instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Track::Track(
Segment* pSegment,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
content_encoding_entries_(NULL),
content_encoding_entries_end_(NULL)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Track::Track(
Track::Track(Segment* pSegment, long long element_start, long long element_size)
: m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
content_encoding_entries_(NULL),
content_encoding_entries_end_(NULL) {}
Track::~Track() {
Info& info = const_cast<Info&>(m_info);
info.Clear();
ContentEncoding** i = content_encoding_entries_;
ContentEncoding** const j = content_encoding_entries_end_;
while (i != j) {
ContentEncoding* const encoding = *i++;
delete encoding;
}
delete[] content_encoding_entries_;
}
| 174,445 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copyIPv6IfDifferent(void * dest, const void * src)
{
if(dest != src) {
memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
}
}
Commit Message: pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static void copyIPv6IfDifferent(void * dest, const void * src)
{
if(dest != src && src != NULL) {
memcpy(dest, src, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
}
}
| 169,665 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_file_permissions_reduced(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, const char *fname, int len,
gx_io_device *iodev, const char *permitgroup)
{
long i;
ref *permitlist = NULL;
/* an empty string (first character == 0) if '\' character is */
/* recognized as a file name separator as on DOS & Windows */
const char *win_sep2 = "\\";
bool use_windows_pathsep = (gs_file_name_check_separator(win_sep2, 1, win_sep2) == 1);
uint plen = gp_file_name_parents(fname, len);
/* we're protecting arbitrary file system accesses, not Postscript device accesses.
* Although, note that %pipe% is explicitly checked for and disallowed elsewhere
*/
if (iodev != iodev_default(imemory)) {
return 0;
}
/* Assuming a reduced file name. */
if (dict_find_string(&(i_ctx_p->userparams), permitgroup, &permitlist) <= 0)
return 0; /* if Permissions not found, just allow access */
for (i=0; i<r_size(permitlist); i++) {
ref permitstring;
const string_match_params win_filename_params = {
'*', '?', '\\', true, true /* ignore case & '/' == '\\' */
};
const byte *permstr;
uint permlen;
int cwd_len = 0;
if (array_get(imemory, permitlist, i, &permitstring) < 0 ||
r_type(&permitstring) != t_string
)
break; /* any problem, just fail */
permstr = permitstring.value.bytes;
permlen = r_size(&permitstring);
/*
* Check if any file name is permitted with "*".
*/
if (permlen == 1 && permstr[0] == '*')
return 0; /* success */
/*
* If the filename starts with parent references,
* the permission element must start with same number of parent references.
*/
if (plen != 0 && plen != gp_file_name_parents((const char *)permstr, permlen))
continue;
cwd_len = gp_file_name_cwds((const char *)permstr, permlen);
/*
* If the permission starts with "./", absolute paths
* are not permitted.
*/
if (cwd_len > 0 && gp_file_name_is_absolute(fname, len))
continue;
/*
* If the permission starts with "./", relative paths
* with no "./" are allowed as well as with "./".
* 'fname' has no "./" because it is reduced.
*/
if (string_match( (const unsigned char*) fname, len,
permstr + cwd_len, permlen - cwd_len,
use_windows_pathsep ? &win_filename_params : NULL))
return 0; /* success */
}
/* not found */
return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | check_file_permissions_reduced(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, const char *fname, int len,
gx_io_device *iodev, const char *permitgroup)
{
long i;
ref *permitlist = NULL;
/* an empty string (first character == 0) if '\' character is */
/* recognized as a file name separator as on DOS & Windows */
const char *win_sep2 = "\\";
bool use_windows_pathsep = (gs_file_name_check_separator(win_sep2, 1, win_sep2) == 1);
uint plen = gp_file_name_parents(fname, len);
/* we're protecting arbitrary file system accesses, not Postscript device accesses.
* Although, note that %pipe% is explicitly checked for and disallowed elsewhere
*/
if (iodev && iodev != iodev_default(imemory)) {
return 0;
}
/* Assuming a reduced file name. */
if (dict_find_string(&(i_ctx_p->userparams), permitgroup, &permitlist) <= 0)
return 0; /* if Permissions not found, just allow access */
for (i=0; i<r_size(permitlist); i++) {
ref permitstring;
const string_match_params win_filename_params = {
'*', '?', '\\', true, true /* ignore case & '/' == '\\' */
};
const byte *permstr;
uint permlen;
int cwd_len = 0;
if (array_get(imemory, permitlist, i, &permitstring) < 0 ||
r_type(&permitstring) != t_string
)
break; /* any problem, just fail */
permstr = permitstring.value.bytes;
permlen = r_size(&permitstring);
/*
* Check if any file name is permitted with "*".
*/
if (permlen == 1 && permstr[0] == '*')
return 0; /* success */
/*
* If the filename starts with parent references,
* the permission element must start with same number of parent references.
*/
if (plen != 0 && plen != gp_file_name_parents((const char *)permstr, permlen))
continue;
cwd_len = gp_file_name_cwds((const char *)permstr, permlen);
/*
* If the permission starts with "./", absolute paths
* are not permitted.
*/
if (cwd_len > 0 && gp_file_name_is_absolute(fname, len))
continue;
/*
* If the permission starts with "./", relative paths
* with no "./" are allowed as well as with "./".
* 'fname' has no "./" because it is reduced.
*/
if (string_match( (const unsigned char*) fname, len,
permstr + cwd_len, permlen - cwd_len,
use_windows_pathsep ? &win_filename_params : NULL))
return 0; /* success */
}
/* not found */
return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
}
| 164,708 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *SoftMP3::memsetSafe(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader, int c, size_t len) {
if (len > outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("memset buffer too small: got %lu, expected %zu", outHeader->nAllocLen, len);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422022");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return NULL;
}
return memset(outHeader->pBuffer, c, len);
}
Commit Message: Fix build
Change-Id: I96a9c437eec53a285ac96794cc1ad0c8954b27e0
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void *SoftMP3::memsetSafe(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader, int c, size_t len) {
if (len > outHeader->nAllocLen) {
ALOGE("memset buffer too small: got %lu, expected %zu", (unsigned long)outHeader->nAllocLen, len);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422022");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return NULL;
}
return memset(outHeader->pBuffer, c, len);
}
| 174,157 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static zval *xml_call_handler(xml_parser *parser, zval *handler, zend_function *function_ptr, int argc, zval **argv)
{
int i;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if (parser && handler && !EG(exception)) {
zval ***args;
zval *retval;
int result;
zend_fcall_info fci;
args = safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval **), argc, 0);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
args[i] = &argv[i];
}
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
fci.function_name = handler;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fci.object_ptr = parser->object;
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval;
fci.param_count = argc;
fci.params = args;
fci.no_separation = 0;
/*fci.function_handler_cache = &function_ptr;*/
result = zend_call_function(&fci, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (result == FAILURE) {
zval **method;
zval **obj;
if (Z_TYPE_P(handler) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s()", Z_STRVAL_P(handler));
} else if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 0, (void **) &obj) == SUCCESS &&
zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 1, (void **) &method) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(obj) == IS_OBJECT &&
Z_TYPE_PP(method) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s::%s()", Z_OBJCE_PP(obj)->name, Z_STRVAL_PP(method));
} else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler");
}
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(args[i]);
}
efree(args);
if (result == FAILURE) {
return NULL;
} else {
return EG(exception) ? NULL : retval;
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static zval *xml_call_handler(xml_parser *parser, zval *handler, zend_function *function_ptr, int argc, zval **argv)
{
int i;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
if (parser && handler && !EG(exception)) {
zval ***args;
zval *retval;
int result;
zend_fcall_info fci;
args = safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval **), argc, 0);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
args[i] = &argv[i];
}
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
fci.function_name = handler;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fci.object_ptr = parser->object;
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval;
fci.param_count = argc;
fci.params = args;
fci.no_separation = 0;
/*fci.function_handler_cache = &function_ptr;*/
result = zend_call_function(&fci, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
if (result == FAILURE) {
zval **method;
zval **obj;
if (Z_TYPE_P(handler) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s()", Z_STRVAL_P(handler));
} else if (zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 0, (void **) &obj) == SUCCESS &&
zend_hash_index_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(handler), 1, (void **) &method) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(obj) == IS_OBJECT &&
Z_TYPE_PP(method) == IS_STRING) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler %s::%s()", Z_OBJCE_PP(obj)->name, Z_STRVAL_PP(method));
} else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to call handler");
}
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(args[i]);
}
efree(args);
if (result == FAILURE) {
return NULL;
} else {
return EG(exception) ? NULL : retval;
}
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[i]);
}
return NULL;
}
}
| 165,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int output_quantization_factor(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth,
int out_depth)
{
if (out_depth == 16 && in_depth != 16 &&
pm->calculations_use_input_precision)
return 257;
else
return 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | static int output_quantization_factor(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth,
static int output_quantization_factor(const png_modifier *pm, int in_depth,
int out_depth)
{
if (out_depth == 16 && in_depth != 16 &&
pm->calculations_use_input_precision)
return 257;
else
return 1;
}
| 173,676 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SProcXFixesQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesQueryVersionReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->majorVersion);
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SProcXFixesQueryVersion(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesQueryVersionReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesQueryVersionReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->majorVersion);
return (*ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType]) (client);
}
| 165,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::Initialize(uint32 session_id) {
if (base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_XP)
launch_elevated_ = false;
if (launch_elevated_) {
process_exit_event_.Set(CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL));
if (!process_exit_event_.IsValid()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create a nameless event";
return false;
}
io_task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Core::InitializeJob, this));
}
return CreateSessionToken(session_id, &session_token_);
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool WtsSessionProcessDelegate::Core::Initialize(uint32 session_id) {
if (base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_XP)
launch_elevated_ = false;
if (launch_elevated_) {
// GetNamedPipeClientProcessId() is available starting from Vista.
HMODULE kernel32 = ::GetModuleHandle(L"kernel32.dll");
CHECK(kernel32 != NULL);
get_named_pipe_client_pid_ =
reinterpret_cast<GetNamedPipeClientProcessIdFn>(
GetProcAddress(kernel32, "GetNamedPipeClientProcessId"));
CHECK(get_named_pipe_client_pid_ != NULL);
process_exit_event_.Set(CreateEvent(NULL, TRUE, FALSE, NULL));
if (!process_exit_event_.IsValid()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create a nameless event";
return false;
}
io_task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&Core::InitializeJob, this));
}
return CreateSessionToken(session_id, &session_token_);
}
| 171,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: progressive_row(png_structp ppIn, png_bytep new_row, png_uint_32 y, int pass)
{
png_const_structp pp = ppIn;
PNG_CONST standard_display *dp = voidcast(standard_display*,
png_get_progressive_ptr(pp));
/* When handling interlacing some rows will be absent in each pass, the
* callback still gets called, but with a NULL pointer. This is checked
* in the 'else' clause below. We need our own 'cbRow', but we can't call
* png_get_rowbytes because we got no info structure.
*/
if (new_row != NULL)
{
png_bytep row;
/* In the case where the reader doesn't do the interlace it gives
* us the y in the sub-image:
*/
if (dp->do_interlace && dp->interlace_type == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7)
{
#ifdef PNG_USER_TRANSFORM_INFO_SUPPORTED
/* Use this opportunity to validate the png 'current' APIs: */
if (y != png_get_current_row_number(pp))
png_error(pp, "png_get_current_row_number is broken");
if (pass != png_get_current_pass_number(pp))
png_error(pp, "png_get_current_pass_number is broken");
#endif
y = PNG_ROW_FROM_PASS_ROW(y, pass);
}
/* Validate this just in case. */
if (y >= dp->h)
png_error(pp, "invalid y to progressive row callback");
row = store_image_row(dp->ps, pp, 0, y);
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Combine the new row into the old: */
if (dp->do_interlace)
{
if (dp->interlace_type == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7)
deinterlace_row(row, new_row, dp->pixel_size, dp->w, pass);
else
row_copy(row, new_row, dp->pixel_size * dp->w);
}
else
png_progressive_combine_row(pp, row, new_row);
#endif /* PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED */
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
else if (dp->interlace_type == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7 &&
PNG_ROW_IN_INTERLACE_PASS(y, pass) &&
PNG_PASS_COLS(dp->w, pass) > 0)
png_error(pp, "missing row in progressive de-interlacing");
#endif /* PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | progressive_row(png_structp ppIn, png_bytep new_row, png_uint_32 y, int pass)
{
png_const_structp pp = ppIn;
const standard_display *dp = voidcast(standard_display*,
png_get_progressive_ptr(pp));
/* When handling interlacing some rows will be absent in each pass, the
* callback still gets called, but with a NULL pointer. This is checked
* in the 'else' clause below. We need our own 'cbRow', but we can't call
* png_get_rowbytes because we got no info structure.
*/
if (new_row != NULL)
{
png_bytep row;
/* In the case where the reader doesn't do the interlace it gives
* us the y in the sub-image:
*/
if (dp->do_interlace && dp->interlace_type == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7)
{
#ifdef PNG_USER_TRANSFORM_INFO_SUPPORTED
/* Use this opportunity to validate the png 'current' APIs: */
if (y != png_get_current_row_number(pp))
png_error(pp, "png_get_current_row_number is broken");
if (pass != png_get_current_pass_number(pp))
png_error(pp, "png_get_current_pass_number is broken");
#endif /* USER_TRANSFORM_INFO */
y = PNG_ROW_FROM_PASS_ROW(y, pass);
}
/* Validate this just in case. */
if (y >= dp->h)
png_error(pp, "invalid y to progressive row callback");
row = store_image_row(dp->ps, pp, 0, y);
/* Combine the new row into the old: */
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
if (dp->do_interlace)
#endif /* READ_INTERLACING */
{
if (dp->interlace_type == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7)
deinterlace_row(row, new_row, dp->pixel_size, dp->w, pass,
dp->littleendian);
else
row_copy(row, new_row, dp->pixel_size * dp->w, dp->littleendian);
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
else
png_progressive_combine_row(pp, row, new_row);
#endif /* PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED */
}
else if (dp->interlace_type == PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7 &&
PNG_ROW_IN_INTERLACE_PASS(y, pass) &&
PNG_PASS_COLS(dp->w, pass) > 0)
png_error(pp, "missing row in progressive de-interlacing");
}
| 173,686 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchDidBlockRequest(
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& fetch_initiator_info,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason blocked_reason) const {
if (IsDetached())
return;
probe::didBlockRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), resource_request,
MasterDocumentLoader(), fetch_initiator_info,
blocked_reason);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void FrameFetchContext::DispatchDidBlockRequest(
const ResourceRequest& resource_request,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& fetch_initiator_info,
ResourceRequestBlockedReason blocked_reason,
Resource::Type resource_type) const {
if (IsDetached())
return;
probe::didBlockRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), resource_request,
MasterDocumentLoader(), fetch_initiator_info,
blocked_reason, resource_type);
}
| 172,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mwifiex_set_uap_rates(struct mwifiex_uap_bss_param *bss_cfg,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *params)
{
struct ieee_types_header *rate_ie;
int var_offset = offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u.beacon.variable);
const u8 *var_pos = params->beacon.head + var_offset;
int len = params->beacon.head_len - var_offset;
u8 rate_len = 0;
rate_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES, var_pos, len);
if (rate_ie) {
memcpy(bss_cfg->rates, rate_ie + 1, rate_ie->len);
rate_len = rate_ie->len;
}
rate_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES,
params->beacon.tail,
params->beacon.tail_len);
if (rate_ie)
memcpy(bss_cfg->rates + rate_len, rate_ie + 1, rate_ie->len);
return;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120 | mwifiex_set_uap_rates(struct mwifiex_uap_bss_param *bss_cfg,
struct cfg80211_ap_settings *params)
{
struct ieee_types_header *rate_ie;
int var_offset = offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u.beacon.variable);
const u8 *var_pos = params->beacon.head + var_offset;
int len = params->beacon.head_len - var_offset;
u8 rate_len = 0;
rate_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_SUPP_RATES, var_pos, len);
if (rate_ie) {
if (rate_ie->len > MWIFIEX_SUPPORTED_RATES)
return;
memcpy(bss_cfg->rates, rate_ie + 1, rate_ie->len);
rate_len = rate_ie->len;
}
rate_ie = (void *)cfg80211_find_ie(WLAN_EID_EXT_SUPP_RATES,
params->beacon.tail,
params->beacon.tail_len);
if (rate_ie) {
if (rate_ie->len > MWIFIEX_SUPPORTED_RATES - rate_len)
return;
memcpy(bss_cfg->rates + rate_len, rate_ie + 1, rate_ie->len);
}
return;
}
| 169,576 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ipv6_renew_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt,
int newtype,
struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *newopt, int newoptlen)
{
int tot_len = 0;
char *p;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt2;
int err;
if (opt) {
if (newtype != IPV6_HOPOPTS && opt->hopopt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->hopopt));
if (newtype != IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS && opt->dst0opt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->dst0opt));
if (newtype != IPV6_RTHDR && opt->srcrt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->srcrt));
if (newtype != IPV6_DSTOPTS && opt->dst1opt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt));
}
if (newopt && newoptlen)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(newoptlen);
if (!tot_len)
return NULL;
tot_len += sizeof(*opt2);
opt2 = sock_kmalloc(sk, tot_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!opt2)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
memset(opt2, 0, tot_len);
opt2->tot_len = tot_len;
p = (char *)(opt2 + 1);
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->hopopt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_HOPOPTS,
&opt2->hopopt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->dst0opt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS,
&opt2->dst0opt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->srcrt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_RTHDR,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr **)&opt2->srcrt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->dst1opt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_DSTOPTS,
&opt2->dst1opt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
opt2->opt_nflen = (opt2->hopopt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->hopopt) : 0) +
(opt2->dst0opt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->dst0opt) : 0) +
(opt2->srcrt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->srcrt) : 0);
opt2->opt_flen = (opt2->dst1opt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->dst1opt) : 0);
return opt2;
out:
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt2, opt2->tot_len);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | ipv6_renew_options(struct sock *sk, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt,
int newtype,
struct ipv6_opt_hdr __user *newopt, int newoptlen)
{
int tot_len = 0;
char *p;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt2;
int err;
if (opt) {
if (newtype != IPV6_HOPOPTS && opt->hopopt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->hopopt));
if (newtype != IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS && opt->dst0opt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->dst0opt));
if (newtype != IPV6_RTHDR && opt->srcrt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->srcrt));
if (newtype != IPV6_DSTOPTS && opt->dst1opt)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt));
}
if (newopt && newoptlen)
tot_len += CMSG_ALIGN(newoptlen);
if (!tot_len)
return NULL;
tot_len += sizeof(*opt2);
opt2 = sock_kmalloc(sk, tot_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!opt2)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
memset(opt2, 0, tot_len);
atomic_set(&opt2->refcnt, 1);
opt2->tot_len = tot_len;
p = (char *)(opt2 + 1);
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->hopopt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_HOPOPTS,
&opt2->hopopt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->dst0opt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS,
&opt2->dst0opt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->srcrt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_RTHDR,
(struct ipv6_opt_hdr **)&opt2->srcrt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ipv6_renew_option(opt ? opt->dst1opt : NULL, newopt, newoptlen,
newtype != IPV6_DSTOPTS,
&opt2->dst1opt, &p);
if (err)
goto out;
opt2->opt_nflen = (opt2->hopopt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->hopopt) : 0) +
(opt2->dst0opt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->dst0opt) : 0) +
(opt2->srcrt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->srcrt) : 0);
opt2->opt_flen = (opt2->dst1opt ? ipv6_optlen(opt2->dst1opt) : 0);
return opt2;
out:
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt2, opt2->tot_len);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
| 167,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void vp8_decoder_remove_threads(VP8D_COMP *pbi)
{
/* shutdown MB Decoding thread; */
if (pbi->b_multithreaded_rd)
{
int i;
pbi->b_multithreaded_rd = 0;
/* allow all threads to exit */
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; i++)
{
sem_post(&pbi->h_event_start_decoding[i]);
pthread_join(pbi->h_decoding_thread[i], NULL);
}
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; i++)
{
sem_destroy(&pbi->h_event_start_decoding[i]);
}
sem_destroy(&pbi->h_event_end_decoding);
vpx_free(pbi->h_decoding_thread);
pbi->h_decoding_thread = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->h_event_start_decoding);
pbi->h_event_start_decoding = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->mb_row_di);
pbi->mb_row_di = NULL ;
vpx_free(pbi->de_thread_data);
pbi->de_thread_data = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID: | void vp8_decoder_remove_threads(VP8D_COMP *pbi)
void vp8_decoder_remove_threads(VP8D_COMP *pbi) {
/* shutdown MB Decoding thread; */
if (pbi->b_multithreaded_rd) {
int i;
pbi->b_multithreaded_rd = 0;
/* allow all threads to exit */
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; ++i) {
sem_post(&pbi->h_event_start_decoding[i]);
pthread_join(pbi->h_decoding_thread[i], NULL);
}
for (i = 0; i < pbi->allocated_decoding_thread_count; ++i) {
sem_destroy(&pbi->h_event_start_decoding[i]);
}
sem_destroy(&pbi->h_event_end_decoding);
vpx_free(pbi->h_decoding_thread);
pbi->h_decoding_thread = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->h_event_start_decoding);
pbi->h_event_start_decoding = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->mb_row_di);
pbi->mb_row_di = NULL;
vpx_free(pbi->de_thread_data);
pbi->de_thread_data = NULL;
vp8mt_de_alloc_temp_buffers(pbi, pbi->common.mb_rows);
}
}
| 174,067 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int add_push_report_sideband_pkt(git_push *push, git_pkt_data *data_pkt, git_buf *data_pkt_buf)
{
git_pkt *pkt;
const char *line, *line_end;
size_t line_len;
int error;
int reading_from_buf = data_pkt_buf->size > 0;
if (reading_from_buf) {
/* We had an existing partial packet, so add the new
* packet to the buffer and parse the whole thing */
git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, data_pkt->data, data_pkt->len);
line = data_pkt_buf->ptr;
line_len = data_pkt_buf->size;
}
else {
line = data_pkt->data;
line_len = data_pkt->len;
}
while (line_len > 0) {
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, line, &line_end, line_len);
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
/* Buffer the data when the inner packet is split
* across multiple sideband packets */
if (!reading_from_buf)
git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, line, line_len);
error = 0;
goto done;
}
else if (error < 0)
goto done;
/* Advance in the buffer */
line_len -= (line_end - line);
line = line_end;
/* When a valid packet with no content has been
* read, git_pkt_parse_line does not report an
* error, but the pkt pointer has not been set.
* Handle this by skipping over empty packets.
*/
if (pkt == NULL)
continue;
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
git_pkt_free(pkt);
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_ITEROVER)
goto done;
}
error = 0;
done:
if (reading_from_buf)
git_buf_consume(data_pkt_buf, line_end);
return error;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int add_push_report_sideband_pkt(git_push *push, git_pkt_data *data_pkt, git_buf *data_pkt_buf)
{
git_pkt *pkt;
const char *line, *line_end;
size_t line_len;
int error;
int reading_from_buf = data_pkt_buf->size > 0;
if (reading_from_buf) {
/* We had an existing partial packet, so add the new
* packet to the buffer and parse the whole thing */
git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, data_pkt->data, data_pkt->len);
line = data_pkt_buf->ptr;
line_len = data_pkt_buf->size;
}
else {
line = data_pkt->data;
line_len = data_pkt->len;
}
while (line_len > 0) {
error = git_pkt_parse_line(&pkt, line, &line_end, line_len);
if (error == GIT_EBUFS) {
/* Buffer the data when the inner packet is split
* across multiple sideband packets */
if (!reading_from_buf)
git_buf_put(data_pkt_buf, line, line_len);
error = 0;
goto done;
}
else if (error < 0)
goto done;
/* Advance in the buffer */
line_len -= (line_end - line);
line = line_end;
error = add_push_report_pkt(push, pkt);
git_pkt_free(pkt);
if (error < 0 && error != GIT_ITEROVER)
goto done;
}
error = 0;
done:
if (reading_from_buf)
git_buf_consume(data_pkt_buf, line_end);
return error;
}
| 170,110 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: TileIndependenceTest()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
md5_fw_order_(),
md5_inv_order_(),
n_tiles_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
init_flags_ = VPX_CODEC_USE_PSNR;
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg;
cfg.w = 704;
cfg.h = 144;
cfg.threads = 1;
fw_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_->Control(VP9_INVERT_TILE_DECODE_ORDER, 1);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | TileIndependenceTest()
: EncoderTest(GET_PARAM(0)),
md5_fw_order_(),
md5_inv_order_(),
n_tiles_(GET_PARAM(1)) {
init_flags_ = VPX_CODEC_USE_PSNR;
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t cfg = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
cfg.w = 704;
cfg.h = 144;
cfg.threads = 1;
fw_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_ = codec_->CreateDecoder(cfg, 0);
inv_dec_->Control(VP9_INVERT_TILE_DECODE_ORDER, 1);
}
| 174,584 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long ContentEncoding::ParseCompressionEntry(long long start, long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentCompression* compression) {
assert(pReader);
assert(compression);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
bool valid = false;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x254) {
long long algo = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (algo < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
compression->algo = algo;
valid = true;
} else if (id == 0x255) {
if (size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
typedef unsigned char* buf_t;
const buf_t buf = new (std::nothrow) unsigned char[buflen];
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int read_status =
pReader->Read(pos, static_cast<long>(buflen), buf);
if (read_status) {
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
compression->settings = buf;
compression->settings_len = buflen;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
if (!valid)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long ContentEncoding::ParseCompressionEntry(long long start, long long size,
IMkvReader* pReader,
ContentCompression* compression) {
assert(pReader);
assert(compression);
long long pos = start;
const long long stop = start + size;
bool valid = false;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x254) {
long long algo = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (algo < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
compression->algo = algo;
valid = true;
} else if (id == 0x255) {
if (size <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
const size_t buflen = static_cast<size_t>(size);
unsigned char* buf = SafeArrayAlloc<unsigned char>(1, buflen);
if (buf == NULL)
return -1;
const int read_status =
pReader->Read(pos, static_cast<long>(buflen), buf);
if (read_status) {
delete[] buf;
return status;
}
compression->settings = buf;
compression->settings_len = buflen;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (!valid)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 173,848 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool TaskService::UnbindInstance() {
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (bound_instance_id_ == kInvalidInstanceId)
return false;
bound_instance_id_ = kInvalidInstanceId;
DCHECK(default_task_runner_);
default_task_runner_ = nullptr;
}
base::subtle::AutoWriteLock task_lock(task_lock_);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Change ReadWriteLock to Lock+ConditionVariable in TaskService
There are non-trivial performance implications of using shared
SRWLocking on Windows as more state has to be checked.
Since there are only two uses of the ReadWriteLock in Chromium after
over 1 year, the decision is to remove it.
BUG=758721
Change-Id: I84d1987d7b624a89e896eb37184ee50845c39d80
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/634423
Commit-Queue: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Toyoshima <toyoshim@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Francois Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497632}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool TaskService::UnbindInstance() {
{
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (bound_instance_id_ == kInvalidInstanceId)
return false;
bound_instance_id_ = kInvalidInstanceId;
DCHECK(default_task_runner_);
default_task_runner_ = nullptr;
}
// But invoked tasks might be still running here. To ensure no task runs on
// quitting this method, wait for all tasks to complete.
base::AutoLock tasks_in_flight_auto_lock(tasks_in_flight_lock_);
while (tasks_in_flight_ > 0)
no_tasks_in_flight_cv_.Wait();
return true;
}
| 172,214 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline unsigned char unimap_bsearch(const uni_to_enc *table, unsigned code_key_a, size_t num)
{
const uni_to_enc *l = table,
*h = &table[num-1],
*m;
unsigned short code_key;
/* we have no mappings outside the BMP */
if (code_key_a > 0xFFFFU)
return 0;
code_key = (unsigned short) code_key_a;
while (l <= h) {
m = l + (h - l) / 2;
if (code_key < m->un_code_point)
h = m - 1;
else if (code_key > m->un_code_point)
l = m + 1;
else
return m->cs_code;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static inline unsigned char unimap_bsearch(const uni_to_enc *table, unsigned code_key_a, size_t num)
{
const uni_to_enc *l = table,
*h = &table[num-1],
*m;
unsigned short code_key;
/* we have no mappings outside the BMP */
if (code_key_a > 0xFFFFU)
return 0;
code_key = (unsigned short) code_key_a;
while (l <= h) {
m = l + (h - l) / 2;
if (code_key < m->un_code_point)
h = m - 1;
else if (code_key > m->un_code_point)
l = m + 1;
else
return m->cs_code;
}
return 0;
}
| 167,180 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void cliRefreshPrompt(void) {
int len;
if (config.eval_ldb) return;
if (config.hostsocket != NULL)
len = snprintf(config.prompt,sizeof(config.prompt),"redis %s",
config.hostsocket);
else
len = anetFormatAddr(config.prompt, sizeof(config.prompt),
config.hostip, config.hostport);
/* Add [dbnum] if needed */
if (config.dbnum != 0)
len += snprintf(config.prompt+len,sizeof(config.prompt)-len,"[%d]",
config.dbnum);
snprintf(config.prompt+len,sizeof(config.prompt)-len,"> ");
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void cliRefreshPrompt(void) {
if (config.eval_ldb) return;
sds prompt = sdsempty();
if (config.hostsocket != NULL) {
prompt = sdscatfmt(prompt,"redis %s",config.hostsocket);
} else {
char addr[256];
anetFormatAddr(addr, sizeof(addr), config.hostip, config.hostport);
prompt = sdscatlen(prompt,addr,strlen(addr));
}
/* Add [dbnum] if needed */
if (config.dbnum != 0)
prompt = sdscatfmt(prompt,"[%i]",config.dbnum);
/* Copy the prompt in the static buffer. */
prompt = sdscatlen(prompt,"> ",2);
snprintf(config.prompt,sizeof(config.prompt),"%s",prompt);
sdsfree(prompt);
}
| 169,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit(Sdb *s, const ut8 *obuf,
RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu, const RBinDwarfDebugAbbrev *da,
size_t offset, const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf, *buf_end = obuf + (cu->hdr.length - 7);
ut64 abbr_code;
size_t i;
if (cu->hdr.length > debug_str_len) {
return NULL;
}
while (buf && buf < buf_end && buf >= obuf) {
if (cu->length && cu->capacity == cu->length) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu (cu);
}
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &abbr_code);
if (abbr_code > da->length || !buf) {
return NULL;
}
r_bin_dwarf_init_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
if (!abbr_code) {
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = 0;
cu->length++;
buf++;
continue;
}
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = abbr_code;
cu->dies[cu->length].tag = da->decls[abbr_code - 1].tag;
abbr_code += offset;
if (da->capacity < abbr_code) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < da->decls[abbr_code - 1].length; i++) {
if (cu->dies[cu->length].length == cu->dies[cu->length].capacity) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
}
if (i >= cu->dies[cu->length].capacity || i >= da->decls[abbr_code - 1].capacity) {
eprintf ("Warning: malformed dwarf attribute capacity doesn't match length\n");
break;
}
memset (&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i], 0, sizeof
(cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i]));
buf = r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value (buf, buf_end - buf,
&da->decls[abbr_code - 1].specs[i],
&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i],
&cu->hdr, debug_str, debug_str_len);
if (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].name == DW_AT_comp_dir) {
const char *name = cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].encoding.str_struct.string;
sdb_set (s, "DW_AT_comp_dir", name, 0);
}
cu->dies[cu->length].length++;
}
cu->length++;
}
return buf;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_comp_unit(Sdb *s, const ut8 *obuf,
RBinDwarfCompUnit *cu, const RBinDwarfDebugAbbrev *da,
size_t offset, const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf, *buf_end = obuf + (cu->hdr.length - 7);
ut64 abbr_code;
size_t i;
if (cu->hdr.length > debug_str_len) {
return NULL;
}
while (buf && buf < buf_end && buf >= obuf) {
if (cu->length && cu->capacity == cu->length) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_cu (cu);
}
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &abbr_code);
if (abbr_code > da->length || !buf) {
return NULL;
}
r_bin_dwarf_init_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
if (!abbr_code) {
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = 0;
cu->length++;
buf++;
continue;
}
cu->dies[cu->length].abbrev_code = abbr_code;
cu->dies[cu->length].tag = da->decls[abbr_code - 1].tag;
abbr_code += offset;
if (da->capacity < abbr_code) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < da->decls[abbr_code - 1].length; i++) {
if (cu->dies[cu->length].length == cu->dies[cu->length].capacity) {
r_bin_dwarf_expand_die (&cu->dies[cu->length]);
}
if (i >= cu->dies[cu->length].capacity || i >= da->decls[abbr_code - 1].capacity) {
eprintf ("Warning: malformed dwarf attribute capacity doesn't match length\n");
break;
}
memset (&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i], 0, sizeof (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i]));
buf = r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value (buf, buf_end - buf,
&da->decls[abbr_code - 1].specs[i],
&cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i],
&cu->hdr, debug_str, debug_str_len);
if (cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].name == DW_AT_comp_dir) {
const char *name = cu->dies[cu->length].attr_values[i].encoding.str_struct.string;
sdb_set (s, "DW_AT_comp_dir", name, 0);
}
cu->dies[cu->length].length++;
}
cu->length++;
}
return buf;
}
| 167,670 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltFreeTemplateHashes(xsltStylesheetPtr style) {
if (style->templatesHash != NULL)
xmlHashFree((xmlHashTablePtr) style->templatesHash,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeCompMatchList);
if (style->rootMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->rootMatch);
if (style->keyMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->keyMatch);
if (style->elemMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->elemMatch);
if (style->attrMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->attrMatch);
if (style->parentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->parentMatch);
if (style->textMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->textMatch);
if (style->piMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->piMatch);
if (style->commentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->commentMatch);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltFreeTemplateHashes(xsltStylesheetPtr style) {
if (style->templatesHash != NULL)
xmlHashFree((xmlHashTablePtr) style->templatesHash,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeCompMatchList);
if (style->rootMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->rootMatch);
if (style->keyMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->keyMatch);
if (style->elemMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->elemMatch);
if (style->attrMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->attrMatch);
if (style->parentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->parentMatch);
if (style->textMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->textMatch);
if (style->piMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->piMatch);
if (style->commentMatch != NULL)
xsltFreeCompMatchList(style->commentMatch);
if (style->namedTemplates != NULL)
xmlHashFree(style->namedTemplates, NULL);
}
| 173,312 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FolderHeaderView::ContentsChanged(views::Textfield* sender,
const base::string16& new_contents) {
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_item_->RemoveObserver(this);
std::string name = base::UTF16ToUTF8(folder_name_view_->text());
delegate_->SetItemName(folder_item_, name);
folder_item_->AddObserver(this);
Layout();
}
Commit Message: Enforce the maximum length of the folder name in UI.
BUG=355797
R=xiyuan@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/203863005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260156 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void FolderHeaderView::ContentsChanged(views::Textfield* sender,
const base::string16& new_contents) {
if (!folder_item_)
return;
folder_name_view_->Update();
folder_item_->RemoveObserver(this);
// Enforce the maximum folder name length in UI.
std::string name = base::UTF16ToUTF8(
folder_name_view_->text().substr(0, kMaxFolderNameChars));
if (name != folder_item_->name())
delegate_->SetItemName(folder_item_, name);
folder_item_->AddObserver(this);
Layout();
}
| 171,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs3svc_decode_readargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readargs *args)
{
unsigned int len;
int v;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->offset);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
len = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
/* set up the kvec */
v=0;
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(p);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = min_t(unsigned int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
}
args->vlen = v;
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | nfs3svc_decode_readargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_readargs *args)
{
unsigned int len;
int v;
u32 max_blocksize = svc_max_payload(rqstp);
p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh);
if (!p)
return 0;
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &args->offset);
args->count = ntohl(*p++);
if (!xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p))
return 0;
len = min(args->count, max_blocksize);
/* set up the kvec */
v=0;
while (len > 0) {
struct page *p = *(rqstp->rq_next_page++);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_base = page_address(p);
rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len = min_t(unsigned int, len, PAGE_SIZE);
len -= rqstp->rq_vec[v].iov_len;
v++;
}
args->vlen = v;
return 1;
}
| 168,140 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::BluetoothDeviceChromeOS(
BluetoothAdapterChromeOS* adapter,
const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path)
: adapter_(adapter),
object_path_(object_path),
num_connecting_calls_(0),
pairing_delegate_(NULL),
pairing_delegate_used_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | BluetoothDeviceChromeOS::BluetoothDeviceChromeOS(
BluetoothAdapterChromeOS* adapter,
const dbus::ObjectPath& object_path)
: adapter_(adapter),
object_path_(object_path),
num_connecting_calls_(0),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
}
| 171,217 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int insert_pin(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *path,
unsigned char id,
unsigned char auth_id,
unsigned char pin_reference,
int min_length,
const char *label,
int pin_flags
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx=p15card->card->ctx;
sc_file_t *f;
struct sc_pkcs15_auth_info pin_info;
struct sc_pkcs15_object pin_obj;
int r;
memset(&pin_info, 0, sizeof(pin_info));
pin_info.auth_id.len = 1;
pin_info.auth_id.value[0] = id;
pin_info.auth_type = SC_PKCS15_PIN_AUTH_TYPE_PIN;
pin_info.attrs.pin.reference = pin_reference;
pin_info.attrs.pin.flags = pin_flags;
pin_info.attrs.pin.type = SC_PKCS15_PIN_TYPE_ASCII_NUMERIC;
pin_info.attrs.pin.min_length = min_length;
pin_info.attrs.pin.stored_length = 16;
pin_info.attrs.pin.max_length = 16;
pin_info.attrs.pin.pad_char = '\0';
pin_info.logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_UNKNOWN;
sc_format_path(path, &pin_info.path);
memset(&pin_obj, 0, sizeof(pin_obj));
strlcpy(pin_obj.label, label, sizeof(pin_obj.label));
pin_obj.flags = SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_MODIFIABLE | SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_PRIVATE;
pin_obj.auth_id.len = auth_id ? 0 : 1;
pin_obj.auth_id.value[0] = auth_id;
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
unsigned char buf[256];
int i, rec_no=0;
if(pin_info.path.len>=2) pin_info.path.len-=2;
sc_append_file_id(&pin_info.path, 0x5049);
if(sc_select_file(card, &pin_info.path, NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&pin_info.path));
return 1;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Searching for PIN-Ref %02X\n", pin_reference);
while((r=sc_read_record(card, ++rec_no, buf, sizeof(buf), SC_RECORD_BY_REC_NR))>0){
int found=0, fbz=-1;
if(buf[0]!=0xA0) continue;
for(i=2;i<buf[1]+2;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0x83 && buf[i+1]==1 && buf[i+2]==pin_reference) ++found;
if(buf[i]==0x90) fbz=buf[i+1+buf[i+1]];
}
if(found) pin_info.tries_left=fbz;
if(found) break;
}
if(r<=0){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"No EF_PWDD-Record found\n");
return 1;
}
} else {
if(sc_select_file(card, &pin_info.path, &f)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"Select(%s) failed\n", path);
return 1;
}
pin_info.tries_left=f->prop_attr[3];
sc_file_free(f);
}
r=sc_pkcs15emu_add_pin_obj(p15card, &pin_obj, &pin_info);
if(r!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "sc_pkcs15emu_add_pin_obj(%s) failed\n", path);
return 4;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s: OK, FBZ=%d\n", path, pin_info.tries_left);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int insert_pin(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card,
const char *path,
unsigned char id,
unsigned char auth_id,
unsigned char pin_reference,
int min_length,
const char *label,
int pin_flags
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_context_t *ctx=p15card->card->ctx;
sc_file_t *f;
struct sc_pkcs15_auth_info pin_info;
struct sc_pkcs15_object pin_obj;
int r;
memset(&pin_info, 0, sizeof(pin_info));
pin_info.auth_id.len = 1;
pin_info.auth_id.value[0] = id;
pin_info.auth_type = SC_PKCS15_PIN_AUTH_TYPE_PIN;
pin_info.attrs.pin.reference = pin_reference;
pin_info.attrs.pin.flags = pin_flags;
pin_info.attrs.pin.type = SC_PKCS15_PIN_TYPE_ASCII_NUMERIC;
pin_info.attrs.pin.min_length = min_length;
pin_info.attrs.pin.stored_length = 16;
pin_info.attrs.pin.max_length = 16;
pin_info.attrs.pin.pad_char = '\0';
pin_info.logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_UNKNOWN;
sc_format_path(path, &pin_info.path);
memset(&pin_obj, 0, sizeof(pin_obj));
strlcpy(pin_obj.label, label, sizeof(pin_obj.label));
pin_obj.flags = SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_MODIFIABLE | SC_PKCS15_CO_FLAG_PRIVATE;
pin_obj.auth_id.len = auth_id ? 0 : 1;
pin_obj.auth_id.value[0] = auth_id;
if(card->type==SC_CARD_TYPE_TCOS_V3){
unsigned char buf[256];
int i, rec_no=0;
if(pin_info.path.len>=2) pin_info.path.len-=2;
sc_append_file_id(&pin_info.path, 0x5049);
if(sc_select_file(card, &pin_info.path, NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Select(%s) failed\n",
sc_print_path(&pin_info.path));
return 1;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Searching for PIN-Ref %02X\n", pin_reference);
while((r=sc_read_record(card, ++rec_no, buf, sizeof(buf), SC_RECORD_BY_REC_NR))>0){
int found=0, fbz=-1;
if(buf[0]!=0xA0) continue;
for(i=2;i<buf[1]+2;i+=2+buf[i+1]){
if(buf[i]==0x83 && buf[i+1]==1 && buf[i+2]==pin_reference) ++found;
if(buf[i]==0x90) fbz=buf[i+1+buf[i+1]];
}
if(found) pin_info.tries_left=fbz;
if(found) break;
}
if(r<=0){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"No EF_PWDD-Record found\n");
return 1;
}
} else {
if(sc_select_file(card, &pin_info.path, &f)!=SC_SUCCESS
|| !f->prop_attr || f->prop_attr_len < 4){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"Select(%s) failed\n", path);
return 1;
}
pin_info.tries_left=f->prop_attr[3];
sc_file_free(f);
}
r=sc_pkcs15emu_add_pin_obj(p15card, &pin_obj, &pin_info);
if(r!=SC_SUCCESS){
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "sc_pkcs15emu_add_pin_obj(%s) failed\n", path);
return 4;
}
sc_debug(ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "%s: OK, FBZ=%d\n", path, pin_info.tries_left);
return 0;
}
| 169,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XGetDeviceButtonMapping(
register Display *dpy,
XDevice *device,
unsigned char map[],
unsigned int nmap)
{
int status = 0;
unsigned char mapping[256]; /* known fixed size */
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
register xGetDeviceButtonMappingReq *req;
xGetDeviceButtonMappingReply rep;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Initial_Release, info) == -1)
return (NoSuchExtension);
GetReq(GetDeviceButtonMapping, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_GetDeviceButtonMapping;
req->deviceid = device->device_id;
status = _XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse);
if (status == 1) {
if (rep.length <= (sizeof(mapping) >> 2)) {
unsigned long nbytes = rep.length << 2;
_XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes);
if (rep.nElts)
memcpy(map, mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap));
status = rep.nElts;
} else {
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
status = 0;
}
} else
status = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | XGetDeviceButtonMapping(
register Display *dpy,
XDevice *device,
unsigned char map[],
unsigned int nmap)
{
int status = 0;
unsigned char mapping[256]; /* known fixed size */
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
register xGetDeviceButtonMappingReq *req;
xGetDeviceButtonMappingReply rep;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_Initial_Release, info) == -1)
return (NoSuchExtension);
GetReq(GetDeviceButtonMapping, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_GetDeviceButtonMapping;
req->deviceid = device->device_id;
status = _XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse);
if (status == 1) {
if (rep.length <= (sizeof(mapping) >> 2) &&
rep.nElts <= (rep.length << 2)) {
unsigned long nbytes = rep.length << 2;
_XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes);
if (rep.nElts)
memcpy(map, mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap));
status = rep.nElts;
} else {
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
status = 0;
}
} else
status = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (status);
}
| 164,917 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyEnabled() const {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) &&
!params::IsEnabledWithNetworkService()) {
return false;
}
return IsDataSaverEnabledByUser();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyEnabled() const {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) &&
!params::IsEnabledWithNetworkService()) {
return false;
}
return IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(GetOriginalProfilePrefs());
}
| 172,554 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CWD_API void realpath_cache_del(const char *path, int path_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
unsigned long key = realpath_cache_key(path, path_len TSRMLS_CC);
#else
unsigned long key = realpath_cache_key(path, path_len);
#endif
unsigned long n = key % (sizeof(CWDG(realpath_cache)) / sizeof(CWDG(realpath_cache)[0]));
realpath_cache_bucket **bucket = &CWDG(realpath_cache)[n];
while (*bucket != NULL) {
if (key == (*bucket)->key && path_len == (*bucket)->path_len &&
memcmp(path, (*bucket)->path, path_len) == 0) {
realpath_cache_bucket *r = *bucket;
*bucket = (*bucket)->next;
/* if the pointers match then only subtract the length of the path */
if(r->path == r->realpath) {
CWDG(realpath_cache_size) -= sizeof(realpath_cache_bucket) + r->path_len + 1;
} else {
CWDG(realpath_cache_size) -= sizeof(realpath_cache_bucket) + r->path_len + 1 + r->realpath_len + 1;
}
free(r);
return;
} else {
bucket = &(*bucket)->next;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | CWD_API void realpath_cache_del(const char *path, int path_len TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
unsigned long key = realpath_cache_key(path, path_len TSRMLS_CC);
#else
unsigned long key = realpath_cache_key(path, path_len);
#endif
unsigned long n = key % (sizeof(CWDG(realpath_cache)) / sizeof(CWDG(realpath_cache)[0]));
realpath_cache_bucket **bucket = &CWDG(realpath_cache)[n];
while (*bucket != NULL) {
if (key == (*bucket)->key && path_len == (*bucket)->path_len &&
memcmp(path, (*bucket)->path, path_len) == 0) {
realpath_cache_bucket *r = *bucket;
*bucket = (*bucket)->next;
/* if the pointers match then only subtract the length of the path */
if(r->path == r->realpath) {
CWDG(realpath_cache_size) -= sizeof(realpath_cache_bucket) + r->path_len + 1;
} else {
CWDG(realpath_cache_size) -= sizeof(realpath_cache_bucket) + r->path_len + 1 + r->realpath_len + 1;
}
free(r);
return;
} else {
bucket = &(*bucket)->next;
}
}
}
/* }}} */
| 164,982 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChangeInputMethodViaIBus(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return false;
std::string input_method_id_to_switch = input_method_id;
if (!InputMethodIsActivated(input_method_id)) {
scoped_ptr<InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(GetActiveInputMethods());
DCHECK(!input_methods->empty());
if (!input_methods->empty()) {
input_method_id_to_switch = input_methods->at(0).id;
LOG(INFO) << "Can't change the current input method to "
<< input_method_id << " since the engine is not preloaded. "
<< "Switch to " << input_method_id_to_switch << " instead.";
}
}
if (chromeos::ChangeInputMethod(input_method_status_connection_,
input_method_id_to_switch.c_str())) {
return true;
}
LOG(ERROR) << "Can't switch input method to " << input_method_id_to_switch;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool ChangeInputMethodViaIBus(const std::string& input_method_id) {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return false;
std::string input_method_id_to_switch = input_method_id;
if (!InputMethodIsActivated(input_method_id)) {
scoped_ptr<input_method::InputMethodDescriptors> input_methods(
GetActiveInputMethods());
DCHECK(!input_methods->empty());
if (!input_methods->empty()) {
input_method_id_to_switch = input_methods->at(0).id;
LOG(INFO) << "Can't change the current input method to "
<< input_method_id << " since the engine is not preloaded. "
<< "Switch to " << input_method_id_to_switch << " instead.";
}
}
if (ibus_controller_->ChangeInputMethod(input_method_id_to_switch)) {
return true;
}
LOG(ERROR) << "Can't switch input method to " << input_method_id_to_switch;
return false;
}
| 170,481 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t fuse_dev_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct file *out, loff_t *ppos,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned nbuf;
unsigned idx;
struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
struct fuse_copy_state cs;
struct fuse_dev *fud;
size_t rem;
ssize_t ret;
fud = fuse_get_dev(out);
if (!fud)
return -EPERM;
pipe_lock(pipe);
bufs = kvmalloc_array(pipe->nrbufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bufs) {
pipe_unlock(pipe);
return -ENOMEM;
}
nbuf = 0;
rem = 0;
for (idx = 0; idx < pipe->nrbufs && rem < len; idx++)
rem += pipe->bufs[(pipe->curbuf + idx) & (pipe->buffers - 1)].len;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (rem < len) {
pipe_unlock(pipe);
goto out;
}
rem = len;
while (rem) {
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf;
struct pipe_buffer *obuf;
BUG_ON(nbuf >= pipe->buffers);
BUG_ON(!pipe->nrbufs);
ibuf = &pipe->bufs[pipe->curbuf];
obuf = &bufs[nbuf];
if (rem >= ibuf->len) {
*obuf = *ibuf;
ibuf->ops = NULL;
pipe->curbuf = (pipe->curbuf + 1) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
pipe->nrbufs--;
} else {
pipe_buf_get(pipe, ibuf);
*obuf = *ibuf;
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
obuf->len = rem;
ibuf->offset += obuf->len;
ibuf->len -= obuf->len;
}
nbuf++;
rem -= obuf->len;
}
pipe_unlock(pipe);
fuse_copy_init(&cs, 0, NULL);
cs.pipebufs = bufs;
cs.nr_segs = nbuf;
cs.pipe = pipe;
if (flags & SPLICE_F_MOVE)
cs.move_pages = 1;
ret = fuse_dev_do_write(fud, &cs, len);
pipe_lock(pipe);
for (idx = 0; idx < nbuf; idx++)
pipe_buf_release(pipe, &bufs[idx]);
pipe_unlock(pipe);
out:
kvfree(bufs);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static ssize_t fuse_dev_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct file *out, loff_t *ppos,
size_t len, unsigned int flags)
{
unsigned nbuf;
unsigned idx;
struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
struct fuse_copy_state cs;
struct fuse_dev *fud;
size_t rem;
ssize_t ret;
fud = fuse_get_dev(out);
if (!fud)
return -EPERM;
pipe_lock(pipe);
bufs = kvmalloc_array(pipe->nrbufs, sizeof(struct pipe_buffer),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bufs) {
pipe_unlock(pipe);
return -ENOMEM;
}
nbuf = 0;
rem = 0;
for (idx = 0; idx < pipe->nrbufs && rem < len; idx++)
rem += pipe->bufs[(pipe->curbuf + idx) & (pipe->buffers - 1)].len;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (rem < len)
goto out_free;
rem = len;
while (rem) {
struct pipe_buffer *ibuf;
struct pipe_buffer *obuf;
BUG_ON(nbuf >= pipe->buffers);
BUG_ON(!pipe->nrbufs);
ibuf = &pipe->bufs[pipe->curbuf];
obuf = &bufs[nbuf];
if (rem >= ibuf->len) {
*obuf = *ibuf;
ibuf->ops = NULL;
pipe->curbuf = (pipe->curbuf + 1) & (pipe->buffers - 1);
pipe->nrbufs--;
} else {
if (!pipe_buf_get(pipe, ibuf))
goto out_free;
*obuf = *ibuf;
obuf->flags &= ~PIPE_BUF_FLAG_GIFT;
obuf->len = rem;
ibuf->offset += obuf->len;
ibuf->len -= obuf->len;
}
nbuf++;
rem -= obuf->len;
}
pipe_unlock(pipe);
fuse_copy_init(&cs, 0, NULL);
cs.pipebufs = bufs;
cs.nr_segs = nbuf;
cs.pipe = pipe;
if (flags & SPLICE_F_MOVE)
cs.move_pages = 1;
ret = fuse_dev_do_write(fud, &cs, len);
pipe_lock(pipe);
out_free:
for (idx = 0; idx < nbuf; idx++)
pipe_buf_release(pipe, &bufs[idx]);
pipe_unlock(pipe);
kvfree(bufs);
return ret;
}
| 170,217 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: store_message(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, char *buffer, size_t bufsize,
size_t pos, PNG_CONST char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pread)
{
/* Reading a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "read: ");
if (ps->current != NULL)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->current->name);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
}
else if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pwrite)
{
/* Writing a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "write: ");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->wname);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
else
{
/* Neither reading nor writing (or a memory error in struct delete) */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "pngvalid: ");
}
if (ps->test[0] != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->test);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, msg);
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | store_message(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, char *buffer, size_t bufsize,
size_t pos, const char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pread)
{
/* Reading a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "read: ");
if (ps->current != NULL)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->current->name);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
}
else if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pwrite)
{
/* Writing a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "write: ");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->wname);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
else
{
/* Neither reading nor writing (or a memory error in struct delete) */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "pngvalid: ");
}
if (ps->test[0] != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->test);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, msg);
return pos;
}
| 173,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AutoFillQueryXmlParser::AutoFillQueryXmlParser(
std::vector<AutoFillFieldType>* field_types,
UploadRequired* upload_required)
: field_types_(field_types),
upload_required_(upload_required) {
DCHECK(upload_required_);
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | AutoFillQueryXmlParser::AutoFillQueryXmlParser(
std::vector<AutoFillFieldType>* field_types,
UploadRequired* upload_required,
std::string* experiment_id)
: field_types_(field_types),
upload_required_(upload_required),
experiment_id_(experiment_id) {
DCHECK(upload_required_);
DCHECK(experiment_id_);
}
| 170,653 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: base::WeakPtr<OTRBrowserContextImpl> GetWeakPtr() {
return weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | base::WeakPtr<OTRBrowserContextImpl> GetWeakPtr() {
| 165,415 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool WebDriverCommand::Init(Response* const response) {
std::string session_id = GetPathVariable(2);
if (session_id.length() == 0) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kBadRequest, "No session ID specified"));
return false;
}
VLOG(1) << "Fetching session: " << session_id;
session_ = SessionManager::GetInstance()->GetSession(session_id);
if (session_ == NULL) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kSessionNotFound, "Session not found: " + session_id));
return false;
}
scoped_ptr<Error> error(session_->WaitForAllTabsToStopLoading());
if (error.get()) {
LOG(WARNING) << error->ToString();
}
error.reset(session_->SwitchToTopFrameIfCurrentFrameInvalid());
if (error.get()) {
LOG(WARNING) << error->ToString();
}
response->SetField("sessionId", Value::CreateStringValue(session_id));
return true;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool WebDriverCommand::Init(Response* const response) {
std::string session_id = GetPathVariable(2);
if (session_id.length() == 0) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kBadRequest, "No session ID specified"));
return false;
}
session_ = SessionManager::GetInstance()->GetSession(session_id);
if (session_ == NULL) {
response->SetError(
new Error(kSessionNotFound, "Session not found: " + session_id));
return false;
}
LOG(INFO) << "Waiting for the page to stop loading";
Error* error = session_->WaitForAllTabsToStopLoading();
if (error) {
response->SetError(error);
return false;
}
LOG(INFO) << "Done waiting for the page to stop loading";
error = session_->SwitchToTopFrameIfCurrentFrameInvalid();
if (error) {
response->SetError(error);
return false;
}
response->SetField("sessionId", Value::CreateStringValue(session_id));
return true;
}
| 170,454 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_remove_events info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Input mostly not implemented XXX.
*/
if (info.remove_mode & SNDRV_SEQ_REMOVE_INPUT) {
/*
* No restrictions so for a user client we can clear
* the whole fifo
*/
if (client->type == USER_CLIENT)
snd_seq_fifo_clear(client->data.user.fifo);
}
if (info.remove_mode & SNDRV_SEQ_REMOVE_OUTPUT)
snd_seq_queue_remove_cells(client->number, &info);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | static int snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_remove_events info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Input mostly not implemented XXX.
*/
if (info.remove_mode & SNDRV_SEQ_REMOVE_INPUT) {
/*
* No restrictions so for a user client we can clear
* the whole fifo
*/
if (client->type == USER_CLIENT && client->data.user.fifo)
snd_seq_fifo_clear(client->data.user.fifo);
}
if (info.remove_mode & SNDRV_SEQ_REMOVE_OUTPUT)
snd_seq_queue_remove_cells(client->number, &info);
return 0;
}
| 167,410 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: err_t verify_signed_hash(const struct RSA_public_key *k
, u_char *s, unsigned int s_max_octets
, u_char **psig
, size_t hash_len
, const u_char *sig_val, size_t sig_len)
{
unsigned int padlen;
/* actual exponentiation; see PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 */
{
chunk_t temp_s;
MP_INT c;
n_to_mpz(&c, sig_val, sig_len);
oswcrypto.mod_exp(&c, &c, &k->e, &k->n);
temp_s = mpz_to_n(&c, sig_len); /* back to octets */
if(s_max_octets < sig_len) {
return "2""exponentiation failed; too many octets";
}
memcpy(s, temp_s.ptr, sig_len);
pfree(temp_s.ptr);
mpz_clear(&c);
}
/* check signature contents */
/* verify padding (not including any DER digest info! */
padlen = sig_len - 3 - hash_len;
/* now check padding */
DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
DBG_dump("verify_sh decrypted SIG1:", s, sig_len));
DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("pad_len calculated: %d hash_len: %d", padlen, (int)hash_len));
/* skip padding */
if(s[0] != 0x00
|| s[1] != 0x01
|| s[padlen+2] != 0x00) {
return "3""SIG padding does not check out";
}
s += padlen + 3;
(*psig) = s;
/* return SUCCESS */
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: wo#7449 . verify padding contents for IKEv2 RSA sig check
Special thanks to Sze Yiu Chau of Purdue University (schau@purdue.edu)
who reported the issue.
CWE ID: CWE-347 | err_t verify_signed_hash(const struct RSA_public_key *k
, u_char *s, unsigned int s_max_octets
, u_char **psig
, size_t hash_len
, const u_char *sig_val, size_t sig_len)
{
unsigned int padlen;
/* actual exponentiation; see PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 */
{
chunk_t temp_s;
MP_INT c;
n_to_mpz(&c, sig_val, sig_len);
oswcrypto.mod_exp(&c, &c, &k->e, &k->n);
temp_s = mpz_to_n(&c, sig_len); /* back to octets */
if(s_max_octets < sig_len) {
return "2""exponentiation failed; too many octets";
}
memcpy(s, temp_s.ptr, sig_len);
pfree(temp_s.ptr);
mpz_clear(&c);
}
/* check signature contents */
/* verify padding (not including any DER digest info! */
padlen = sig_len - 3 - hash_len;
/* now check padding */
DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
DBG_dump("verify_sh decrypted SIG1:", s, sig_len));
DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("pad_len calculated: %d hash_len: %d", padlen, (int)hash_len));
/* skip padding */
if(s[0] != 0x00
|| s[1] != 0x01
|| s[padlen+2] != 0x00) {
return "3""SIG padding does not check out";
}
/* signature starts after ASN wrapped padding [00,01,FF..FF,00] */
(*psig) = s + padlen + 3;
/* verify padding contents */
{
const u_char *p;
size_t cnt_ffs = 0;
for (p = s+2; p < s+padlen+2; p++)
if (*p == 0xFF)
cnt_ffs ++;
if (cnt_ffs != padlen)
return "4" "invalid Padding String";
}
/* return SUCCESS */
return NULL;
}
| 169,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GpuProcessHost::~GpuProcessHost() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
SendOutstandingReplies();
if (process_launched_ && kind_ == GPU_PROCESS_KIND_SANDBOXED) {
if (software_rendering_) {
if (++g_gpu_software_crash_count >= kGpuMaxCrashCount) {
gpu_enabled_ = false;
}
} else {
if (++g_gpu_crash_count >= kGpuMaxCrashCount) {
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
hardware_gpu_enabled_ = false;
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->BlacklistCard();
#endif
}
}
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessLifetimeEvents",
DIED_FIRST_TIME + g_gpu_crash_count,
GPU_PROCESS_LIFETIME_EVENT_MAX);
int exit_code;
base::TerminationStatus status = process_->GetTerminationStatus(&exit_code);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessTerminationStatus",
status,
base::TERMINATION_STATUS_MAX_ENUM);
if (status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION ||
status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_ABNORMAL_TERMINATION) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessExitCode",
exit_code,
content::RESULT_CODE_LAST_CODE);
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (gpu_process_)
CloseHandle(gpu_process_);
#endif
while (!queued_messages_.empty()) {
delete queued_messages_.front();
queued_messages_.pop();
}
if (g_gpu_process_hosts[kind_] == this)
g_gpu_process_hosts[kind_] = NULL;
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GpuProcessHostUIShim::Destroy, host_id_));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | GpuProcessHost::~GpuProcessHost() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
SendOutstandingReplies();
if (process_launched_ && kind_ == GPU_PROCESS_KIND_SANDBOXED) {
if (software_rendering_) {
if (++g_gpu_software_crash_count >= kGpuMaxCrashCount) {
gpu_enabled_ = false;
}
} else {
if (++g_gpu_crash_count >= kGpuMaxCrashCount) {
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
hardware_gpu_enabled_ = false;
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->BlacklistCard();
#endif
}
}
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessLifetimeEvents",
DIED_FIRST_TIME + g_gpu_crash_count,
GPU_PROCESS_LIFETIME_EVENT_MAX);
int exit_code;
base::TerminationStatus status = process_->GetTerminationStatus(&exit_code);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessTerminationStatus",
status,
base::TERMINATION_STATUS_MAX_ENUM);
if (status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_NORMAL_TERMINATION ||
status == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_ABNORMAL_TERMINATION) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("GPU.GPUProcessExitCode",
exit_code,
content::RESULT_CODE_LAST_CODE);
}
while (!queued_messages_.empty()) {
delete queued_messages_.front();
queued_messages_.pop();
}
if (g_gpu_process_hosts[kind_] == this)
g_gpu_process_hosts[kind_] = NULL;
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GpuProcessHostUIShim::Destroy, host_id_));
}
| 170,924 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int hashtable_do_rehash(hashtable_t *hashtable)
{
list_t *list, *next;
pair_t *pair;
size_t i, index, new_size;
jsonp_free(hashtable->buckets);
hashtable->num_buckets++;
new_size = num_buckets(hashtable);
hashtable->buckets = jsonp_malloc(new_size * sizeof(bucket_t));
if(!hashtable->buckets)
return -1;
for(i = 0; i < num_buckets(hashtable); i++)
{
hashtable->buckets[i].first = hashtable->buckets[i].last =
&hashtable->list;
}
list = hashtable->list.next;
list_init(&hashtable->list);
for(; list != &hashtable->list; list = next) {
next = list->next;
pair = list_to_pair(list);
index = pair->hash % new_size;
insert_to_bucket(hashtable, &hashtable->buckets[index], &pair->list);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | static int hashtable_do_rehash(hashtable_t *hashtable)
{
list_t *list, *next;
pair_t *pair;
size_t i, index, new_size;
jsonp_free(hashtable->buckets);
hashtable->order++;
new_size = hashsize(hashtable->order);
hashtable->buckets = jsonp_malloc(new_size * sizeof(bucket_t));
if(!hashtable->buckets)
return -1;
for(i = 0; i < hashsize(hashtable->order); i++)
{
hashtable->buckets[i].first = hashtable->buckets[i].last =
&hashtable->list;
}
list = hashtable->list.next;
list_init(&hashtable->list);
for(; list != &hashtable->list; list = next) {
next = list->next;
pair = list_to_pair(list);
index = pair->hash % new_size;
insert_to_bucket(hashtable, &hashtable->buckets[index], &pair->list);
}
return 0;
}
| 166,529 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BaseRenderingContext2D::BaseRenderingContext2D()
: clip_antialiasing_(kNotAntiAliased) {
state_stack_.push_back(CanvasRenderingContext2DState::Create());
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | BaseRenderingContext2D::BaseRenderingContext2D()
: clip_antialiasing_(kNotAntiAliased), origin_tainted_by_content_(false) {
state_stack_.push_back(CanvasRenderingContext2DState::Create());
}
| 172,904 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void addArgumentToVtab(Parse *pParse){
if( pParse->sArg.z && pParse->pNewTable ){
const char *z = (const char*)pParse->sArg.z;
int n = pParse->sArg.n;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
addModuleArgument(db, pParse->pNewTable, sqlite3DbStrNDup(db, z, n));
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void addArgumentToVtab(Parse *pParse){
if( pParse->sArg.z && pParse->pNewTable ){
const char *z = (const char*)pParse->sArg.z;
int n = pParse->sArg.n;
sqlite3 *db = pParse->db;
addModuleArgument(pParse, pParse->pNewTable, sqlite3DbStrNDup(db, z, n));
}
}
| 173,013 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer,
size_t size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer");
base::SharedMemory shared_memory(transfer_buffer, false);
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->RegisterTransferBuffer(&shared_memory,
size,
id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer(
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer,
uint32 size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnRegisterTransferBuffer");
base::SharedMemory shared_memory(transfer_buffer, false);
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->RegisterTransferBuffer(&shared_memory,
size,
id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_RegisterTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
| 171,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SelectCache(
int host_id,
const GURL& document_url,
const int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from,
const GURL& manifest_url) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host || host->was_select_cache_called())
return false;
host->SelectCache(document_url, cache_document_was_loaded_from,
manifest_url);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | bool AppCacheBackendImpl::SelectCache(
int host_id,
const GURL& document_url,
const int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from,
const GURL& manifest_url) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host)
return false;
return host->SelectCache(document_url, cache_document_was_loaded_from,
manifest_url);
}
| 171,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Tracks::Tracks(
Segment* pSegment,
long long start,
long long size_,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_trackEntries(NULL),
m_trackEntriesEnd(NULL)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Tracks::Tracks(
| 174,446 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Browser::SetWebContentsBlocked(content::WebContents* web_contents,
bool blocked) {
int index = tab_strip_model_->GetIndexOfWebContents(web_contents);
if (index == TabStripModel::kNoTab) {
return;
}
tab_strip_model_->SetTabBlocked(index, blocked);
bool browser_active = BrowserList::GetInstance()->GetLastActive() == this;
bool contents_is_active =
tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents() == web_contents;
if (!blocked && contents_is_active && browser_active)
web_contents->Focus();
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Browser::SetWebContentsBlocked(content::WebContents* web_contents,
bool blocked) {
int index = tab_strip_model_->GetIndexOfWebContents(web_contents);
if (index == TabStripModel::kNoTab) {
return;
}
// For security, if the WebContents is in fullscreen, have it drop fullscreen.
// This gives the user the context they need in order to make informed
// decisions.
if (web_contents->IsFullscreenForCurrentTab())
web_contents->ExitFullscreen(true);
tab_strip_model_->SetTabBlocked(index, blocked);
bool browser_active = BrowserList::GetInstance()->GetLastActive() == this;
bool contents_is_active =
tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents() == web_contents;
if (!blocked && contents_is_active && browser_active)
web_contents->Focus();
}
| 172,664 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sp<MediaSource> OMXCodec::Create(
const sp<IOMX> &omx,
const sp<MetaData> &meta, bool createEncoder,
const sp<MediaSource> &source,
const char *matchComponentName,
uint32_t flags,
const sp<ANativeWindow> &nativeWindow) {
int32_t requiresSecureBuffers;
if (source->getFormat()->findInt32(
kKeyRequiresSecureBuffers,
&requiresSecureBuffers)
&& requiresSecureBuffers) {
flags |= kIgnoreCodecSpecificData;
flags |= kUseSecureInputBuffers;
}
const char *mime;
bool success = meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime);
CHECK(success);
Vector<CodecNameAndQuirks> matchingCodecs;
findMatchingCodecs(
mime, createEncoder, matchComponentName, flags, &matchingCodecs);
if (matchingCodecs.isEmpty()) {
ALOGV("No matching codecs! (mime: %s, createEncoder: %s, "
"matchComponentName: %s, flags: 0x%x)",
mime, createEncoder ? "true" : "false", matchComponentName, flags);
return NULL;
}
sp<OMXCodecObserver> observer = new OMXCodecObserver;
IOMX::node_id node = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < matchingCodecs.size(); ++i) {
const char *componentNameBase = matchingCodecs[i].mName.string();
uint32_t quirks = matchingCodecs[i].mQuirks;
const char *componentName = componentNameBase;
AString tmp;
if (flags & kUseSecureInputBuffers) {
tmp = componentNameBase;
tmp.append(".secure");
componentName = tmp.c_str();
}
if (createEncoder) {
sp<MediaSource> softwareCodec =
InstantiateSoftwareEncoder(componentName, source, meta);
if (softwareCodec != NULL) {
ALOGV("Successfully allocated software codec '%s'", componentName);
return softwareCodec;
}
}
ALOGV("Attempting to allocate OMX node '%s'", componentName);
if (!createEncoder
&& (quirks & kOutputBuffersAreUnreadable)
&& (flags & kClientNeedsFramebuffer)) {
if (strncmp(componentName, "OMX.SEC.", 8)) {
ALOGW("Component '%s' does not give the client access to "
"the framebuffer contents. Skipping.",
componentName);
continue;
}
}
status_t err = omx->allocateNode(componentName, observer, &node);
if (err == OK) {
ALOGV("Successfully allocated OMX node '%s'", componentName);
sp<OMXCodec> codec = new OMXCodec(
omx, node, quirks, flags,
createEncoder, mime, componentName,
source, nativeWindow);
observer->setCodec(codec);
err = codec->configureCodec(meta);
if (err == OK) {
return codec;
}
ALOGV("Failed to configure codec '%s'", componentName);
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119 | sp<MediaSource> OMXCodec::Create(
const sp<IOMX> &omx,
const sp<MetaData> &meta, bool createEncoder,
const sp<MediaSource> &source,
const char *matchComponentName,
uint32_t flags,
const sp<ANativeWindow> &nativeWindow) {
int32_t requiresSecureBuffers;
if (source->getFormat()->findInt32(
kKeyRequiresSecureBuffers,
&requiresSecureBuffers)
&& requiresSecureBuffers) {
flags |= kIgnoreCodecSpecificData;
flags |= kUseSecureInputBuffers;
}
const char *mime;
bool success = meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime);
CHECK(success);
Vector<CodecNameAndQuirks> matchingCodecs;
findMatchingCodecs(
mime, createEncoder, matchComponentName, flags, &matchingCodecs);
if (matchingCodecs.isEmpty()) {
ALOGV("No matching codecs! (mime: %s, createEncoder: %s, "
"matchComponentName: %s, flags: 0x%x)",
mime, createEncoder ? "true" : "false", matchComponentName, flags);
return NULL;
}
sp<OMXCodecObserver> observer = new OMXCodecObserver;
IOMX::node_id node = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < matchingCodecs.size(); ++i) {
const char *componentNameBase = matchingCodecs[i].mName.string();
uint32_t quirks = matchingCodecs[i].mQuirks;
const char *componentName = componentNameBase;
AString tmp;
if (flags & kUseSecureInputBuffers) {
tmp = componentNameBase;
tmp.append(".secure");
componentName = tmp.c_str();
}
if (createEncoder) {
sp<MediaSource> softwareCodec =
InstantiateSoftwareEncoder(componentName, source, meta);
if (softwareCodec != NULL) {
ALOGV("Successfully allocated software codec '%s'", componentName);
return softwareCodec;
}
}
ALOGV("Attempting to allocate OMX node '%s'", componentName);
status_t err = omx->allocateNode(componentName, observer, &node);
if (err == OK) {
ALOGV("Successfully allocated OMX node '%s'", componentName);
sp<OMXCodec> codec = new OMXCodec(
omx, node, quirks, flags,
createEncoder, mime, componentName,
source, nativeWindow);
observer->setCodec(codec);
err = codec->configureCodec(meta);
if (err == OK) {
return codec;
}
ALOGV("Failed to configure codec '%s'", componentName);
}
}
return NULL;
}
| 173,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SQLWCHAR* _multi_string_alloc_and_expand( LPCSTR in )
{
SQLWCHAR *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc(sizeof( SQLWCHAR ) * ( len + 2 ));
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
return chr;
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SQLWCHAR* _multi_string_alloc_and_expand( LPCSTR in )
{
SQLWCHAR *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return NULL;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc(sizeof( SQLWCHAR ) * ( len + 2 ));
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
chr[ len ++ ] = 0;
return chr;
}
| 169,314 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _TIFFmalloc(tsize_t s)
{
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | _TIFFmalloc(tsize_t s)
{
if (s == 0)
return ((void *) NULL);
return (malloc((size_t) s));
}
| 169,460 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fst_get_iface(struct fst_card_info *card, struct fst_port_info *port,
struct ifreq *ifr)
{
sync_serial_settings sync;
int i;
/* First check what line type is set, we'll default to reporting X.21
* if nothing is set as IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL implies it can't be
* changed
*/
switch (port->hwif) {
case E1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_E1;
break;
case T1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_T1;
break;
case V35:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V35;
break;
case V24:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V24;
break;
case X21D:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21D;
break;
case X21:
default:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21;
break;
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size == 0) {
return 0; /* only type requested */
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < sizeof (sync)) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
i = port->index;
sync.clock_rate = FST_RDL(card, portConfig[i].lineSpeed);
/* Lucky card and linux use same encoding here */
sync.clock_type = FST_RDB(card, portConfig[i].internalClock) ==
INTCLK ? CLOCK_INT : CLOCK_EXT;
sync.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &sync, sizeof (sync))) {
return -EFAULT;
}
ifr->ifr_settings.size = sizeof (sync);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | fst_get_iface(struct fst_card_info *card, struct fst_port_info *port,
struct ifreq *ifr)
{
sync_serial_settings sync;
int i;
/* First check what line type is set, we'll default to reporting X.21
* if nothing is set as IF_IFACE_SYNC_SERIAL implies it can't be
* changed
*/
switch (port->hwif) {
case E1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_E1;
break;
case T1:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_T1;
break;
case V35:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V35;
break;
case V24:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_V24;
break;
case X21D:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21D;
break;
case X21:
default:
ifr->ifr_settings.type = IF_IFACE_X21;
break;
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size == 0) {
return 0; /* only type requested */
}
if (ifr->ifr_settings.size < sizeof (sync)) {
return -ENOMEM;
}
i = port->index;
memset(&sync, 0, sizeof(sync));
sync.clock_rate = FST_RDL(card, portConfig[i].lineSpeed);
/* Lucky card and linux use same encoding here */
sync.clock_type = FST_RDB(card, portConfig[i].internalClock) ==
INTCLK ? CLOCK_INT : CLOCK_EXT;
sync.loopback = 0;
if (copy_to_user(ifr->ifr_settings.ifs_ifsu.sync, &sync, sizeof (sync))) {
return -EFAULT;
}
ifr->ifr_settings.size = sizeof (sync);
return 0;
}
| 166,439 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Read(const base::Pickle* m,
base::PickleIterator* iter,
SkBitmap* r) {
const char* fixed_data;
int fixed_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&fixed_data, &fixed_data_size) ||
(fixed_data_size <= 0)) {
return false;
}
if (fixed_data_size != sizeof(SkBitmap_Data))
return false; // Message is malformed.
const char* variable_data;
int variable_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&variable_data, &variable_data_size) ||
(variable_data_size < 0)) {
return false;
}
const SkBitmap_Data* bmp_data =
reinterpret_cast<const SkBitmap_Data*>(fixed_data);
return bmp_data->InitSkBitmapFromData(r, variable_data, variable_data_size);
}
Commit Message: Update IPC ParamTraits for SkBitmap to follow best practices.
Using memcpy() to serialize a POD struct is highly discouraged. Just use
the standard IPC param traits macros for doing it.
Bug: 779428
Change-Id: I48f52c1f5c245ba274d595829ed92e8b3cb41334
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/899649
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534562}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | bool ParamTraits<SkBitmap>::Read(const base::Pickle* m,
base::PickleIterator* iter,
SkBitmap* r) {
SkImageInfo image_info;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &image_info))
return false;
const char* bitmap_data;
int bitmap_data_size = 0;
if (!iter->ReadData(&bitmap_data, &bitmap_data_size))
return false;
// ReadData() only returns true if bitmap_data_size >= 0.
if (!r->tryAllocPixels(image_info))
return false;
if (static_cast<size_t>(bitmap_data_size) != r->computeByteSize())
return false;
memcpy(r->getPixels(), bitmap_data, bitmap_data_size);
return true;
}
| 172,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Browser::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
TabDetachedAtImpl(old_contents, index, DETACH_TYPE_REPLACE);
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (session_service)
session_service->TabClosing(old_contents->web_contents());
TabInsertedAt(new_contents->web_contents(), index, (index == active_index()));
int entry_count =
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryCount();
if (entry_count > 0) {
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().NotifyEntryChanged(
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryAtIndex(
entry_count - 1),
entry_count - 1);
}
if (session_service) {
session_service->TabRestored(new_contents,
tab_strip_model_->IsTabPinned(index));
}
content::DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->ContentsReplaced(
old_contents->web_contents(), new_contents->web_contents());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Browser::TabReplacedAt(TabStripModel* tab_strip_model,
TabContents* old_contents,
TabContents* new_contents,
int index) {
TabDetachedAtImpl(old_contents->web_contents(), index, DETACH_TYPE_REPLACE);
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
if (session_service)
session_service->TabClosing(old_contents->web_contents());
TabInsertedAt(new_contents->web_contents(), index, (index == active_index()));
int entry_count =
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryCount();
if (entry_count > 0) {
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().NotifyEntryChanged(
new_contents->web_contents()->GetController().GetEntryAtIndex(
entry_count - 1),
entry_count - 1);
}
if (session_service) {
session_service->TabRestored(new_contents,
tab_strip_model_->IsTabPinned(index));
}
content::DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->ContentsReplaced(
old_contents->web_contents(), new_contents->web_contents());
}
| 171,509 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LockContentsView::UserState::UserState(AccountId account_id)
: account_id(account_id) {}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | LockContentsView::UserState::UserState(AccountId account_id)
| 172,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Track::Info::~Info()
{
Clear();
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Track::Info::~Info()
| 174,468 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Chapters::Atom::GetStopTime(const Chapters* pChapters) const
{
return GetTime(pChapters, m_stop_timecode);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Chapters::Atom::GetStopTime(const Chapters* pChapters) const
| 174,357 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void timer_enter_running(Timer *t) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
int r;
assert(t);
/* Don't start job if we are supposed to go down */
if (unit_stop_pending(UNIT(t)))
return;
r = manager_add_job(UNIT(t)->manager, JOB_START, UNIT_TRIGGER(UNIT(t)),
JOB_REPLACE, true, &error, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
dual_timestamp_get(&t->last_trigger);
if (t->stamp_path)
touch_file(t->stamp_path, true, t->last_trigger.realtime, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, 0);
timer_set_state(t, TIMER_RUNNING);
return;
fail:
log_unit_warning(UNIT(t), "Failed to queue unit startup job: %s", bus_error_message(&error, r));
timer_enter_dead(t, TIMER_FAILURE_RESOURCES);
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void timer_enter_running(Timer *t) {
_cleanup_bus_error_free_ sd_bus_error error = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
int r;
assert(t);
/* Don't start job if we are supposed to go down */
if (unit_stop_pending(UNIT(t)))
return;
r = manager_add_job(UNIT(t)->manager, JOB_START, UNIT_TRIGGER(UNIT(t)),
JOB_REPLACE, true, &error, NULL);
if (r < 0)
goto fail;
dual_timestamp_get(&t->last_trigger);
if (t->stamp_path)
touch_file(t->stamp_path, true, t->last_trigger.realtime, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID, MODE_INVALID);
timer_set_state(t, TIMER_RUNNING);
return;
fail:
log_unit_warning(UNIT(t), "Failed to queue unit startup job: %s", bus_error_message(&error, r));
timer_enter_dead(t, TIMER_FAILURE_RESOURCES);
}
| 170,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool DebuggerFunction::InitAgentHost() {
if (debuggee_.tab_id) {
WebContents* web_contents = NULL;
bool result = ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(*debuggee_.tab_id,
GetProfile(),
include_incognito(),
NULL,
NULL,
&web_contents,
NULL);
if (result && web_contents) {
if (content::HasWebUIScheme(web_contents->GetURL())) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
keys::kAttachToWebUIError,
web_contents->GetURL().scheme());
return false;
}
agent_host_ = DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(web_contents);
}
} else if (debuggee_.extension_id) {
ExtensionHost* extension_host =
ExtensionSystem::Get(GetProfile())
->process_manager()
->GetBackgroundHostForExtension(*debuggee_.extension_id);
if (extension_host) {
agent_host_ = DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(
extension_host->render_view_host());
}
} else if (debuggee_.target_id) {
agent_host_ = DevToolsAgentHost::GetForId(*debuggee_.target_id);
} else {
error_ = keys::kInvalidTargetError;
return false;
}
if (!agent_host_.get()) {
FormatErrorMessage(keys::kNoTargetError);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool DebuggerFunction::InitAgentHost() {
const Extension* extension = GetExtension();
if (debuggee_.tab_id) {
WebContents* web_contents = NULL;
bool result = ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(*debuggee_.tab_id,
GetProfile(),
include_incognito(),
NULL,
NULL,
&web_contents,
NULL);
if (result && web_contents) {
// TODO(rdevlin.cronin) This should definitely be GetLastCommittedURL().
GURL url = web_contents->GetVisibleURL();
if (PermissionsData::IsRestrictedUrl(url, url, extension, &error_))
return false;
agent_host_ = DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(web_contents);
}
} else if (debuggee_.extension_id) {
ExtensionHost* extension_host =
ExtensionSystem::Get(GetProfile())
->process_manager()
->GetBackgroundHostForExtension(*debuggee_.extension_id);
if (extension_host) {
if (PermissionsData::IsRestrictedUrl(extension_host->GetURL(),
extension_host->GetURL(),
extension,
&error_)) {
return false;
}
agent_host_ = DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(
extension_host->render_view_host());
}
} else if (debuggee_.target_id) {
agent_host_ = DevToolsAgentHost::GetForId(*debuggee_.target_id);
} else {
error_ = keys::kInvalidTargetError;
return false;
}
if (!agent_host_.get()) {
FormatErrorMessage(keys::kNoTargetError);
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 171,653 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void impeg2d_peek_next_start_code(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush_to_byte_boundary(ps_stream);
while ((impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
&& (ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset <= ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset))
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void impeg2d_peek_next_start_code(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush_to_byte_boundary(ps_stream);
while ((impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
&& (ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset < ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset))
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
return;
}
| 173,951 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int64 GetOriginalListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return ListPrefInt64Value(*original_update_, index);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int64 GetOriginalListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return original_.GetListPrefValue(index);
}
| 171,323 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_dh_reply){
int rc;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL,"Received SSH_KEXDH_REPLY");
if(session->session_state!= SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH &&
session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT_SENT){
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"ssh_packet_dh_reply called in wrong state : %d:%d",
session->session_state,session->dh_handshake_state);
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_client_dh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_client_ecdh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_client_curve25519_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_dh_reply");
goto error;
}
if(rc==SSH_OK) {
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
error:
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | SSH_PACKET_CALLBACK(ssh_packet_dh_reply){
int rc;
(void)type;
(void)user;
SSH_LOG(SSH_LOG_PROTOCOL,"Received SSH_KEXDH_REPLY");
if (session->session_state != SSH_SESSION_STATE_DH ||
session->dh_handshake_state != DH_STATE_INIT_SENT){
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"ssh_packet_dh_reply called in wrong state : %d:%d",
session->session_state,session->dh_handshake_state);
goto error;
}
switch(session->next_crypto->kex_type){
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP1_SHA1:
case SSH_KEX_DH_GROUP14_SHA1:
rc=ssh_client_dh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_ECDH
case SSH_KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256:
rc = ssh_client_ecdh_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CURVE25519
case SSH_KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_LIBSSH_ORG:
rc = ssh_client_curve25519_reply(session, packet);
break;
#endif
default:
ssh_set_error(session,SSH_FATAL,"Wrong kex type in ssh_packet_dh_reply");
goto error;
}
if(rc==SSH_OK) {
session->dh_handshake_state = DH_STATE_NEWKEYS_SENT;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
error:
session->session_state=SSH_SESSION_STATE_ERROR;
return SSH_PACKET_USED;
}
| 165,323 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowPluginTypeForDocument(
const Document& document,
const String& type,
const String& type_attribute,
const KURL& url,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) const {
if (document.GetContentSecurityPolicy() &&
!document.GetContentSecurityPolicy()->AllowPluginType(
type, type_attribute, url, reporting_policy))
return false;
LocalFrame* frame = document.GetFrame();
if (frame && frame->Tree().Parent() && document.IsPluginDocument()) {
ContentSecurityPolicy* parent_csp = frame->Tree()
.Parent()
->GetSecurityContext()
->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (parent_csp && !parent_csp->AllowPluginType(type, type_attribute, url,
reporting_policy))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool ContentSecurityPolicy::AllowPluginTypeForDocument(
const Document& document,
const String& type,
const String& type_attribute,
const KURL& url,
SecurityViolationReportingPolicy reporting_policy) const {
if (document.GetContentSecurityPolicy() &&
!document.GetContentSecurityPolicy()->AllowPluginType(
type, type_attribute, url, reporting_policy))
return false;
return true;
}
| 173,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ber_parse_header(STREAM s, int tagval, int *length)
{
int tag, len;
if (tagval > 0xff)
{
in_uint16_be(s, tag);
}
else
{
in_uint8(s, tag);
}
if (tag != tagval)
{
logger(Core, Error, "ber_parse_header(), expected tag %d, got %d", tagval, tag);
return False;
}
in_uint8(s, len);
if (len & 0x80)
{
len &= ~0x80;
*length = 0;
while (len--)
next_be(s, *length);
}
else
*length = len;
return s_check(s);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ber_parse_header(STREAM s, int tagval, int *length)
ber_parse_header(STREAM s, int tagval, uint32 *length)
{
int tag, len;
if (tagval > 0xff)
{
in_uint16_be(s, tag);
}
else
{
in_uint8(s, tag);
}
if (tag != tagval)
{
logger(Core, Error, "ber_parse_header(), expected tag %d, got %d", tagval, tag);
return False;
}
in_uint8(s, len);
if (len & 0x80)
{
len &= ~0x80;
*length = 0;
while (len--)
next_be(s, *length);
}
else
*length = len;
return s_check(s);
}
| 169,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: token_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, scanner_state * pstate, bool save)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int code;
ref token;
/* Note that gs_scan_token may change osp! */
pop(1); /* remove the file or scanner state */
again:
gs_scanner_error_object(i_ctx_p, pstate, &i_ctx_p->error_object);
break;
case scan_BOS:
code = 0;
case 0: /* read a token */
push(2);
ref_assign(op - 1, &token);
make_true(op);
break;
case scan_EOF: /* no tokens */
push(1);
make_false(op);
code = 0;
break;
case scan_Refill: /* need more data */
code = gs_scan_handle_refill(i_ctx_p, pstate, save,
ztoken_continue);
switch (code) {
case 0: /* state is not copied to the heap */
goto again;
case o_push_estack:
return code;
}
break; /* error */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | token_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, scanner_state * pstate, bool save)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int code;
ref token;
/* Since we might free pstate below, and we're dealing with
* gc memory referenced by the stack, we need to explicitly
* remove the reference to pstate from the stack, otherwise
* the garbager will fall over
*/
make_null(osp);
/* Note that gs_scan_token may change osp! */
pop(1); /* remove the file or scanner state */
again:
gs_scanner_error_object(i_ctx_p, pstate, &i_ctx_p->error_object);
break;
case scan_BOS:
code = 0;
case 0: /* read a token */
push(2);
ref_assign(op - 1, &token);
make_true(op);
break;
case scan_EOF: /* no tokens */
push(1);
make_false(op);
code = 0;
break;
case scan_Refill: /* need more data */
code = gs_scan_handle_refill(i_ctx_p, pstate, save,
ztoken_continue);
switch (code) {
case 0: /* state is not copied to the heap */
goto again;
case o_push_estack:
return code;
}
break; /* error */
}
| 164,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static js_Ast *callexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Ast *a = newexp(J);
loop:
if (jsP_accept(J, '.')) { a = EXP2(MEMBER, a, identifiername(J)); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '[')) { a = EXP2(INDEX, a, expression(J, 0)); jsP_expect(J, ']'); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '(')) { a = EXP2(CALL, a, arguments(J)); jsP_expect(J, ')'); goto loop; }
return a;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-674 | static js_Ast *callexp(js_State *J)
{
js_Ast *a = newexp(J);
SAVEREC();
loop:
INCREC();
if (jsP_accept(J, '.')) { a = EXP2(MEMBER, a, identifiername(J)); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '[')) { a = EXP2(INDEX, a, expression(J, 0)); jsP_expect(J, ']'); goto loop; }
if (jsP_accept(J, '(')) { a = EXP2(CALL, a, arguments(J)); jsP_expect(J, ')'); goto loop; }
POPREC();
return a;
}
| 165,135 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void ConvertLoopSlice(ModSample &src, ModSample &dest, SmpLength start, SmpLength len, bool loop)
{
if(!src.HasSampleData()) return;
dest.FreeSample();
dest = src;
dest.nLength = len;
dest.pSample = nullptr;
if(!dest.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
if(len != src.nLength)
MemsetZero(dest.cues);
std::memcpy(dest.pSample8, src.pSample8 + start, len);
dest.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP, loop);
if(loop)
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = len;
} else
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: [Fix] STP: Possible out-of-bounds memory read with malformed STP files (caught with afl-fuzz).
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@9567 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void ConvertLoopSlice(ModSample &src, ModSample &dest, SmpLength start, SmpLength len, bool loop)
{
if(!src.HasSampleData()
|| start >= src.nLength
|| src.nLength - start < len)
{
return;
}
dest.FreeSample();
dest = src;
dest.nLength = len;
dest.pSample = nullptr;
if(!dest.AllocateSample())
{
return;
}
if(len != src.nLength)
MemsetZero(dest.cues);
std::memcpy(dest.pSample8, src.pSample8 + start, len);
dest.uFlags.set(CHN_LOOP, loop);
if(loop)
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = len;
} else
{
dest.nLoopStart = 0;
dest.nLoopEnd = 0;
}
}
| 169,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ip_printroute(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int ptr;
register u_int len;
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
return;
}
if ((length + 1) & 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
ptr = cp[2] - 1;
if (ptr < 3 || ((ptr + 1) & 3) || ptr > length + 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad ptr %u]", cp[2]));
for (len = 3; len < length; len += 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &cp[len])));
if (ptr > len)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13022/IP: Add bounds checks to ip_printroute().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ip_printroute(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int ptr;
register u_int len;
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
return (0);
}
if ((length + 1) & 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
ND_TCHECK(cp[2]);
ptr = cp[2] - 1;
if (ptr < 3 || ((ptr + 1) & 3) || ptr > length + 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad ptr %u]", cp[2]));
for (len = 3; len < length; len += 4) {
ND_TCHECK2(cp[len], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &cp[len])));
if (ptr > len)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
}
return (0);
trunc:
return (-1);
}
| 167,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DrawingBuffer::ScopedStateRestorer::~ScopedStateRestorer() {
DCHECK_EQ(drawing_buffer_->state_restorer_, this);
drawing_buffer_->state_restorer_ = previous_state_restorer_;
Client* client = drawing_buffer_->client_;
if (!client)
return;
if (clear_state_dirty_) {
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreScissorTest();
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreMaskAndClearValues();
}
if (pixel_pack_alignment_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelPackAlignment();
if (texture_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreTexture2DBinding();
if (renderbuffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreRenderbufferBinding();
if (framebuffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreFramebufferBinding();
if (pixel_unpack_buffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelUnpackBufferBinding();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | DrawingBuffer::ScopedStateRestorer::~ScopedStateRestorer() {
DCHECK_EQ(drawing_buffer_->state_restorer_, this);
drawing_buffer_->state_restorer_ = previous_state_restorer_;
Client* client = drawing_buffer_->client_;
if (!client)
return;
if (clear_state_dirty_) {
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreScissorTest();
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreMaskAndClearValues();
}
if (pixel_pack_parameters_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelPackParameters();
if (texture_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreTexture2DBinding();
if (renderbuffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreRenderbufferBinding();
if (framebuffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestoreFramebufferBinding();
if (pixel_unpack_buffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelUnpackBufferBinding();
if (pixel_pack_buffer_binding_dirty_)
client->DrawingBufferClientRestorePixelPackBufferBinding();
}
| 172,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: transform_range_check(png_const_structp pp, unsigned int r, unsigned int g,
unsigned int b, unsigned int a, unsigned int in_digitized, double in,
unsigned int out, png_byte sample_depth, double err, double limit,
PNG_CONST char *name, double digitization_error)
{
/* Compare the scaled, digitzed, values of our local calculation (in+-err)
* with the digitized values libpng produced; 'sample_depth' is the actual
* digitization depth of the libpng output colors (the bit depth except for
* palette images where it is always 8.) The check on 'err' is to detect
* internal errors in pngvalid itself.
*/
unsigned int max = (1U<<sample_depth)-1;
double in_min = ceil((in-err)*max - digitization_error);
double in_max = floor((in+err)*max + digitization_error);
if (err > limit || !(out >= in_min && out <= in_max))
{
char message[256];
size_t pos;
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, 0, name);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " output value error: rgba(");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, r);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, g);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, b);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, a);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, "): ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, out);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " expected: ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, in_digitized);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " (");
pos = safecatd(message, sizeof message, pos, (in-err)*max, 3);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, "..");
pos = safecatd(message, sizeof message, pos, (in+err)*max, 3);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ")");
png_error(pp, message);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | transform_range_check(png_const_structp pp, unsigned int r, unsigned int g,
unsigned int b, unsigned int a, unsigned int in_digitized, double in,
unsigned int out, png_byte sample_depth, double err, double limit,
const char *name, double digitization_error)
{
/* Compare the scaled, digitzed, values of our local calculation (in+-err)
* with the digitized values libpng produced; 'sample_depth' is the actual
* digitization depth of the libpng output colors (the bit depth except for
* palette images where it is always 8.) The check on 'err' is to detect
* internal errors in pngvalid itself.
*/
unsigned int max = (1U<<sample_depth)-1;
double in_min = ceil((in-err)*max - digitization_error);
double in_max = floor((in+err)*max + digitization_error);
if (err > limit || !(out >= in_min && out <= in_max))
{
char message[256];
size_t pos;
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, 0, name);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " output value error: rgba(");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, r);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, g);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, b);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, a);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, "): ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, out);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " expected: ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, in_digitized);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " (");
pos = safecatd(message, sizeof message, pos, (in-err)*max, 3);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, "..");
pos = safecatd(message, sizeof message, pos, (in+err)*max, 3);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ")");
png_error(pp, message);
}
}
| 173,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MemoryInfo *RelinquishVirtualMemory(MemoryInfo *memory_info)
{
assert(memory_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL);
assert(memory_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (memory_info->blob != (void *) NULL)
switch (memory_info->type)
{
case AlignedVirtualMemory:
{
memory_info->blob=RelinquishAlignedMemory(memory_info->blob);
RelinquishMagickResource(MemoryResource,memory_info->length);
break;
}
case MapVirtualMemory:
{
(void) UnmapBlob(memory_info->blob,memory_info->length);
memory_info->blob=NULL;
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,memory_info->length);
if (*memory_info->filename != '\0')
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
break;
}
case UnalignedVirtualMemory:
default:
{
memory_info->blob=RelinquishMagickMemory(memory_info->blob);
break;
}
}
memory_info->signature=(~MagickSignature);
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) RelinquishAlignedMemory(memory_info);
return(memory_info);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | MagickExport MemoryInfo *RelinquishVirtualMemory(MemoryInfo *memory_info)
{
assert(memory_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL);
assert(memory_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (memory_info->blob != (void *) NULL)
switch (memory_info->type)
{
case AlignedVirtualMemory:
{
memory_info->blob=RelinquishAlignedMemory(memory_info->blob);
RelinquishMagickResource(MemoryResource,memory_info->length);
break;
}
case MapVirtualMemory:
{
(void) UnmapBlob(memory_info->blob,memory_info->length);
memory_info->blob=NULL;
RelinquishMagickResource(MapResource,memory_info->length);
if (*memory_info->filename != '\0')
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(memory_info->filename);
RelinquishMagickResource(DiskResource,memory_info->length);
}
break;
}
case UnalignedVirtualMemory:
default:
{
memory_info->blob=RelinquishMagickMemory(memory_info->blob);
break;
}
}
memory_info->signature=(~MagickSignature);
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) RelinquishAlignedMemory(memory_info);
return(memory_info);
}
| 168,860 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsDataSaverEnabled(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings*
data_reduction_proxy_settings =
DataReductionProxyChromeSettingsFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
browser_context);
return data_reduction_proxy_settings &&
data_reduction_proxy_settings->IsDataSaverEnabledByUser();
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::IsDataSaverEnabled(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
return profile && data_reduction_proxy::DataReductionProxySettings::
IsDataSaverEnabledByUser(profile->GetPrefs());
}
| 172,547 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void V8RecursionScope::didLeaveScriptContext()
{
Microtask::performCheckpoint();
V8PerIsolateData::from(m_isolate)->runEndOfScopeTasks();
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void V8RecursionScope::didLeaveScriptContext()
{
Microtask::performCheckpoint(m_isolate);
V8PerIsolateData::from(m_isolate)->runEndOfScopeTasks();
}
| 171,943 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xps_load_sfnt_name(xps_font_t *font, char *namep)
{
byte *namedata;
int offset, length;
/*int format;*/
int count, stringoffset;
int found;
int i, k;
found = 0;
strcpy(namep, "Unknown");
offset = xps_find_sfnt_table(font, "name", &length);
if (offset < 0 || length < 6)
{
gs_warn("cannot find name table");
return;
}
namedata = font->data + offset;
/*format = u16(namedata + 0);*/
count = u16(namedata + 2);
stringoffset = u16(namedata + 4);
if (length < 6 + (count * 12))
{
gs_warn("name table too short");
{
if (pid == 1 && eid == 0 && langid == 0) /* mac roman, english */
{
if (found < 3)
{
memcpy(namep, namedata + stringoffset + offset, length);
namep[length] = 0;
found = 3;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 1 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-2, US */
{
if (found < 2)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 2;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u16(s + k * 2);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 2;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 10 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-4, US */
{
if (found < 1)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 4;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u32(s + k * 4);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | xps_load_sfnt_name(xps_font_t *font, char *namep)
{
byte *namedata;
int offset, length;
/*int format;*/
int count, stringoffset;
int found;
int i, k;
found = 0;
strcpy(namep, "Unknown");
offset = xps_find_sfnt_table(font, "name", &length);
if (offset < 0 || length < 6)
{
gs_warn("cannot find name table");
return;
}
/* validate the offset, and the data for the two
* values we're about to read
*/
if (offset + 6 > font->length)
{
gs_warn("name table byte offset invalid");
return;
}
namedata = font->data + offset;
/*format = u16(namedata + 0);*/
count = u16(namedata + 2);
stringoffset = u16(namedata + 4);
if (stringoffset + offset > font->length
|| offset + 6 + count * 12 > font->length)
{
gs_warn("name table invalid");
return;
}
if (length < 6 + (count * 12))
{
gs_warn("name table too short");
{
if (pid == 1 && eid == 0 && langid == 0) /* mac roman, english */
{
if (found < 3)
{
memcpy(namep, namedata + stringoffset + offset, length);
namep[length] = 0;
found = 3;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 1 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-2, US */
{
if (found < 2)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 2;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u16(s + k * 2);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 2;
}
}
if (pid == 3 && eid == 10 && langid == 0x409) /* windows unicode ucs-4, US */
{
if (found < 1)
{
unsigned char *s = namedata + stringoffset + offset;
int n = length / 4;
for (k = 0; k < n; k ++)
{
int c = u32(s + k * 4);
namep[k] = isprint(c) ? c : '?';
}
namep[k] = 0;
found = 1;
}
}
}
}
}
| 164,787 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CheckSADs() {
unsigned int reference_sad, exp_sad[4];
SADs(exp_sad);
for (int block = 0; block < 4; block++) {
reference_sad = ReferenceSAD(UINT_MAX, block);
EXPECT_EQ(exp_sad[block], reference_sad) << "block " << block;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void CheckSADs() {
unsigned int reference_sad, exp_sad[4];
SADs(exp_sad);
for (int block = 0; block < 4; ++block) {
reference_sad = ReferenceSAD(block);
EXPECT_EQ(reference_sad, exp_sad[block]) << "block " << block;
}
}
| 174,569 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_seek (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t position, int whence)
{
switch (whence)
{ case SEEK_SET :
if (position > SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header))
{ /* Too much header to cache so just seek instead. */
psf_fseek (psf, position, whence) ;
return ;
} ;
if (position > psf->headend)
psf->headend += psf_fread (psf->header + psf->headend, 1, position - psf->headend, psf) ;
psf->headindex = position ;
break ;
case SEEK_CUR :
if (psf->headindex + position < 0)
break ;
if (psf->headindex >= SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header))
{ psf_fseek (psf, position, whence) ;
return ;
} ;
if (psf->headindex + position <= psf->headend)
{ psf->headindex += position ;
break ;
} ;
if (psf->headindex + position > SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header))
{ /* Need to jump this without caching it. */
psf->headindex = psf->headend ;
psf_fseek (psf, position, SEEK_CUR) ;
break ;
} ;
psf->headend += psf_fread (psf->header + psf->headend, 1, position - (psf->headend - psf->headindex), psf) ;
psf->headindex = psf->headend ;
break ;
case SEEK_END :
default :
psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad whence param in header_seek().\n") ;
break ;
} ;
return ;
} /* header_seek */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_seek (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t position, int whence)
{
switch (whence)
{ case SEEK_SET :
if (psf->header.indx + position >= psf->header.len)
psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, position) ;
if (position > psf->header.len)
{ /* Too much header to cache so just seek instead. */
psf_fseek (psf, position, whence) ;
return ;
} ;
if (position > psf->header.end)
psf->header.end += psf_fread (psf->header.ptr + psf->header.end, 1, position - psf->header.end, psf) ;
psf->header.indx = position ;
break ;
case SEEK_CUR :
if (psf->header.indx + position >= psf->header.len)
psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, position) ;
if (psf->header.indx + position < 0)
break ;
if (psf->header.indx >= psf->header.len)
{ psf_fseek (psf, position, whence) ;
return ;
} ;
if (psf->header.indx + position <= psf->header.end)
{ psf->header.indx += position ;
break ;
} ;
if (psf->header.indx + position > psf->header.len)
{ /* Need to jump this without caching it. */
psf->header.indx = psf->header.end ;
psf_fseek (psf, position, SEEK_CUR) ;
break ;
} ;
psf->header.end += psf_fread (psf->header.ptr + psf->header.end, 1, position - (psf->header.end - psf->header.indx), psf) ;
psf->header.indx = psf->header.end ;
break ;
case SEEK_END :
default :
psf_log_printf (psf, "Bad whence param in header_seek().\n") ;
break ;
} ;
return ;
} /* header_seek */
| 170,062 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp(BlockDriverState *bs,
const char *snapshot_id,
const char *name,
Error **errp)
{
int i, snapshot_index;
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot *sn;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int new_l1_bytes;
int ret;
assert(bs->read_only);
/* Search the snapshot */
snapshot_index = find_snapshot_by_id_and_name(bs, snapshot_id, name);
if (snapshot_index < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"Can't find snapshot");
return -ENOENT;
}
sn = &s->snapshots[snapshot_index];
/* Allocate and read in the snapshot's L1 table */
new_l1_bytes = sn->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t);
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_bytes, 512));
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp(BlockDriverState *bs,
const char *snapshot_id,
const char *name,
Error **errp)
{
int i, snapshot_index;
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot *sn;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int new_l1_bytes;
int ret;
assert(bs->read_only);
/* Search the snapshot */
snapshot_index = find_snapshot_by_id_and_name(bs, snapshot_id, name);
if (snapshot_index < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"Can't find snapshot");
return -ENOENT;
}
sn = &s->snapshots[snapshot_index];
/* Allocate and read in the snapshot's L1 table */
if (sn->l1_size > QCOW_MAX_L1_SIZE) {
error_setg(errp, "Snapshot L1 table too large");
return -EFBIG;
}
new_l1_bytes = sn->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t);
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_bytes, 512));
return ret;
}
| 165,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
if (current_url.is_empty()) {
if (new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme))
return true;
return false;
}
if (current_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme) ||
new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
if (current_url.GetOrigin() != new_url.GetOrigin())
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool ChromeContentBrowserClient::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
SiteInstance* site_instance,
const GURL& current_url,
const GURL& new_url) {
if (current_url.is_empty()) {
if (new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme))
return true;
return false;
}
if (current_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme) ||
new_url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme)) {
if (current_url.GetOrigin() != new_url.GetOrigin())
return true;
}
// The checks below only matter if we can retrieve which extensions are
// installed.
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->extension_service();
if (!service)
return false;
// We must swap if the URL is for an extension and we are not using an
// extension process.
const Extension* new_extension =
service->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(ExtensionURLInfo(new_url));
// Ignore all hosted apps except the Chrome Web Store, since they do not
// require their own BrowsingInstance (e.g., postMessage is ok).
if (new_extension &&
new_extension->is_hosted_app() &&
new_extension->id() != extension_misc::kWebStoreAppId)
new_extension = NULL;
if (new_extension &&
site_instance->HasProcess() &&
!service->process_map()->Contains(new_extension->id(),
site_instance->GetProcess()->GetID()))
return true;
return false;
}
| 171,436 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_strings_2_svc(gstrings_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gstrings_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gstrings_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_strings((void *)handle, arg->princ, &ret.strings,
&ret.count);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | get_strings_2_svc(gstrings_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gstrings_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gstrings_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_strings((void *)handle, arg->princ, &ret.strings,
&ret.count);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,518 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int SeekHead::GetVoidElementCount() const
{
return m_void_element_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int SeekHead::GetVoidElementCount() const
| 174,381 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_palette_to_rgb_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return colour_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE;
}
| 173,638 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static int store_xauthority(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_XAUTHORITY_FILE;
// create an empty file as root, and change ownership to user
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.Xauthority", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: invalid .Xauthority file\n");
return 0;
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0600);
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
| 168,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MaintainContentLengthPrefsForDateChange(
base::ListValue* original_update,
base::ListValue* received_update,
int days_since_last_update) {
if (days_since_last_update == -1) {
days_since_last_update = 0;
} else if (days_since_last_update < -1) {
original_update->Clear();
received_update->Clear();
days_since_last_update = kNumDaysInHistory;
//// DailyContentLengthUpdate maintains a data saving pref. The pref is a list
//// of |kNumDaysInHistory| elements of daily total content lengths for the past
//// |kNumDaysInHistory| days.
}
DCHECK_GE(days_since_last_update, 0);
for (int i = 0;
i < days_since_last_update && i < static_cast<int>(kNumDaysInHistory);
++i) {
original_update->AppendString(base::Int64ToString(0));
received_update->AppendString(base::Int64ToString(0));
}
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(original_update, kNumDaysInHistory);
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(received_update, kNumDaysInHistory);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void MaintainContentLengthPrefsForDateChange(
//// DailyContentLengthUpdate maintains a data saving pref. The pref is a list
//// of |kNumDaysInHistory| elements of daily total content lengths for the past
//// |kNumDaysInHistory| days.
class DailyContentLengthUpdate {
public:
DailyContentLengthUpdate(
const char* pref,
PrefService* pref_service)
: update_(pref_service, pref) {
}
void UpdateForDataChange(int days_since_last_update) {
// New empty lists may have been created. Maintain the invariant that
// there should be exactly |kNumDaysInHistory| days in the histories.
MaintainContentLengthPrefsWindow(update_.Get(), kNumDaysInHistory);
if (days_since_last_update) {
MaintainContentLengthPrefForDateChange(days_since_last_update);
}
}
| 171,325 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SetImePropertyActivated(const char* key, bool activated) {
if (!IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SetImePropertyActivated: IBus connection is not alive";
return;
}
if (!key || (key[0] == '\0')) {
return;
}
if (input_context_path_.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Input context is unknown";
return;
}
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
ibus_input_context_property_activate(
context, key, (activated ? PROP_STATE_CHECKED : PROP_STATE_UNCHECKED));
g_object_unref(context);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SetImePropertyActivated(const char* key, bool activated) {
// IBusController override.
virtual void SetImePropertyActivated(const std::string& key,
bool activated) {
if (!IBusConnectionsAreAlive()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "SetImePropertyActivated: IBus connection is not alive";
return;
}
if (key.empty()) {
return;
}
if (input_context_path_.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Input context is unknown";
return;
}
IBusInputContext* context = GetInputContext(input_context_path_, ibus_);
if (!context) {
return;
}
ibus_input_context_property_activate(
context, key.c_str(),
(activated ? PROP_STATE_CHECKED : PROP_STATE_UNCHECKED));
g_object_unref(context);
}
| 170,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Initialize(
SyncFrontend* frontend,
const GURL& sync_service_url,
const syncable::ModelTypeSet& types,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* baseline_context_getter,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool delete_sync_data_folder) {
if (!core_thread_.Start())
return;
frontend_ = frontend;
DCHECK(frontend);
registrar_.workers[GROUP_DB] = new DatabaseModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_UI] = new UIModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSIVE] = new ModelSafeWorker();
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableSyncTypedUrls) || types.count(syncable::TYPED_URLS)) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_HISTORY] =
new HistoryModelWorker(
profile_->GetHistoryService(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS));
}
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::const_iterator it = types.begin();
it != types.end(); ++it) {
registrar_.routing_info[(*it)] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
}
PasswordStore* password_store =
profile_->GetPasswordStore(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSWORD] =
new PasswordModelWorker(password_store);
} else {
LOG_IF(WARNING, types.count(syncable::PASSWORDS) > 0) << "Password store "
<< "not initialized, cannot sync passwords";
registrar_.routing_info.erase(syncable::PASSWORDS);
}
registrar_.routing_info[syncable::NIGORI] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
core_->CreateSyncNotifier(baseline_context_getter);
InitCore(Core::DoInitializeOptions(
sync_service_url,
MakeHttpBridgeFactory(baseline_context_getter),
credentials,
delete_sync_data_folder,
RestoreEncryptionBootstrapToken(),
false));
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SyncBackendHost::Initialize(
SyncFrontend* frontend,
const GURL& sync_service_url,
const syncable::ModelTypeSet& types,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* baseline_context_getter,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool delete_sync_data_folder) {
if (!core_thread_.Start())
return;
frontend_ = frontend;
DCHECK(frontend);
registrar_.workers[GROUP_DB] = new DatabaseModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_UI] = new UIModelWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSIVE] = new ModelSafeWorker();
registrar_.workers[GROUP_HISTORY] = new HistoryModelWorker(
profile_->GetHistoryService(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS));
for (syncable::ModelTypeSet::const_iterator it = types.begin();
it != types.end(); ++it) {
registrar_.routing_info[(*it)] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
}
PasswordStore* password_store =
profile_->GetPasswordStore(Profile::IMPLICIT_ACCESS);
if (password_store) {
registrar_.workers[GROUP_PASSWORD] =
new PasswordModelWorker(password_store);
} else {
LOG_IF(WARNING, types.count(syncable::PASSWORDS) > 0) << "Password store "
<< "not initialized, cannot sync passwords";
registrar_.routing_info.erase(syncable::PASSWORDS);
}
registrar_.routing_info[syncable::NIGORI] = GROUP_PASSIVE;
core_->CreateSyncNotifier(baseline_context_getter);
InitCore(Core::DoInitializeOptions(
sync_service_url,
MakeHttpBridgeFactory(baseline_context_getter),
credentials,
delete_sync_data_folder,
RestoreEncryptionBootstrapToken(),
false));
}
| 170,614 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, mode_t open_flags)
{
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL || (delegation->type & open_flags) == open_flags) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, mode_t open_flags)
static void nfs4_return_incompatible_delegation(struct inode *inode, fmode_t fmode)
{
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation == NULL || (delegation->type & fmode) == fmode) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
nfs_inode_return_delegation(inode);
}
| 165,703 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void gamma_transform_test(png_modifier *pm,
PNG_CONST png_byte colour_type, PNG_CONST png_byte bit_depth,
PNG_CONST int palette_number,
PNG_CONST int interlace_type, PNG_CONST double file_gamma,
PNG_CONST double screen_gamma, PNG_CONST png_byte sbit,
PNG_CONST int use_input_precision, PNG_CONST int scale16)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char name[64];
if (sbit != bit_depth && sbit != 0)
{
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "sbit(");
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, sbit);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, ") ");
}
else
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "gamma ");
if (scale16)
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "16to8 ");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, file_gamma, 3);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "->");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, screen_gamma, 3);
gamma_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number, interlace_type,
file_gamma, screen_gamma, sbit, 0, name, use_input_precision,
scale16, pm->test_gamma_expand16, 0 , 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | static void gamma_transform_test(png_modifier *pm,
const png_byte colour_type, const png_byte bit_depth,
const int palette_number,
const int interlace_type, const double file_gamma,
const double screen_gamma, const png_byte sbit,
const int use_input_precision, const int scale16)
{
size_t pos = 0;
char name[64];
if (sbit != bit_depth && sbit != 0)
{
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "sbit(");
pos = safecatn(name, sizeof name, pos, sbit);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, ") ");
}
else
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "gamma ");
if (scale16)
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "16to8 ");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, file_gamma, 3);
pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, pos, "->");
pos = safecatd(name, sizeof name, pos, screen_gamma, 3);
gamma_test(pm, colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number, interlace_type,
file_gamma, screen_gamma, sbit, 0, name, use_input_precision,
scale16, pm->test_gamma_expand16, 0 , 0, 0);
}
| 173,615 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_gray_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_gray_to_rgb(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_gray_to_rgb_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
image_transform_png_set_gray_to_rgb_set(const image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_gray_to_rgb(pp);
/* NOTE: this doesn't result in tRNS expansion. */
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,637 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CreateAuthenticatorFactory() {
DCHECK(context_->network_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::string local_certificate = key_pair_.GenerateCertificate();
if (local_certificate.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to generate host certificate.";
Shutdown(kHostInitializationFailed);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<protocol::AuthenticatorFactory> factory(
new protocol::Me2MeHostAuthenticatorFactory(
local_certificate, *key_pair_.private_key(), host_secret_hash_));
host_->SetAuthenticatorFactory(factory.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void CreateAuthenticatorFactory() {
DCHECK(context_->network_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!host_ || shutting_down_)
return;
std::string local_certificate = key_pair_.GenerateCertificate();
if (local_certificate.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to generate host certificate.";
Shutdown(kHostInitializationFailed);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<protocol::AuthenticatorFactory> factory(
new protocol::Me2MeHostAuthenticatorFactory(
local_certificate, *key_pair_.private_key(), host_secret_hash_));
host_->SetAuthenticatorFactory(factory.Pass());
}
| 171,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const SeekHead::Entry* SeekHead::GetEntry(int idx) const
{
if (idx < 0)
return 0;
if (idx >= m_entry_count)
return 0;
return m_entries + idx;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const SeekHead::Entry* SeekHead::GetEntry(int idx) const
| 174,317 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(
const TransportDIB::Handle& handle_in,
TransportDIB::Handle* handle_out) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if ((handle_out->fd = HANDLE_EINTR(dup(handle_in.fd))) < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "dup()";
return;
}
handle_out->auto_close = true;
#else
*handle_out = handle_in;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | static void CopyTransportDIBHandleForMessage(
const TransportDIB::Handle& handle_in,
TransportDIB::Handle* handle_out,
base::ProcessId peer_pid) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if ((handle_out->fd = HANDLE_EINTR(dup(handle_in.fd))) < 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "dup()";
return;
}
handle_out->auto_close = true;
#elif defined(OS_WIN)
// On Windows we need to duplicate the handle for the plugin process.
*handle_out = NULL;
sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle(handle_in, peer_pid, handle_out,
FILE_MAP_READ | FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0);
CHECK(*handle_out != NULL);
#else
*handle_out = handle_in;
#endif
}
| 170,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void locationAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->location());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
| 171,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool svc_rdma_prealloc_maps(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
{
unsigned int i;
/* One for each receive buffer on this connection. */
i = xprt->sc_max_requests;
while (i--) {
struct svc_rdma_req_map *map;
map = alloc_req_map(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!map) {
dprintk("svcrdma: No memory for request map\n");
return false;
}
list_add(&map->free, &xprt->sc_maps);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | static bool svc_rdma_prealloc_maps(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt)
| 168,182 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int read_request(int fd, debugger_request_t* out_request) {
ucred cr;
socklen_t len = sizeof(cr);
int status = getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cr, &len);
if (status != 0) {
ALOGE("cannot get credentials");
return -1;
}
ALOGV("reading tid");
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
pollfd pollfds[1];
pollfds[0].fd = fd;
pollfds[0].events = POLLIN;
pollfds[0].revents = 0;
status = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(pollfds, 1, 3000));
if (status != 1) {
ALOGE("timed out reading tid (from pid=%d uid=%d)\n", cr.pid, cr.uid);
return -1;
}
debugger_msg_t msg;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
status = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, &msg, sizeof(msg)));
if (status < 0) {
ALOGE("read failure? %s (pid=%d uid=%d)\n", strerror(errno), cr.pid, cr.uid);
return -1;
}
if (status != sizeof(debugger_msg_t)) {
ALOGE("invalid crash request of size %d (from pid=%d uid=%d)\n", status, cr.pid, cr.uid);
return -1;
}
out_request->action = static_cast<debugger_action_t>(msg.action);
out_request->tid = msg.tid;
out_request->pid = cr.pid;
out_request->uid = cr.uid;
out_request->gid = cr.gid;
out_request->abort_msg_address = msg.abort_msg_address;
out_request->original_si_code = msg.original_si_code;
if (msg.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_CRASH) {
char buf[64];
struct stat s;
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "/proc/%d/task/%d", out_request->pid, out_request->tid);
if (stat(buf, &s)) {
ALOGE("tid %d does not exist in pid %d. ignoring debug request\n",
out_request->tid, out_request->pid);
return -1;
}
} else if (cr.uid == 0
|| (cr.uid == AID_SYSTEM && msg.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_DUMP_BACKTRACE)) {
status = get_process_info(out_request->tid, &out_request->pid,
&out_request->uid, &out_request->gid);
if (status < 0) {
ALOGE("tid %d does not exist. ignoring explicit dump request\n", out_request->tid);
return -1;
}
if (!selinux_action_allowed(fd, out_request))
return -1;
} else {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: debuggerd: verify that traced threads belong to the right process.
Fix two races in debuggerd's PTRACE_ATTACH logic:
1. The target thread in a crash dump request could exit between the
/proc/<pid>/task/<tid> check and the PTRACE_ATTACH.
2. Sibling threads could exit between listing /proc/<pid>/task and the
PTRACE_ATTACH.
Bug: http://b/29555636
Change-Id: I4dfe1ea30e2c211d2389321bd66e3684dd757591
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int read_request(int fd, debugger_request_t* out_request) {
ucred cr;
socklen_t len = sizeof(cr);
int status = getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cr, &len);
if (status != 0) {
ALOGE("cannot get credentials");
return -1;
}
ALOGV("reading tid");
fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
pollfd pollfds[1];
pollfds[0].fd = fd;
pollfds[0].events = POLLIN;
pollfds[0].revents = 0;
status = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(pollfds, 1, 3000));
if (status != 1) {
ALOGE("timed out reading tid (from pid=%d uid=%d)\n", cr.pid, cr.uid);
return -1;
}
debugger_msg_t msg;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
status = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, &msg, sizeof(msg)));
if (status < 0) {
ALOGE("read failure? %s (pid=%d uid=%d)\n", strerror(errno), cr.pid, cr.uid);
return -1;
}
if (status != sizeof(debugger_msg_t)) {
ALOGE("invalid crash request of size %d (from pid=%d uid=%d)\n", status, cr.pid, cr.uid);
return -1;
}
out_request->action = static_cast<debugger_action_t>(msg.action);
out_request->tid = msg.tid;
out_request->pid = cr.pid;
out_request->uid = cr.uid;
out_request->gid = cr.gid;
out_request->abort_msg_address = msg.abort_msg_address;
out_request->original_si_code = msg.original_si_code;
if (msg.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_CRASH) {
// This check needs to happen again after ptracing the requested thread to prevent a race.
if (!pid_contains_tid(out_request->pid, out_request->tid)) {
ALOGE("tid %d does not exist in pid %d. ignoring debug request\n", out_request->tid,
out_request->pid);
return -1;
}
} else if (cr.uid == 0 || (cr.uid == AID_SYSTEM && msg.action == DEBUGGER_ACTION_DUMP_BACKTRACE)) {
status = get_process_info(out_request->tid, &out_request->pid,
&out_request->uid, &out_request->gid);
if (status < 0) {
ALOGE("tid %d does not exist. ignoring explicit dump request\n", out_request->tid);
return -1;
}
if (!selinux_action_allowed(fd, out_request))
return -1;
} else {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 173,407 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: valid_length(uint8_t option, int dl, int *type)
{
const struct dhcp_opt *opt;
ssize_t sz;
if (dl == 0)
return -1;
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (opt->option != option)
continue;
if (type)
*type = opt->type;
if (opt->type == 0 ||
opt->type & (STRING | RFC3442 | RFC5969))
return 0;
sz = 0;
if (opt->type & (UINT32 | IPV4))
sz = sizeof(uint32_t);
if (opt->type & UINT16)
sz = sizeof(uint16_t);
if (opt->type & UINT8)
sz = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (opt->type & (IPV4 | ARRAY))
return dl % sz;
return (dl == sz ? 0 : -1);
}
/* unknown option, so let it pass */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
CWE ID: CWE-119 | valid_length(uint8_t option, int dl, int *type)
{
const struct dhcp_opt *opt;
ssize_t sz;
if (dl == 0)
return -1;
for (opt = dhcp_opts; opt->option; opt++) {
if (opt->option != option)
continue;
if (type)
*type = opt->type;
/* The size of RFC3442 and RFC5969 options is checked at a later
* stage in the code */
if (opt->type == 0 ||
opt->type & (STRING | RFC3442 | RFC5969))
return 0;
/* The code does not use SINT16 / SINT32 together with ARRAY.
* It is however far easier to reason about the code if all
* possible array elements are included, and also does not code
* any additional CPU resources. sizeof(uintXX_t) ==
* sizeof(intXX_t) can be assumed. */
sz = 0;
if (opt->type & (UINT32 | SINT32 | IPV4))
sz = sizeof(uint32_t);
else if (opt->type & (UINT16 | SINT16))
sz = sizeof(uint16_t);
else if (opt->type & UINT8)
sz = sizeof(uint8_t);
if (opt->type & ARRAY) {
/* The result of modulo zero is undefined. There are no
* options defined in this file that do not match one of
* the if-clauses above, so the following is not really
* necessary. However, to avoid confusion and unexpected
* behavior if the defined options are ever extended,
* returning false here seems sensible. */
if (!sz) return -1;
return (dl % sz == 0) ? 0 : -1;
}
return (sz == dl) ? 0 : -1;
}
/* unknown option, so let it pass */
return 0;
}
| 173,900 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int skcipher_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
return crypto_skcipher_setkey(private, key, keylen);
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int skcipher_setkey(void *private, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
struct skcipher_tfm *tfm = private;
int err;
err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm->skcipher, key, keylen);
tfm->has_key = !err;
return err;
}
| 167,457 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, int open_flags)
{
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) == 0)
memcpy(state->stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->stateid.data));
memcpy(state->open_stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->open_stateid.data));
switch (open_flags) {
case FMODE_READ:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static void nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, int open_flags)
static void nfs_set_open_stateid_locked(struct nfs4_state *state, nfs4_stateid *stateid, fmode_t fmode)
{
if (test_bit(NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, &state->flags) == 0)
memcpy(state->stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->stateid.data));
memcpy(state->open_stateid.data, stateid->data, sizeof(state->open_stateid.data));
switch (fmode) {
case FMODE_READ:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_WRONLY_STATE, &state->flags);
break;
case FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE:
set_bit(NFS_O_RDWR_STATE, &state->flags);
}
}
| 165,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: linkaddr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep,
const unsigned int type, const unsigned int len)
{
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct enamemem *tp;
if (len == 0)
return ("<empty>");
if (type == LINKADDR_ETHER && len == ETHER_ADDR_LEN)
return (etheraddr_string(ndo, ep));
if (type == LINKADDR_FRELAY)
return (q922_string(ndo, ep, len));
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->e_name)
return (tp->e_name);
tp->e_name = cp = (char *)malloc(len*3);
if (tp->e_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "linkaddr_string: malloc");
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
for (i = len-1; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = ':';
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
}
*cp = '\0';
return (tp->e_name);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | linkaddr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep,
const unsigned int type, const unsigned int len)
{
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct bsnamemem *tp;
if (len == 0)
return ("<empty>");
if (type == LINKADDR_ETHER && len == ETHER_ADDR_LEN)
return (etheraddr_string(ndo, ep));
if (type == LINKADDR_FRELAY)
return (q922_string(ndo, ep, len));
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->bs_name)
return (tp->bs_name);
tp->bs_name = cp = (char *)malloc(len*3);
if (tp->bs_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "linkaddr_string: malloc");
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
for (i = len-1; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = ':';
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
}
*cp = '\0';
return (tp->bs_name);
}
| 167,959 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
int ret;
if (!data->rpc_done) {
state = nfs4_try_open_cached(data);
goto out;
}
ret = -EAGAIN;
if (!(data->f_attr.valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR))
goto err;
inode = nfs_fhget(data->dir->d_sb, &data->o_res.fh, &data->f_attr);
ret = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto err;
ret = -ENOMEM;
state = nfs4_get_open_state(inode, data->owner);
if (state == NULL)
goto err_put_inode;
if (data->o_res.delegation_type != 0) {
int delegation_flags = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation)
delegation_flags = delegation->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
if ((delegation_flags & 1UL<<NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM) == 0)
nfs_inode_set_delegation(state->inode,
data->owner->so_cred,
&data->o_res);
else
nfs_inode_reclaim_delegation(state->inode,
data->owner->so_cred,
&data->o_res);
}
update_open_stateid(state, &data->o_res.stateid, NULL,
data->o_arg.open_flags);
iput(inode);
out:
return state;
err_put_inode:
iput(inode);
err:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static struct nfs4_state *nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct nfs4_state *state = NULL;
struct nfs_delegation *delegation;
int ret;
if (!data->rpc_done) {
state = nfs4_try_open_cached(data);
goto out;
}
ret = -EAGAIN;
if (!(data->f_attr.valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR))
goto err;
inode = nfs_fhget(data->dir->d_sb, &data->o_res.fh, &data->f_attr);
ret = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto err;
ret = -ENOMEM;
state = nfs4_get_open_state(inode, data->owner);
if (state == NULL)
goto err_put_inode;
if (data->o_res.delegation_type != 0) {
int delegation_flags = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
delegation = rcu_dereference(NFS_I(inode)->delegation);
if (delegation)
delegation_flags = delegation->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
if ((delegation_flags & 1UL<<NFS_DELEGATION_NEED_RECLAIM) == 0)
nfs_inode_set_delegation(state->inode,
data->owner->so_cred,
&data->o_res);
else
nfs_inode_reclaim_delegation(state->inode,
data->owner->so_cred,
&data->o_res);
}
update_open_stateid(state, &data->o_res.stateid, NULL,
data->o_arg.fmode);
iput(inode);
out:
return state;
err_put_inode:
iput(inode);
err:
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
| 165,701 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation(
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation) {
OperationID id = next_operation_id_++;
operations_.emplace(id, std::move(operation));
return id;
}
Commit Message: [FileSystem] Harden against overflows of OperationID a bit better.
Rather than having a UAF when OperationID overflows instead overwrite
the old operation with the new one. Can still cause weirdness, but at
least won't result in UAF. Also update OperationID to uint64_t to
make sure we don't overflow to begin with.
Bug: 925864
Change-Id: Ifdf3fa0935ab5ea8802d91bba39601f02b0dbdc9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1441498
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#627115}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | OperationID FileSystemOperationRunner::BeginOperation(
std::unique_ptr<FileSystemOperation> operation) {
OperationID id = next_operation_id_++;
operations_[id] = std::move(operation);
return id;
}
| 173,030 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void *btif_hl_select_thread(void *arg){
fd_set org_set, curr_set;
int r, max_curr_s, max_org_s;
UNUSED(arg);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("entered btif_hl_select_thread");
FD_ZERO(&org_set);
max_org_s = btif_hl_select_wakeup_init(&org_set);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("max_s=%d ", max_org_s);
for (;;)
{
r = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("set curr_set = org_set ");
curr_set = org_set;
max_curr_s = max_org_s;
int ret = select((max_curr_s + 1), &curr_set, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("select unblocked ret=%d", ret);
if (ret == -1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("select() ret -1, exit the thread");
btif_hl_thread_cleanup();
select_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
else if (ret)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_signaled, signal ret=%d", ret);
if (btif_hl_select_wake_signaled(&curr_set))
{
r = btif_hl_select_wake_reset();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_signaled, signal:%d", r);
if (r == btif_hl_signal_select_wakeup || r == btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected )
{
btif_hl_select_wakeup_callback(&org_set, r);
}
else if( r == btif_hl_signal_select_exit)
{
btif_hl_thread_cleanup();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Exit hl_select_thread for btif_hl_signal_select_exit");
return 0;
}
}
btif_hl_select_monitor_callback(&curr_set, &org_set);
max_org_s = btif_hl_update_maxfd(max_org_s);
}
else
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("no data, select ret: %d\n", ret);
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("leaving hl_select_thread");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void *btif_hl_select_thread(void *arg){
fd_set org_set, curr_set;
int r, max_curr_s, max_org_s;
UNUSED(arg);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("entered btif_hl_select_thread");
FD_ZERO(&org_set);
max_org_s = btif_hl_select_wakeup_init(&org_set);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("max_s=%d ", max_org_s);
for (;;)
{
r = 0;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("set curr_set = org_set ");
curr_set = org_set;
max_curr_s = max_org_s;
int ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(select((max_curr_s + 1), &curr_set, NULL, NULL, NULL));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("select unblocked ret=%d", ret);
if (ret == -1)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("select() ret -1, exit the thread");
btif_hl_thread_cleanup();
select_thread_id = -1;
return 0;
}
else if (ret)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_signaled, signal ret=%d", ret);
if (btif_hl_select_wake_signaled(&curr_set))
{
r = btif_hl_select_wake_reset();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_select_wake_signaled, signal:%d", r);
if (r == btif_hl_signal_select_wakeup || r == btif_hl_signal_select_close_connected )
{
btif_hl_select_wakeup_callback(&org_set, r);
}
else if( r == btif_hl_signal_select_exit)
{
btif_hl_thread_cleanup();
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("Exit hl_select_thread for btif_hl_signal_select_exit");
return 0;
}
}
btif_hl_select_monitor_callback(&curr_set, &org_set);
max_org_s = btif_hl_update_maxfd(max_org_s);
}
else
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("no data, select ret: %d\n", ret);
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("leaving hl_select_thread");
return 0;
}
| 173,442 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVCEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
avcParams->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline;
OMX_U32 omxLevel = AVC_LEVEL2;
if (OMX_ErrorNone !=
ConvertAvcSpecLevelToOmxAvcLevel(mAVCEncLevel, &omxLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
avcParams->eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE) omxLevel;
avcParams->nRefFrames = 1;
avcParams->nBFrames = 0;
avcParams->bUseHadamard = OMX_TRUE;
avcParams->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
avcParams->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->bWeightedPPrediction = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bEntropyCodingCABAC = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bconstIpred = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirect8x8Inference = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirectSpatialTemporal = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->nCabacInitIdc = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVCEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitRate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
bitRate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
bitRate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(avcParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (avcParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
avcParams->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline;
OMX_U32 omxLevel = AVC_LEVEL2;
if (OMX_ErrorNone !=
ConvertAvcSpecLevelToOmxAvcLevel(mAVCEncLevel, &omxLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
avcParams->eLevel = (OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE) omxLevel;
avcParams->nRefFrames = 1;
avcParams->nBFrames = 0;
avcParams->bUseHadamard = OMX_TRUE;
avcParams->nAllowedPictureTypes =
(OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeI | OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeP);
avcParams->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 = 0;
avcParams->bWeightedPPrediction = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bEntropyCodingCABAC = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bconstIpred = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirect8x8Inference = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->bDirectSpatialTemporal = OMX_FALSE;
avcParams->nCabacInitIdc = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,198 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EncoderTest::InitializeConfig() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = codec_->DefaultEncoderConfig(&cfg_, 0);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void EncoderTest::InitializeConfig() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res = codec_->DefaultEncoderConfig(&cfg_, 0);
dec_cfg_ = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
}
| 174,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ContextualSearchParams()
: version(-1),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
now_on_tap_version(0) {}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | ContextualSearchParams()
: version(-1),
start(base::string16::npos),
end(base::string16::npos),
| 171,645 |
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