instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CNB::SetupLSO(virtio_net_hdr_basic *VirtioHeader, PVOID IpHeader, ULONG EthPayloadLength) const
{
PopulateIPLength(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), static_cast<USHORT>(EthPayloadLength));
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview;
packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerifyFlat(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), EthPayloadLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrFixIPChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrFixPHChecksum,
__FUNCTION__);
if (packetReview.xxpCheckSum == ppresPCSOK || packetReview.fixedXxpCS)
{
auto IpHeaderOffset = m_Context->Offload.ipHeaderOffset;
auto VHeader = static_cast<virtio_net_hdr_basic*>(VirtioHeader);
auto PriorityHdrLen = (m_ParentNBL->TCI() != 0) ? ETH_PRIORITY_HEADER_SIZE : 0;
VHeader->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
VHeader->gso_type = packetReview.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 ? VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 : VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
VHeader->hdr_len = (USHORT)(packetReview.XxpIpHeaderSize + IpHeaderOffset + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->gso_size = (USHORT)m_ParentNBL->MSS();
VHeader->csum_start = (USHORT)(m_ParentNBL->TCPHeaderOffset() + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->csum_offset = TCP_CHECKSUM_OFFSET;
}
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void CNB::SetupLSO(virtio_net_hdr_basic *VirtioHeader, PVOID IpHeader, ULONG EthPayloadLength) const
{
PopulateIPLength(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), static_cast<USHORT>(EthPayloadLength));
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult packetReview;
packetReview = ParaNdis_CheckSumVerifyFlat(reinterpret_cast<IPv4Header*>(IpHeader), EthPayloadLength,
pcrIpChecksum | pcrFixIPChecksum | pcrTcpChecksum | pcrFixPHChecksum,
FALSE,
__FUNCTION__);
if (packetReview.xxpCheckSum == ppresPCSOK || packetReview.fixedXxpCS)
{
auto IpHeaderOffset = m_Context->Offload.ipHeaderOffset;
auto VHeader = static_cast<virtio_net_hdr_basic*>(VirtioHeader);
auto PriorityHdrLen = (m_ParentNBL->TCI() != 0) ? ETH_PRIORITY_HEADER_SIZE : 0;
VHeader->flags = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM;
VHeader->gso_type = packetReview.ipStatus == ppresIPV4 ? VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV4 : VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_TCPV6;
VHeader->hdr_len = (USHORT)(packetReview.XxpIpHeaderSize + IpHeaderOffset + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->gso_size = (USHORT)m_ParentNBL->MSS();
VHeader->csum_start = (USHORT)(m_ParentNBL->TCPHeaderOffset() + PriorityHdrLen);
VHeader->csum_offset = TCP_CHECKSUM_OFFSET;
}
}
| 170,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool BaseSessionService::RestoreUpdateTabNavigationCommand(
const SessionCommand& command,
TabNavigation* navigation,
SessionID::id_type* tab_id) {
scoped_ptr<Pickle> pickle(command.PayloadAsPickle());
if (!pickle.get())
return false;
void* iterator = NULL;
std::string url_spec;
if (!pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, tab_id) ||
!pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, &(navigation->index_)) ||
!pickle->ReadString(&iterator, &url_spec) ||
!pickle->ReadString16(&iterator, &(navigation->title_)) ||
!pickle->ReadString(&iterator, &(navigation->state_)) ||
!pickle->ReadInt(&iterator,
reinterpret_cast<int*>(&(navigation->transition_))))
return false;
bool has_type_mask = pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, &(navigation->type_mask_));
if (has_type_mask) {
std::string referrer_spec;
pickle->ReadString(&iterator, &referrer_spec);
int policy_int;
WebReferrerPolicy policy;
if (pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, &policy_int))
policy = static_cast<WebReferrerPolicy>(policy_int);
else
policy = WebKit::WebReferrerPolicyDefault;
navigation->referrer_ = content::Referrer(
referrer_spec.empty() ? GURL() : GURL(referrer_spec),
policy);
std::string content_state;
if (CompressDataHelper::ReadAndDecompressStringFromPickle(
*pickle.get(), &iterator, &content_state) &&
!content_state.empty()) {
navigation->state_ = content_state;
}
}
navigation->virtual_url_ = GURL(url_spec);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool BaseSessionService::RestoreUpdateTabNavigationCommand(
const SessionCommand& command,
TabNavigation* navigation,
SessionID::id_type* tab_id) {
scoped_ptr<Pickle> pickle(command.PayloadAsPickle());
if (!pickle.get())
return false;
void* iterator = NULL;
std::string url_spec;
if (!pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, tab_id) ||
!pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, &(navigation->index_)) ||
!pickle->ReadString(&iterator, &url_spec) ||
!pickle->ReadString16(&iterator, &(navigation->title_)) ||
!pickle->ReadString(&iterator, &(navigation->state_)) ||
!pickle->ReadInt(&iterator,
reinterpret_cast<int*>(&(navigation->transition_))))
return false;
bool has_type_mask = pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, &(navigation->type_mask_));
if (has_type_mask) {
std::string referrer_spec;
pickle->ReadString(&iterator, &referrer_spec);
int policy_int;
WebReferrerPolicy policy;
if (pickle->ReadInt(&iterator, &policy_int))
policy = static_cast<WebReferrerPolicy>(policy_int);
else
policy = WebKit::WebReferrerPolicyDefault;
navigation->referrer_ = content::Referrer(
referrer_spec.empty() ? GURL() : GURL(referrer_spec),
policy);
base::TimeTicks start_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
std::string content_state;
if (CompressDataHelper::ReadAndDecompressStringFromPickle(
*pickle.get(), &iterator, &content_state) &&
!content_state.empty()) {
navigation->state_ = content_state;
}
base::TimeDelta total_time = base::TimeTicks::Now() - start_time_;
time_spent_reading_compressed_content_states += total_time;
}
navigation->virtual_url_ = GURL(url_spec);
return true;
}
| 171,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DefragInOrderSimpleTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *p3 = NULL;
Packet *reassembled = NULL;
int id = 12;
int i;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = BuildTestPacket(id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = BuildTestPacket(id, 1, 1, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
p3 = BuildTestPacket(id, 2, 0, 'C', 3);
if (p3 == NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
reassembled = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (reassembled == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(reassembled) != 20) {
goto end;
}
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(reassembled) != 39) {
goto end;
}
/* 20 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of A. */
for (i = 20; i < 20 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'A') {
goto end;
}
}
/* 28 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of B. */
for (i = 28; i < 28 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'B') {
goto end;
}
}
/* And 36 bytes in we should find 3 bytes of C. */
for (i = 36; i < 36 + 3; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'C')
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
if (p3 != NULL)
SCFree(p3);
if (reassembled != NULL)
SCFree(reassembled);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | DefragInOrderSimpleTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *p3 = NULL;
Packet *reassembled = NULL;
int id = 12;
int i;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 1, 1, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
p3 = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 2, 0, 'C', 3);
if (p3 == NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
reassembled = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL);
if (reassembled == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(reassembled) != 20) {
goto end;
}
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(reassembled) != 39) {
goto end;
}
/* 20 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of A. */
for (i = 20; i < 20 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'A') {
goto end;
}
}
/* 28 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of B. */
for (i = 28; i < 28 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'B') {
goto end;
}
}
/* And 36 bytes in we should find 3 bytes of C. */
for (i = 36; i < 36 + 3; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'C')
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
if (p3 != NULL)
SCFree(p3);
if (reassembled != NULL)
SCFree(reassembled);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
| 168,298 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool DeserializeNotificationDatabaseData(const std::string& input,
NotificationDatabaseData* output) {
DCHECK(output);
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
if (!message.ParseFromString(input))
return false;
output->notification_id = message.notification_id();
output->origin = GURL(message.origin());
output->service_worker_registration_id =
message.service_worker_registration_id();
PlatformNotificationData* notification_data = &output->notification_data;
const NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData& payload =
message.notification_data();
notification_data->title = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload.title());
switch (payload.direction()) {
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
notification_data->direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT;
break;
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
notification_data->direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT;
break;
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO:
notification_data->direction = PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO;
break;
}
notification_data->lang = payload.lang();
notification_data->body = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload.body());
notification_data->tag = payload.tag();
notification_data->icon = GURL(payload.icon());
if (payload.vibration_pattern().size() > 0) {
notification_data->vibration_pattern.assign(
payload.vibration_pattern().begin(), payload.vibration_pattern().end());
}
notification_data->timestamp =
base::Time::FromInternalValue(payload.timestamp());
notification_data->silent = payload.silent();
notification_data->require_interaction = payload.require_interaction();
if (payload.data().length()) {
notification_data->data.assign(payload.data().begin(),
payload.data().end());
}
for (const auto& payload_action : payload.actions()) {
PlatformNotificationAction action;
action.action = payload_action.action();
action.title = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload_action.title());
notification_data->actions.push_back(action);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | bool DeserializeNotificationDatabaseData(const std::string& input,
NotificationDatabaseData* output) {
DCHECK(output);
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
if (!message.ParseFromString(input))
return false;
output->notification_id = message.notification_id();
output->origin = GURL(message.origin());
output->service_worker_registration_id =
message.service_worker_registration_id();
PlatformNotificationData* notification_data = &output->notification_data;
const NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData& payload =
message.notification_data();
notification_data->title = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload.title());
switch (payload.direction()) {
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
notification_data->direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT;
break;
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
notification_data->direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT;
break;
case NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO:
notification_data->direction = PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO;
break;
}
notification_data->lang = payload.lang();
notification_data->body = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload.body());
notification_data->tag = payload.tag();
notification_data->icon = GURL(payload.icon());
if (payload.vibration_pattern().size() > 0) {
notification_data->vibration_pattern.assign(
payload.vibration_pattern().begin(), payload.vibration_pattern().end());
}
notification_data->timestamp =
base::Time::FromInternalValue(payload.timestamp());
notification_data->silent = payload.silent();
notification_data->require_interaction = payload.require_interaction();
if (payload.data().length()) {
notification_data->data.assign(payload.data().begin(),
payload.data().end());
}
for (const auto& payload_action : payload.actions()) {
PlatformNotificationAction action;
action.action = payload_action.action();
action.title = base::UTF8ToUTF16(payload_action.title());
action.icon = GURL(payload_action.icon());
notification_data->actions.push_back(action);
}
return true;
}
| 171,629 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp, int fenceFd) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (getGraphicBufferSource() != NULL) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, kPortIndexInput);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
sp<ABuffer> backup = buffer_meta->getBuffer(header, true /* backup */, false /* limit */);
sp<ABuffer> codec = buffer_meta->getBuffer(header, false /* backup */, false /* limit */);
if (mMetadataType[kPortIndexInput] == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource
&& backup->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoNativeMetadata)
&& codec->capacity() >= sizeof(VideoGrallocMetadata)
&& ((VideoNativeMetadata *)backup->base())->eType
== kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer) {
VideoNativeMetadata &backupMeta = *(VideoNativeMetadata *)backup->base();
VideoGrallocMetadata &codecMeta = *(VideoGrallocMetadata *)codec->base();
CLOG_BUFFER(emptyBuffer, "converting ANWB %p to handle %p",
backupMeta.pBuffer, backupMeta.pBuffer->handle);
codecMeta.pHandle = backupMeta.pBuffer != NULL ? backupMeta.pBuffer->handle : NULL;
codecMeta.eType = kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource;
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength ? sizeof(codecMeta) : 0;
header->nOffset = 0;
} else {
if (rangeOffset > header->nAllocLen
|| rangeLength > header->nAllocLen - rangeOffset) {
CLOG_ERROR(emptyBuffer, OMX_ErrorBadParameter, FULL_BUFFER(NULL, header, fenceFd));
if (fenceFd >= 0) {
::close(fenceFd);
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
}
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer, fenceFd);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: do not convert ANWB to gralloc source in emptyBuffer
Bug: 29422020
Bug: 31412859
Change-Id: If48e3e0b6f1af99a459fdc3f6f03744bbf0dc375
(cherry picked from commit 534bb6132a6a664f90b42b3ef81298b42efb3dc2)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::emptyBuffer(
OMX::buffer_id buffer,
OMX_U32 rangeOffset, OMX_U32 rangeLength,
OMX_U32 flags, OMX_TICKS timestamp, int fenceFd) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (getGraphicBufferSource() != NULL) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, kPortIndexInput);
if (header == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta =
static_cast<BufferMeta *>(header->pAppPrivate);
// set up proper filled length if component is configured for gralloc metadata mode
// ignore rangeOffset in this case (as client may be assuming ANW meta buffers).
if (mMetadataType[kPortIndexInput] == kMetadataBufferTypeGrallocSource) {
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength ? sizeof(VideoGrallocMetadata) : 0;
header->nOffset = 0;
} else {
if (rangeOffset > header->nAllocLen
|| rangeLength > header->nAllocLen - rangeOffset) {
CLOG_ERROR(emptyBuffer, OMX_ErrorBadParameter, FULL_BUFFER(NULL, header, fenceFd));
if (fenceFd >= 0) {
::close(fenceFd);
}
return BAD_VALUE;
}
header->nFilledLen = rangeLength;
header->nOffset = rangeOffset;
buffer_meta->CopyToOMX(header);
}
return emptyBuffer_l(header, flags, timestamp, (intptr_t)buffer, fenceFd);
}
| 174,145 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_Parse( const char *value )
{
cJSON *c;
ep = 0;
if ( ! ( c = cJSON_New_Item() ) )
return 0; /* memory fail */
if ( ! parse_value( c, skip( value ) ) ) {
cJSON_Delete( c );
return 0;
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_Parse( const char *value )
cJSON *cJSON_ParseWithOpts(const char *value,const char **return_parse_end,int require_null_terminated)
{
const char *end=0,**ep=return_parse_end?return_parse_end:&global_ep;
cJSON *c=cJSON_New_Item();
*ep=0;
if (!c) return 0; /* memory fail */
end=parse_value(c,skip(value),ep);
if (!end) {cJSON_Delete(c);return 0;} /* parse failure. ep is set. */
/* if we require null-terminated JSON without appended garbage, skip and then check for a null terminator */
if (require_null_terminated) {end=skip(end);if (*end) {cJSON_Delete(c);*ep=end;return 0;}}
if (return_parse_end) *return_parse_end=end;
return c;
}
| 167,292 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
const SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument())
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (global_object_reuse_policy != WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithDocumentLoader(this)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext(),
false);
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearActivation();
if (frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation() !=
had_sticky_activation_) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
GetLocalFrameClient().SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation(global_object_reuse_policy);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad()) {
if (document->GetSettings()
->GetForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector()) {
OriginTrialContext::FromOrCreate(document)->AddFeature(
"ForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector");
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Origin_Trial));
}
bool stale_while_revalidate_enabled =
OriginTrials::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(document);
fetcher_->SetStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(stale_while_revalidate_enabled);
if (stale_while_revalidate_enabled &&
!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabledByRuntimeFlag())
UseCounter::Count(frame_, WebFeature::kStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled);
parser_ = document->OpenForNavigation(parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
ScriptableDocumentParser* scriptable_parser =
parser_->AsScriptableDocumentParser();
if (scriptable_parser && GetResource()) {
scriptable_parser->SetInlineScriptCacheHandler(
ToRawResource(GetResource())->InlineScriptCacheHandler());
}
document->ApplyFeaturePolicyFromHeader(
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Feature_Policy));
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
const SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
const ContentSecurityPolicy* previous_csp = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument()) {
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
previous_csp = frame_->GetDocument()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
if (global_object_reuse_policy != WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithDocumentLoader(this)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext()
.WithPreviousDocumentCSP(previous_csp),
false);
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearActivation();
if (frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation() !=
had_sticky_activation_) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
GetLocalFrameClient().SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document, previous_csp);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation(global_object_reuse_policy);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad()) {
if (document->GetSettings()
->GetForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector()) {
OriginTrialContext::FromOrCreate(document)->AddFeature(
"ForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector");
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Origin_Trial));
}
bool stale_while_revalidate_enabled =
OriginTrials::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(document);
fetcher_->SetStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(stale_while_revalidate_enabled);
if (stale_while_revalidate_enabled &&
!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabledByRuntimeFlag())
UseCounter::Count(frame_, WebFeature::kStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled);
parser_ = document->OpenForNavigation(parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
ScriptableDocumentParser* scriptable_parser =
parser_->AsScriptableDocumentParser();
if (scriptable_parser && GetResource()) {
scriptable_parser->SetInlineScriptCacheHandler(
ToRawResource(GetResource())->InlineScriptCacheHandler());
}
document->ApplyFeaturePolicyFromHeader(
response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Feature_Policy));
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
| 172,618 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
int ret;
serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serial_priv)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];
ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
if (ret) {
kfree(serial_priv);
return ret;
}
usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | static int digi_startup(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
struct device *dev = &serial->interface->dev;
struct digi_serial *serial_priv;
int ret;
int i;
/* check whether the device has the expected number of endpoints */
if (serial->num_port_pointers < serial->type->num_ports + 1) {
dev_err(dev, "OOB endpoints missing\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
for (i = 0; i < serial->type->num_ports + 1 ; i++) {
if (!serial->port[i]->read_urb) {
dev_err(dev, "bulk-in endpoint missing\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!serial->port[i]->write_urb) {
dev_err(dev, "bulk-out endpoint missing\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
}
serial_priv = kzalloc(sizeof(*serial_priv), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!serial_priv)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num = serial->type->num_ports;
serial_priv->ds_oob_port = serial->port[serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num];
ret = digi_port_init(serial_priv->ds_oob_port,
serial_priv->ds_oob_port_num);
if (ret) {
kfree(serial_priv);
return ret;
}
usb_set_serial_data(serial, serial_priv);
return 0;
}
| 167,357 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cfm_network_addr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *tptr)
{
u_int network_addr_type;
u_int hexdump = FALSE;
/*
* Altough AFIs are tpically 2 octects wide,
* 802.1ab specifies that this field width
* is only once octet
*/
network_addr_type = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Network Address Type %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown", network_addr_type),
network_addr_type));
/*
* Resolve the passed in Address.
*/
switch(network_addr_type) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 1)));
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr + 1)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13052/CFM: refine decoding of the Sender ID TLV
In cfm_network_addr_print() add a length argument and use it to validate
the input buffer.
In cfm_print() add a length check for MAC address chassis ID. Supply
cfm_network_addr_print() with the length of its buffer and a correct
pointer to the buffer (it was off-by-one before). Change some error
handling blocks to skip to the next TLV in the current PDU rather than to
stop decoding the PDU. Print the management domain and address contents,
although in hex only so far.
Add some comments to clarify the code flow and to tell exact sections in
IEEE standard documents. Add new error messages and make some existing
messages more specific.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | cfm_network_addr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *tptr, const u_int length)
{
u_int network_addr_type;
u_int hexdump = FALSE;
/*
* Altough AFIs are tpically 2 octects wide,
* 802.1ab specifies that this field width
* is only once octet
*/
if (length < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Network Address Type (invalid, no data"));
return hexdump;
}
/* The calling function must make any due ND_TCHECK calls. */
network_addr_type = *tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Network Address Type %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown", network_addr_type),
network_addr_type));
/*
* Resolve the passed in Address.
*/
switch(network_addr_type) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (length != 1 + 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(invalid IPv4 address length %u)", length - 1));
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 1)));
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (length != 1 + 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(invalid IPv6 address length %u)", length - 1));
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr + 1)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
| 167,821 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int snd_ctl_elem_write(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *control)
{
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int index_offset;
int result;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &control->id);
if (kctl == NULL) {
result = -ENOENT;
} else {
index_offset = snd_ctl_get_ioff(kctl, &control->id);
vd = &kctl->vd[index_offset];
if (!(vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE) ||
kctl->put == NULL ||
(file && vd->owner && vd->owner != file)) {
result = -EPERM;
} else {
snd_ctl_build_ioff(&control->id, kctl, index_offset);
result = kctl->put(kctl, control);
}
if (result > 0) {
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_VALUE,
&control->id);
return 0;
}
}
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return result;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Don't access controls outside of protected regions
A control that is visible on the card->controls list can be freed at any time.
This means we must not access any of its memory while not holding the
controls_rw_lock. Otherwise we risk a use after free access.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | static int snd_ctl_elem_write(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_ctl_file *file,
struct snd_ctl_elem_value *control)
{
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int index_offset;
int result;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &control->id);
if (kctl == NULL) {
result = -ENOENT;
} else {
index_offset = snd_ctl_get_ioff(kctl, &control->id);
vd = &kctl->vd[index_offset];
if (!(vd->access & SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_WRITE) ||
kctl->put == NULL ||
(file && vd->owner && vd->owner != file)) {
result = -EPERM;
} else {
snd_ctl_build_ioff(&control->id, kctl, index_offset);
result = kctl->put(kctl, control);
}
if (result > 0) {
struct snd_ctl_elem_id id = control->id;
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_VALUE, &id);
return 0;
}
}
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return result;
}
| 166,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int PDFiumEngine::GetVisiblePageIndex(FPDF_PAGE page) {
for (int page_index : visible_pages_) {
if (pages_[page_index]->GetPage() == page)
return page_index;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int PDFiumEngine::GetVisiblePageIndex(FPDF_PAGE page) {
// Copy visible_pages_ since it can change as a result of loading the page in
// GetPage(). See https://crbug.com/822091.
std::vector<int> visible_pages_copy(visible_pages_);
for (int page_index : visible_pages_copy) {
if (pages_[page_index]->GetPage() == page)
return page_index;
}
return -1;
}
| 172,701 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnProcessLaunched() {
FilePath irt_path;
const char* irt_path_var = getenv("NACL_IRT_LIBRARY");
if (irt_path_var != NULL) {
FilePath::StringType string(irt_path_var,
irt_path_var + strlen(irt_path_var));
irt_path = FilePath(string);
} else {
FilePath plugin_dir;
if (!PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_INTERNAL_PLUGINS, &plugin_dir)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to locate the plugins directory";
delete this;
return;
}
irt_path = plugin_dir.Append(GetIrtLibraryFilename());
}
base::FileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpenCallback* callback =
callback_factory_.NewCallback(&NaClProcessHost::OpenIrtFileDone);
if (!base::FileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpen(
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
irt_path,
base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN | base::PLATFORM_FILE_READ,
callback)) {
delete callback;
delete this;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void NaClProcessHost::OnProcessLaunched() {
FilePath irt_path;
const char* irt_path_var = getenv("NACL_IRT_LIBRARY");
if (irt_path_var != NULL) {
FilePath::StringType string(irt_path_var,
irt_path_var + strlen(irt_path_var));
irt_path = FilePath(string);
} else {
FilePath plugin_dir;
if (!PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_INTERNAL_PLUGINS, &plugin_dir)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to locate the plugins directory";
delete this;
return;
}
irt_path = plugin_dir.Append(GetIrtLibraryFilename());
}
base::FileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpenCallback* callback =
callback_factory_.NewCallback(&NaClProcessHost::OpenIrtFileDone);
if (!base::FileUtilProxy::CreateOrOpen(
BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::FILE),
irt_path,
base::PLATFORM_FILE_OPEN | base::PLATFORM_FILE_READ,
callback)) {
delete this;
}
}
| 170,275 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static entity_table_opt determine_entity_table(int all, int doctype)
{
entity_table_opt retval = {NULL};
assert(!(doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_XML1 && all));
if (all) {
retval.ms_table = (doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5) ?
entity_ms_table_html5 : entity_ms_table_html4;
} else {
retval.table = (doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML401) ?
stage3_table_be_noapos_00000 : stage3_table_be_apos_00000;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static entity_table_opt determine_entity_table(int all, int doctype)
{
entity_table_opt retval = {NULL};
assert(!(doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_XML1 && all));
if (all) {
retval.ms_table = (doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML5) ?
entity_ms_table_html5 : entity_ms_table_html4;
} else {
retval.table = (doctype == ENT_HTML_DOC_HTML401) ?
stage3_table_be_noapos_00000 : stage3_table_be_apos_00000;
}
return retval;
}
| 167,170 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Curves16Data* CurvesAlloc(cmsContext ContextID, int nCurves, int nElements, cmsToneCurve** G)
{
int i, j;
Curves16Data* c16;
c16 = _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(Curves16Data));
if (c16 == NULL) return NULL;
c16 ->nCurves = nCurves;
c16 ->nElements = nElements;
c16 ->Curves = _cmsCalloc(ContextID, nCurves, sizeof(cmsUInt16Number*));
if (c16 ->Curves == NULL) return NULL;
for (i=0; i < nCurves; i++) {
c16->Curves[i] = _cmsCalloc(ContextID, nElements, sizeof(cmsUInt16Number));
if (nElements == 256) {
for (j=0; j < nElements; j++) {
c16 ->Curves[i][j] = cmsEvalToneCurve16(G[i], FROM_8_TO_16(j));
}
}
else {
for (j=0; j < nElements; j++) {
c16 ->Curves[i][j] = cmsEvalToneCurve16(G[i], (cmsUInt16Number) j);
}
}
}
return c16;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | Curves16Data* CurvesAlloc(cmsContext ContextID, int nCurves, int nElements, cmsToneCurve** G)
{
int i, j;
Curves16Data* c16;
c16 = _cmsMallocZero(ContextID, sizeof(Curves16Data));
if (c16 == NULL) return NULL;
c16 ->nCurves = nCurves;
c16 ->nElements = nElements;
c16 ->Curves = _cmsCalloc(ContextID, nCurves, sizeof(cmsUInt16Number*));
if (c16 ->Curves == NULL) return NULL;
for (i=0; i < nCurves; i++) {
c16->Curves[i] = _cmsCalloc(ContextID, nElements, sizeof(cmsUInt16Number));
if (c16->Curves[i] == NULL) {
for (j=0; j < i; j++) {
_cmsFree(ContextID, c16->Curves[j]);
}
_cmsFree(ContextID, c16->Curves);
_cmsFree(ContextID, c16);
return NULL;
}
if (nElements == 256) {
for (j=0; j < nElements; j++) {
c16 ->Curves[i][j] = cmsEvalToneCurve16(G[i], FROM_8_TO_16(j));
}
}
else {
for (j=0; j < nElements; j++) {
c16 ->Curves[i][j] = cmsEvalToneCurve16(G[i], (cmsUInt16Number) j);
}
}
}
return c16;
}
| 166,544 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: untrusted_launcher_response_callback (GtkDialog *dialog,
int response_id,
ActivateParametersDesktop *parameters)
{
GdkScreen *screen;
char *uri;
GFile *file;
switch (response_id)
{
case RESPONSE_RUN:
{
screen = gtk_widget_get_screen (GTK_WIDGET (parameters->parent_window));
uri = nautilus_file_get_uri (parameters->file);
DEBUG ("Launching untrusted launcher %s", uri);
nautilus_launch_desktop_file (screen, uri, NULL,
parameters->parent_window);
g_free (uri);
}
break;
case RESPONSE_MARK_TRUSTED:
{
file = nautilus_file_get_location (parameters->file);
nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted (file,
parameters->parent_window,
TRUE,
NULL, NULL);
g_object_unref (file);
}
break;
default:
{
/* Just destroy dialog */
}
break;
}
gtk_widget_destroy (GTK_WIDGET (dialog));
activate_parameters_desktop_free (parameters);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | untrusted_launcher_response_callback (GtkDialog *dialog,
int response_id,
ActivateParametersDesktop *parameters)
{
GdkScreen *screen;
char *uri;
GFile *file;
switch (response_id)
{
case GTK_RESPONSE_OK:
{
file = nautilus_file_get_location (parameters->file);
/* We need to do this in order to prevent malicious desktop files
* with the executable bit already set.
* See https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
*/
nautilus_file_set_metadata (parameters->file, NAUTILUS_METADATA_KEY_DESKTOP_FILE_TRUSTED,
NULL,
"yes");
nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_executable (file,
parameters->parent_window,
TRUE,
NULL, NULL);
/* Need to force a reload of the attributes so is_trusted is marked
* correctly. Not sure why the general monitor doesn't fire in this
* case when setting the metadata
*/
nautilus_file_invalidate_all_attributes (parameters->file);
screen = gtk_widget_get_screen (GTK_WIDGET (parameters->parent_window));
uri = nautilus_file_get_uri (parameters->file);
DEBUG ("Launching untrusted launcher %s", uri);
nautilus_launch_desktop_file (screen, uri, NULL,
parameters->parent_window);
g_free (uri);
g_object_unref (file);
}
break;
default:
{
/* Just destroy dialog */
}
break;
}
gtk_widget_destroy (GTK_WIDGET (dialog));
activate_parameters_desktop_free (parameters);
}
| 167,753 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SADs(unsigned int *results) {
const uint8_t* refs[] = {GetReference(0), GetReference(1),
GetReference(2), GetReference(3)};
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(GET_PARAM(2)(source_data_, source_stride_,
refs, reference_stride_,
results));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SADs(unsigned int *results) {
const uint8_t *references[] = {GetReference(0), GetReference(1),
GetReference(2), GetReference(3)};
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(GET_PARAM(2)(source_data_, source_stride_,
references, reference_stride_,
results));
}
| 174,576 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int lookup1_values(int entries, int dim)
{
int r = (int) floor(exp((float) log((float) entries) / dim));
if ((int) floor(pow((float) r+1, dim)) <= entries) // (int) cast for MinGW warning;
++r; // floor() to avoid _ftol() when non-CRT
assert(pow((float) r+1, dim) > entries);
assert((int) floor(pow((float) r, dim)) <= entries); // (int),floor() as above
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point()
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int lookup1_values(int entries, int dim)
{
int r = (int) floor(exp((float) log((float) entries) / dim));
if ((int) floor(pow((float) r+1, dim)) <= entries) // (int) cast for MinGW warning;
++r; // floor() to avoid _ftol() when non-CRT
if (pow((float) r+1, dim) <= entries)
return -1;
if ((int) floor(pow((float) r, dim)) > entries)
return -1;
return r;
}
| 169,616 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::SetClient(mojom::AppControllerClientPtr client) {
client_ = std::move(client);
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void AppControllerImpl::SetClient(mojom::AppControllerClientPtr client) {
void AppControllerService::SetClient(mojom::AppControllerClientPtr client) {
client_ = std::move(client);
}
| 172,088 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Segment::~Segment() {
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** i = m_clusters;
Cluster** j = m_clusters + count;
while (i != j) {
Cluster* const p = *i++;
assert(p);
delete p;
}
delete[] m_clusters;
delete m_pTracks;
delete m_pInfo;
delete m_pCues;
delete m_pChapters;
delete m_pSeekHead;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | Segment::~Segment() {
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
Cluster** i = m_clusters;
Cluster** j = m_clusters + count;
while (i != j) {
Cluster* const p = *i++;
delete p;
}
delete[] m_clusters;
delete m_pTracks;
delete m_pInfo;
delete m_pCues;
delete m_pChapters;
delete m_pTags;
delete m_pSeekHead;
}
| 173,870 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ProcessBackingStore(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsValid());
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsMarked());
header->Unmark();
ThreadHeap::GcInfo(header->GcInfoIndex())->trace_(this, header->Payload());
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void ProcessBackingStore(HeapObjectHeader* header) {
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsValid());
EXPECT_TRUE(header->IsMarked());
header->Unmark();
GCInfoTable::Get()
.GCInfoFromIndex(header->GcInfoIndex())
->trace_(this, header->Payload());
}
| 173,140 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void TIFFGetProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent],
*text;
uint32
count,
length,
type;
unsigned long
*tietz;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ARTIST,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:artist",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COPYRIGHT,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:copyright",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DATETIME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:timestamp",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DOCUMENTNAME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:document",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_HOSTCOMPUTER,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:hostcomputer",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEDESCRIPTION,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAKE,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:make",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MODEL,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:model",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_OPIIMAGEID,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:image-id",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENAME,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SOFTWARE,&text) == 1)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:software",text,exception);
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,33423,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-33423",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,36867,&count,&text) == 1)
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-36867",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,&type) == 1)
switch (type)
{
case 0x01:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
break;
}
case 0x02:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","PAGE",exception);
break;
}
case 0x04:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","MASK",exception);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,37706,&length,&tietz) == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%lu",tietz[0]);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:tietz_offset",message,exception);
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static void TIFFGetProperties(TIFF *tiff,Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
message[MagickPathExtent],
*text;
uint32
count,
length,
type;
unsigned long
*tietz;
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ARTIST,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:artist",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COPYRIGHT,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:copyright",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DATETIME,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:timestamp",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_DOCUMENTNAME,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:document",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_HOSTCOMPUTER,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:hostcomputer",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEDESCRIPTION,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"comment",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAKE,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:make",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_MODEL,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:model",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_OPIIMAGEID,&count,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:image-id",message,exception);
}
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENAME,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SOFTWARE,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:software",text,exception);
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,33423,&count,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-33423",message,exception);
}
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,36867,&count,&text) == 1) &&
(text != (char *) NULL))
{
if (count >= MagickPathExtent)
count=MagickPathExtent-1;
(void) CopyMagickString(message,text,count+1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:kodak-36867",message,exception);
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_SUBFILETYPE,&type) == 1)
switch (type)
{
case 0x01:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","REDUCEDIMAGE",
exception);
break;
}
case 0x02:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","PAGE",exception);
break;
}
case 0x04:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:subfiletype","MASK",exception);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,37706,&length,&tietz) == 1) &&
(tietz != (unsigned long *) NULL))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(message,MagickPathExtent,"%lu",tietz[0]);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:tietz_offset",message,exception);
}
}
| 168,679 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVCEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1 ||
bitRate->eControlRate != OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitrate = bitRate->nTargetBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcType =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (avcType->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (avcType->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline ||
avcType->nRefFrames != 1 ||
avcType->nBFrames != 0 ||
avcType->bUseHadamard != OMX_TRUE ||
(avcType->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) != 0 ||
avcType->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 != 0 ||
avcType->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 != 0 ||
avcType->bWeightedPPrediction != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bEntropyCodingCABAC != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bconstIpred != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bDirect8x8Inference != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bDirectSpatialTemporal != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->nCabacInitIdc != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (OK != ConvertOmxAvcLevelToAvcSpecLevel(avcType->eLevel, &mAVCEncLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVCEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitRate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *) params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitRate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (bitRate->nPortIndex != 1 ||
bitRate->eControlRate != OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitrate = bitRate->nTargetBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAvc:
{
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *avcType =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_AVCTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(avcType)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (avcType->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (avcType->eProfile != OMX_VIDEO_AVCProfileBaseline ||
avcType->nRefFrames != 1 ||
avcType->nBFrames != 0 ||
avcType->bUseHadamard != OMX_TRUE ||
(avcType->nAllowedPictureTypes & OMX_VIDEO_PictureTypeB) != 0 ||
avcType->nRefIdx10ActiveMinus1 != 0 ||
avcType->nRefIdx11ActiveMinus1 != 0 ||
avcType->bWeightedPPrediction != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bEntropyCodingCABAC != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bconstIpred != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bDirect8x8Inference != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->bDirectSpatialTemporal != OMX_FALSE ||
avcType->nCabacInitIdc != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (OK != ConvertOmxAvcLevelToAvcSpecLevel(avcType->eLevel, &mAVCEncLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SoftVideoEncoderOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,199 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int iwl_process_add_sta_resp(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_addsta_cmd *addsta,
struct iwl_rx_packet *pkt)
{
u8 sta_id = addsta->sta.sta_id;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -EIO;
if (pkt->hdr.flags & IWL_CMD_FAILED_MSK) {
IWL_ERR(priv, "Bad return from REPLY_ADD_STA (0x%08X)\n",
pkt->hdr.flags);
return ret;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "Processing response for adding station %u\n",
sta_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
switch (pkt->u.add_sta.status) {
case ADD_STA_SUCCESS_MSK:
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "REPLY_ADD_STA PASSED\n");
iwl_sta_ucode_activate(priv, sta_id);
ret = 0;
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_ROOM_IN_TABLE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no room in table.\n",
sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_BLOCK_ACK_RESOURCE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no block ack "
"resource.\n", sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_MODIFY_NON_EXIST_STA:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Attempting to modify non-existing station %d\n",
sta_id);
break;
default:
IWL_DEBUG_ASSOC(priv, "Received REPLY_ADD_STA:(0x%08X)\n",
pkt->u.add_sta.status);
break;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station id %u addr %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
sta_id, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr);
/*
* XXX: The MAC address in the command buffer is often changed from
* the original sent to the device. That is, the MAC address
* written to the command buffer often is not the same MAC address
* read from the command buffer when the command returns. This
* issue has not yet been resolved and this debugging is left to
* observe the problem.
*/
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station according to cmd buffer %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
addsta->sta.addr);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int iwl_process_add_sta_resp(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_addsta_cmd *addsta,
struct iwl_rx_packet *pkt)
{
u8 sta_id = addsta->sta.sta_id;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -EIO;
if (pkt->hdr.flags & IWL_CMD_FAILED_MSK) {
IWL_ERR(priv, "Bad return from REPLY_ADD_STA (0x%08X)\n",
pkt->hdr.flags);
return ret;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "Processing response for adding station %u\n",
sta_id);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
switch (pkt->u.add_sta.status) {
case ADD_STA_SUCCESS_MSK:
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "REPLY_ADD_STA PASSED\n");
ret = iwl_sta_ucode_activate(priv, sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_ROOM_IN_TABLE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no room in table.\n",
sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_NO_BLOCK_ACK_RESOURCE:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Adding station %d failed, no block ack "
"resource.\n", sta_id);
break;
case ADD_STA_MODIFY_NON_EXIST_STA:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Attempting to modify non-existing station %d\n",
sta_id);
break;
default:
IWL_DEBUG_ASSOC(priv, "Received REPLY_ADD_STA:(0x%08X)\n",
pkt->u.add_sta.status);
break;
}
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station id %u addr %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
sta_id, priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.addr);
/*
* XXX: The MAC address in the command buffer is often changed from
* the original sent to the device. That is, the MAC address
* written to the command buffer often is not the same MAC address
* read from the command buffer when the command returns. This
* issue has not yet been resolved and this debugging is left to
* observe the problem.
*/
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(priv, "%s station according to cmd buffer %pM\n",
priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode ==
STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ? "Modified" : "Added",
addsta->sta.addr);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
| 169,868 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void put_filp(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
security_file_free(file);
file_sb_list_del(file);
file_free(file);
}
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | void put_filp(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
security_file_free(file);
file_free(file);
}
}
| 166,804 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int msg_parse_fetch(struct ImapHeader *h, char *s)
{
char tmp[SHORT_STRING];
char *ptmp = NULL;
if (!s)
return -1;
while (*s)
{
SKIPWS(s);
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("FLAGS", s, 5) == 0)
{
s = msg_parse_flags(h, s);
if (!s)
return -1;
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("UID", s, 3) == 0)
{
s += 3;
SKIPWS(s);
if (mutt_str_atoui(s, &h->data->uid) < 0)
return -1;
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("INTERNALDATE", s, 12) == 0)
{
s += 12;
SKIPWS(s);
if (*s != '\"')
{
mutt_debug(1, "bogus INTERNALDATE entry: %s\n", s);
return -1;
}
s++;
ptmp = tmp;
while (*s && *s != '\"')
*ptmp++ = *s++;
if (*s != '\"')
return -1;
s++; /* skip past the trailing " */
*ptmp = '\0';
h->received = mutt_date_parse_imap(tmp);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("RFC822.SIZE", s, 11) == 0)
{
s += 11;
SKIPWS(s);
ptmp = tmp;
while (isdigit((unsigned char) *s))
*ptmp++ = *s++;
*ptmp = '\0';
if (mutt_str_atol(tmp, &h->content_length) < 0)
return -1;
}
else if ((mutt_str_strncasecmp("BODY", s, 4) == 0) ||
(mutt_str_strncasecmp("RFC822.HEADER", s, 13) == 0))
{
/* handle above, in msg_fetch_header */
return -2;
}
else if (*s == ')')
s++; /* end of request */
else if (*s)
{
/* got something i don't understand */
imap_error("msg_parse_fetch", s);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int msg_parse_fetch(struct ImapHeader *h, char *s)
{
char tmp[SHORT_STRING];
char *ptmp = NULL;
if (!s)
return -1;
while (*s)
{
SKIPWS(s);
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("FLAGS", s, 5) == 0)
{
s = msg_parse_flags(h, s);
if (!s)
return -1;
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("UID", s, 3) == 0)
{
s += 3;
SKIPWS(s);
if (mutt_str_atoui(s, &h->data->uid) < 0)
return -1;
s = imap_next_word(s);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("INTERNALDATE", s, 12) == 0)
{
s += 12;
SKIPWS(s);
if (*s != '\"')
{
mutt_debug(1, "bogus INTERNALDATE entry: %s\n", s);
return -1;
}
s++;
ptmp = tmp;
while (*s && (*s != '\"') && (ptmp != (tmp + sizeof(tmp) - 1)))
*ptmp++ = *s++;
if (*s != '\"')
return -1;
s++; /* skip past the trailing " */
*ptmp = '\0';
h->received = mutt_date_parse_imap(tmp);
}
else if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("RFC822.SIZE", s, 11) == 0)
{
s += 11;
SKIPWS(s);
ptmp = tmp;
while (isdigit((unsigned char) *s) && (ptmp != (tmp + sizeof(tmp) - 1)))
*ptmp++ = *s++;
*ptmp = '\0';
if (mutt_str_atol(tmp, &h->content_length) < 0)
return -1;
}
else if ((mutt_str_strncasecmp("BODY", s, 4) == 0) ||
(mutt_str_strncasecmp("RFC822.HEADER", s, 13) == 0))
{
/* handle above, in msg_fetch_header */
return -2;
}
else if (*s == ')')
s++; /* end of request */
else if (*s)
{
/* got something i don't understand */
imap_error("msg_parse_fetch", s);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 169,132 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char *suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char buffer[4096];
char buffer2[4096];
char *buf = buffer, *buf2 = buffer2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
if (name_len > sizeof(buffer)-2) {
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
} else {
memcpy(buf, name, name_len);
buf[name_len] = 0;
}
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
encrypt_return_plain:
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
return estrndup(value, value_len);
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto encrypt_return_plain;
}
}
if (strlen(value) <= sizeof(buffer2)-2) {
memcpy(buf2, value, value_len);
buf2[value_len] = 0;
} else {
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
}
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_encrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
d_url = php_url_encode(d, strlen(d), &l);
efree(d);
if (buf != buffer) {
efree(buf);
}
if (buf2 != buffer2) {
efree(buf2);
}
return d_url;
}
Commit Message: Fixed stack based buffer overflow in transparent cookie encryption (see separate advisory)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char *suhosin_encrypt_single_cookie(char *name, int name_len, char *value, int value_len, char *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
char *buf, *buf2, *d, *d_url;
int l;
buf = estrndup(name, name_len);
name_len = php_url_decode(buf, name_len);
normalize_varname(buf);
name_len = strlen(buf);
if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist)) {
if (zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_plainlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
encrypt_return_plain:
efree(buf);
return estrndup(value, value_len);
}
} else if (SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist)) {
if (!zend_hash_exists(SUHOSIN_G(cookie_cryptlist), buf, name_len+1)) {
goto encrypt_return_plain;
}
}
buf2 = estrndup(value, value_len);
value_len = php_url_decode(buf2, value_len);
d = suhosin_encrypt_string(buf2, value_len, buf, name_len, key TSRMLS_CC);
d_url = php_url_encode(d, strlen(d), &l);
efree(d);
efree(buf);
efree(buf2);
return d_url;
}
| 165,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::Reshape(const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
const gfx::ColorSpace& color_space,
bool has_alpha,
bool use_stencil) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (initialize_waitable_event_) {
initialize_waitable_event_->Wait();
initialize_waitable_event_ = nullptr;
}
SkSurfaceCharacterization* characterization = nullptr;
if (characterization_.isValid()) {
characterization_ =
characterization_.createResized(size.width(), size.height());
RecreateRootRecorder();
} else {
characterization = &characterization_;
initialize_waitable_event_ = std::make_unique<base::WaitableEvent>(
base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
}
auto callback = base::BindOnce(
&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::Reshape,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), size, device_scale_factor,
std::move(color_space), has_alpha, use_stencil, pre_transform_,
characterization, initialize_waitable_event_.get());
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::Reshape(const gfx::Size& size,
float device_scale_factor,
const gfx::ColorSpace& color_space,
bool has_alpha,
bool use_stencil) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (initialize_waitable_event_) {
initialize_waitable_event_->Wait();
initialize_waitable_event_.reset();
}
SkSurfaceCharacterization* characterization = nullptr;
if (characterization_.isValid()) {
sk_sp<SkColorSpace> sk_color_space = color_space.ToSkColorSpace();
if (!SkColorSpace::Equals(characterization_.refColorSpace().get(),
sk_color_space.get())) {
characterization_ = characterization_.createColorSpace(sk_color_space);
}
if (size.width() != characterization_.width() ||
size.height() != characterization_.height()) {
characterization_ =
characterization_.createResized(size.width(), size.height());
}
// TODO(kylechar): Update |characterization_| if |use_alpha| changes.
RecreateRootRecorder();
} else {
characterization = &characterization_;
initialize_waitable_event_ = std::make_unique<base::WaitableEvent>(
base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
}
auto task = base::BindOnce(&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::Reshape,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), size,
device_scale_factor, color_space, has_alpha,
use_stencil, pre_transform_, characterization,
initialize_waitable_event_.get());
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(task), {});
}
| 172,317 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: tight_filter_gradient24(VncState *vs, uint8_t *buf, int w, int h)
{
uint32_t *buf32;
uint32_t pix32;
int shift[3];
int *prev;
int here[3], upper[3], left[3], upperleft[3];
int prediction;
int x, y, c;
buf32 = (uint32_t *)buf;
memset(vs->tight.gradient.buffer, 0, w * 3 * sizeof(int));
if ((vs->clientds.flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) ==
(vs->ds->surface->flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG)) {
shift[0] = vs->clientds.pf.rshift;
shift[1] = vs->clientds.pf.gshift;
shift[2] = vs->clientds.pf.bshift;
} else {
shift[0] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.rshift;
shift[1] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.gshift;
shift[2] = 24 - vs->clientds.pf.bshift;
}
for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upper[c] = 0;
here[c] = 0;
}
prev = (int *)vs->tight.gradient.buffer;
for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
pix32 = *buf32++;
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upperleft[c] = upper[c];
left[c] = here[c];
upper[c] = *prev;
here[c] = (int)(pix32 >> shift[c] & 0xFF);
*prev++ = here[c];
prediction = left[c] + upper[c] - upperleft[c];
if (prediction < 0) {
prediction = 0;
} else if (prediction > 0xFF) {
prediction = 0xFF;
}
*buf++ = (char)(here[c] - prediction);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | tight_filter_gradient24(VncState *vs, uint8_t *buf, int w, int h)
{
uint32_t *buf32;
uint32_t pix32;
int shift[3];
int *prev;
int here[3], upper[3], left[3], upperleft[3];
int prediction;
int x, y, c;
buf32 = (uint32_t *)buf;
memset(vs->tight.gradient.buffer, 0, w * 3 * sizeof(int));
if (1 /* FIXME: (vs->clientds.flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) ==
(vs->ds->surface->flags & QEMU_BIG_ENDIAN_FLAG) */) {
shift[0] = vs->client_pf.rshift;
shift[1] = vs->client_pf.gshift;
shift[2] = vs->client_pf.bshift;
} else {
shift[0] = 24 - vs->client_pf.rshift;
shift[1] = 24 - vs->client_pf.gshift;
shift[2] = 24 - vs->client_pf.bshift;
}
for (y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upper[c] = 0;
here[c] = 0;
}
prev = (int *)vs->tight.gradient.buffer;
for (x = 0; x < w; x++) {
pix32 = *buf32++;
for (c = 0; c < 3; c++) {
upperleft[c] = upper[c];
left[c] = here[c];
upper[c] = *prev;
here[c] = (int)(pix32 >> shift[c] & 0xFF);
*prev++ = here[c];
prediction = left[c] + upper[c] - upperleft[c];
if (prediction < 0) {
prediction = 0;
} else if (prediction > 0xFF) {
prediction = 0xFF;
}
*buf++ = (char)(here[c] - prediction);
}
}
}
}
| 165,467 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_ReplaceItemInObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *newitem )
{
int i = 0;
cJSON *c = object->child;
while ( c && cJSON_strcasecmp( c->string, string ) ) {
++i;
c = c->next;
}
if ( c ) {
newitem->string = cJSON_strdup( string );
cJSON_ReplaceItemInArray( object, i, newitem );
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_ReplaceItemInObject( cJSON *object, const char *string, cJSON *newitem )
| 167,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_encrypt)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_string_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, Z_STRVAL_PP(mode), iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), MCRYPT_ENCRYPT, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_encrypt)
{
zval **mode;
char *cipher, *key, *data, *iv = NULL;
int cipher_len, key_len, data_len, iv_len = 0;
MCRYPT_GET_CRYPT_ARGS
convert_to_string_ex(mode);
php_mcrypt_do_crypt(cipher, key, key_len, data, data_len, Z_STRVAL_PP(mode), iv, iv_len, ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), MCRYPT_ENCRYPT, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,106 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: nfs4_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct dentry *parent;
struct iattr attr;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
struct nfs4_state *state;
struct dentry *res;
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_CREATE) {
attr.ia_mode = nd->intent.open.create_mode;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir))
attr.ia_mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
} else {
attr.ia_valid = 0;
BUG_ON(nd->intent.open.flags & O_CREAT);
}
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred))
return (struct dentry *)cred;
parent = dentry->d_parent;
/* Protect against concurrent sillydeletes */
nfs_block_sillyrename(parent);
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, nd->intent.open.flags, &attr, cred);
put_rpccred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
if (PTR_ERR(state) == -ENOENT) {
d_add(dentry, NULL);
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
}
nfs_unblock_sillyrename(parent);
return (struct dentry *)state;
}
res = d_add_unique(dentry, igrab(state->inode));
if (res != NULL)
path.dentry = res;
nfs_set_verifier(path.dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
nfs_unblock_sillyrename(parent);
nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state);
return res;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | nfs4_atomic_open(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct path path = {
.mnt = nd->path.mnt,
.dentry = dentry,
};
struct dentry *parent;
struct iattr attr;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
struct nfs4_state *state;
struct dentry *res;
fmode_t fmode = nd->intent.open.flags & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_EXEC);
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_CREATE) {
attr.ia_mode = nd->intent.open.create_mode;
attr.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir))
attr.ia_mode &= ~current->fs->umask;
} else {
attr.ia_valid = 0;
BUG_ON(nd->intent.open.flags & O_CREAT);
}
cred = rpc_lookup_cred();
if (IS_ERR(cred))
return (struct dentry *)cred;
parent = dentry->d_parent;
/* Protect against concurrent sillydeletes */
nfs_block_sillyrename(parent);
state = nfs4_do_open(dir, &path, fmode, nd->intent.open.flags, &attr, cred);
put_rpccred(cred);
if (IS_ERR(state)) {
if (PTR_ERR(state) == -ENOENT) {
d_add(dentry, NULL);
nfs_set_verifier(dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
}
nfs_unblock_sillyrename(parent);
return (struct dentry *)state;
}
res = d_add_unique(dentry, igrab(state->inode));
if (res != NULL)
path.dentry = res;
nfs_set_verifier(path.dentry, nfs_save_change_attribute(dir));
nfs_unblock_sillyrename(parent);
nfs4_intent_set_file(nd, &path, state, fmode);
return res;
}
| 165,688 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Utterance::FinishAndDestroy() {
completion_task_->Run();
completion_task_ = NULL;
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Utterance::FinishAndDestroy() {
| 170,377 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static PHP_RINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
if (_php_libxml_per_request_initialization) {
/* report errors via handler rather than stderr */
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(NULL, php_libxml_error_handler);
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | static PHP_RINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
if (_php_libxml_per_request_initialization) {
/* report errors via handler rather than stderr */
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(NULL, php_libxml_error_handler);
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename);
/* Enable the entity loader by default. This ensure that
* other threads/requests that might have disable the loader
* do not affect the current request.
*/
LIBXML(entity_loader_disabled) = 0;
}
return SUCCESS;
}
| 165,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::KillProcess(DWORD exit_code) {
exit_code_ = exit_code;
BOOL result = SetEvent(process_exit_event_);
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::KillProcess(DWORD exit_code) {
BOOL result = SetEvent(process_exit_event_);
EXPECT_TRUE(result);
}
| 171,550 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index,
IncludePrivacySensitiveFields include_privacy_sensitive_fields) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | DictionaryValue* ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
const WebContents* contents,
TabStripModel* tab_strip,
int tab_index) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return NULL;
}
| 171,456 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _dbus_header_byteswap (DBusHeader *header,
int new_order)
{
if (header->byte_order == new_order)
return;
_dbus_marshal_byteswap (&_dbus_header_signature_str,
0, header->byte_order,
new_order,
&header->data, 0);
header->byte_order = new_order;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | _dbus_header_byteswap (DBusHeader *header,
int new_order)
{
unsigned char byte_order;
if (header->byte_order == new_order)
return;
byte_order = _dbus_string_get_byte (&header->data, BYTE_ORDER_OFFSET);
_dbus_assert (header->byte_order == byte_order);
_dbus_marshal_byteswap (&_dbus_header_signature_str,
0, header->byte_order,
new_order,
&header->data, 0);
_dbus_string_set_byte (&header->data, BYTE_ORDER_OFFSET, new_order);
header->byte_order = new_order;
}
| 164,686 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const CuePoint* Cues::GetLast() const {
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return NULL;
if (m_count <= 0)
return NULL;
#if 0
LoadCuePoint(); //init cues
const size_t count = m_count + m_preload_count;
if (count == 0) //weird
return NULL;
const size_t index = count - 1;
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[index];
assert(pCP);
pCP->Load(m_pSegment->m_pReader);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#else
const long index = m_count - 1;
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
assert(pp);
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[index];
assert(pCP);
assert(pCP->GetTimeCode() >= 0);
#endif
return pCP;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | const CuePoint* Cues::GetLast() const {
if (m_cue_points == NULL || m_count <= 0)
return NULL;
const long index = m_count - 1;
CuePoint* const* const pp = m_cue_points;
if (pp == NULL)
return NULL;
CuePoint* const pCP = pp[index];
if (pCP == NULL || pCP->GetTimeCode() < 0)
return NULL;
return pCP;
}
| 173,820 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Edition::Edition()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Chapters::Edition::Edition()
const int size = (m_atoms_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_atoms_size;
Atom* const atoms = new (std::nothrow) Atom[size];
if (atoms == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_atoms_count; ++idx) {
m_atoms[idx].ShallowCopy(atoms[idx]);
}
delete[] m_atoms;
m_atoms = atoms;
m_atoms_size = size;
return true;
}
| 174,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool UnpackOriginPermissions(const std::vector<std::string>& origins_input,
const PermissionSet& required_permissions,
const PermissionSet& optional_permissions,
bool allow_file_access,
UnpackPermissionSetResult* result,
std::string* error) {
int user_script_schemes = UserScript::ValidUserScriptSchemes();
int explicit_schemes = Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes;
if (!allow_file_access) {
user_script_schemes &= ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE;
explicit_schemes &= ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE;
}
for (const auto& origin_str : origins_input) {
URLPattern explicit_origin(explicit_schemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = explicit_origin.Parse(origin_str);
if (URLPattern::ParseResult::kSuccess != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin, origin_str,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return false;
}
bool used_origin = false;
if (required_permissions.explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(
explicit_origin)) {
used_origin = true;
result->required_explicit_hosts.AddPattern(explicit_origin);
} else if (optional_permissions.explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(
explicit_origin)) {
used_origin = true;
result->optional_explicit_hosts.AddPattern(explicit_origin);
}
URLPattern scriptable_origin(user_script_schemes);
if (scriptable_origin.Parse(origin_str) ==
URLPattern::ParseResult::kSuccess &&
required_permissions.scriptable_hosts().ContainsPattern(
scriptable_origin)) {
used_origin = true;
result->required_scriptable_hosts.AddPattern(scriptable_origin);
}
if (!used_origin)
result->unlisted_hosts.AddPattern(explicit_origin);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | bool UnpackOriginPermissions(const std::vector<std::string>& origins_input,
const PermissionSet& required_permissions,
const PermissionSet& optional_permissions,
bool allow_file_access,
UnpackPermissionSetResult* result,
std::string* error) {
int user_script_schemes = UserScript::ValidUserScriptSchemes();
int explicit_schemes = Extension::kValidHostPermissionSchemes;
if (!allow_file_access) {
user_script_schemes &= ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE;
explicit_schemes &= ~URLPattern::SCHEME_FILE;
}
auto filter_chrome_scheme = [](URLPattern* pattern) {
// We disallow the chrome:-scheme unless the pattern is explicitly
// "chrome://..." - that is, <all_urls> should not match the chrome:-scheme.
// Patterns which explicitly specify the chrome:-scheme are safe, since
// manifest parsing won't allow them unless the kExtensionsOnChromeURLs
// switch is enabled.
// Note that we don't check PermissionsData::AllUrlsIncludesChromeUrls()
// here, since that's only needed for Chromevox (which doesn't use optional
// permissions).
if (pattern->scheme() != content::kChromeUIScheme) {
// NOTE: We use pattern->valid_schemes() here (instead of
// |user_script_schemes| or |explicit_schemes|) because
// URLPattern::Parse() can mutate the valid schemes for a pattern, and we
// don't want to override those changes.
pattern->SetValidSchemes(pattern->valid_schemes() &
~URLPattern::SCHEME_CHROMEUI);
}
};
for (const auto& origin_str : origins_input) {
URLPattern explicit_origin(explicit_schemes);
URLPattern::ParseResult parse_result = explicit_origin.Parse(origin_str);
if (URLPattern::ParseResult::kSuccess != parse_result) {
*error = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(
kInvalidOrigin, origin_str,
URLPattern::GetParseResultString(parse_result));
return false;
}
filter_chrome_scheme(&explicit_origin);
bool used_origin = false;
if (required_permissions.explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(
explicit_origin)) {
used_origin = true;
result->required_explicit_hosts.AddPattern(explicit_origin);
} else if (optional_permissions.explicit_hosts().ContainsPattern(
explicit_origin)) {
used_origin = true;
result->optional_explicit_hosts.AddPattern(explicit_origin);
}
URLPattern scriptable_origin(user_script_schemes);
if (scriptable_origin.Parse(origin_str) ==
URLPattern::ParseResult::kSuccess) {
filter_chrome_scheme(&scriptable_origin);
if (required_permissions.scriptable_hosts().ContainsPattern(
scriptable_origin)) {
used_origin = true;
result->required_scriptable_hosts.AddPattern(scriptable_origin);
}
}
if (!used_origin)
result->unlisted_hosts.AddPattern(explicit_origin);
}
return true;
}
| 173,118 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::GenerateFakeDeviceList() {
GenerateFakeDiscoveredDevice(
"Fake Wireless Keyboard",
"01-02-03-04-05-06",
"input-keyboard",
true,
true);
GenerateFakeDiscoveredDevice(
"Fake Wireless Mouse",
"02-03-04-05-06-01",
"input-mouse",
true,
false);
GenerateFakeDiscoveredDevice(
"Fake Wireless Headset",
"03-04-05-06-01-02",
"headset",
false,
false);
GenerateFakePairing(
"Fake Connecting Keyboard",
"04-05-06-01-02-03",
"input-keyboard",
"bluetoothRemotePasskey");
GenerateFakePairing(
"Fake Connecting Phone",
"05-06-01-02-03-04",
"phone",
"bluetoothConfirmPasskey");
GenerateFakePairing(
"Fake Connecting Headset",
"06-01-02-03-04-05",
"headset",
"bluetoothEnterPasskey");
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.notifyBluetoothSearchComplete");
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void BluetoothOptionsHandler::GenerateFakeDeviceList() {
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Wireless Keyboard",
"01-02-03-04-05-06",
"input-keyboard",
true,
true,
"");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Wireless Mouse",
"02-03-04-05-06-01",
"input-mouse",
true,
false,
"");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Wireless Headset",
"03-04-05-06-01-02",
"headset",
false,
false,
"");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Connecting Keyboard",
"04-05-06-01-02-03",
"input-keyboard",
false,
false,
"bluetoothRemotePasskey");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Connecting Phone",
"05-06-01-02-03-04",
"phone",
false,
false,
"bluetoothConfirmPasskey");
GenerateFakeDevice(
"Fake Connecting Headset",
"06-01-02-03-04-05",
"headset",
false,
false,
"bluetoothEnterPasskey");
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.notifyBluetoothSearchComplete");
}
| 170,968 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: horAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
assert((cc%(2*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] = (uint16)(((unsigned int)wp[stride] + (unsigned int)wp[0]) & 0xffff); wp++)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | horAcc16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint16* wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 2;
if((cc%(2*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "horAcc16",
"%s", "cc%(2*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] = (uint16)(((unsigned int)wp[stride] + (unsigned int)wp[0]) & 0xffff); wp++)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
return 1;
}
| 166,882 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(
Blob* blob) {
loader_->Start(blob->GetBlobDataHandle());
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(
void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::LoadBlobAsync(Blob* blob) {
loader_->Start(blob->GetBlobDataHandle());
}
| 173,068 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int __init balloon_init(void)
{
if (!xen_domain())
return -ENODEV;
pr_info("Initialising balloon driver\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
balloon_stats.current_pages = xen_pv_domain()
? min(xen_start_info->nr_pages - xen_released_pages, max_pfn)
: get_num_physpages();
#else
balloon_stats.current_pages = get_num_physpages();
#endif
balloon_stats.target_pages = balloon_stats.current_pages;
balloon_stats.balloon_low = 0;
balloon_stats.balloon_high = 0;
balloon_stats.total_pages = balloon_stats.current_pages;
balloon_stats.schedule_delay = 1;
balloon_stats.max_schedule_delay = 32;
balloon_stats.retry_count = 1;
balloon_stats.max_retry_count = RETRY_UNLIMITED;
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
set_online_page_callback(&xen_online_page);
register_memory_notifier(&xen_memory_nb);
register_sysctl_table(xen_root);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
{
int i;
/*
* Initialize the balloon with pages from the extra memory
* regions (see arch/x86/xen/setup.c).
*/
for (i = 0; i < XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS; i++)
if (xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns)
balloon_add_region(xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn,
xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns);
}
#endif
/* Init the xen-balloon driver. */
xen_balloon_init();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
commit a1078e821b605813b63bf6bca414a85f804d5c66 upstream.
Instead of trying to allocate pages with GFP_USER in
add_ballooned_pages() check the available free memory via
si_mem_available(). GFP_USER is far less limiting memory exhaustion
than the test via si_mem_available().
This will avoid dom0 running out of memory due to excessive foreign
page mappings especially on ARM and on x86 in PVH mode, as those don't
have a pre-ballooned area which can be used for foreign mappings.
As the normal ballooning suffers from the same problem don't balloon
down more than si_mem_available() pages in one iteration. At the same
time limit the default maximum number of retries.
This is part of XSA-300.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | static int __init balloon_init(void)
{
if (!xen_domain())
return -ENODEV;
pr_info("Initialising balloon driver\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
balloon_stats.current_pages = xen_pv_domain()
? min(xen_start_info->nr_pages - xen_released_pages, max_pfn)
: get_num_physpages();
#else
balloon_stats.current_pages = get_num_physpages();
#endif
balloon_stats.target_pages = balloon_stats.current_pages;
balloon_stats.balloon_low = 0;
balloon_stats.balloon_high = 0;
balloon_stats.total_pages = balloon_stats.current_pages;
balloon_stats.schedule_delay = 1;
balloon_stats.max_schedule_delay = 32;
balloon_stats.retry_count = 1;
balloon_stats.max_retry_count = 4;
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG
set_online_page_callback(&xen_online_page);
register_memory_notifier(&xen_memory_nb);
register_sysctl_table(xen_root);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
{
int i;
/*
* Initialize the balloon with pages from the extra memory
* regions (see arch/x86/xen/setup.c).
*/
for (i = 0; i < XEN_EXTRA_MEM_MAX_REGIONS; i++)
if (xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns)
balloon_add_region(xen_extra_mem[i].start_pfn,
xen_extra_mem[i].n_pfns);
}
#endif
/* Init the xen-balloon driver. */
xen_balloon_init();
return 0;
}
| 169,493 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Wait() {
message_loop_runner_->Run();
message_loop_runner_ = new MessageLoopRunner;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | void Wait() {
run_loop_->Run();
run_loop_ = std::make_unique<base::RunLoop>();
}
| 172,719 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t k90_show_current_profile(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int current_profile;
char data[8];
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
return -EIO;
}
current_profile = data[7];
if (current_profile < 1 || current_profile > 3) {
dev_warn(dev, "Read invalid current profile: %02hhx.\n",
data[7]);
return -EIO;
}
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", current_profile);
}
Commit Message: HID: corsair: fix DMA buffers on stack
Not all platforms support DMA to the stack, and specifically since v4.9
this is no longer supported on x86 with VMAP_STACK either.
Note that the macro-mode buffer was larger than necessary.
Fixes: 6f78193ee9ea ("HID: corsair: Add Corsair Vengeance K90 driver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static ssize_t k90_show_current_profile(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
int ret;
struct usb_interface *usbif = to_usb_interface(dev->parent);
struct usb_device *usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbif);
int current_profile;
char *data;
data = kmalloc(8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = usb_control_msg(usbdev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usbdev, 0),
K90_REQUEST_STATUS,
USB_DIR_IN | USB_TYPE_VENDOR |
USB_RECIP_DEVICE, 0, 0, data, 8,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (ret < 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "Failed to get K90 initial state (error %d).\n",
ret);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
current_profile = data[7];
if (current_profile < 1 || current_profile > 3) {
dev_warn(dev, "Read invalid current profile: %02hhx.\n",
data[7]);
ret = -EIO;
goto out;
}
ret = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", current_profile);
out:
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
| 168,394 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pitem *item;
/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
return 0;
rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
{
if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
rdata->packet = s->packet;
rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
item->data = rdata;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
(s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
s->packet = NULL;
s->packet_length = 0;
memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
return(0);
}
/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
{
DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
pitem *item;
/* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
return 0;
rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
{
if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return(0);
}
rdata->packet = s->packet;
rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
item->data = rdata;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
(s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
}
#endif
s->packet = NULL;
s->packet_length = 0;
memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
return(-1);
}
/* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
if (rdata->rbuf.buf != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(rdata->rbuf.buf);
OPENSSL_free(rdata);
pitem_free(item);
return(-1);
}
return(1);
}
| 166,745 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: white_point(PNG_CONST color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white;
white.X = encoding->red.X + encoding->green.X + encoding->blue.X;
white.Y = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y + encoding->blue.Y;
white.Z = encoding->red.Z + encoding->green.Z + encoding->blue.Z;
return white;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | white_point(PNG_CONST color_encoding *encoding)
white_point(const color_encoding *encoding)
{
CIE_color white;
white.X = encoding->red.X + encoding->green.X + encoding->blue.X;
white.Y = encoding->red.Y + encoding->green.Y + encoding->blue.Y;
white.Z = encoding->red.Z + encoding->green.Z + encoding->blue.Z;
return white;
}
| 173,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint8_t* FAST_FUNC udhcp_get_option32(struct dhcp_packet *packet, int code)
{
uint8_t *r = udhcp_get_option(packet, code);
if (r) {
if (r[-1] != 4)
r = NULL;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | uint8_t* FAST_FUNC udhcp_get_option32(struct dhcp_packet *packet, int code)
{
uint8_t *r = udhcp_get_option(packet, code);
if (r) {
if (r[-OPT_DATA + OPT_LEN] != 4)
r = NULL;
}
return r;
}
| 164,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
{
struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
unsigned long flags;
if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
struct task_struct *t = task;
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &task->signal->ioac);
while_each_thread(task, t)
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &t->ioac);
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
}
return sprintf(buffer,
"rchar: %llu\n"
"wchar: %llu\n"
"syscr: %llu\n"
"syscw: %llu\n"
"read_bytes: %llu\n"
"write_bytes: %llu\n"
"cancelled_write_bytes: %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)acct.rchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.wchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscr,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscw,
(unsigned long long)acct.read_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.write_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.cancelled_write_bytes);
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
{
struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
unsigned long flags;
if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
return -EACCES;
if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
struct task_struct *t = task;
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &task->signal->ioac);
while_each_thread(task, t)
task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &t->ioac);
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
}
return sprintf(buffer,
"rchar: %llu\n"
"wchar: %llu\n"
"syscr: %llu\n"
"syscw: %llu\n"
"read_bytes: %llu\n"
"write_bytes: %llu\n"
"cancelled_write_bytes: %llu\n",
(unsigned long long)acct.rchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.wchar,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscr,
(unsigned long long)acct.syscw,
(unsigned long long)acct.read_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.write_bytes,
(unsigned long long)acct.cancelled_write_bytes);
}
| 165,860 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
const char *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct key_user *user;
struct key *key;
int ret;
kenter("");
user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
key_user_put(user);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0) {
kdebug("cons failed");
goto construction_failed;
}
} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
ret = 0;
} else {
goto couldnt_alloc_key;
}
key_put(dest_keyring);
kleave(" = key %d", key_serial(key));
return key;
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
couldnt_alloc_key:
key_put(dest_keyring);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull key handling fixes from David Howells:
"Here are two patches, the first of which at least should go upstream
immediately:
(1) Prevent a user-triggerable crash in the keyrings destructor when a
negatively instantiated keyring is garbage collected. I have also
seen this triggered for user type keys.
(2) Prevent the user from using requesting that a keyring be created
and instantiated through an upcall. Doing so is probably safe
since the keyring type ignores the arguments to its instantiation
function - but we probably shouldn't let keyrings be created in
this manner"
* 'keys-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: Don't permit request_key() to construct a new keyring
KEYS: Fix crash when attempt to garbage collect an uninstantiated keyring
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
const char *callout_info,
size_t callout_len,
void *aux,
struct key *dest_keyring,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct key_user *user;
struct key *key;
int ret;
kenter("");
if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring);
ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key);
key_user_put(user);
if (ret == 0) {
ret = construct_key(key, callout_info, callout_len, aux,
dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0) {
kdebug("cons failed");
goto construction_failed;
}
} else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
ret = 0;
} else {
goto couldnt_alloc_key;
}
key_put(dest_keyring);
kleave(" = key %d", key_serial(key));
return key;
construction_failed:
key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL);
key_put(key);
couldnt_alloc_key:
key_put(dest_keyring);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
| 166,577 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: explicit MountState(DriveFsHost* host)
: host_(host),
mojo_connection_delegate_(
host_->delegate_->CreateMojoConnectionDelegate()),
pending_token_(base::UnguessableToken::Create()),
binding_(this) {
source_path_ = base::StrCat({kMountScheme, pending_token_.ToString()});
std::string datadir_option = base::StrCat(
{"datadir=",
host_->profile_path_.Append(kDataPath)
.Append(host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey())
.value()});
chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::GetInstance()->MountPath(
source_path_, "",
base::StrCat(
{"drivefs-", host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey()}),
{datadir_option}, chromeos::MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE,
chromeos::MOUNT_ACCESS_MODE_READ_WRITE);
auto bootstrap =
mojo::MakeProxy(mojo_connection_delegate_->InitializeMojoConnection());
mojom::DriveFsDelegatePtr delegate;
binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&delegate));
bootstrap->Init(
{base::in_place, host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetUserEmail()},
mojo::MakeRequest(&drivefs_), std::move(delegate));
PendingConnectionManager::Get().ExpectOpenIpcChannel(
pending_token_,
base::BindOnce(&DriveFsHost::MountState::AcceptMojoConnection,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | explicit MountState(DriveFsHost* host)
: host_(host),
mojo_connection_delegate_(
host_->delegate_->CreateMojoConnectionDelegate()),
pending_token_(base::UnguessableToken::Create()),
binding_(this) {
source_path_ = base::StrCat({kMountScheme, pending_token_.ToString()});
std::string datadir_option = base::StrCat(
{"datadir=",
host_->profile_path_.Append(kDataPath)
.Append(host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey())
.value()});
auto bootstrap =
mojo::MakeProxy(mojo_connection_delegate_->InitializeMojoConnection());
mojom::DriveFsDelegatePtr delegate;
binding_.Bind(mojo::MakeRequest(&delegate));
bootstrap->Init(
{base::in_place, host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetUserEmail()},
mojo::MakeRequest(&drivefs_), std::move(delegate));
PendingConnectionManager::Get().ExpectOpenIpcChannel(
pending_token_,
base::BindOnce(&DriveFsHost::MountState::AcceptMojoConnection,
base::Unretained(this)));
chromeos::disks::DiskMountManager::GetInstance()->MountPath(
source_path_, "",
base::StrCat(
{"drivefs-", host_->delegate_->GetAccountId().GetAccountIdKey()}),
{datadir_option}, chromeos::MOUNT_TYPE_NETWORK_STORAGE,
chromeos::MOUNT_ACCESS_MODE_READ_WRITE);
}
| 171,729 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromArray( cJSON *array, int which )
{
cJSON_Delete( cJSON_DetachItemFromArray( array, which ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_DeleteItemFromArray( cJSON *array, int which )
| 167,282 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void RemoveResolutionFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
break;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
if ((id == 0x000003ed) && (PSDQuantum(count) < (ssize_t) (length-12)))
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+PSDQuantum(count)+12,length-
(PSDQuantum(count)+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(PSDQuantum(count)+12));
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
Commit Message: Added check for out of bounds read (https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/108).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void RemoveResolutionFromResourceBlock(StringInfo *bim_profile)
{
register const unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
unsigned char
*datum;
unsigned int
count,
long_sans;
unsigned short
id,
short_sans;
length=GetStringInfoLength(bim_profile);
if (length < 16)
return;
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(bim_profile);
for (p=datum; (p >= datum) && (p < (datum+length-16)); )
{
register unsigned char
*q;
ssize_t
cnt;
q=(unsigned char *) p;
if (LocaleNCompare((const char *) p,"8BIM",4) != 0)
return;
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&long_sans);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&id);
p=PushShortPixel(MSBEndian,p,&short_sans);
p=PushLongPixel(MSBEndian,p,&count);
cnt=PSDQuantum(count);
if (cnt < 0)
return;
if ((id == 0x000003ed) && (cnt < (ssize_t) (length-12)))
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(q,q+cnt+12,length-(cnt+12)-(q-datum));
SetStringInfoLength(bim_profile,length-(cnt+12));
break;
}
p+=count;
if ((count & 0x01) != 0)
p++;
}
}
| 168,796 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int create_flush_cmd_control(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
dev_t dev = sbi->sb->s_bdev->bd_dev;
struct flush_cmd_control *fcc;
int err = 0;
if (SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info) {
fcc = SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info;
goto init_thread;
}
fcc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct flush_cmd_control), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fcc)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_set(&fcc->issued_flush, 0);
atomic_set(&fcc->issing_flush, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&fcc->flush_wait_queue);
init_llist_head(&fcc->issue_list);
SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info = fcc;
init_thread:
fcc->f2fs_issue_flush = kthread_run(issue_flush_thread, sbi,
"f2fs_flush-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
if (IS_ERR(fcc->f2fs_issue_flush)) {
err = PTR_ERR(fcc->f2fs_issue_flush);
kfree(fcc);
SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info = NULL;
return err;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int create_flush_cmd_control(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
dev_t dev = sbi->sb->s_bdev->bd_dev;
struct flush_cmd_control *fcc;
int err = 0;
if (SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info) {
fcc = SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info;
goto init_thread;
}
fcc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct flush_cmd_control), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fcc)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_set(&fcc->issued_flush, 0);
atomic_set(&fcc->issing_flush, 0);
init_waitqueue_head(&fcc->flush_wait_queue);
init_llist_head(&fcc->issue_list);
SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info = fcc;
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE))
return err;
init_thread:
fcc->f2fs_issue_flush = kthread_run(issue_flush_thread, sbi,
"f2fs_flush-%u:%u", MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev));
if (IS_ERR(fcc->f2fs_issue_flush)) {
err = PTR_ERR(fcc->f2fs_issue_flush);
kfree(fcc);
SM_I(sbi)->fcc_info = NULL;
return err;
}
return err;
}
| 169,382 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static const uint8_t *get_signature(const uint8_t *asn1_sig, int *len)
{
int offset = 0;
const uint8_t *ptr = NULL;
if (asn1_next_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE) < 0 ||
asn1_skip_obj(asn1_sig, &offset, ASN1_SEQUENCE))
goto end_get_sig;
if (asn1_sig[offset++] != ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
goto end_get_sig;
*len = get_asn1_length(asn1_sig, &offset);
ptr = &asn1_sig[offset]; /* all ok */
end_get_sig:
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: Apply CVE fixes for X509 parsing
Apply patches developed by Sze Yiu which correct a vulnerability in
X509 parsing. See CVE-2018-16150 and CVE-2018-16149 for more info.
CWE ID: CWE-347 | static const uint8_t *get_signature(const uint8_t *asn1_sig, int *len)
| 169,085 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EventBindings::AttachFilteredEvent(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(2, args.Length());
CHECK(args[0]->IsString());
CHECK(args[1]->IsObject());
std::string event_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0]);
if (!context()->HasAccessOrThrowError(event_name))
return;
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> filter;
{
std::unique_ptr<content::V8ValueConverter> converter(
content::V8ValueConverter::create());
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> filter_value(converter->FromV8Value(
v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(args[1]), context()->v8_context()));
if (!filter_value || !filter_value->IsType(base::Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(-1));
return;
}
filter = base::DictionaryValue::From(std::move(filter_value));
}
base::DictionaryValue* filter_weak = filter.get();
int id = g_event_filter.Get().AddEventMatcher(
event_name, ParseEventMatcher(std::move(filter)));
attached_matcher_ids_.insert(id);
std::string extension_id = context()->GetExtensionID();
if (AddFilter(event_name, extension_id, *filter_weak)) {
bool lazy = ExtensionFrameHelper::IsContextForEventPage(context());
content::RenderThread::Get()->Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_AddFilteredListener(
extension_id, event_name, *filter_weak, lazy));
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(id));
}
Commit Message: Ignore filtered event if an event matcher cannot be added.
BUG=625404
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236133002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411472}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void EventBindings::AttachFilteredEvent(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(2, args.Length());
CHECK(args[0]->IsString());
CHECK(args[1]->IsObject());
std::string event_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0]);
if (!context()->HasAccessOrThrowError(event_name))
return;
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> filter;
{
std::unique_ptr<content::V8ValueConverter> converter(
content::V8ValueConverter::create());
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> filter_value(converter->FromV8Value(
v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(args[1]), context()->v8_context()));
if (!filter_value || !filter_value->IsType(base::Value::TYPE_DICTIONARY)) {
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(-1));
return;
}
filter = base::DictionaryValue::From(std::move(filter_value));
}
int id = g_event_filter.Get().AddEventMatcher(
event_name, ParseEventMatcher(std::move(filter)));
if (id == -1) {
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(-1));
return;
}
attached_matcher_ids_.insert(id);
const EventMatcher* matcher = g_event_filter.Get().GetEventMatcher(id);
DCHECK(matcher);
base::DictionaryValue* filter_weak = matcher->value();
std::string extension_id = context()->GetExtensionID();
if (AddFilter(event_name, extension_id, *filter_weak)) {
bool lazy = ExtensionFrameHelper::IsContextForEventPage(context());
content::RenderThread::Get()->Send(new ExtensionHostMsg_AddFilteredListener(
extension_id, event_name, *filter_weak, lazy));
}
args.GetReturnValue().Set(static_cast<int32_t>(id));
}
| 172,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f, *match;
u8 type = type_flags & 0xff;
u8 flags = type_flags >> 8;
int err;
switch (type) {
case PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER:
if (type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)
return -EINVAL;
case PACKET_FANOUT_HASH:
case PACKET_FANOUT_LB:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CPU:
case PACKET_FANOUT_RND:
case PACKET_FANOUT_QM:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CBPF:
case PACKET_FANOUT_EBPF:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!po->running)
return -EINVAL;
if (po->fanout)
return -EALREADY;
if (type == PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER ||
(type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)) {
po->rollover = kzalloc(sizeof(*po->rollover), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!po->rollover)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num, 0);
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_huge, 0);
atomic_long_set(&po->rollover->num_failed, 0);
}
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
match = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(f, &fanout_list, list) {
if (f->id == id &&
read_pnet(&f->net) == sock_net(sk)) {
match = f;
break;
}
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match && match->flags != flags)
goto out;
if (!match) {
err = -ENOMEM;
match = kzalloc(sizeof(*match), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!match)
goto out;
write_pnet(&match->net, sock_net(sk));
match->id = id;
match->type = type;
match->flags = flags;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&match->list);
spin_lock_init(&match->lock);
atomic_set(&match->sk_ref, 0);
fanout_init_data(match);
match->prot_hook.type = po->prot_hook.type;
match->prot_hook.dev = po->prot_hook.dev;
match->prot_hook.func = packet_rcv_fanout;
match->prot_hook.af_packet_priv = match;
match->prot_hook.id_match = match_fanout_group;
dev_add_pack(&match->prot_hook);
list_add(&match->list, &fanout_list);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match->type == type &&
match->prot_hook.type == po->prot_hook.type &&
match->prot_hook.dev == po->prot_hook.dev) {
err = -ENOSPC;
if (atomic_read(&match->sk_ref) < PACKET_FANOUT_MAX) {
__dev_remove_pack(&po->prot_hook);
po->fanout = match;
atomic_inc(&match->sk_ref);
__fanout_link(sk, po);
err = 0;
}
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
if (err) {
kfree(po->rollover);
po->rollover = NULL;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static int fanout_add(struct sock *sk, u16 id, u16 type_flags)
{
struct packet_rollover *rollover = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
struct packet_fanout *f, *match;
u8 type = type_flags & 0xff;
u8 flags = type_flags >> 8;
int err;
switch (type) {
case PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER:
if (type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)
return -EINVAL;
case PACKET_FANOUT_HASH:
case PACKET_FANOUT_LB:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CPU:
case PACKET_FANOUT_RND:
case PACKET_FANOUT_QM:
case PACKET_FANOUT_CBPF:
case PACKET_FANOUT_EBPF:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
mutex_lock(&fanout_mutex);
err = -EINVAL;
if (!po->running)
goto out;
err = -EALREADY;
if (po->fanout)
goto out;
if (type == PACKET_FANOUT_ROLLOVER ||
(type_flags & PACKET_FANOUT_FLAG_ROLLOVER)) {
err = -ENOMEM;
rollover = kzalloc(sizeof(*rollover), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!rollover)
goto out;
atomic_long_set(&rollover->num, 0);
atomic_long_set(&rollover->num_huge, 0);
atomic_long_set(&rollover->num_failed, 0);
po->rollover = rollover;
}
match = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(f, &fanout_list, list) {
if (f->id == id &&
read_pnet(&f->net) == sock_net(sk)) {
match = f;
break;
}
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match && match->flags != flags)
goto out;
if (!match) {
err = -ENOMEM;
match = kzalloc(sizeof(*match), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!match)
goto out;
write_pnet(&match->net, sock_net(sk));
match->id = id;
match->type = type;
match->flags = flags;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&match->list);
spin_lock_init(&match->lock);
atomic_set(&match->sk_ref, 0);
fanout_init_data(match);
match->prot_hook.type = po->prot_hook.type;
match->prot_hook.dev = po->prot_hook.dev;
match->prot_hook.func = packet_rcv_fanout;
match->prot_hook.af_packet_priv = match;
match->prot_hook.id_match = match_fanout_group;
dev_add_pack(&match->prot_hook);
list_add(&match->list, &fanout_list);
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (match->type == type &&
match->prot_hook.type == po->prot_hook.type &&
match->prot_hook.dev == po->prot_hook.dev) {
err = -ENOSPC;
if (atomic_read(&match->sk_ref) < PACKET_FANOUT_MAX) {
__dev_remove_pack(&po->prot_hook);
po->fanout = match;
atomic_inc(&match->sk_ref);
__fanout_link(sk, po);
err = 0;
}
}
out:
if (err && rollover) {
kfree(rollover);
po->rollover = NULL;
}
mutex_unlock(&fanout_mutex);
return err;
}
| 168,346 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Dispatcher::RegisterNativeHandlers(ModuleSystem* module_system,
ScriptContext* context,
Dispatcher* dispatcher,
RequestSender* request_sender,
V8SchemaRegistry* v8_schema_registry) {
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"chrome", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new ChromeNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"lazy_background_page",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new LazyBackgroundPageNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"logging", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new LoggingNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler("schema_registry",
v8_schema_registry->AsNativeHandler());
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"print", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new PrintNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"test_features",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new TestFeaturesNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"test_native_handler",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new TestNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"user_gestures",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new UserGesturesNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"utils", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new UtilsNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"v8_context",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new V8ContextNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"event_natives", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new EventBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"messaging_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(MessagingBindings::Get(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"apiDefinitions",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new ApiDefinitionsNatives(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"sendRequest",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new SendRequestNatives(request_sender, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"setIcon",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new SetIconNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"activityLogger",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new APIActivityLogger(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"renderFrameObserverNatives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new RenderFrameObserverNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_system_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new FileSystemNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"app_window_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new AppWindowCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"blob_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new BlobNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"context_menus",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new ContextMenusCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"css_natives", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new CssNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"document_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new DocumentCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"guest_view_internal",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new GuestViewInternalCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"i18n", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new I18NCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"id_generator",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new IdGeneratorCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"runtime", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new RuntimeCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"display_source",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new DisplaySourceCustomBindings(context)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void Dispatcher::RegisterNativeHandlers(ModuleSystem* module_system,
ScriptContext* context,
Dispatcher* dispatcher,
RequestSender* request_sender,
V8SchemaRegistry* v8_schema_registry) {
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"chrome", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new ChromeNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"logging", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new LoggingNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler("schema_registry",
v8_schema_registry->AsNativeHandler());
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"test_features",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new TestFeaturesNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"test_native_handler",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new TestNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"user_gestures",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new UserGesturesNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"utils", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new UtilsNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"v8_context",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new V8ContextNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"event_natives", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new EventBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"messaging_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(MessagingBindings::Get(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"apiDefinitions",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new ApiDefinitionsNatives(dispatcher, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"sendRequest",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new SendRequestNatives(request_sender, context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"setIcon",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new SetIconNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"activityLogger",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new APIActivityLogger(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"renderFrameObserverNatives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new RenderFrameObserverNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"file_system_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new FileSystemNatives(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"app_window_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new AppWindowCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"blob_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new BlobNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"context_menus",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new ContextMenusCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"css_natives", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new CssNativeHandler(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"document_natives",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new DocumentCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"guest_view_internal",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(
new GuestViewInternalCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"id_generator",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new IdGeneratorCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"runtime", scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new RuntimeCustomBindings(context)));
module_system->RegisterNativeHandler(
"display_source",
scoped_ptr<NativeHandler>(new DisplaySourceCustomBindings(context)));
}
| 172,247 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftFlacEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalGetParameter(index=0x%x)", index);
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioFlac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *flacParams = (OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *)params;
flacParams->nCompressionLevel = mCompressionLevel;
flacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
flacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftFlacEncoder::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
ALOGV("SoftFlacEncoder::internalGetParameter(index=0x%x)", index);
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioFlac:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *flacParams = (OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_FLACTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(flacParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
flacParams->nCompressionLevel = mCompressionLevel;
flacParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
flacParams->nSampleRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,203 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (session->restricted() && !IsFrameHostAllowedForRestrictedSessions())
return false;
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kVizDisplayCompositor) &&
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kUseVideoCaptureApiForDevToolsSnapshots)) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
}
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not create target handler for restricted sessions
Bug: 805224
Change-Id: I08528e44e79d0a097cfe72ab4949dda538efd098
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/988695
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547496}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::AttachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (session->restricted() && !IsFrameHostAllowedForRestrictedSessions())
return false;
session->SetRenderer(frame_host_ ? frame_host_->GetProcess()->GetID()
: ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID,
frame_host_);
protocol::EmulationHandler* emulation_handler =
new protocol::EmulationHandler();
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::BrowserHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::DOMHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(emulation_handler));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InputHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::InspectorHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::IOHandler(
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::MemoryHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::NetworkHandler(GetId())));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SchemaHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::ServiceWorkerHandler()));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::StorageHandler()));
if (!session->restricted()) {
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(
new protocol::TargetHandler(false /* browser_only */)));
}
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::TracingHandler(
protocol::TracingHandler::Renderer,
frame_tree_node_ ? frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id() : 0,
GetIOContext())));
session->AddHandler(
base::WrapUnique(new protocol::PageHandler(emulation_handler)));
session->AddHandler(base::WrapUnique(new protocol::SecurityHandler()));
if (EnsureAgent())
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
if (sessions().size() == 1) {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kVizDisplayCompositor) &&
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(
features::kUseVideoCaptureApiForDevToolsSnapshots)) {
frame_trace_recorder_.reset(new DevToolsFrameTraceRecorder());
}
GrantPolicy();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
GetWakeLock()->RequestWakeLock();
#endif
}
return true;
}
| 173,235 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::fillBuffer(OMX::buffer_id buffer, int fenceFd) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer);
header->nFilledLen = 0;
header->nOffset = 0;
header->nFlags = 0;
status_t res = storeFenceInMeta_l(header, fenceFd, kPortIndexOutput);
if (res != OK) {
CLOG_ERROR(fillBuffer::storeFenceInMeta, res, EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd));
return res;
}
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.add(header);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(fillBuffer, WITH_STATS(EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd)));
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_FillThisBuffer(mHandle, header);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(fillBuffer, err, EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd));
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.remove(header);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::fillBuffer(OMX::buffer_id buffer, int fenceFd) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header = findBufferHeader(buffer, kPortIndexOutput);
if (header == NULL) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
header->nFilledLen = 0;
header->nOffset = 0;
header->nFlags = 0;
status_t res = storeFenceInMeta_l(header, fenceFd, kPortIndexOutput);
if (res != OK) {
CLOG_ERROR(fillBuffer::storeFenceInMeta, res, EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd));
return res;
}
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.add(header);
CLOG_BUMPED_BUFFER(fillBuffer, WITH_STATS(EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd)));
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_FillThisBuffer(mHandle, header);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(fillBuffer, err, EMPTY_BUFFER(buffer, header, fenceFd));
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDebugLock);
mOutputBuffersWithCodec.remove(header);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
| 173,527 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void fdct8x8_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fdct8x8_c(in, out, stride);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void fdct8x8_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
const int kSignBiasMaxDiff255 = 1500;
const int kSignBiasMaxDiff15 = 10000;
typedef void (*FdctFunc)(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride);
typedef void (*IdctFunc)(const tran_low_t *in, uint8_t *out, int stride);
typedef void (*FhtFunc)(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride,
int tx_type);
typedef void (*IhtFunc)(const tran_low_t *in, uint8_t *out, int stride,
int tx_type);
typedef std::tr1::tuple<FdctFunc, IdctFunc, int, vpx_bit_depth_t> Dct8x8Param;
typedef std::tr1::tuple<FhtFunc, IhtFunc, int, vpx_bit_depth_t> Ht8x8Param;
typedef std::tr1::tuple<IdctFunc, IdctFunc, int, vpx_bit_depth_t> Idct8x8Param;
void reference_8x8_dct_1d(const double in[8], double out[8], int stride) {
const double kInvSqrt2 = 0.707106781186547524400844362104;
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
out[k] = 0.0;
for (int n = 0; n < 8; n++)
out[k] += in[n] * cos(kPi * (2 * n + 1) * k / 16.0);
if (k == 0)
out[k] = out[k] * kInvSqrt2;
}
}
| 174,564 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: next_line(struct archive_read *a,
const char **b, ssize_t *avail, ssize_t *ravail, ssize_t *nl)
{
ssize_t len;
int quit;
quit = 0;
if (*avail == 0) {
*nl = 0;
len = 0;
} else
len = get_line_size(*b, *avail, nl);
/*
* Read bytes more while it does not reach the end of line.
*/
while (*nl == 0 && len == *avail && !quit) {
ssize_t diff = *ravail - *avail;
size_t nbytes_req = (*ravail+1023) & ~1023U;
ssize_t tested;
/* Increase reading bytes if it is not enough to at least
* new two lines. */
if (nbytes_req < (size_t)*ravail + 160)
nbytes_req <<= 1;
*b = __archive_read_ahead(a, nbytes_req, avail);
if (*b == NULL) {
if (*ravail >= *avail)
return (0);
/* Reading bytes reaches the end of file. */
*b = __archive_read_ahead(a, *avail, avail);
quit = 1;
}
*ravail = *avail;
*b += diff;
*avail -= diff;
tested = len;/* Skip some bytes we already determinated. */
len = get_line_size(*b, *avail, nl);
if (len >= 0)
len += tested;
}
return (len);
}
Commit Message: Issue 747 (and others?): Avoid OOB read when parsing multiple long lines
The mtree bidder needs to look several lines ahead
in the input. It does this by extending the read-ahead
and parsing subsequent lines from the same growing buffer.
A bookkeeping error when extending the read-ahead would
sometimes lead it to significantly over-count the
size of the line being read.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | next_line(struct archive_read *a,
const char **b, ssize_t *avail, ssize_t *ravail, ssize_t *nl)
{
ssize_t len;
int quit;
quit = 0;
if (*avail == 0) {
*nl = 0;
len = 0;
} else
len = get_line_size(*b, *avail, nl);
/*
* Read bytes more while it does not reach the end of line.
*/
while (*nl == 0 && len == *avail && !quit) {
ssize_t diff = *ravail - *avail;
size_t nbytes_req = (*ravail+1023) & ~1023U;
ssize_t tested;
/* Increase reading bytes if it is not enough to at least
* new two lines. */
if (nbytes_req < (size_t)*ravail + 160)
nbytes_req <<= 1;
*b = __archive_read_ahead(a, nbytes_req, avail);
if (*b == NULL) {
if (*ravail >= *avail)
return (0);
/* Reading bytes reaches the end of file. */
*b = __archive_read_ahead(a, *avail, avail);
quit = 1;
}
*ravail = *avail;
*b += diff;
*avail -= diff;
tested = len;/* Skip some bytes we already determinated. */
len = get_line_size(*b + len, *avail - len, nl);
if (len >= 0)
len += tested;
}
return (len);
}
| 168,765 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char* dexOptGenerateCacheFileName(const char* fileName, const char* subFileName)
{
char nameBuf[512];
char absoluteFile[sizeof(nameBuf)];
const size_t kBufLen = sizeof(nameBuf) - 1;
const char* dataRoot;
char* cp;
/*
* Get the absolute path of the Jar or DEX file.
*/
absoluteFile[0] = '\0';
if (fileName[0] != '/') {
/*
* Generate the absolute path. This doesn't do everything it
* should, e.g. if filename is "./out/whatever" it doesn't crunch
* the leading "./" out, but it'll do.
*/
if (getcwd(absoluteFile, kBufLen) == NULL) {
ALOGE("Can't get CWD while opening jar file");
return NULL;
}
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen);
}
strncat(absoluteFile, fileName, kBufLen);
/*
* Append the name of the Jar file entry, if any. This is not currently
* required, but will be if we start putting more than one DEX file
* in a Jar.
*/
if (subFileName != NULL) {
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen);
strncat(absoluteFile, subFileName, kBufLen);
}
/* Turn the path into a flat filename by replacing
* any slashes after the first one with '@' characters.
*/
cp = absoluteFile + 1;
while (*cp != '\0') {
if (*cp == '/') {
*cp = '@';
}
cp++;
}
/* Build the name of the cache directory.
*/
dataRoot = getenv("ANDROID_DATA");
if (dataRoot == NULL)
dataRoot = "/data";
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName, kInstructionSet);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
/* Tack on the file name for the actual cache file path.
*/
strncat(nameBuf, absoluteFile, kBufLen);
ALOGV("Cache file for '%s' '%s' is '%s'", fileName, subFileName, nameBuf);
return strdup(nameBuf);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential buffer overrun.
BUG=27840771
Change-Id: I240f188b2e8f4b45d90138cfb3b14869cf506452
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char* dexOptGenerateCacheFileName(const char* fileName, const char* subFileName)
{
char nameBuf[512];
char absoluteFile[sizeof(nameBuf)];
const size_t kBufLen = sizeof(nameBuf) - 1;
const char* dataRoot;
char* cp;
/*
* Get the absolute path of the Jar or DEX file.
*/
absoluteFile[0] = '\0';
if (fileName[0] != '/') {
/*
* Generate the absolute path. This doesn't do everything it
* should, e.g. if filename is "./out/whatever" it doesn't crunch
* the leading "./" out, but it'll do.
*/
if (getcwd(absoluteFile, kBufLen) == NULL) {
ALOGE("Can't get CWD while opening jar file");
return NULL;
}
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen - strlen(absoluteFile));
}
strncat(absoluteFile, fileName, kBufLen - strlen(absoluteFile));
/*
* Append the name of the Jar file entry, if any. This is not currently
* required, but will be if we start putting more than one DEX file
* in a Jar.
*/
if (subFileName != NULL) {
strncat(absoluteFile, "/", kBufLen - strlen(absoluteFile));
strncat(absoluteFile, subFileName, kBufLen - strlen(absoluteFile));
}
/* Turn the path into a flat filename by replacing
* any slashes after the first one with '@' characters.
*/
cp = absoluteFile + 1;
while (*cp != '\0') {
if (*cp == '/') {
*cp = '@';
}
cp++;
}
/* Build the name of the cache directory.
*/
dataRoot = getenv("ANDROID_DATA");
if (dataRoot == NULL)
dataRoot = "/data";
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
snprintf(nameBuf, kBufLen, "%s/%s/%s", dataRoot, kCacheDirectoryName, kInstructionSet);
if (strcmp(dataRoot, "/data") != 0) {
int result = dexOptMkdir(nameBuf, 0700);
if (result != 0 && errno != EEXIST) {
ALOGE("Failed to create dalvik-cache directory %s: %s", nameBuf, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
}
/* Tack on the file name for the actual cache file path.
*/
strncat(nameBuf, absoluteFile, kBufLen - strlen(nameBuf));
ALOGV("Cache file for '%s' '%s' is '%s'", fileName, subFileName, nameBuf);
return strdup(nameBuf);
}
| 173,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ManifestChangeNotifier::DidChangeManifest() {
if (weak_factory_.HasWeakPtrs())
return;
if (!render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->IsLoading()) {
render_frame()
->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnspecedLoading)
->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ManifestChangeNotifier::ReportManifestChange,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return;
}
ReportManifestChange();
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID: | void ManifestChangeNotifier::DidChangeManifest() {
// Manifests are not considered when the current page has a unique origin.
if (!ManifestManager::CanFetchManifest(render_frame()))
return;
if (weak_factory_.HasWeakPtrs())
return;
if (!render_frame()->GetWebFrame()->IsLoading()) {
render_frame()
->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kUnspecedLoading)
->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ManifestChangeNotifier::ReportManifestChange,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
return;
}
ReportManifestChange();
}
| 172,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_GetObjectItem( cJSON *object, const char *string )
{
cJSON *c = object->child;
while ( c && cJSON_strcasecmp( c->string, string ) )
c = c->next;
return c;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_GetObjectItem( cJSON *object, const char *string )
| 167,289 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetMountLibrary(
MountLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->mount_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetMountLibrary(
| 170,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::Check(base::StringPiece16 label) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result = uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()),
NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII ||
(result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)))
return true;
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
"[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}\\p{scx=hani}]"
"[\\u30ce\\u30f3\\u30bd\\u30be]"
"[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}\\p{scx=hani}]|"
"[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}]\\u30fc|"
"\\u30fc[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}]|"
"^[\\p{scx=kana}]+[\\u3078-\\u307a][\\p{scx=kana}]+$|"
"^[\\p{scx=hira}]+[\\u30d8-\\u30da][\\p{scx=hira}]+$|"
"[a-z]\\u30fb|\\u30fb[a-z]|"
"^[\\u0585\\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\\u0585\\u0581]+$|"
"[a-z][\\u0585\\u0581]+[a-z]|"
"^[og]+[\\p{scx=armn}]|[\\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|"
"[\\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\\p{scx=armn}]", -1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool IDNSpoofChecker::Check(base::StringPiece16 label) {
bool IDNSpoofChecker::Check(base::StringPiece16 label, bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result = uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()),
NULL, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
// extra check unless it contains Kana letter exceptions or it's made entirely
// of Cyrillic letters that look like Latin letters. Note that the following
// combinations of scripts are treated as a 'logical' single script.
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII) return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
// Check Cyrillic confusable only for ASCII TLDs.
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
if (!tls_index.initialized())
tls_index.Initialize(&OnThreadTermination);
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(tls_index.Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
dangerous_pattern = new icu::RegexMatcher(
icu::UnicodeString(
"[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}\\p{scx=hani}]"
"[\\u30ce\\u30f3\\u30bd\\u30be]"
"[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}\\p{scx=hani}]|"
"[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}]\\u30fc|"
"\\u30fc[^\\p{scx=kana}\\p{scx=hira}]|"
"^[\\p{scx=kana}]+[\\u3078-\\u307a][\\p{scx=kana}]+$|"
"^[\\p{scx=hira}]+[\\u30d8-\\u30da][\\p{scx=hira}]+$|"
"[a-z]\\u30fb|\\u30fb[a-z]|"
"^[\\u0585\\u0581]+[a-z]|[a-z][\\u0585\\u0581]+$|"
"[a-z][\\u0585\\u0581]+[a-z]|"
"^[og]+[\\p{scx=armn}]|[\\p{scx=armn}][og]+$|"
"[\\p{scx=armn}][og]+[\\p{scx=armn}]", -1, US_INV),
0, status);
tls_index.Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
| 172,388 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void smp_proc_master_id(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
tBTM_LE_PENC_KEYS le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, true);
STREAM_TO_UINT16(le_key.ediv, p);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(le_key.rand, p, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
/* store the encryption keys from peer device */
memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PENC,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE*)&le_key, true);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Add packet length check in smp_proc_master_id
Bug: 111937027
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1144c9879e84fa79d68ad9d5fece4f58e2a3b075
(cherry picked from commit c8294662d07a98e9b8b1cab1ab681ec0805ce4e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void smp_proc_master_id(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t* p = p_data->p_data;
tBTM_LE_PENC_KEYS le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len < 11) { // 1(Code) + 2(EDIV) + 8(Rand)
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111937027");
SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s: Invalid command length: %d, should be at least 11",
__func__, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len);
return;
}
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ENC, true);
STREAM_TO_UINT16(le_key.ediv, p);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(le_key.rand, p, BT_OCTET8_LEN);
/* store the encryption keys from peer device */
memcpy(le_key.ltk, p_cb->ltk, BT_OCTET16_LEN);
le_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level;
le_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size;
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PENC,
(tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE*)&le_key, true);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
| 174,076 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void StorageHandler::GetUsageAndQuota(
const String& origin,
std::unique_ptr<GetUsageAndQuotaCallback> callback) {
if (!process_)
return callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid()) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::Error(origin + " is not a valid URL"));
}
storage::QuotaManager* manager =
process_->GetStoragePartition()->GetQuotaManager();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&GetUsageAndQuotaOnIOThread, base::RetainedRef(manager),
origin_url, base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void StorageHandler::GetUsageAndQuota(
const String& origin,
std::unique_ptr<GetUsageAndQuotaCallback> callback) {
if (!storage_partition_)
return callback->sendFailure(Response::InternalError());
GURL origin_url(origin);
if (!origin_url.is_valid()) {
return callback->sendFailure(
Response::Error(origin + " is not a valid URL"));
}
storage::QuotaManager* manager = storage_partition_->GetQuotaManager();
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&GetUsageAndQuotaOnIOThread, base::RetainedRef(manager),
origin_url, base::Passed(std::move(callback))));
}
| 172,773 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: String AXNodeObject::textFromDescendants(AXObjectSet& visited,
bool recursive) const {
if (!canHaveChildren() && recursive)
return String();
StringBuilder accumulatedText;
AXObject* previous = nullptr;
AXObjectVector children;
HeapVector<Member<AXObject>> ownedChildren;
computeAriaOwnsChildren(ownedChildren);
for (AXObject* obj = rawFirstChild(); obj; obj = obj->rawNextSibling()) {
if (!axObjectCache().isAriaOwned(obj))
children.push_back(obj);
}
for (const auto& ownedChild : ownedChildren)
children.push_back(ownedChild);
for (AXObject* child : children) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(child->getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "true"))
continue;
if (previous && accumulatedText.length() &&
!isHTMLSpace(accumulatedText[accumulatedText.length() - 1])) {
if (!isInSameNonInlineBlockFlow(child->getLayoutObject(),
previous->getLayoutObject()))
accumulatedText.append(' ');
}
String result;
if (child->isPresentational())
result = child->textFromDescendants(visited, true);
else
result = recursiveTextAlternative(*child, false, visited);
accumulatedText.append(result);
previous = child;
}
return accumulatedText.toString();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | String AXNodeObject::textFromDescendants(AXObjectSet& visited,
bool recursive) const {
if (!canHaveChildren() && recursive)
return String();
StringBuilder accumulatedText;
AXObject* previous = nullptr;
AXObjectVector children;
HeapVector<Member<AXObject>> ownedChildren;
computeAriaOwnsChildren(ownedChildren);
for (AXObject* obj = rawFirstChild(); obj; obj = obj->rawNextSibling()) {
if (!axObjectCache().isAriaOwned(obj))
children.push_back(obj);
}
for (const auto& ownedChild : ownedChildren)
children.push_back(ownedChild);
for (AXObject* child : children) {
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(child->getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "true"))
continue;
if (previous && accumulatedText.length() &&
!isHTMLSpace(accumulatedText[accumulatedText.length() - 1])) {
if (!isInSameNonInlineBlockFlow(child->getLayoutObject(),
previous->getLayoutObject()))
accumulatedText.append(' ');
}
String result;
if (child->isPresentational())
result = child->textFromDescendants(visited, true);
else
result = recursiveTextAlternative(*child, false, visited);
accumulatedText.append(result);
previous = child;
}
return accumulatedText.toString();
}
| 171,922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t driver_override_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", pdev->driver_override);
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static ssize_t driver_override_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct platform_device *pdev = to_platform_device(dev);
ssize_t len;
device_lock(dev);
len = sprintf(buf, "%s\n", pdev->driver_override);
device_unlock(dev);
return len;
}
| 167,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXARIAGridCell::isAriaRowHeader() const {
const AtomicString& role = getAttribute(HTMLNames::roleAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(role, "rowheader");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXARIAGridCell::isAriaRowHeader() const {
const AtomicString& role = getAttribute(HTMLNames::roleAttr);
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(role, "rowheader");
}
| 171,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void v9fs_walk(void *opaque)
{
int name_idx;
V9fsFidState *newfidp = NULL;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddw", &fid, &newfid, &nwnames);
if (err < 0) {
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
return ;
}
V9fsFidState *newfidp = NULL;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddw", &fid, &newfid, &nwnames);
if (err < 0) {
for (i = 0; i < nwnames; i++) {
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "s", &wnames[i]);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
if (name_is_illegal(wnames[i].data)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
offset += err;
}
} else if (nwnames > P9_MAXWELEM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
v9fs_path_init(&dpath);
v9fs_path_init(&path);
/*
* Both dpath and path initially poin to fidp.
* Needed to handle request with nwnames == 0
*/
v9fs_path_copy(&dpath, &fidp->path);
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | static void v9fs_walk(void *opaque)
{
int name_idx;
V9fsFidState *newfidp = NULL;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddw", &fid, &newfid, &nwnames);
if (err < 0) {
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
return ;
}
V9fsFidState *newfidp = NULL;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
V9fsQID qid;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "ddw", &fid, &newfid, &nwnames);
if (err < 0) {
for (i = 0; i < nwnames; i++) {
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "s", &wnames[i]);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
if (name_is_illegal(wnames[i].data)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
offset += err;
}
} else if (nwnames > P9_MAXWELEM) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
v9fs_path_init(&dpath);
v9fs_path_init(&path);
/*
* Both dpath and path initially poin to fidp.
* Needed to handle request with nwnames == 0
*/
v9fs_path_copy(&dpath, &fidp->path);
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
| 164,939 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Edition::ParseAtom(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long pos,
long long size)
{
if (!ExpandAtomsArray())
return -1;
Atom& a = m_atoms[m_atoms_count++];
a.Init();
return a.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Chapters::Edition::ParseAtom(
SegmentInfo::~SegmentInfo() {
delete[] m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8;
m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8 = NULL;
delete[] m_pWritingAppAsUTF8;
m_pWritingAppAsUTF8 = NULL;
delete[] m_pTitleAsUTF8;
m_pTitleAsUTF8 = NULL;
}
| 174,415 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t BnSoundTriggerHwService::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case LIST_MODULES: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(ISoundTriggerHwService, data, reply);
unsigned int numModulesReq = data.readInt32();
unsigned int numModules = numModulesReq;
struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor *modules =
(struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor *)calloc(numModulesReq,
sizeof(struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor));
status_t status = listModules(modules, &numModules);
reply->writeInt32(status);
reply->writeInt32(numModules);
ALOGV("LIST_MODULES status %d got numModules %d", status, numModules);
if (status == NO_ERROR) {
if (numModulesReq > numModules) {
numModulesReq = numModules;
}
reply->write(modules,
numModulesReq * sizeof(struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor));
}
free(modules);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(ISoundTriggerHwService, data, reply);
sound_trigger_module_handle_t handle;
data.read(&handle, sizeof(sound_trigger_module_handle_t));
sp<ISoundTriggerClient> client =
interface_cast<ISoundTriggerClient>(data.readStrongBinder());
sp<ISoundTrigger> module;
status_t status = attach(handle, client, module);
reply->writeInt32(status);
if (module != 0) {
reply->writeInt32(1);
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(module));
} else {
reply->writeInt32(0);
}
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_CAPTURE_STATE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(ISoundTriggerHwService, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(setCaptureState((bool)data.readInt32()));
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Commit Message: Check memory allocation in ISoundTriggerHwService
Add memory allocation check in ISoundTriggerHwService::listModules().
Bug: 19385640.
Change-Id: Iaf74b6f154c3437e1bfc9da78b773d64b16a7604
CWE ID: CWE-190 | status_t BnSoundTriggerHwService::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags)
{
switch(code) {
case LIST_MODULES: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(ISoundTriggerHwService, data, reply);
unsigned int numModulesReq = data.readInt32();
if (numModulesReq > MAX_ITEMS_PER_LIST) {
numModulesReq = MAX_ITEMS_PER_LIST;
}
unsigned int numModules = numModulesReq;
struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor *modules =
(struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor *)calloc(numModulesReq,
sizeof(struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor));
if (modules == NULL) {
reply->writeInt32(NO_MEMORY);
reply->writeInt32(0);
return NO_ERROR;
}
status_t status = listModules(modules, &numModules);
reply->writeInt32(status);
reply->writeInt32(numModules);
ALOGV("LIST_MODULES status %d got numModules %d", status, numModules);
if (status == NO_ERROR) {
if (numModulesReq > numModules) {
numModulesReq = numModules;
}
reply->write(modules,
numModulesReq * sizeof(struct sound_trigger_module_descriptor));
}
free(modules);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ATTACH: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(ISoundTriggerHwService, data, reply);
sound_trigger_module_handle_t handle;
data.read(&handle, sizeof(sound_trigger_module_handle_t));
sp<ISoundTriggerClient> client =
interface_cast<ISoundTriggerClient>(data.readStrongBinder());
sp<ISoundTrigger> module;
status_t status = attach(handle, client, module);
reply->writeInt32(status);
if (module != 0) {
reply->writeInt32(1);
reply->writeStrongBinder(IInterface::asBinder(module));
} else {
reply->writeInt32(0);
}
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
case SET_CAPTURE_STATE: {
CHECK_INTERFACE(ISoundTriggerHwService, data, reply);
reply->writeInt32(setCaptureState((bool)data.readInt32()));
return NO_ERROR;
} break;
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
| 174,072 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CopyFromOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
sp<ABuffer> codec = getBuffer(header, false /* backup */, true /* limit */);
memcpy((OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset, codec->data(), codec->size());
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void CopyFromOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mCopyFromOmx) {
return;
}
sp<ABuffer> codec = getBuffer(header, false /* backup */, true /* limit */);
memcpy((OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset, codec->data(), codec->size());
}
| 174,127 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_user_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while(impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,8);
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void impeg2d_dec_user_data(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UWORD32 u4_start_code;
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while(u4_start_code == USER_DATA_START_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
while((impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN) != START_CODE_PREFIX) &&
(ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset))
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,8);
}
u4_start_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
}
}
| 173,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LoadingStatsCollector::RecordPreconnectStats(
std::unique_ptr<PreconnectStats> stats) {
const GURL& main_frame_url = stats->url;
auto it = preconnect_stats_.find(main_frame_url);
if (it != preconnect_stats_.end()) {
ReportPreconnectAccuracy(*it->second,
std::map<GURL, OriginRequestSummary>());
preconnect_stats_.erase(it);
}
preconnect_stats_.emplace(main_frame_url, std::move(stats));
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void LoadingStatsCollector::RecordPreconnectStats(
std::unique_ptr<PreconnectStats> stats) {
const GURL& main_frame_url = stats->url;
auto it = preconnect_stats_.find(main_frame_url);
if (it != preconnect_stats_.end()) {
ReportPreconnectAccuracy(*it->second, {});
preconnect_stats_.erase(it);
}
preconnect_stats_.emplace(main_frame_url, std::move(stats));
}
| 172,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr)
{
console_verbose();
pr_crit("Bad mode in %s handler detected, code 0x%08x\n",
handler[reason], esr);
die("Oops - bad mode", regs, 0);
local_irq_disable();
panic("bad mode");
}
Commit Message: arm64: don't kill the kernel on a bad esr from el0
Rather than completely killing the kernel if we receive an esr value we
can't deal with in the el0 handlers, send the process a SIGILL and log
the esr value in the hope that we can debug it. If we receive a bad esr
from el1, we'll die() as before.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: | asmlinkage void bad_mode(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr)
{
siginfo_t info;
void __user *pc = (void __user *)instruction_pointer(regs);
console_verbose();
pr_crit("Bad mode in %s handler detected, code 0x%08x\n",
handler[reason], esr);
__show_regs(regs);
info.si_signo = SIGILL;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = ILL_ILLOPC;
info.si_addr = pc;
arm64_notify_die("Oops - bad mode", regs, &info, 0);
}
| 166,012 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void llc_sap_rcv(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk)
{
struct llc_sap_state_ev *ev = llc_sap_ev(skb);
ev->type = LLC_SAP_EV_TYPE_PDU;
ev->reason = 0;
skb->sk = sk;
llc_sap_state_process(sap, skb);
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static void llc_sap_rcv(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sock *sk)
{
struct llc_sap_state_ev *ev = llc_sap_ev(skb);
ev->type = LLC_SAP_EV_TYPE_PDU;
ev->reason = 0;
skb_orphan(skb);
sock_hold(sk);
skb->sk = sk;
skb->destructor = sock_efree;
llc_sap_state_process(sap, skb);
}
| 168,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cdf_file_summary_info(struct magic_set *ms, const cdf_header_t *h,
const cdf_stream_t *sst, const uint64_t clsid[2])
{
cdf_summary_info_header_t si;
cdf_property_info_t *info;
size_t count;
int m;
if (cdf_unpack_summary_info(sst, h, &si, &info, &count) == -1)
return -1;
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
const char *str;
if (file_printf(ms, "Composite Document File V2 Document")
== -1)
return -1;
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s Endian",
si.si_byte_order == 0xfffe ? "Little" : "Big") == -1)
return -2;
switch (si.si_os) {
case 2:
if (file_printf(ms, ", Os: Windows, Version %d.%d",
si.si_os_version & 0xff,
(uint32_t)si.si_os_version >> 8) == -1)
return -2;
break;
case 1:
if (file_printf(ms, ", Os: MacOS, Version %d.%d",
(uint32_t)si.si_os_version >> 8,
si.si_os_version & 0xff) == -1)
return -2;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", Os %d, Version: %d.%d", si.si_os,
si.si_os_version & 0xff,
(uint32_t)si.si_os_version >> 8) == -1)
return -2;
break;
}
str = cdf_clsid_to_mime(clsid, clsid2desc);
if (str)
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s", str) == -1)
return -2;
}
m = cdf_file_property_info(ms, info, count, clsid);
free(info);
return m == -1 ? -2 : m;
}
Commit Message: Apply patches from file-CVE-2012-1571.patch
From Francisco Alonso Espejo:
file < 5.18/git version can be made to crash when checking some
corrupt CDF files (Using an invalid cdf_read_short_sector size)
The problem I found here, is that in most situations (if
h_short_sec_size_p2 > 8) because the blocksize is 512 and normal
values are 06 which means reading 64 bytes.As long as the check
for the block size copy is not checked properly (there's an assert
that makes wrong/invalid assumptions)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cdf_file_summary_info(struct magic_set *ms, const cdf_header_t *h,
const cdf_stream_t *sst, const cdf_directory_t *root_storage)
{
cdf_summary_info_header_t si;
cdf_property_info_t *info;
size_t count;
int m;
if (cdf_unpack_summary_info(sst, h, &si, &info, &count) == -1)
return -1;
if (NOTMIME(ms)) {
const char *str;
if (file_printf(ms, "Composite Document File V2 Document")
== -1)
return -1;
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s Endian",
si.si_byte_order == 0xfffe ? "Little" : "Big") == -1)
return -2;
switch (si.si_os) {
case 2:
if (file_printf(ms, ", Os: Windows, Version %d.%d",
si.si_os_version & 0xff,
(uint32_t)si.si_os_version >> 8) == -1)
return -2;
break;
case 1:
if (file_printf(ms, ", Os: MacOS, Version %d.%d",
(uint32_t)si.si_os_version >> 8,
si.si_os_version & 0xff) == -1)
return -2;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", Os %d, Version: %d.%d", si.si_os,
si.si_os_version & 0xff,
(uint32_t)si.si_os_version >> 8) == -1)
return -2;
break;
}
if (root_storage) {
str = cdf_clsid_to_mime(root_storage->d_storage_uuid, clsid2desc);
if (str)
if (file_printf(ms, ", %s", str) == -1)
return -2;
}
}
m = cdf_file_property_info(ms, info, count, root_storage);
free(info);
return m == -1 ? -2 : m;
}
| 166,446 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: base::string16 GetApplicationNameForProtocol(const GURL& url) {
base::string16 application_name;
if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8) {
application_name = GetAppForProtocolUsingAssocQuery(url);
if (!application_name.empty())
return application_name;
}
return GetAppForProtocolUsingRegistry(url);
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | base::string16 GetApplicationNameForProtocol(const GURL& url) {
if (base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8) {
base::string16 application_name = GetAppForProtocolUsingAssocQuery(url);
if (!application_name.empty())
return application_name;
}
return GetAppForProtocolUsingRegistry(url);
}
| 172,637 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, valid)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] != '\0');
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, valid)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name[0] != '\0');
}
| 167,030 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SProcXFixesChangeSaveSet(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesChangeSaveSetReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->window);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SProcXFixesChangeSaveSet(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesChangeSaveSetReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesChangeSaveSetReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->window);
}
| 165,443 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t nfs4_proc_get_acl(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
int ret;
if (!nfs4_server_supports_acls(server))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = nfs_revalidate_inode(server, inode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_ACL)
nfs_zap_acl_cache(inode);
ret = nfs4_read_cached_acl(inode, buf, buflen);
if (ret != -ENOENT)
return ret;
return nfs4_get_acl_uncached(inode, buf, buflen);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static ssize_t nfs4_proc_get_acl(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
int ret;
if (!nfs4_server_supports_acls(server))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = nfs_revalidate_inode(server, inode);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (NFS_I(inode)->cache_validity & NFS_INO_INVALID_ACL)
nfs_zap_acl_cache(inode);
ret = nfs4_read_cached_acl(inode, buf, buflen);
if (ret != -ENOENT)
/* -ENOENT is returned if there is no ACL or if there is an ACL
* but no cached acl data, just the acl length */
return ret;
return nfs4_get_acl_uncached(inode, buf, buflen);
}
| 165,718 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: main(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngfix does not work without read support\n");
return 77;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | main(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "pngfix does not work without read deinterlace support\n");
return 77;
}
| 173,735 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltNumberFormatAlpha(xmlBufferPtr buffer,
double number,
int is_upper)
{
char temp_string[sizeof(double) * CHAR_BIT * sizeof(xmlChar) + 1];
char *pointer;
int i;
char *alpha_list;
double alpha_size = (double)(sizeof(alpha_upper_list) - 1);
/* Build buffer from back */
pointer = &temp_string[sizeof(temp_string)];
*(--pointer) = 0;
alpha_list = (is_upper) ? alpha_upper_list : alpha_lower_list;
for (i = 1; i < (int)sizeof(temp_string); i++) {
number--;
*(--pointer) = alpha_list[((int)fmod(number, alpha_size))];
number /= alpha_size;
if (fabs(number) < 1.0)
break; /* for */
}
xmlBufferCCat(buffer, pointer);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltNumberFormatAlpha(xmlBufferPtr buffer,
double number,
int is_upper)
{
char temp_string[sizeof(double) * CHAR_BIT * sizeof(xmlChar) + 1];
char *pointer;
int i;
char *alpha_list;
double alpha_size = (double)(sizeof(alpha_upper_list) - 1);
if (number < 1.0)
return;
/* Build buffer from back */
pointer = &temp_string[sizeof(temp_string)];
*(--pointer) = 0;
alpha_list = (is_upper) ? alpha_upper_list : alpha_lower_list;
for (i = 1; i < (int)sizeof(temp_string); i++) {
number--;
*(--pointer) = alpha_list[((int)fmod(number, alpha_size))];
number /= alpha_size;
if (number < 1.0)
break; /* for */
}
xmlBufferCCat(buffer, pointer);
}
| 173,307 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: InputMethodDescriptors* CrosMock::CreateInputMethodDescriptors() {
InputMethodDescriptors* descriptors = new InputMethodDescriptors;
descriptors->push_back(
input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
return descriptors;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | InputMethodDescriptors* CrosMock::CreateInputMethodDescriptors() {
input_method::InputMethodDescriptors*
CrosMock::CreateInputMethodDescriptors() {
input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* descriptors =
new input_method::InputMethodDescriptors;
descriptors->push_back(
input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
return descriptors;
}
| 170,475 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: size_t compile_tree(struct filter_op **fop)
{
int i = 1;
struct filter_op *array = NULL;
struct unfold_elm *ue;
BUG_IF(tree_root == NULL);
fprintf(stdout, " Unfolding the meta-tree ");
fflush(stdout);
/* start the recursion on the tree */
unfold_blk(&tree_root);
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
/* substitute the virtual labels with real offsets */
labels_to_offsets();
/* convert the tailq into an array */
TAILQ_FOREACH(ue, &unfolded_tree, next) {
/* label == 0 means a real instruction */
if (ue->label == 0) {
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
memcpy(&array[i - 1], &ue->fop, sizeof(struct filter_op));
i++;
}
}
/* always append the exit function to a script */
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
array[i - 1].opcode = FOP_EXIT;
/* return the pointer to the array */
*fop = array;
return (i);
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | size_t compile_tree(struct filter_op **fop)
{
int i = 1;
struct filter_op *array = NULL;
struct unfold_elm *ue;
// invalid file
if (tree_root == NULL)
return 0;
fprintf(stdout, " Unfolding the meta-tree ");
fflush(stdout);
/* start the recursion on the tree */
unfold_blk(&tree_root);
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
/* substitute the virtual labels with real offsets */
labels_to_offsets();
/* convert the tailq into an array */
TAILQ_FOREACH(ue, &unfolded_tree, next) {
/* label == 0 means a real instruction */
if (ue->label == 0) {
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
memcpy(&array[i - 1], &ue->fop, sizeof(struct filter_op));
i++;
}
}
/* always append the exit function to a script */
SAFE_REALLOC(array, i * sizeof(struct filter_op));
array[i - 1].opcode = FOP_EXIT;
/* return the pointer to the array */
*fop = array;
return (i);
}
| 168,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ixheaacd_complex_anal_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer) {
WORD32 idx;
WORD32 anal_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
WORD32 N = (10 * anal_size);
for (idx = 0; idx < (ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins >> 1); idx++) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l;
FLOAT32 window_output[640];
FLOAT32 u[128], u_in[256], u_out[256];
FLOAT32 accu_r, accu_i;
const FLOAT32 *inp_signal;
FLOAT32 *anal_buf;
FLOAT32 *analy_cos_sin_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff;
FLOAT32 *x = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf;
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1], 0,
TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM * sizeof(FLOAT32));
inp_signal = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
idx * 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size + 1;
anal_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1]
[4 * ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start];
for (i = N - 1; i >= anal_size; i--) {
x[i] = x[i - anal_size];
}
for (i = anal_size - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
x[i] = inp_signal[anal_size - 1 - i];
}
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
window_output[i] = x[i] * interp_window_coeff[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < 2 * anal_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + window_output[i + j * 2 * anal_size];
}
u[i] = accu_r;
}
if (anal_size == 40) {
for (i = 1; i < anal_size; i++) {
FLOAT32 temp1 = u[i] + u[2 * anal_size - i];
FLOAT32 temp2 = u[i] - u[2 * anal_size - i];
u[i] = temp1;
u[2 * anal_size - i] = temp2;
}
for (k = 0; k < anal_size; k++) {
accu_r = u[anal_size];
if (k & 1)
accu_i = u[0];
else
accu_i = -u[0];
for (l = 1; l < anal_size; l++) {
accu_r = accu_r + u[0 + l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 0];
accu_i = accu_i + u[2 * anal_size - l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 1];
}
analy_cos_sin_tab += (2 * anal_size);
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_i;
}
} else {
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = u_in;
FLOAT32 *ptr_v = u_out;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size * 2; k++) {
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
}
if (ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft != NULL)
(*ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft)(u_in, u_out, anal_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size / 2; k++) {
*(anal_buf + 1) = -*ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = *ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
*(anal_buf + 1) = *ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = -*ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | WORD32 ixheaacd_complex_anal_filt(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer) {
WORD32 idx;
WORD32 anal_size = 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size;
WORD32 N = (10 * anal_size);
for (idx = 0; idx < (ptr_hbe_txposer->no_bins >> 1); idx++) {
WORD32 i, j, k, l;
FLOAT32 window_output[640];
FLOAT32 u[128], u_in[256], u_out[256];
FLOAT32 accu_r, accu_i;
const FLOAT32 *inp_signal;
FLOAT32 *anal_buf;
FLOAT32 *analy_cos_sin_tab = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_cos_sin_tab;
const FLOAT32 *interp_window_coeff = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_wind_coeff;
FLOAT32 *x = ptr_hbe_txposer->analy_buf;
memset(ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1], 0,
TWICE_QMF_SYNTH_CHANNELS_NUM * sizeof(FLOAT32));
inp_signal = ptr_hbe_txposer->ptr_input_buf +
idx * 2 * ptr_hbe_txposer->synth_size + 1;
anal_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[idx + HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN - 1]
[4 * ptr_hbe_txposer->k_start];
for (i = N - 1; i >= anal_size; i--) {
x[i] = x[i - anal_size];
}
for (i = anal_size - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
x[i] = inp_signal[anal_size - 1 - i];
}
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
window_output[i] = x[i] * interp_window_coeff[i];
}
for (i = 0; i < 2 * anal_size; i++) {
accu_r = 0.0;
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++) {
accu_r = accu_r + window_output[i + j * 2 * anal_size];
}
u[i] = accu_r;
}
if (anal_size == 40) {
for (i = 1; i < anal_size; i++) {
FLOAT32 temp1 = u[i] + u[2 * anal_size - i];
FLOAT32 temp2 = u[i] - u[2 * anal_size - i];
u[i] = temp1;
u[2 * anal_size - i] = temp2;
}
for (k = 0; k < anal_size; k++) {
accu_r = u[anal_size];
if (k & 1)
accu_i = u[0];
else
accu_i = -u[0];
for (l = 1; l < anal_size; l++) {
accu_r = accu_r + u[0 + l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 0];
accu_i = accu_i + u[2 * anal_size - l] * analy_cos_sin_tab[2 * l + 1];
}
analy_cos_sin_tab += (2 * anal_size);
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_r;
*anal_buf++ = (FLOAT32)accu_i;
}
} else {
FLOAT32 *ptr_u = u_in;
FLOAT32 *ptr_v = u_out;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size * 2; k++) {
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
*ptr_u++ = ((*analy_cos_sin_tab++) * u[k]);
}
if (ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft != NULL)
(*(ptr_hbe_txposer->ixheaacd_cmplx_anal_fft))(u_in, u_out,
anal_size * 2);
else
return -1;
for (k = 0; k < anal_size / 2; k++) {
*(anal_buf + 1) = -*ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = *ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
*(anal_buf + 1) = *ptr_v++;
*anal_buf = -*ptr_v++;
anal_buf += 2;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
| 174,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int huft_build(const unsigned *b, const unsigned n,
const unsigned s, const unsigned short *d,
const unsigned char *e, huft_t **t, unsigned *m)
{
unsigned a; /* counter for codes of length k */
unsigned c[BMAX + 1]; /* bit length count table */
unsigned eob_len; /* length of end-of-block code (value 256) */
unsigned f; /* i repeats in table every f entries */
int g; /* maximum code length */
int htl; /* table level */
unsigned i; /* counter, current code */
unsigned j; /* counter */
int k; /* number of bits in current code */
unsigned *p; /* pointer into c[], b[], or v[] */
huft_t *q; /* points to current table */
huft_t r; /* table entry for structure assignment */
huft_t *u[BMAX]; /* table stack */
unsigned v[N_MAX]; /* values in order of bit length */
int ws[BMAX + 1]; /* bits decoded stack */
int w; /* bits decoded */
unsigned x[BMAX + 1]; /* bit offsets, then code stack */
int y; /* number of dummy codes added */
unsigned z; /* number of entries in current table */
/* Length of EOB code, if any */
eob_len = n > 256 ? b[256] : BMAX;
*t = NULL;
/* Generate counts for each bit length */
memset(c, 0, sizeof(c));
p = (unsigned *) b; /* cast allows us to reuse p for pointing to b */
i = n;
do {
c[*p]++; /* assume all entries <= BMAX */
} while (--i);
if (c[0] == n) { /* null input - all zero length codes */
*m = 0;
return 2;
}
/* Find minimum and maximum length, bound *m by those */
for (j = 1; (j <= BMAX) && (c[j] == 0); j++)
continue;
k = j; /* minimum code length */
for (i = BMAX; (c[i] == 0) && i; i--)
continue;
g = i; /* maximum code length */
*m = (*m < j) ? j : ((*m > i) ? i : *m);
/* Adjust last length count to fill out codes, if needed */
for (y = 1 << j; j < i; j++, y <<= 1) {
y -= c[j];
if (y < 0)
return 2; /* bad input: more codes than bits */
}
y -= c[i];
if (y < 0)
return 2;
c[i] += y;
/* Generate starting offsets into the value table for each length */
x[1] = j = 0;
p = c + 1;
xp = x + 2;
while (--i) { /* note that i == g from above */
j += *p++;
*xp++ = j;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int huft_build(const unsigned *b, const unsigned n,
const unsigned s, const unsigned short *d,
const unsigned char *e, huft_t **t, unsigned *m)
{
unsigned a; /* counter for codes of length k */
unsigned c[BMAX + 1]; /* bit length count table */
unsigned eob_len; /* length of end-of-block code (value 256) */
unsigned f; /* i repeats in table every f entries */
int g; /* maximum code length */
int htl; /* table level */
unsigned i; /* counter, current code */
unsigned j; /* counter */
int k; /* number of bits in current code */
const unsigned *p; /* pointer into c[], b[], or v[] */
huft_t *q; /* points to current table */
huft_t r; /* table entry for structure assignment */
huft_t *u[BMAX]; /* table stack */
unsigned v[N_MAX]; /* values in order of bit length */
unsigned v_end;
int ws[BMAX + 1]; /* bits decoded stack */
int w; /* bits decoded */
unsigned x[BMAX + 1]; /* bit offsets, then code stack */
int y; /* number of dummy codes added */
unsigned z; /* number of entries in current table */
/* Length of EOB code, if any */
eob_len = n > 256 ? b[256] : BMAX;
*t = NULL;
/* Generate counts for each bit length */
memset(c, 0, sizeof(c));
p = b;
i = n;
do {
c[*p]++; /* assume all entries <= BMAX */
} while (--i);
if (c[0] == n) { /* null input - all zero length codes */
*m = 0;
return 2;
}
/* Find minimum and maximum length, bound *m by those */
for (j = 1; (j <= BMAX) && (c[j] == 0); j++)
continue;
k = j; /* minimum code length */
for (i = BMAX; (c[i] == 0) && i; i--)
continue;
g = i; /* maximum code length */
*m = (*m < j) ? j : ((*m > i) ? i : *m);
/* Adjust last length count to fill out codes, if needed */
for (y = 1 << j; j < i; j++, y <<= 1) {
y -= c[j];
if (y < 0)
return 2; /* bad input: more codes than bits */
}
y -= c[i];
if (y < 0)
return 2;
c[i] += y;
/* Generate starting offsets into the value table for each length */
x[1] = j = 0;
p = c + 1;
xp = x + 2;
while (--i) { /* note that i == g from above */
j += *p++;
*xp++ = j;
}
}
| 165,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static future_t *init(void) {
pthread_mutex_init(&lock, NULL);
config = config_new(CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN("%s unable to load config file; attempting to transcode legacy file.", __func__);
config = btif_config_transcode(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN("%s unable to transcode legacy file, starting unconfigured.", __func__);
config = config_new_empty();
if (!config) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate a config object.", __func__);
goto error;
}
}
if (config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH))
unlink(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
}
btif_config_remove_unpaired(config);
alarm_timer = alarm_new();
if (!alarm_timer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create alarm.", __func__);
goto error;
}
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_SUCCESS);
error:;
alarm_free(alarm_timer);
config_free(config);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&lock);
alarm_timer = NULL;
config = NULL;
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_FAIL);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static future_t *init(void) {
pthread_mutex_init(&lock, NULL);
config = config_new(CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN("%s unable to load config file; attempting to transcode legacy file.", __func__);
config = btif_config_transcode(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
if (!config) {
LOG_WARN("%s unable to transcode legacy file, starting unconfigured.", __func__);
config = config_new_empty();
if (!config) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to allocate a config object.", __func__);
goto error;
}
}
if (config_save(config, CONFIG_FILE_PATH))
unlink(LEGACY_CONFIG_FILE_PATH);
}
btif_config_remove_unpaired(config);
// Cleanup temporary pairings if we have left guest mode
if (!is_restricted_mode())
btif_config_remove_restricted(config);
alarm_timer = alarm_new();
if (!alarm_timer) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to create alarm.", __func__);
goto error;
}
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_SUCCESS);
error:;
alarm_free(alarm_timer);
config_free(config);
pthread_mutex_destroy(&lock);
alarm_timer = NULL;
config = NULL;
return future_new_immediate(FUTURE_FAIL);
}
| 173,553 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int blk_rq_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq,
struct rq_map_data *map_data,
const struct iov_iter *iter, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
bool copy = false;
unsigned long align = q->dma_pad_mask | queue_dma_alignment(q);
struct bio *bio = NULL;
struct iov_iter i;
int ret;
if (map_data)
copy = true;
else if (iov_iter_alignment(iter) & align)
copy = true;
else if (queue_virt_boundary(q))
copy = queue_virt_boundary(q) & iov_iter_gap_alignment(iter);
i = *iter;
do {
ret =__blk_rq_map_user_iov(rq, map_data, &i, gfp_mask, copy);
if (ret)
goto unmap_rq;
if (!bio)
bio = rq->bio;
} while (iov_iter_count(&i));
if (!bio_flagged(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED))
rq->cmd_flags |= REQ_COPY_USER;
return 0;
unmap_rq:
__blk_rq_unmap_user(bio);
rq->bio = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: Don't feed anything but regular iovec's to blk_rq_map_user_iov
In theory we could map other things, but there's a reason that function
is called "user_iov". Using anything else (like splice can do) just
confuses it.
Reported-and-tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int blk_rq_map_user_iov(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq,
struct rq_map_data *map_data,
const struct iov_iter *iter, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
bool copy = false;
unsigned long align = q->dma_pad_mask | queue_dma_alignment(q);
struct bio *bio = NULL;
struct iov_iter i;
int ret;
if (!iter_is_iovec(iter))
goto fail;
if (map_data)
copy = true;
else if (iov_iter_alignment(iter) & align)
copy = true;
else if (queue_virt_boundary(q))
copy = queue_virt_boundary(q) & iov_iter_gap_alignment(iter);
i = *iter;
do {
ret =__blk_rq_map_user_iov(rq, map_data, &i, gfp_mask, copy);
if (ret)
goto unmap_rq;
if (!bio)
bio = rq->bio;
} while (iov_iter_count(&i));
if (!bio_flagged(bio, BIO_USER_MAPPED))
rq->cmd_flags |= REQ_COPY_USER;
return 0;
unmap_rq:
__blk_rq_unmap_user(bio);
fail:
rq->bio = NULL;
return -EINVAL;
}
| 166,858 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: InvalidState AXNodeObject::getInvalidState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kInvalid);
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "false"))
return InvalidStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "true"))
return InvalidStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "spelling"))
return InvalidStateSpelling;
if (equalIgnoringCase(attributeValue, "grammar"))
return InvalidStateGrammar;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return InvalidStateOther;
if (getNode() && getNode()->isElementNode() &&
toElement(getNode())->isFormControlElement()) {
HTMLFormControlElement* element = toHTMLFormControlElement(getNode());
HeapVector<Member<HTMLFormControlElement>> invalidControls;
bool isInvalid =
!element->checkValidity(&invalidControls, CheckValidityDispatchNoEvent);
return isInvalid ? InvalidStateTrue : InvalidStateFalse;
}
return AXObject::getInvalidState();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | InvalidState AXNodeObject::getInvalidState() const {
const AtomicString& attributeValue =
getAOMPropertyOrARIAAttribute(AOMStringProperty::kInvalid);
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "false"))
return InvalidStateFalse;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "true"))
return InvalidStateTrue;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "spelling"))
return InvalidStateSpelling;
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(attributeValue, "grammar"))
return InvalidStateGrammar;
if (!attributeValue.isEmpty())
return InvalidStateOther;
if (getNode() && getNode()->isElementNode() &&
toElement(getNode())->isFormControlElement()) {
HTMLFormControlElement* element = toHTMLFormControlElement(getNode());
HeapVector<Member<HTMLFormControlElement>> invalidControls;
bool isInvalid =
!element->checkValidity(&invalidControls, CheckValidityDispatchNoEvent);
return isInvalid ? InvalidStateTrue : InvalidStateFalse;
}
return AXObject::getInvalidState();
}
| 171,912 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void* sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle)
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwUpper);
return pointer;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | void* sspi_SecureHandleGetUpperPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle || !SecIsValidHandle(handle))
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwUpper);
return pointer;
}
| 167,605 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void set_own_dir(const char *argv0) {
size_t l = strlen(argv0);
while(l && argv0[l - 1] != '/')
l--;
if(l == 0)
memcpy(own_dir, ".", 2);
else {
memcpy(own_dir, argv0, l - 1);
own_dir[l] = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: fix for CVE-2015-3887
closes #60
CWE ID: CWE-426 | static void set_own_dir(const char *argv0) {
size_t l = strlen(argv0);
while(l && argv0[l - 1] != '/')
l--;
if(l == 0)
#ifdef SUPER_SECURE
memcpy(own_dir, "/dev/null/", 2);
#else
memcpy(own_dir, ".", 2);
#endif
else {
memcpy(own_dir, argv0, l - 1);
own_dir[l] = 0;
}
}
| 168,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_opendata_alloc(struct path *path,
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, int flags,
const struct iattr *attrs)
{
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
struct inode *dir = parent->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *p;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
p->o_arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&sp->so_seqid);
if (p->o_arg.seqid == NULL)
goto err_free;
p->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
p->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
p->dir = parent;
p->owner = sp;
atomic_inc(&sp->so_count);
p->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(dir);
p->o_arg.open_flags = flags,
p->o_arg.clientid = server->nfs_client->cl_clientid;
p->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
p->o_arg.name = &p->path.dentry->d_name;
p->o_arg.server = server;
p->o_arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
p->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL;
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
u32 *s = (u32 *) p->o_arg.u.verifier.data;
s[0] = jiffies;
s[1] = current->pid;
} else if (flags & O_CREAT) {
p->o_arg.u.attrs = &p->attrs;
memcpy(&p->attrs, attrs, sizeof(p->attrs));
}
p->c_arg.fh = &p->o_res.fh;
p->c_arg.stateid = &p->o_res.stateid;
p->c_arg.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
nfs4_init_opendata_res(p);
kref_init(&p->kref);
return p;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err:
dput(parent);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | static struct nfs4_opendata *nfs4_opendata_alloc(struct path *path,
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp, fmode_t fmode, int flags,
const struct iattr *attrs)
{
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(path->dentry);
struct inode *dir = parent->d_inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(dir);
struct nfs4_opendata *p;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL)
goto err;
p->o_arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&sp->so_seqid);
if (p->o_arg.seqid == NULL)
goto err_free;
p->path.mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
p->path.dentry = dget(path->dentry);
p->dir = parent;
p->owner = sp;
atomic_inc(&sp->so_count);
p->o_arg.fh = NFS_FH(dir);
p->o_arg.open_flags = flags;
p->o_arg.fmode = fmode & (FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE);
p->o_arg.clientid = server->nfs_client->cl_clientid;
p->o_arg.id = sp->so_owner_id.id;
p->o_arg.name = &p->path.dentry->d_name;
p->o_arg.server = server;
p->o_arg.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask;
p->o_arg.claim = NFS4_OPEN_CLAIM_NULL;
if (flags & O_EXCL) {
u32 *s = (u32 *) p->o_arg.u.verifier.data;
s[0] = jiffies;
s[1] = current->pid;
} else if (flags & O_CREAT) {
p->o_arg.u.attrs = &p->attrs;
memcpy(&p->attrs, attrs, sizeof(p->attrs));
}
p->c_arg.fh = &p->o_res.fh;
p->c_arg.stateid = &p->o_res.stateid;
p->c_arg.seqid = p->o_arg.seqid;
nfs4_init_opendata_res(p);
kref_init(&p->kref);
return p;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err:
dput(parent);
return NULL;
}
| 165,700 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline LineContribType *_gdContributionsCalc(unsigned int line_size, unsigned int src_size, double scale_d, const interpolation_method pFilter)
{
double width_d;
double scale_f_d = 1.0;
const double filter_width_d = DEFAULT_BOX_RADIUS;
int windows_size;
unsigned int u;
LineContribType *res;
if (scale_d < 1.0) {
width_d = filter_width_d / scale_d;
scale_f_d = scale_d;
} else {
width_d= filter_width_d;
}
windows_size = 2 * (int)ceil(width_d) + 1;
res = _gdContributionsAlloc(line_size, windows_size);
for (u = 0; u < line_size; u++) {
const double dCenter = (double)u / scale_d;
/* get the significant edge points affecting the pixel */
register int iLeft = MAX(0, (int)floor (dCenter - width_d));
int iRight = MIN((int)ceil(dCenter + width_d), (int)src_size - 1);
double dTotalWeight = 0.0;
int iSrc;
res->ContribRow[u].Left = iLeft;
res->ContribRow[u].Right = iRight;
/* Cut edge points to fit in filter window in case of spill-off */
if (iRight - iLeft + 1 > windows_size) {
if (iLeft < ((int)src_size - 1 / 2)) {
iLeft++;
} else {
iRight--;
}
}
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
dTotalWeight += (res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] = scale_f_d * (*pFilter)(scale_f_d * (dCenter - (double)iSrc)));
}
if (dTotalWeight < 0.0) {
_gdContributionsFree(res);
return NULL;
}
if (dTotalWeight > 0.0) {
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] /= dTotalWeight;
}
}
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fixed memory overrun bug in gdImageScaleTwoPass
_gdContributionsCalc would compute a window size and then adjust
the left and right positions of the window to make a window within
that size. However, it was storing the values in the struct *before*
it made the adjustment. This change fixes that.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static inline LineContribType *_gdContributionsCalc(unsigned int line_size, unsigned int src_size, double scale_d, const interpolation_method pFilter)
{
double width_d;
double scale_f_d = 1.0;
const double filter_width_d = DEFAULT_BOX_RADIUS;
int windows_size;
unsigned int u;
LineContribType *res;
if (scale_d < 1.0) {
width_d = filter_width_d / scale_d;
scale_f_d = scale_d;
} else {
width_d= filter_width_d;
}
windows_size = 2 * (int)ceil(width_d) + 1;
res = _gdContributionsAlloc(line_size, windows_size);
for (u = 0; u < line_size; u++) {
const double dCenter = (double)u / scale_d;
/* get the significant edge points affecting the pixel */
register int iLeft = MAX(0, (int)floor (dCenter - width_d));
int iRight = MIN((int)ceil(dCenter + width_d), (int)src_size - 1);
double dTotalWeight = 0.0;
int iSrc;
/* Cut edge points to fit in filter window in case of spill-off */
if (iRight - iLeft + 1 > windows_size) {
if (iLeft < ((int)src_size - 1 / 2)) {
iLeft++;
} else {
iRight--;
}
}
res->ContribRow[u].Left = iLeft;
res->ContribRow[u].Right = iRight;
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
dTotalWeight += (res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] = scale_f_d * (*pFilter)(scale_f_d * (dCenter - (double)iSrc)));
}
if (dTotalWeight < 0.0) {
_gdContributionsFree(res);
return NULL;
}
if (dTotalWeight > 0.0) {
for (iSrc = iLeft; iSrc <= iRight; iSrc++) {
res->ContribRow[u].Weights[iSrc-iLeft] /= dTotalWeight;
}
}
}
return res;
}
| 167,591 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::notifyPreparedAndCleanup(status_t err) {
if (err != OK) {
mMetaDataSize = -1ll;
mContentType = "";
mSniffedMIME = "";
{
sp<DataSource> dataSource = mDataSource;
sp<NuCachedSource2> cachedSource = mCachedSource;
sp<DataSource> httpSource = mHttpSource;
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDisconnectLock);
mDataSource.clear();
mCachedSource.clear();
mHttpSource.clear();
}
}
cancelPollBuffering();
}
notifyPrepared(err);
}
Commit Message: GenericSource: reset mDrmManagerClient when mDataSource is cleared.
Bug: 25070434
Change-Id: Iade3472c496ac42456e42db35e402f7b66416f5b
(cherry picked from commit b41fd0d4929f0a89811bafcc4fd944b128f00ce2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void NuPlayer::GenericSource::notifyPreparedAndCleanup(status_t err) {
if (err != OK) {
mMetaDataSize = -1ll;
mContentType = "";
mSniffedMIME = "";
{
sp<DataSource> dataSource = mDataSource;
sp<NuCachedSource2> cachedSource = mCachedSource;
sp<DataSource> httpSource = mHttpSource;
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mDisconnectLock);
mDataSource.clear();
mDrmManagerClient = NULL;
mCachedSource.clear();
mHttpSource.clear();
}
}
cancelPollBuffering();
}
notifyPrepared(err);
}
| 173,969 |
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