text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:T1627.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Geofencing
Adversaries may use a device’s geographical location to limit certain malicious behaviors. For example, malware operators may limit the distribution of a second stage payload to certain geographic regions. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat has uploaded files and data to its C2 servers.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can mimic HTTP protocol with custom HTTP "verbs" HIDE, ZVVP, and NOP.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used scheduled tasks to maintain RDP backdoors.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar gathers information about network adapters.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic heavily obfuscates its code to make analysis more difficult.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
Some variants of ADVSTORESHELL achieve persistence by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA has communicated with the C2 using HTTPS requests over ports 43111, 43223, and 43773.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon can impersonate tokens using LogonUser, ImpersonateLoggedOnUser, and ImpersonateNamedPipeClient.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer has used RC4-encrypted strings and string hashes to avoid identifiable strings within the binary.[52] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-22 The Black Hat Europe NOC Report
Back with another year of soul-crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up, stabilize, and secure the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 attempted to masquerade their files as popular anti-virus software.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Multi-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication imp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors deployed malware that used API calls, including CreateProcessAsUser.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Making these files immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:CORESHELL
CORESHELL has established persistence by creating autostart extensibility point (ASEP) Registry entries in the Run key and other Registry keys, as well as by creating shortcuts in the Internet Explorer Quick Start folder.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom actors have been known to use the Sticky Keys replacement within RDP sessions to obtain persistence.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can use Mshta.exe to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0242
ATT&CK Technique Name:SynAck
SynAck gathers computer names, OS version info, and also checks installed keyboard layouts to estimate if it has been launched from a certain list of countries.[360] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can call multiple Windows API functions used for privilege escalation, service execution, and to overwrite random bites of data.[90][91][92][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has the ability to communicate with its C2 over DNS.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0450
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHARPSTATS
SHARPSTATS has the ability to upload and download files.[406] | secon |
title:botconf2016 Locky, Dridex, Necurs: the evil triad
While Locky and Dridex inner working are well understood as they have been on the news all year long, how their distribution system operate is still relatively unknown as it is only seen by email providers.In this talk we lift the curtain and present how Locky, D... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 One Glitch to Rule Them All: Fault Injection Attacks Against the AMD Secure Processor
Today's AMD CPUs contain a dedicated security coprocessor that forms the root of trust of all modern AMD systems, the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP), formerly known as Platform Security Processor (PSP). Besides act... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Do not reuse local administrator account passwords across systems. Ensure password complexity and uniqueness such that the passwords cannot be cracked or guessed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Ensure that all wired and/or wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use best practices for authentication protocols, such as Kerberos, and ensure web traffic that may contain credentials is protected by SSL/TLS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to capture screenshots.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Periodically review user accounts and remove those that are inactive or unnecessary. Limit the ability for user accounts to create additional accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Network Configuration Discovery
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate has the ability to set file attributes to hidden.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used scheduled tasks to stage its operation.[160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has executed legitimate tools in hidden windows.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can use services to establish persistence.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Change Default File Association
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Diving Into Spooler: Discovering LPE and RCE Vulnerabilities in Windows Printer
Ten years ago, an escalation of privilege bug in Windows Printer Spooler was used in Stuxnet, which is a notorious worm that destroyed the nuclear enrichment centrifuges of Iran and infected more than 45000 networks. In... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0953
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Backup
Take and store data backups from end user systems and critical servers. Ensure backup and storage systems are hardened and kept separate from the corporate network to prevent compromise. Maintain and exercise incident response plans [12], including the management of g... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has exploited Office vulnerabilities such as CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2017-8570 for execution during delivery.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can capture screenshots of not only the entire screen, but of each separate window open, in case they are overlapping.[76][77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used InstallUtil.exe to execute a malicious Beacon stager.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0238
ATT&CK Technique Name:Proxysvc
Proxysvc searches the local system and gathers data.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0490
ATT&CK Technique Name:XLoader for iOS
XLoader for iOS has exfiltrated data using HTTP requests.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi executes received commands with wmic.exe (for WMI commands). [109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Software Installation
Restrict software installation to user groups that require it. A VNC server must be manually installed by the user or adversary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT executes batch scripts on the victim’s machine, and can launch a reverse shell for command execution.[120][121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1069
ATT&CK Technique Name:TangleBot
TangleBot can record the screen and stream the data off the device.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has he ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that high permission level service binaries cannot be replaced or modified by users with a lower permission level. | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Complexity Killed Security
In the past decade, we have seen an increasing number of software-based attacks on increasingly complex hardware. Many times, I have been asked: Why don't you just check the hardware documentation?The hardware documentation we would need here is usually not available to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0391
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAWKBALL
HAWKBALL has leveraged several Windows API calls to create processes, gather disk information, and detect debugger activity.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has obfuscated code using RC4, XOR, and RSA.[94][95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Kerberos preauthentication is enabled by default. Older protocols might not support preauthentication therefore it is possible to have this setting disabled. Make sure that all accounts have preauthentication whenever possible and audit changes to setting. Windows tools such ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0699
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mythic
Mythic can use SOCKS proxies to tunnel traffic through another protocol.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0359
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nltest
Nltest may be used to enumerate the parent domain of a local machine using /parentdomain.[158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has exfiltrated domain credentials and network enumeration information over command and control (C2) channels.[144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Input Capture
Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Restrict unallowed ISAPI extensions and filters from running by specifying a list of ISAPI extensions and filters that can run on IIS.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used emails containing Word, Excel and/or HWP (Hangul Word Processor) documents in their spearphishing campaigns.[122][123][124][125][126][6][127][128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora has the ability to encrypt communications with D3DES.[102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has masqueraded as legitimate software including TeamViewer and macOS Finder.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0322
ATT&CK Technique Name:HummingBad
HummingBad can exploit unfixed vulnerabilities in older Android versions to root victim phones.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has a tool that can copy files to remote machines.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury can intercept private keys using a trojanized ssh-add function.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 It's not FINished: The Evolving Maturity in Ransomware Operations
Ransom demands are becoming larger, attackers smarter, and intrusions longer. Ransomware threat actors are hitting European companies hard with more effective ransomware deployment resulting in devastating impacts to victim organi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHOPSTICK
CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has the ability to write collected data to a file created in the ./LOGS directory.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can send data gathered from a target through the command and control channel.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can be controlled via phone call from a set of "control phones."[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can use a dynamic XOR key and a custom XOR methodology to encode data before exfiltration. Also, FoggyWeb can encode C2 command output within a legitimate WebP file.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0205
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naid
Naid creates Registry entries that store information about a created service and point to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad communicates over HTTP to retrieve a string that is decoded into a C2 server URL.[298] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy uses SSL and AES ECB for encrypting C2 communications.[72][73][74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1584
ATT&CK Technique Name:Compromise Infrastructure
Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adv... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Equation
Equation is known to have the capability to overwrite the firmware on hard drives from some manufacturers.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. [4] [5] [3] [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0948
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0581
ATT&CK Technique Name:IronNetInjector
IronNetInjector has the ability to decrypt embedded .NET and PE payloads.[119] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Can You Roll Your Own SIEM?
At Two Sigma, we had sunk over $1 million in licensing for a popular third-party SIEM product and were paying an additional $200,000 in annual maintenance. We were limited on what data sources we could leverage as our license was restricted to a low daily ingestion rate. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
The HIDE_OVERLAY_WINDOWS permission was introduced in Android 12 allowing apps to hide overlay windows of type TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY drawn by other apps with the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission, preventing other applications from creating overlay windows on ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used credential dumpers or stealers to obtain legitimate credentials, which they used to gain access to victim accounts.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has attempted to exploit a known vulnerability in WinRAR (CVE-2018-20250), and attempted to gain remote code execution via a security bypass vulnerability (CVE-2017-11774).[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0071
ATT&CK Technique Name:hcdLoader
hcdLoader provides command-line access to the compromised system.[150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in web browsers. If web browser credential disclosure is a significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may be used to prevent storage of credentials in web browsers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1543.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windows Service
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy has enabled the TESTSIGNING boot configuration option to facilitate loading of a driver component.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has conducted watering holes schemes to gain initial access to victims.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz’s LSADUMP::DCSync and KERBEROS::PTT modules implement the three steps required to extract the krbtgt account hash and create/use Kerberos tickets.[8][9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [21] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Windows Heap-backed Pool: The Good, the Bad, and the Encoded
For decades, the Windows kernel pool remained the same, using simple structures that were easy to read, parse and search for, but recently this all changed, with a new and complex design that breaks assumptions and exploits, and of course,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Binaries can also be baselined for what dynamic libraries they require, and if an app requires a new dynamic library that wasn\u2019t included as part of an update, it should be investigated. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0336
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanoCore
NanoCore can perform keylogging on the victim’s machine.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0436
ATT&CK Technique Name:TSCookie
TSCookie has the ability to steal saved passwords from the Internet Explorer, Edge, Firefox, and Chrome browsers.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot had used InstallUtil.exe to download and deploy executables.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0601
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hildegard
Hildegard has disguised itself as a known Linux process.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can monitor browser activity for online banking actions and display full-screen overlay images to block user access to the intended site or present additional data fields.[11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can use DLL side-loading to execute malicious payloads.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used cmd.exe to execute commands on remote machines.[311][312] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0406
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gustuff
Gustuff can capture files and photos from the compromised device.[20] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Automation, structured knowledge in Tactical Threat Intelligence
The connected societies facing ever evolving risks, traditional cyber security solutions have been charged by the popular jury for incompetence. Yet they are working for what they have been designed for, the rise of targeted attacks as w... | secon |
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