendor_string.length > 0) {
if (length < obj->vendor_string.length) {
obj->vendor_string.length = 0;
obj->vendor_string.entry = 0;
goto skip;
}
else
length -= obj->vendor_string.length;
if (0 == (obj->vendor_string.entry = safe_malloc_add_2op_(obj->vendor_string.length, /*+*/1))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, obj->vendor_string.entry, obj->vendor_string.length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
obj->vendor_string.entry[obj->vendor_string.length] = '\0';
}
else
obj->vendor_string.entry = 0;
/* read num comments */
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_VORBIS_COMMENT_NUM_COMMENTS_LEN == 32);
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_uint32_little_endian(decoder->private_->input, &obj->num_comments))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
/* read comments */
if (obj->num_comments > 100000) {
/* Possibly malicious file. */
obj->num_comments = 0;
return false;
}
if (obj->num_comments > 0) {
if (0 == (obj->comments = safe_malloc_mul_2op_p(obj->num_comments, /*times*/sizeof(FLAC__StreamMetadata_VorbisComment_Entry)))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
obj->num_comments = 0;
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < obj->num_comments; i++) {
/* Initialize here just to make sure. */
obj->comments[i].length = 0;
obj->comments[i].entry = 0;
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__STREAM_METADATA_VORBIS_COMMENT_ENTRY_LENGTH_LEN == 32);
if (length < 4) {
obj->num_comments = i;
goto skip;
}
else
length -= 4;
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_uint32_little_endian(decoder->private_->input, &obj->comments[i].length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
if (obj->comments[i].length > 0) {
if (length < obj->comments[i].length) {
obj->num_comments = i;
goto skip;
}
else
length -= obj->comments[i].length;
if (0 == (obj->comments[i].entry = safe_malloc_add_2op_(obj->comments[i].length, /*+*/1))) {
decoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
memset (obj->comments[i].entry, 0, obj->comments[i].length) ;
if (!FLAC__bitreader_read_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, obj->comments[i].entry, obj->comments[i].length)) {
obj->num_comments = i;
goto skip;
}
obj->comments[i].entry[obj->comments[i].length] = '\0';
}
else
obj->comments[i].entry = 0;
}
}
else
obj->comments = 0;
}
skip:
if (length > 0) {
/* This will only happen on files with invalid data in comments */
if(!FLAC__bitreader_skip_byte_block_aligned_no_crc(decoder->private_->input, length))
return false; /* read_callback_ sets the state for us */
}
return true;
}
| 173,888 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13025/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't cause 'tcpdump: pcap_loop: truncated dump file'
CWE ID: CWE-125 | mobility_opt_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const unsigned len)
{
unsigned i, optlen;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += optlen) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i]);
if (bp[i] == IP6MOPT_PAD1)
optlen = 1;
else {
if (i + 1 < len) {
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + 1]);
optlen = bp[i + 1] + 2;
}
else
goto trunc;
}
if (i + optlen > len)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(bp[i + optlen]);
switch (bp[i]) {
case IP6MOPT_PAD1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(pad1)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_PADN:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(padn)"));
break;
case IP6MOPT_REFRESH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_REFRESH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(refresh: %u)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]) << 2));
break;
case IP6MOPT_ALTCOA:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_ALTCOA_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(altcoa: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK_128BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(alt-CoA: %s)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[i+2])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_NONCEID:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_NONCEID_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+2]);
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(&bp[i+4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(ni: ho=0x%04x co=0x%04x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+2]),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[i+4])));
break;
case IP6MOPT_AUTH:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_AUTH_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth: trunc)"));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(auth)"));
break;
default:
if (len - i < IP6MOPT_MINLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(sopt_type %u: trunc)", bp[i]));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(type-0x%02x: len=%u)", bp[i], bp[i + 1]));
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
return 1;
}
| 167,866 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: transform_test(png_modifier *pmIn, PNG_CONST png_uint_32 idIn,
PNG_CONST image_transform* transform_listIn, PNG_CONST char * volatile name)
{
transform_display d;
context(&pmIn->this, fault);
transform_display_init(&d, pmIn, idIn, transform_listIn);
Try
{
size_t pos = 0;
png_structp pp;
png_infop pi;
char full_name[256];
/* Make sure the encoding fields are correct and enter the required
* modifications.
*/
transform_set_encoding(&d);
/* Add any modifications required by the transform list. */
d.transform_list->ini(d.transform_list, &d);
/* Add the color space information, if any, to the name. */
pos = safecat(full_name, sizeof full_name, pos, name);
pos = safecat_current_encoding(full_name, sizeof full_name, pos, d.pm);
/* Get a png_struct for reading the image. */
pp = set_modifier_for_read(d.pm, &pi, d.this.id, full_name);
standard_palette_init(&d.this);
# if 0
/* Logging (debugging only) */
{
char buffer[256];
(void)store_message(&d.pm->this, pp, buffer, sizeof buffer, 0,
"running test");
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", buffer);
}
# endif
/* Introduce the correct read function. */
if (d.pm->this.progressive)
{
/* Share the row function with the standard implementation. */
png_set_progressive_read_fn(pp, &d, transform_info, progressive_row,
transform_end);
/* Now feed data into the reader until we reach the end: */
modifier_progressive_read(d.pm, pp, pi);
}
else
{
/* modifier_read expects a png_modifier* */
png_set_read_fn(pp, d.pm, modifier_read);
/* Check the header values: */
png_read_info(pp, pi);
/* Process the 'info' requirements. Only one image is generated */
transform_info_imp(&d, pp, pi);
sequential_row(&d.this, pp, pi, -1, 0);
if (!d.this.speed)
transform_image_validate(&d, pp, pi);
else
d.this.ps->validated = 1;
}
modifier_reset(d.pm);
}
Catch(fault)
{
modifier_reset(voidcast(png_modifier*,(void*)fault));
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | transform_test(png_modifier *pmIn, PNG_CONST png_uint_32 idIn,
transform_test(png_modifier *pmIn, const png_uint_32 idIn,
const image_transform* transform_listIn, const char * const name)
{
transform_display d;
context(&pmIn->this, fault);
transform_display_init(&d, pmIn, idIn, transform_listIn);
Try
{
size_t pos = 0;
png_structp pp;
png_infop pi;
char full_name[256];
/* Make sure the encoding fields are correct and enter the required
* modifications.
*/
transform_set_encoding(&d);
/* Add any modifications required by the transform list. */
d.transform_list->ini(d.transform_list, &d);
/* Add the color space information, if any, to the name. */
pos = safecat(full_name, sizeof full_name, pos, name);
pos = safecat_current_encoding(full_name, sizeof full_name, pos, d.pm);
/* Get a png_struct for reading the image. */
pp = set_modifier_for_read(d.pm, &pi, d.this.id, full_name);
standard_palette_init(&d.this);
# if 0
/* Logging (debugging only) */
{
char buffer[256];
(void)store_message(&d.pm->this, pp, buffer, sizeof buffer, 0,
"running test");
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", buffer);
}
# endif
/* Introduce the correct read function. */
if (d.pm->this.progressive)
{
/* Share the row function with the standard implementation. */
png_set_progressive_read_fn(pp, &d, transform_info, progressive_row,
transform_end);
/* Now feed data into the reader until we reach the end: */
modifier_progressive_read(d.pm, pp, pi);
}
else
{
/* modifier_read expects a png_modifier* */
png_set_read_fn(pp, d.pm, modifier_read);
/* Check the header values: */
png_read_info(pp, pi);
/* Process the 'info' requirements. Only one image is generated */
transform_info_imp(&d, pp, pi);
sequential_row(&d.this, pp, pi, -1, 0);
if (!d.this.speed)
transform_image_validate(&d, pp, pi);
else
d.this.ps->validated = 1;
}
modifier_reset(d.pm);
}
Catch(fault)
{
modifier_reset(voidcast(png_modifier*,(void*)fault));
}
}
| 173,717 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Segment::Load() {
assert(m_clusters == NULL);
assert(m_clusterSize == 0);
assert(m_clusterCount == 0);
const long long header_status = ParseHeaders();
if (header_status < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(header_status);
if (header_status > 0) // underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
assert(m_pInfo);
assert(m_pTracks);
for (;;) {
const int status = LoadCluster();
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (status >= 1) // no more clusters
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Segment::Load() {
assert(m_clusters == NULL);
assert(m_clusterSize == 0);
assert(m_clusterCount == 0);
const long long header_status = ParseHeaders();
if (header_status < 0) // error
return static_cast<long>(header_status);
if (header_status > 0) // underflow
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (m_pInfo == NULL || m_pTracks == NULL)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
for (;;) {
const int status = LoadCluster();
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (status >= 1) // no more clusters
return 0;
}
}
| 173,828 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintHeaderAndFooter(
blink::WebCanvas* canvas,
int page_number,
int total_pages,
const blink::WebLocalFrame& source_frame,
float webkit_scale_factor,
const PageSizeMargins& page_layout,
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& params) {
cc::PaintCanvasAutoRestore auto_restore(canvas, true);
canvas->scale(1 / webkit_scale_factor, 1 / webkit_scale_factor);
blink::WebSize page_size(page_layout.margin_left + page_layout.margin_right +
page_layout.content_width,
page_layout.margin_top + page_layout.margin_bottom +
page_layout.content_height);
blink::WebView* web_view = blink::WebView::Create(
nullptr, blink::mojom::PageVisibilityState::kVisible);
web_view->GetSettings()->SetJavaScriptEnabled(true);
class HeaderAndFooterClient final : public blink::WebFrameClient {
public:
void BindToFrame(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) override { frame_ = frame; }
void FrameDetached(DetachType detach_type) override {
frame_->FrameWidget()->Close();
frame_->Close();
frame_ = nullptr;
}
private:
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame_;
};
HeaderAndFooterClient frame_client;
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = blink::WebLocalFrame::CreateMainFrame(
web_view, &frame_client, nullptr, nullptr);
blink::WebWidgetClient web_widget_client;
blink::WebFrameWidget::Create(&web_widget_client, frame);
base::Value html(base::UTF8ToUTF16(
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetRawDataResource(
IDR_PRINT_PREVIEW_PAGE)));
ExecuteScript(frame, kPageLoadScriptFormat, html);
auto options = base::MakeUnique<base::DictionaryValue>();
options->SetDouble(kSettingHeaderFooterDate, base::Time::Now().ToJsTime());
options->SetDouble("width", page_size.width);
options->SetDouble("height", page_size.height);
options->SetDouble("topMargin", page_layout.margin_top);
options->SetDouble("bottomMargin", page_layout.margin_bottom);
options->SetInteger("pageNumber", page_number);
options->SetInteger("totalPages", total_pages);
options->SetString("url", params.url);
base::string16 title = source_frame.GetDocument().Title().Utf16();
options->SetString("title", title.empty() ? params.title : title);
ExecuteScript(frame, kPageSetupScriptFormat, *options);
blink::WebPrintParams webkit_params(page_size);
webkit_params.printer_dpi = GetDPI(¶ms);
frame->PrintBegin(webkit_params);
frame->PrintPage(0, canvas);
frame->PrintEnd();
web_view->Close();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintHeaderAndFooter(
blink::WebCanvas* canvas,
int page_number,
int total_pages,
const blink::WebLocalFrame& source_frame,
float webkit_scale_factor,
const PageSizeMargins& page_layout,
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& params) {
cc::PaintCanvasAutoRestore auto_restore(canvas, true);
canvas->scale(1 / webkit_scale_factor, 1 / webkit_scale_factor);
blink::WebSize page_size(page_layout.margin_left + page_layout.margin_right +
page_layout.content_width,
page_layout.margin_top + page_layout.margin_bottom +
page_layout.content_height);
blink::WebView* web_view = blink::WebView::Create(
nullptr, blink::mojom::PageVisibilityState::kVisible);
web_view->GetSettings()->SetJavaScriptEnabled(true);
class HeaderAndFooterClient final : public blink::WebFrameClient {
public:
void BindToFrame(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) override { frame_ = frame; }
void FrameDetached(DetachType detach_type) override {
frame_->FrameWidget()->Close();
frame_->Close();
frame_ = nullptr;
}
private:
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame_;
};
HeaderAndFooterClient frame_client;
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame = blink::WebLocalFrame::CreateMainFrame(
web_view, &frame_client, nullptr, nullptr);
blink::WebWidgetClient web_widget_client;
blink::WebFrameWidget::Create(&web_widget_client, frame);
base::Value html(base::UTF8ToUTF16(
ui::ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().GetRawDataResource(
IDR_PRINT_PREVIEW_PAGE)));
ExecuteScript(frame, kPageLoadScriptFormat, html);
auto options = base::MakeUnique<base::DictionaryValue>();
options->SetDouble(kSettingHeaderFooterDate, base::Time::Now().ToJsTime());
options->SetDouble("width", page_size.width);
options->SetDouble("height", page_size.height);
options->SetDouble("topMargin", page_layout.margin_top);
options->SetDouble("bottomMargin", page_layout.margin_bottom);
options->SetInteger("pageNumber", page_number);
options->SetInteger("totalPages", total_pages);
options->SetString("url", params.url);
base::string16 title = source_frame.GetDocument().Title().Utf16();
options->SetString("title", title.empty() ? params.title : title);
options->SetString("headerTemplate", params.header_template);
options->SetString("footerTemplate", params.footer_template);
ExecuteScript(frame, kPageSetupScriptFormat, *options);
blink::WebPrintParams webkit_params(page_size);
webkit_params.printer_dpi = GetDPI(¶ms);
frame->PrintBegin(webkit_params);
frame->PrintPage(0, canvas);
frame->PrintEnd();
web_view->Close();
}
| 172,899 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Chapters::Edition::Init()
{
m_atoms = NULL;
m_atoms_size = 0;
m_atoms_count = 0;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Chapters::Edition::Init()
m_displays = NULL;
m_displays_size = 0;
m_displays_count = 0;
}
| 174,386 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, MetadataBufferType *type) {
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeMetaDataInBuffers");
OMX_STRING nativeBufferName = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeANWBufferInMetadata");
MetadataBufferType negotiatedType;
MetadataBufferType requestedType = type != NULL ? *type : kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bStoreMetaData = enable;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, nativeBufferName, &index)
: OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
name = nativeBufferName; // set name for debugging
negotiatedType = requestedType;
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
negotiatedType =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource : requestedType;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
CLOGW("component does not support metadata mode; using fallback");
} else if (xerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, xerr, "%s", name);
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d type=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, negotiatedType);
}
negotiatedType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
} else {
if (!enable) {
negotiatedType = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
mMetadataType[portIndex] = negotiatedType;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(storeMetaDataInBuffers, "%s:%u %srequested %s:%d negotiated %s:%d",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable ? "" : "UN",
asString(requestedType), requestedType, asString(negotiatedType), negotiatedType);
if (type != NULL) {
*type = negotiatedType;
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::storeMetaDataInBuffers_l(
OMX_U32 portIndex, OMX_BOOL enable, MetadataBufferType *type) {
if (mSailed) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (portIndex != kPortIndexInput && portIndex != kPortIndexOutput) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26324358");
if (type != NULL) {
*type = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
OMX_STRING name = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeMetaDataInBuffers");
OMX_STRING nativeBufferName = const_cast<OMX_STRING>(
"OMX.google.android.index.storeANWBufferInMetadata");
MetadataBufferType negotiatedType;
MetadataBufferType requestedType = type != NULL ? *type : kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer;
StoreMetaDataInBuffersParams params;
InitOMXParams(¶ms);
params.nPortIndex = portIndex;
params.bStoreMetaData = enable;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, nativeBufferName, &index)
: OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
OMX_ERRORTYPE xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
name = nativeBufferName; // set name for debugging
negotiatedType = requestedType;
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
err = OMX_GetExtensionIndex(mHandle, name, &index);
xerr = err;
if (err == OMX_ErrorNone) {
negotiatedType =
requestedType == kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer
? kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource : requestedType;
err = OMX_SetParameter(mHandle, index, ¶ms);
}
}
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (err == OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
CLOGW("component does not support metadata mode; using fallback");
} else if (xerr != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(getExtensionIndex, xerr, "%s", name);
} else {
CLOG_ERROR(setParameter, err, "%s(%#x): %s:%u en=%d type=%d", name, index,
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable, negotiatedType);
}
negotiatedType = mMetadataType[portIndex];
} else {
if (!enable) {
negotiatedType = kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
}
mMetadataType[portIndex] = negotiatedType;
}
CLOG_CONFIG(storeMetaDataInBuffers, "%s:%u %srequested %s:%d negotiated %s:%d",
portString(portIndex), portIndex, enable ? "" : "UN",
asString(requestedType), requestedType, asString(negotiatedType), negotiatedType);
if (type != NULL) {
*type = negotiatedType;
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
| 174,140 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int fetch_uidl(char *line, void *data)
{
int i, index;
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
char *endp = NULL;
errno = 0;
index = strtol(line, &endp, 10);
if (errno)
return -1;
while (*endp == ' ')
endp++;
memmove(line, endp, strlen(endp) + 1);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
if (mutt_str_strcmp(line, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0)
break;
if (i == ctx->msgcount)
{
mutt_debug(1, "new header %d %s\n", index, line);
if (i >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
ctx->msgcount++;
ctx->hdrs[i] = mutt_header_new();
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = mutt_str_strdup(line);
}
else if (ctx->hdrs[i]->index != index - 1)
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index - 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ensure UID in fetch_uidl
CWE ID: CWE-824 | static int fetch_uidl(char *line, void *data)
{
int i, index;
struct Context *ctx = (struct Context *) data;
struct PopData *pop_data = (struct PopData *) ctx->data;
char *endp = NULL;
errno = 0;
index = strtol(line, &endp, 10);
if (errno)
return -1;
while (*endp == ' ')
endp++;
memmove(line, endp, strlen(endp) + 1);
/* uid must be at least be 1 byte */
if (strlen(line) == 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
if (mutt_str_strcmp(line, ctx->hdrs[i]->data) == 0)
break;
if (i == ctx->msgcount)
{
mutt_debug(1, "new header %d %s\n", index, line);
if (i >= ctx->hdrmax)
mx_alloc_memory(ctx);
ctx->msgcount++;
ctx->hdrs[i] = mutt_header_new();
ctx->hdrs[i]->data = mutt_str_strdup(line);
}
else if (ctx->hdrs[i]->index != index - 1)
pop_data->clear_cache = true;
ctx->hdrs[i]->refno = index;
ctx->hdrs[i]->index = index - 1;
return 0;
}
| 169,136 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPreview(const base::DictionaryValue& settings) {
print_preview_context_.OnPrintPreview();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("PrintPreview.PreviewEvent",
PREVIEW_EVENT_REQUESTED, PREVIEW_EVENT_MAX);
if (!print_preview_context_.source_frame()) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(print_preview_context_.source_frame(),
print_preview_context_.source_node(), settings)) {
if (print_preview_context_.last_error() != PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING) {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewInvalidPrinterSettings(
routing_id(), print_pages_params_
? print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie
: 0));
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false; // Already sent.
}
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (print_pages_params_->params.is_first_request &&
!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable()) {
PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument_Params options;
if (SetOptionsFromPdfDocument(&options))
Send(new PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument(routing_id(), options));
}
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_ = false;
print_pages_params_->params.supports_alpha_blend = true;
bool generate_draft_pages = false;
if (!settings.GetBoolean(kSettingGenerateDraftData, &generate_draft_pages)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
print_preview_context_.set_generate_draft_pages(generate_draft_pages);
PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument();
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPreview(const base::DictionaryValue& settings) {
CHECK_LE(ipc_nesting_level_, 1);
print_preview_context_.OnPrintPreview();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("PrintPreview.PreviewEvent",
PREVIEW_EVENT_REQUESTED, PREVIEW_EVENT_MAX);
if (!print_preview_context_.source_frame()) {
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(print_preview_context_.source_frame(),
print_preview_context_.source_node(), settings)) {
if (print_preview_context_.last_error() != PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING) {
Send(new PrintHostMsg_PrintPreviewInvalidPrinterSettings(
routing_id(), print_pages_params_
? print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie
: 0));
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false; // Already sent.
}
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PREVIEW);
return;
}
if (print_pages_params_->params.is_first_request &&
!print_preview_context_.IsModifiable()) {
PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument_Params options;
if (SetOptionsFromPdfDocument(&options))
Send(new PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument(routing_id(), options));
}
is_print_ready_metafile_sent_ = false;
print_pages_params_->params.supports_alpha_blend = true;
bool generate_draft_pages = false;
if (!settings.GetBoolean(kSettingGenerateDraftData, &generate_draft_pages)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
print_preview_context_.set_generate_draft_pages(generate_draft_pages);
PrepareFrameForPreviewDocument();
}
| 171,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: init_rc(void)
{
int i;
struct stat st;
FILE *f;
if (rc_dir != NULL)
goto open_rc;
rc_dir = expandPath(RC_DIR);
i = strlen(rc_dir);
if (i > 1 && rc_dir[i - 1] == '/')
rc_dir[i - 1] = '\0';
#ifdef USE_M17N
display_charset_str = wc_get_ces_list();
document_charset_str = display_charset_str;
system_charset_str = display_charset_str;
#endif
if (stat(rc_dir, &st) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT) { /* no directory */
if (do_mkdir(rc_dir, 0700) < 0) {
/* fprintf(stderr, "Can't create config directory (%s)!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
else {
stat(rc_dir, &st);
}
}
else {
/* fprintf(stderr, "Can't open config directory (%s)!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
}
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
/* not a directory */
/* fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a directory!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
if (!(st.st_mode & S_IWUSR)) {
/* fprintf(stderr, "%s is not writable!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
no_rc_dir = FALSE;
tmp_dir = rc_dir;
if (config_file == NULL)
config_file = rcFile(CONFIG_FILE);
create_option_search_table();
open_rc:
/* open config file */
if ((f = fopen(etcFile(W3MCONFIG), "rt")) != NULL) {
interpret_rc(f);
fclose(f);
}
if ((f = fopen(confFile(CONFIG_FILE), "rt")) != NULL) {
interpret_rc(f);
fclose(f);
}
if (config_file && (f = fopen(config_file, "rt")) != NULL) {
interpret_rc(f);
fclose(f);
}
return;
rc_dir_err:
no_rc_dir = TRUE;
if (((tmp_dir = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL || *tmp_dir == '\0') &&
((tmp_dir = getenv("TMP")) == NULL || *tmp_dir == '\0') &&
((tmp_dir = getenv("TEMP")) == NULL || *tmp_dir == '\0'))
tmp_dir = "/tmp";
create_option_search_table();
goto open_rc;
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59 | init_rc(void)
{
int i;
struct stat st;
FILE *f;
if (rc_dir != NULL)
goto open_rc;
rc_dir = expandPath(RC_DIR);
i = strlen(rc_dir);
if (i > 1 && rc_dir[i - 1] == '/')
rc_dir[i - 1] = '\0';
#ifdef USE_M17N
display_charset_str = wc_get_ces_list();
document_charset_str = display_charset_str;
system_charset_str = display_charset_str;
#endif
if (stat(rc_dir, &st) < 0) {
if (errno == ENOENT) { /* no directory */
if (do_mkdir(rc_dir, 0700) < 0) {
/* fprintf(stderr, "Can't create config directory (%s)!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
else {
stat(rc_dir, &st);
}
}
else {
/* fprintf(stderr, "Can't open config directory (%s)!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
}
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
/* not a directory */
/* fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a directory!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
if (!(st.st_mode & S_IWUSR)) {
/* fprintf(stderr, "%s is not writable!\n", rc_dir); */
goto rc_dir_err;
}
no_rc_dir = FALSE;
tmp_dir = rc_dir;
if (config_file == NULL)
config_file = rcFile(CONFIG_FILE);
create_option_search_table();
open_rc:
/* open config file */
if ((f = fopen(etcFile(W3MCONFIG), "rt")) != NULL) {
interpret_rc(f);
fclose(f);
}
if ((f = fopen(confFile(CONFIG_FILE), "rt")) != NULL) {
interpret_rc(f);
fclose(f);
}
if (config_file && (f = fopen(config_file, "rt")) != NULL) {
interpret_rc(f);
fclose(f);
}
return;
rc_dir_err:
no_rc_dir = TRUE;
if (((tmp_dir = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL || *tmp_dir == '\0') &&
((tmp_dir = getenv("TMP")) == NULL || *tmp_dir == '\0') &&
((tmp_dir = getenv("TEMP")) == NULL || *tmp_dir == '\0'))
tmp_dir = "/tmp";
#ifdef HAVE_MKDTEMP
tmp_dir = mkdtemp(Strnew_m_charp(tmp_dir, "/w3m-XXXXXX", NULL)->ptr);
if (tmp_dir == NULL)
tmp_dir = rc_dir;
#endif
create_option_search_table();
goto open_rc;
}
| 169,346 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void wifi_cleanup(wifi_handle handle, wifi_cleaned_up_handler handler)
{
hal_info *info = getHalInfo(handle);
char buf[64];
info->cleaned_up_handler = handler;
if (write(info->cleanup_socks[0], "Exit", 4) < 1) {
ALOGE("could not write to the cleanup socket");
} else {
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
int result = read(info->cleanup_socks[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
ALOGE("%s: Read after POLL returned %d, error no = %d", __FUNCTION__, result, errno);
if (strncmp(buf, "Done", 4) == 0) {
ALOGE("Event processing terminated");
} else {
ALOGD("Rx'ed %s", buf);
}
}
info->clean_up = true;
pthread_mutex_lock(&info->cb_lock);
int bad_commands = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < info->num_event_cb; i++) {
cb_info *cbi = &(info->event_cb[i]);
WifiCommand *cmd = (WifiCommand *)cbi->cb_arg;
ALOGI("Command left in event_cb %p:%s", cmd, (cmd ? cmd->getType(): ""));
}
while (info->num_cmd > bad_commands) {
int num_cmd = info->num_cmd;
cmd_info *cmdi = &(info->cmd[bad_commands]);
WifiCommand *cmd = cmdi->cmd;
if (cmd != NULL) {
ALOGI("Cancelling command %p:%s", cmd, cmd->getType());
pthread_mutex_unlock(&info->cb_lock);
cmd->cancel();
pthread_mutex_lock(&info->cb_lock);
/* release reference added when command is saved */
cmd->releaseRef();
if (num_cmd == info->num_cmd) {
ALOGI("Cancelling command %p:%s did not work", cmd, (cmd ? cmd->getType(): ""));
bad_commands++;
}
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < info->num_event_cb; i++) {
cb_info *cbi = &(info->event_cb[i]);
WifiCommand *cmd = (WifiCommand *)cbi->cb_arg;
ALOGE("Leaked command %p", cmd);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&info->cb_lock);
internal_cleaned_up_handler(handle);
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in wifi_cleanup()
Release reference to cmd only after possibly calling getType().
BUG: 25753768
Change-Id: Id2156ce51acec04e8364706cf7eafc7d4adae9eb
(cherry picked from commit d7f3cb9915d9ac514393d0ad7767662958054b8f https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/815223)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void wifi_cleanup(wifi_handle handle, wifi_cleaned_up_handler handler)
{
hal_info *info = getHalInfo(handle);
char buf[64];
info->cleaned_up_handler = handler;
if (write(info->cleanup_socks[0], "Exit", 4) < 1) {
ALOGE("could not write to the cleanup socket");
} else {
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
int result = read(info->cleanup_socks[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
ALOGE("%s: Read after POLL returned %d, error no = %d", __FUNCTION__, result, errno);
if (strncmp(buf, "Done", 4) == 0) {
ALOGE("Event processing terminated");
} else {
ALOGD("Rx'ed %s", buf);
}
}
info->clean_up = true;
pthread_mutex_lock(&info->cb_lock);
int bad_commands = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < info->num_event_cb; i++) {
cb_info *cbi = &(info->event_cb[i]);
WifiCommand *cmd = (WifiCommand *)cbi->cb_arg;
ALOGI("Command left in event_cb %p:%s", cmd, (cmd ? cmd->getType(): ""));
}
while (info->num_cmd > bad_commands) {
int num_cmd = info->num_cmd;
cmd_info *cmdi = &(info->cmd[bad_commands]);
WifiCommand *cmd = cmdi->cmd;
if (cmd != NULL) {
ALOGI("Cancelling command %p:%s", cmd, cmd->getType());
pthread_mutex_unlock(&info->cb_lock);
cmd->cancel();
pthread_mutex_lock(&info->cb_lock);
if (num_cmd == info->num_cmd) {
ALOGI("Cancelling command %p:%s did not work", cmd, (cmd ? cmd->getType(): ""));
bad_commands++;
}
/* release reference added when command is saved */
cmd->releaseRef();
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < info->num_event_cb; i++) {
cb_info *cbi = &(info->event_cb[i]);
WifiCommand *cmd = (WifiCommand *)cbi->cb_arg;
ALOGE("Leaked command %p", cmd);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&info->cb_lock);
internal_cleaned_up_handler(handle);
}
| 173,964 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: __reiserfs_set_acl(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th, struct inode *inode,
int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
char *name;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_equiv_mode(acl, &inode->i_mode);
if (error < 0)
return error;
else {
if (error == 0)
acl = NULL;
}
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = reiserfs_posix_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
error = reiserfs_xattr_set_handle(th, inode, name, value, size, 0);
/*
* Ensure that the inode gets dirtied if we're only using
* the mode bits and an old ACL didn't exist. We don't need
* to check if the inode is hashed here since we won't get
* called by reiserfs_inherit_default_acl().
*/
if (error == -ENODATA) {
error = 0;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
}
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | __reiserfs_set_acl(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th, struct inode *inode,
int type, struct posix_acl *acl)
{
char *name;
void *value = NULL;
size_t size = 0;
int error;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS;
if (acl) {
error = posix_acl_update_mode(inode, &inode->i_mode, &acl);
if (error)
return error;
}
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
name = XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
return acl ? -EACCES : 0;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (acl) {
value = reiserfs_posix_acl_to_disk(acl, &size);
if (IS_ERR(value))
return (int)PTR_ERR(value);
}
error = reiserfs_xattr_set_handle(th, inode, name, value, size, 0);
/*
* Ensure that the inode gets dirtied if we're only using
* the mode bits and an old ACL didn't exist. We don't need
* to check if the inode is hashed here since we won't get
* called by reiserfs_inherit_default_acl().
*/
if (error == -ENODATA) {
error = 0;
if (type == ACL_TYPE_ACCESS) {
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
}
kfree(value);
if (!error)
set_cached_acl(inode, type, acl);
return error;
}
| 166,978 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int dns_read_name(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char *bufend,
unsigned char *name, char *destination, int dest_len,
int *offset)
{
int nb_bytes = 0, n = 0;
int label_len;
unsigned char *reader = name;
char *dest = destination;
while (1) {
/* Name compression is in use */
if ((*reader & 0xc0) == 0xc0) {
/* Must point BEFORE current position */
if ((buffer + reader[1]) > reader)
goto err;
n = dns_read_name(buffer, bufend, buffer + reader[1],
dest, dest_len - nb_bytes, offset);
if (n == 0)
goto err;
}
label_len = *reader;
if (label_len == 0)
goto out;
/* Check if:
* - we won't read outside the buffer
* - there is enough place in the destination
*/
if ((reader + label_len >= bufend) || (nb_bytes + label_len >= dest_len))
goto err;
/* +1 to take label len + label string */
label_len++;
memcpy(dest, reader, label_len);
dest += label_len;
nb_bytes += label_len;
reader += label_len;
}
out:
/* offset computation:
* parse from <name> until finding either NULL or a pointer "c0xx"
*/
reader = name;
*offset = 0;
while (reader < bufend) {
if ((reader[0] & 0xc0) == 0xc0) {
*offset += 2;
break;
}
else if (*reader == 0) {
*offset += 1;
break;
}
*offset += 1;
++reader;
}
return nb_bytes;
err:
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | int dns_read_name(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char *bufend,
unsigned char *name, char *destination, int dest_len,
int *offset, unsigned int depth)
{
int nb_bytes = 0, n = 0;
int label_len;
unsigned char *reader = name;
char *dest = destination;
while (1) {
/* Name compression is in use */
if ((*reader & 0xc0) == 0xc0) {
/* Must point BEFORE current position */
if ((buffer + reader[1]) > reader)
goto err;
if (depth++ > 100)
goto err;
n = dns_read_name(buffer, bufend, buffer + reader[1],
dest, dest_len - nb_bytes, offset, depth);
if (n == 0)
goto err;
}
label_len = *reader;
if (label_len == 0)
goto out;
/* Check if:
* - we won't read outside the buffer
* - there is enough place in the destination
*/
if ((reader + label_len >= bufend) || (nb_bytes + label_len >= dest_len))
goto err;
/* +1 to take label len + label string */
label_len++;
memcpy(dest, reader, label_len);
dest += label_len;
nb_bytes += label_len;
reader += label_len;
}
out:
/* offset computation:
* parse from <name> until finding either NULL or a pointer "c0xx"
*/
reader = name;
*offset = 0;
while (reader < bufend) {
if ((reader[0] & 0xc0) == 0xc0) {
*offset += 2;
break;
}
else if (*reader == 0) {
*offset += 1;
break;
}
*offset += 1;
++reader;
}
return nb_bytes;
err:
return 0;
}
| 164,599 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline void build_tablename(smart_str *querystr, PGconn *pg_link, const char *table) /* {{{ */
{
char *table_copy, *escaped, *token, *tmp;
size_t len;
/* schame.table should be "schame"."table" */
table_copy = estrdup(table);
token = php_strtok_r(table_copy, ".", &tmp);
len = strlen(token);
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(token, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(querystr, token, len);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
if (tmp && *tmp) {
len = strlen(tmp);
/* "schema"."table" format */
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(tmp, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appendl(querystr, tmp, len);
} else {
escaped = PGSQLescapeIdentifier(pg_link, tmp, len);
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appends(querystr, escaped);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
}
efree(table_copy);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | static inline void build_tablename(smart_str *querystr, PGconn *pg_link, const char *table) /* {{{ */
{
char *table_copy, *escaped, *token, *tmp;
size_t len;
/* schame.table should be "schame"."table" */
table_copy = estrdup(table);
token = php_strtok_r(table_copy, ".", &tmp);
if (token == NULL) {
token = table;
}
len = strlen(token);
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(token, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(querystr, token, len);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
if (tmp && *tmp) {
len = strlen(tmp);
/* "schema"."table" format */
if (_php_pgsql_detect_identifier_escape(tmp, len) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appendl(querystr, tmp, len);
} else {
escaped = PGSQLescapeIdentifier(pg_link, tmp, len);
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '.');
smart_str_appends(querystr, escaped);
PGSQLfree(escaped);
}
}
efree(table_copy);
}
/* }}} */
| 164,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Editor::ChangeSelectionAfterCommand(
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection,
const SetSelectionData& options) {
if (new_selection.IsNone())
return;
bool selection_did_not_change_dom_position =
new_selection == GetFrame().Selection().GetSelectionInDOMTree();
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder(new_selection)
.SetIsHandleVisible(GetFrame().Selection().IsHandleVisible())
.Build(),
options);
if (selection_did_not_change_dom_position) {
Client().RespondToChangedSelection(
frame_, GetFrame().Selection().GetSelectionInDOMTree().Type());
}
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Editor::ChangeSelectionAfterCommand(
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection,
const SetSelectionData& options) {
if (new_selection.IsNone())
return;
bool selection_did_not_change_dom_position =
new_selection == GetFrame().Selection().GetSelectionInDOMTree();
GetFrame().Selection().SetSelection(
new_selection,
SetSelectionData::Builder(options)
.SetShouldShowHandle(GetFrame().Selection().IsHandleVisible())
.Build());
if (selection_did_not_change_dom_position) {
Client().RespondToChangedSelection(
frame_, GetFrame().Selection().GetSelectionInDOMTree().Type());
}
}
| 171,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool mkvparser::Match(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long& pos,
unsigned long id_,
unsigned char*& buf,
size_t& buflen)
{
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; //consume id
const long long size_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size_ >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; //consume length of size of payload
assert((pos + size_) <= available);
const long buflen_ = static_cast<long>(size_);
buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen_];
assert(buf); //TODO
status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen_, buf);
assert(status == 0); //TODO
buflen = buflen_;
pos += size_; //consume size of payload
return true;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool mkvparser::Match(
bool mkvparser::Match(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos, unsigned long id_,
unsigned char*& buf, size_t& buflen) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
long long total, available;
long status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
assert(status >= 0);
assert((total < 0) || (available <= total));
if (status < 0)
return false;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
if ((unsigned long)id != id_)
return false;
pos += len; // consume id
const long long size_ = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size_ >= 0);
assert(len > 0);
assert(len <= 8);
assert((pos + len) <= available);
pos += len; // consume length of size of payload
assert((pos + size_) <= available);
const long buflen_ = static_cast<long>(size_);
buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen_];
assert(buf); // TODO
status = pReader->Read(pos, buflen_, buf);
assert(status == 0); // TODO
buflen = buflen_;
pos += size_; // consume size of payload
return true;
}
| 174,399 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t AMRSource::read(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
*out = NULL;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
size_t size;
int64_t seekFrame = seekTimeUs / 20000ll; // 20ms per frame.
mCurrentTimeUs = seekFrame * 20000ll;
size_t index = seekFrame < 0 ? 0 : seekFrame / 50;
if (index >= mOffsetTableLength) {
index = mOffsetTableLength - 1;
}
mOffset = mOffsetTable[index] + (mIsWide ? 9 : 6);
for (size_t i = 0; i< seekFrame - index * 50; i++) {
status_t err;
if ((err = getFrameSizeByOffset(mDataSource, mOffset,
mIsWide, &size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
mOffset += size;
}
}
uint8_t header;
ssize_t n = mDataSource->readAt(mOffset, &header, 1);
if (n < 1) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (header & 0x83) {
ALOGE("padding bits must be 0, header is 0x%02x", header);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
unsigned FT = (header >> 3) & 0x0f;
size_t frameSize = getFrameSize(mIsWide, FT);
if (frameSize == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
MediaBuffer *buffer;
status_t err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&buffer);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
n = mDataSource->readAt(mOffset, buffer->data(), frameSize);
if (n != (ssize_t)frameSize) {
buffer->release();
buffer = NULL;
if (n < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
} else {
mOffset += n;
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
}
buffer->set_range(0, frameSize);
buffer->meta_data()->setInt64(kKeyTime, mCurrentTimeUs);
buffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
mOffset += frameSize;
mCurrentTimeUs += 20000; // Each frame is 20ms
*out = buffer;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | status_t AMRSource::read(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
*out = NULL;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (mOffsetTableLength > 0 && options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
size_t size;
int64_t seekFrame = seekTimeUs / 20000ll; // 20ms per frame.
mCurrentTimeUs = seekFrame * 20000ll;
size_t index = seekFrame < 0 ? 0 : seekFrame / 50;
if (index >= mOffsetTableLength) {
index = mOffsetTableLength - 1;
}
mOffset = mOffsetTable[index] + (mIsWide ? 9 : 6);
for (size_t i = 0; i< seekFrame - index * 50; i++) {
status_t err;
if ((err = getFrameSizeByOffset(mDataSource, mOffset,
mIsWide, &size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
mOffset += size;
}
}
uint8_t header;
ssize_t n = mDataSource->readAt(mOffset, &header, 1);
if (n < 1) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (header & 0x83) {
ALOGE("padding bits must be 0, header is 0x%02x", header);
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
unsigned FT = (header >> 3) & 0x0f;
size_t frameSize = getFrameSize(mIsWide, FT);
if (frameSize == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
MediaBuffer *buffer;
status_t err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&buffer);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
n = mDataSource->readAt(mOffset, buffer->data(), frameSize);
if (n != (ssize_t)frameSize) {
buffer->release();
buffer = NULL;
if (n < 0) {
return ERROR_IO;
} else {
mOffset += n;
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
}
buffer->set_range(0, frameSize);
buffer->meta_data()->setInt64(kKeyTime, mCurrentTimeUs);
buffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
mOffset += frameSize;
mCurrentTimeUs += 20000; // Each frame is 20ms
*out = buffer;
return OK;
}
| 174,002 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoInitialize(const DoInitializeOptions& options) {
DCHECK(!sync_loop_);
sync_loop_ = options.sync_loop;
DCHECK(sync_loop_);
if (options.delete_sync_data_folder) {
DeleteSyncDataFolder();
}
bool success = file_util::CreateDirectory(sync_data_folder_path_);
DCHECK(success);
DCHECK(!registrar_);
registrar_ = options.registrar;
DCHECK(registrar_);
sync_manager_.reset(new sync_api::SyncManager(name_));
sync_manager_->AddObserver(this);
success = sync_manager_->Init(
sync_data_folder_path_,
options.event_handler,
options.service_url.host() + options.service_url.path(),
options.service_url.EffectiveIntPort(),
options.service_url.SchemeIsSecure(),
BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool(),
options.make_http_bridge_factory_fn.Run(),
options.registrar /* as ModelSafeWorkerRegistrar */,
options.extensions_activity_monitor,
options.registrar /* as SyncManager::ChangeDelegate */,
MakeUserAgentForSyncApi(),
options.credentials,
true,
new BridgedSyncNotifier(
options.chrome_sync_notification_bridge,
options.sync_notifier_factory->CreateSyncNotifier()),
options.restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
options.testing_mode,
&encryptor_,
options.unrecoverable_error_handler,
options.report_unrecoverable_error_function);
LOG_IF(ERROR, !success) << "Syncapi initialization failed!";
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kSyncThrowUnrecoverableError)) {
sync_manager_->ThrowUnrecoverableError();
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoInitialize(const DoInitializeOptions& options) {
DCHECK(!sync_loop_);
sync_loop_ = options.sync_loop;
DCHECK(sync_loop_);
if (options.delete_sync_data_folder) {
DeleteSyncDataFolder();
}
bool success = file_util::CreateDirectory(sync_data_folder_path_);
DCHECK(success);
DCHECK(!registrar_);
registrar_ = options.registrar;
DCHECK(registrar_);
sync_manager_.reset(new sync_api::SyncManager(name_));
sync_manager_->AddObserver(this);
success = sync_manager_->Init(
sync_data_folder_path_,
options.event_handler,
options.service_url.host() + options.service_url.path(),
options.service_url.EffectiveIntPort(),
options.service_url.SchemeIsSecure(),
BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool(),
options.make_http_bridge_factory_fn.Run(),
options.registrar /* as ModelSafeWorkerRegistrar */,
options.extensions_activity_monitor,
options.registrar /* as SyncManager::ChangeDelegate */,
MakeUserAgentForSyncApi(),
options.credentials,
new BridgedSyncNotifier(
options.chrome_sync_notification_bridge,
options.sync_notifier_factory->CreateSyncNotifier()),
options.restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
options.testing_mode,
&encryptor_,
options.unrecoverable_error_handler,
options.report_unrecoverable_error_function);
LOG_IF(ERROR, !success) << "Syncapi initialization failed!";
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kSyncThrowUnrecoverableError)) {
sync_manager_->ThrowUnrecoverableError();
}
}
| 170,785 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int a2dp_ctrl_receive(struct a2dp_stream_common *common, void* buffer, int length)
{
int ret = recv(common->ctrl_fd, buffer, length, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
if (ret < 0)
{
ERROR("ack failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EINTR)
{
/* retry again */
ret = recv(common->ctrl_fd, buffer, length, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
if (ret < 0)
{
ERROR("ack failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
}
else
{
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int a2dp_ctrl_receive(struct a2dp_stream_common *common, void* buffer, int length)
{
int ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(common->ctrl_fd, buffer, length, MSG_NOSIGNAL));
if (ret < 0)
{
ERROR("ack failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EINTR)
{
/* retry again */
ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(common->ctrl_fd, buffer, length, MSG_NOSIGNAL));
if (ret < 0)
{
ERROR("ack failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
}
else
{
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
return -1;
}
}
return ret;
}
| 173,423 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_end_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD8 u1_is_idr_slice,
UWORD16 u2_frame_num)
{
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
WORD32 ret;
ps_dec->u2_mbx = 0xffff;
ps_dec->u2_mby = 0;
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_processing(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
ps_dec->u2_total_mbs_coded = 0;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt - calculate the Pic Order Cnt */
/* Needed to detect end of picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
pocstruct_t *ps_prev_poc = &ps_dec->s_prev_pic_poc;
pocstruct_t *ps_cur_poc = &ps_dec->s_cur_pic_poc;
if((0 == u1_is_idr_slice) && ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
if(u1_is_idr_slice || ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5)
ps_dec->u2_prev_ref_frame_num = 0;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u1_gaps_in_frame_num_value_allowed_flag)
{
ret = ih264d_decode_gaps_in_frame_num(ps_dec, u2_frame_num);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
ps_prev_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst = ps_cur_poc->i4_prev_frame_num_ofst;
ps_prev_poc->u2_frame_num = ps_cur_poc->u2_frame_num;
ps_prev_poc->u1_mmco_equalto5 = ps_cur_slice->u1_mmco_equalto5;
if(ps_cur_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc)
{
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_lsb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb = ps_cur_poc->i4_pic_order_cnt_msb;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt_bottom;
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[0];
ps_prev_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1] =
ps_cur_poc->i4_delta_pic_order_cnt[1];
ps_prev_poc->u1_bot_field = ps_cur_poc->u1_bot_field;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Moved end of pic processing to end of decode call
ih264d_end_of_pic() was called after parsing slice of a new picture.
This is now being done at the end of decode of the current picture.
decode_gaps_in_frame_num which needs frame_num of new slice is now
done after decoding frame_num in new slice.
This helps in handling errors in picaff streams with gaps in frames
Bug: 33588051
Bug: 33641588
Bug: 34097231
Change-Id: I1a26e611aaa2c19e2043e05a210849bd21b22220
CWE ID: CWE-119 | WORD32 ih264d_end_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
WORD32 ih264d_end_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec)
{
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
WORD32 ret;
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_processing(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt - calculate the Pic Order Cnt */
/* Needed to detect end of picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
| 174,056 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl;
int instance = 0;
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
char *rem_addr = NULL;
char *community = "public";
char Opts[256];
int arg;
char *command;
int i;
/* Get options at the command line (overide default values) */
strcpy(Opts, "i:d:h-");
while ((arg = getopt(argc, argv, Opts)) != EOF) {
switch (arg) {
case 'h':
case '-':
usage(argv[0]);
return(0);
case 'i':
instance = atol(optarg);
break;
case 'd':
rem_addr = optarg;
break;
default:
usage(argv[0]);
return(-1);
}
}
if(optind >= argc){
fprintf(stderr, "Command required\n");
usage(argv[0]);
return -1;
}
command = argv[optind++];
printf("Connecting to %s FM instance %d\n", (rem_addr==NULL) ? "LOCAL":rem_addr, instance);
if((res = fm_mgr_config_init(&hdl,instance, rem_addr, community)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize the client handle: %d\n", res);
goto die_clean;
}
if((res = fm_mgr_config_connect(hdl)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect: (%d) %s\n",res,fm_mgr_get_error_str(res));
goto die_clean;
}
for(i=0;i<commandListLen;i++){
if(strcmp(command,commandList[i].name) == 0){
return commandList[i].cmdPtr(hdl, commandList[i].mgr, (argc - optind), &argv[optind]);
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "Command (%s) is not valid\n",command);
usage(argv[0]);
res = -1;
die_clean:
if (hdl) free(hdl);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl = NULL;
int instance = 0;
fm_mgr_config_errno_t res;
char *rem_addr = NULL;
char *community = "public";
char Opts[256];
int arg;
char *command;
int i;
/* Get options at the command line (overide default values) */
strcpy(Opts, "i:d:h-");
while ((arg = getopt(argc, argv, Opts)) != EOF) {
switch (arg) {
case 'h':
case '-':
usage(argv[0]);
return(0);
case 'i':
instance = atol(optarg);
break;
case 'd':
rem_addr = optarg;
break;
default:
usage(argv[0]);
return(-1);
}
}
if(optind >= argc){
fprintf(stderr, "Command required\n");
usage(argv[0]);
return -1;
}
command = argv[optind++];
printf("Connecting to %s FM instance %d\n", (rem_addr==NULL) ? "LOCAL":rem_addr, instance);
if((res = fm_mgr_config_init(&hdl,instance, rem_addr, community)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize the client handle: %d\n", res);
goto cleanup;
}
if((res = fm_mgr_config_connect(hdl)) != FM_CONF_OK)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to connect: (%d) %s\n",res,fm_mgr_get_error_str(res));
goto cleanup;
}
for(i=0;i<commandListLen;i++){
if(strcmp(command,commandList[i].name) == 0){
res = commandList[i].cmdPtr(hdl, commandList[i].mgr, (argc - optind), &argv[optind]);
goto cleanup;
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "Command (%s) is not valid\n",command);
usage(argv[0]);
res = -1;
cleanup:
if (hdl)
{
if (hdl->sm_hdl)
{
if (hdl->sm_hdl->c_path[0])
unlink(hdl->sm_hdl->c_path);
}
if (hdl->pm_hdl)
{
if (hdl->pm_hdl->c_path[0])
unlink(hdl->pm_hdl->c_path);
}
if (hdl->fe_hdl)
{
if (hdl->fe_hdl->c_path[0])
unlink(hdl->fe_hdl->c_path);
}
free(hdl);
}
return res;
}
| 170,127 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint8_t rfc_parse_data(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, MX_FRAME* p_frame, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t ead, eal, fcs;
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
uint8_t* p_start = p_data;
uint16_t len;
if (p_buf->len < RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length1: %d", p_buf->len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_CTRL_FIELD(ead, p_frame->cr, p_frame->dlci, p_data);
if (!ead) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Address(EA must be 1)");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_TYPE_FIELD(p_frame->type, p_frame->pf, p_data);
RFCOMM_PARSE_LEN_FIELD(eal, len, p_data);
p_buf->len -= (3 + !ead + !eal + 1); /* Additional 1 for FCS */
p_buf->offset += (3 + !ead + !eal);
/* handle credit if credit based flow control */
if ((p_mcb->flow == PORT_FC_CREDIT) && (p_frame->type == RFCOMM_UIH) &&
(p_frame->dlci != RFCOMM_MX_DLCI) && (p_frame->pf == 1)) {
p_frame->credit = *p_data++;
p_buf->len--;
p_buf->offset++;
} else
p_frame->credit = 0;
if (p_buf->len != len) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length2 %d %d", p_buf->len, len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
fcs = *(p_data + len);
/* All control frames that we are sending are sent with P=1, expect */
/* reply with F=1 */
/* According to TS 07.10 spec ivalid frames are discarded without */
/* notification to the sender */
switch (p_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_SABME:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad SABME");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_SABME);
case RFCOMM_UA:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UA");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UA);
case RFCOMM_DM:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) || len ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DM");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DM);
case RFCOMM_DISC:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DISC");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DISC);
case RFCOMM_UIH:
if (!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - invalid DLCI");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (!rfc_check_fcs(2, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - FCS");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr)) {
/* we assume that this is ok to allow bad implementations to work */
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - response");
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
}
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
Commit Message: Add bound check for rfc_parse_data
Bug: 78288018
Test: manual
Change-Id: I44349cd22c141483d01bce0f5a2131b727d0feb0
(cherry picked from commit 6039cb7225733195192b396ad19c528800feb735)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | uint8_t rfc_parse_data(tRFC_MCB* p_mcb, MX_FRAME* p_frame, BT_HDR* p_buf) {
uint8_t ead, eal, fcs;
uint8_t* p_data = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + p_buf->offset;
uint8_t* p_start = p_data;
uint16_t len;
if (p_buf->len < RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length1: %d", p_buf->len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_CTRL_FIELD(ead, p_frame->cr, p_frame->dlci, p_data);
if (!ead) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Address(EA must be 1)");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
RFCOMM_PARSE_TYPE_FIELD(p_frame->type, p_frame->pf, p_data);
eal = *(p_data)&RFCOMM_EA;
len = *(p_data)++ >> RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH1;
if (eal == 0 && p_buf->len < RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN) {
len += (*(p_data)++ << RFCOMM_SHIFT_LENGTH2);
} else if (eal == 0) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length when EAL = 0: %d", p_buf->len);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "78288018");
return RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME;
}
p_buf->len -= (3 + !ead + !eal + 1); /* Additional 1 for FCS */
p_buf->offset += (3 + !ead + !eal);
/* handle credit if credit based flow control */
if ((p_mcb->flow == PORT_FC_CREDIT) && (p_frame->type == RFCOMM_UIH) &&
(p_frame->dlci != RFCOMM_MX_DLCI) && (p_frame->pf == 1)) {
p_frame->credit = *p_data++;
p_buf->len--;
p_buf->offset++;
} else
p_frame->credit = 0;
if (p_buf->len != len) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad Length2 %d %d", p_buf->len, len);
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
fcs = *(p_data + len);
/* All control frames that we are sending are sent with P=1, expect */
/* reply with F=1 */
/* According to TS 07.10 spec ivalid frames are discarded without */
/* notification to the sender */
switch (p_frame->type) {
case RFCOMM_SABME:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad SABME");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_SABME);
case RFCOMM_UA:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UA");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UA);
case RFCOMM_DM:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_CMD(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) || len ||
!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DM");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DM);
case RFCOMM_DISC:
if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr) ||
!p_frame->pf || len || !RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci) ||
!rfc_check_fcs(RFCOMM_CTRL_FRAME_LEN, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad DISC");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_DISC);
case RFCOMM_UIH:
if (!RFCOMM_VALID_DLCI(p_frame->dlci)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - invalid DLCI");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (!rfc_check_fcs(2, p_start, fcs)) {
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - FCS");
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
} else if (RFCOMM_FRAME_IS_RSP(p_mcb->is_initiator, p_frame->cr)) {
/* we assume that this is ok to allow bad implementations to work */
RFCOMM_TRACE_ERROR("Bad UIH - response");
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
} else
return (RFC_EVENT_UIH);
}
return (RFC_EVENT_BAD_FRAME);
}
| 174,612 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(GetActiveInputMethods());
return input_methods->size();
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual size_t GetNumActiveInputMethods() {
scoped_ptr<input_method::InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(
GetActiveInputMethods());
return input_methods->size();
}
| 170,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void registerBlobURLTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().registerBlobURL(blobRegistryContext->url, blobRegistryContext->blobData.release());
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | static void registerBlobURLTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry()) {
WebBlobData webBlobData(blobRegistryContext->blobData.release());
registry->registerBlobURL(blobRegistryContext->url, webBlobData);
}
}
| 170,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev1_nonce_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," n len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
} else if (1 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, (const u_char *)(const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ep))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835 | ikev1_nonce_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
/*
* Our caller has ensured that the length is >= 4.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," n len=%u", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (ntohs(e.len) > 4) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
} else if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, (const u_char *)(ext + 1), ep))
goto trunc;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RecordResourceCompletionUMA(bool image_complete,
bool css_complete,
bool xhr_complete) {
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Image",
image_complete);
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Css",
css_complete);
base::UmaHistogramBoolean("OfflinePages.Background.ResourceCompletion.Xhr",
xhr_complete);
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RecordResourceCompletionUMA(bool image_complete,
| 172,483 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int php_stream_temp_cast(php_stream *stream, int castas, void **ret TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
php_stream *file;
size_t memsize;
char *membuf;
off_t pos;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (php_stream_is(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_IS_STDIO)) {
return php_stream_cast(ts->innerstream, castas, ret, 0);
}
/* we are still using a memory based backing. If they are if we can be
* a FILE*, say yes because we can perform the conversion.
* If they actually want to perform the conversion, we need to switch
* the memory stream to a tmpfile stream */
if (ret == NULL && castas == PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO) {
return SUCCESS;
}
/* say "no" to other stream forms */
if (ret == NULL) {
return FAILURE;
}
/* perform the conversion and then pass the request on to the innerstream */
membuf = php_stream_memory_get_buffer(ts->innerstream, &memsize);
file = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
php_stream_write(file, membuf, memsize);
pos = php_stream_tell(ts->innerstream);
php_stream_free_enclosed(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE);
ts->innerstream = file;
php_stream_encloses(stream, ts->innerstream);
php_stream_seek(ts->innerstream, pos, SEEK_SET);
return php_stream_cast(ts->innerstream, castas, ret, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int php_stream_temp_cast(php_stream *stream, int castas, void **ret TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
php_stream *file;
size_t memsize;
char *membuf;
off_t pos;
assert(ts != NULL);
if (!ts->innerstream) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (php_stream_is(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_IS_STDIO)) {
return php_stream_cast(ts->innerstream, castas, ret, 0);
}
/* we are still using a memory based backing. If they are if we can be
* a FILE*, say yes because we can perform the conversion.
* If they actually want to perform the conversion, we need to switch
* the memory stream to a tmpfile stream */
if (ret == NULL && castas == PHP_STREAM_AS_STDIO) {
return SUCCESS;
}
/* say "no" to other stream forms */
if (ret == NULL) {
return FAILURE;
}
/* perform the conversion and then pass the request on to the innerstream */
membuf = php_stream_memory_get_buffer(ts->innerstream, &memsize);
file = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
php_stream_write(file, membuf, memsize);
pos = php_stream_tell(ts->innerstream);
php_stream_free_enclosed(ts->innerstream, PHP_STREAM_FREE_CLOSE);
ts->innerstream = file;
php_stream_encloses(stream, ts->innerstream);
php_stream_seek(ts->innerstream, pos, SEEK_SET);
return php_stream_cast(ts->innerstream, castas, ret, 1);
}
| 165,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (ipc_enabled_)
worker_delegate_->OnChannelConnected();
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!ipc_enabled_)
return;
// Verify |peer_pid| because it is controlled by the client and cannot be
// trusted.
DWORD actual_pid = launcher_delegate_->GetProcessId();
if (peer_pid != static_cast<int32>(actual_pid)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "The actual client PID " << actual_pid
<< " does not match the one reported by the client: "
<< peer_pid;
StopWorker();
return;
}
worker_delegate_->OnChannelConnected(peer_pid);
}
| 171,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool ndp_msg_check_valid(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
size_t len = ndp_msg_payload_len(msg);
enum ndp_msg_type msg_type = ndp_msg_type(msg);
if (len < ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->raw_struct_size)
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: libndb: reject redirect and router advertisements from non-link-local
RFC4861 suggests that these messages should only originate from
link-local addresses in 6.1.2 (RA) and 8.1. (redirect):
Mitigates CVE-2016-3698.
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static bool ndp_msg_check_valid(struct ndp_msg *msg)
{
size_t len = ndp_msg_payload_len(msg);
enum ndp_msg_type msg_type = ndp_msg_type(msg);
if (len < ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->raw_struct_size)
return false;
if (ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->addrto_validate)
return ndp_msg_type_info(msg_type)->addrto_validate(&msg->addrto);
else
return true;
}
| 169,971 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper::PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper(
ppapi::host::ResourceHost* resource_host,
Delegate* delegate,
PP_DeviceType_Dev device_type,
const GURL& document_url)
: resource_host_(resource_host),
delegate_(delegate),
device_type_(device_type),
document_url_(document_url) {}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper::PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper(
ppapi::host::ResourceHost* resource_host,
base::WeakPtr<Delegate> delegate,
PP_DeviceType_Dev device_type,
const GURL& document_url)
: resource_host_(resource_host),
delegate_(delegate),
device_type_(device_type),
document_url_(document_url) {}
| 171,604 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebContentsImpl::WebContentsImpl(BrowserContext* browser_context)
: delegate_(NULL),
controller_(this, browser_context),
render_view_host_delegate_view_(NULL),
created_with_opener_(false),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
accessible_parent_(NULL),
#endif
frame_tree_(new NavigatorImpl(&controller_, this),
this,
this,
this,
this),
is_loading_(false),
is_load_to_different_document_(false),
crashed_status_(base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING),
crashed_error_code_(0),
waiting_for_response_(false),
load_state_(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE, base::string16()),
upload_size_(0),
upload_position_(0),
is_resume_pending_(false),
displayed_insecure_content_(false),
has_accessed_initial_document_(false),
theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
last_sent_theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
did_first_visually_non_empty_paint_(false),
capturer_count_(0),
should_normally_be_visible_(true),
is_being_destroyed_(false),
notify_disconnection_(false),
dialog_manager_(NULL),
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_(false),
last_active_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
closed_by_user_gesture_(false),
minimum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMinimumZoomFactor * 100)),
maximum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMaximumZoomFactor * 100)),
zoom_scroll_remainder_(0),
render_view_message_source_(NULL),
render_frame_message_source_(NULL),
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_(MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
fullscreen_widget_had_focus_at_shutdown_(false),
is_subframe_(false),
force_disable_overscroll_content_(false),
last_dialog_suppressed_(false),
geolocation_service_context_(new GeolocationServiceContext()),
accessibility_mode_(
BrowserAccessibilityStateImpl::GetInstance()->accessibility_mode()),
audio_stream_monitor_(this),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
page_scale_factor_is_one_(true),
loading_weak_factory_(this) {
frame_tree_.SetFrameRemoveListener(
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnFrameRemoved,
base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserverAndroid(this));
#else
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserver(this));
#endif
loader_io_thread_notifier_.reset(new LoaderIOThreadNotifier(this));
wake_lock_service_context_.reset(new WakeLockServiceContext(this));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | WebContentsImpl::WebContentsImpl(BrowserContext* browser_context)
: delegate_(NULL),
controller_(this, browser_context),
render_view_host_delegate_view_(NULL),
created_with_opener_(false),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
accessible_parent_(NULL),
#endif
frame_tree_(new NavigatorImpl(&controller_, this),
this,
this,
this,
this),
is_loading_(false),
is_load_to_different_document_(false),
crashed_status_(base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING),
crashed_error_code_(0),
waiting_for_response_(false),
load_state_(net::LOAD_STATE_IDLE, base::string16()),
upload_size_(0),
upload_position_(0),
is_resume_pending_(false),
displayed_insecure_content_(false),
has_accessed_initial_document_(false),
theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
last_sent_theme_color_(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT),
did_first_visually_non_empty_paint_(false),
capturer_count_(0),
should_normally_be_visible_(true),
is_being_destroyed_(false),
notify_disconnection_(false),
dialog_manager_(NULL),
is_showing_before_unload_dialog_(false),
last_active_time_(base::TimeTicks::Now()),
closed_by_user_gesture_(false),
minimum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMinimumZoomFactor * 100)),
maximum_zoom_percent_(static_cast<int>(kMaximumZoomFactor * 100)),
zoom_scroll_remainder_(0),
render_view_message_source_(NULL),
render_frame_message_source_(NULL),
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_(MSG_ROUTING_NONE),
fullscreen_widget_had_focus_at_shutdown_(false),
is_subframe_(false),
force_disable_overscroll_content_(false),
last_dialog_suppressed_(false),
geolocation_service_context_(new GeolocationServiceContext()),
accessibility_mode_(
BrowserAccessibilityStateImpl::GetInstance()->accessibility_mode()),
audio_stream_monitor_(this),
virtual_keyboard_requested_(false),
page_scale_factor_is_one_(true),
loading_weak_factory_(this),
weak_factory_(this) {
frame_tree_.SetFrameRemoveListener(
base::Bind(&WebContentsImpl::OnFrameRemoved,
base::Unretained(this)));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserverAndroid(this));
#else
media_web_contents_observer_.reset(new MediaWebContentsObserver(this));
#endif
loader_io_thread_notifier_.reset(new LoaderIOThreadNotifier(this));
wake_lock_service_context_.reset(new WakeLockServiceContext(this));
}
| 172,211 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void add_bytes_l2_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src1, uint8_t *src2, int w)
{
long i;
for (i = 0; i <= w - sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) {
long a = *(long *)(src1 + i);
long b = *(long *)(src2 + i);
*(long *)(dst + i) = ((a & pb_7f) + (b & pb_7f)) ^ ((a ^ b) & pb_80);
}
for (; i < w; i++)
dst[i] = src1[i] + src2[i];
}
Commit Message: avcodec/pngdsp: fix (un)signed type in end comparission
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2919
Found_by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static void add_bytes_l2_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src1, uint8_t *src2, int w)
{
long i;
for (i = 0; i <= w - (int)sizeof(long); i += sizeof(long)) {
long a = *(long *)(src1 + i);
long b = *(long *)(src2 + i);
*(long *)(dst + i) = ((a & pb_7f) + (b & pb_7f)) ^ ((a ^ b) & pb_80);
}
for (; i < w; i++)
dst[i] = src1[i] + src2[i];
}
| 165,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline signed int ReadPropertySignedLong(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned int
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[3] << 24) | (buffer[2] << 16) |
(buffer[1] << 8 ) | (buffer[0]));
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffffffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned int) ((buffer[0] << 24) | (buffer[1] << 16) |
(buffer[2] << 8) | buffer[3]);
quantum.unsigned_value=(value & 0xffffffff);
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static inline signed int ReadPropertySignedLong(const EndianType endian,
const unsigned char *buffer)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
signed int
signed_value;
} quantum;
unsigned int
value;
if (endian == LSBEndian)
{
value=(unsigned int) buffer[3] << 24;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[2] << 16;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[1] << 8;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[0];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffffffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
value=(unsigned int) buffer[0] << 24;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[1] << 16;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[2] << 8;
value|=(unsigned int) buffer[3];
quantum.unsigned_value=value & 0xffffffff;
return(quantum.signed_value);
}
| 169,954 |
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