text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has renamed malicious binaries as wallpaper.mp4 and slideshow.mp4 to avoid detection.[36][37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot uses vncDll module to remote control the victim machine.[30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has disguised their exfiltration malware as ZoomVideoApp.exe.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot has relied on victims' opening a malicious file for initial execution.[65][66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyZBot
TinyZBot can install as a Windows service for persistence.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0846
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote System Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for subsequent Lateral Movement or Discovery techniques. Functionality could exist within adversary tools to enable t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY has used encrypted strings in its installer.[183] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu or by modifying existing .lnk files to execute the malware through cmd.exe.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear can check for analysis environments and signs of debugging using the Windows API kernel32!GetTickCountKernel32 call.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird side loads a malicious file, sspisrv.dll, in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service.[66][67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles used valid credentials when laterally moving through RDP jump boxes into the ICS environment. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has used scheduled tasks to execute additional payloads and to gain persistence on a compromised host.[175][176][177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0809
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operational Information Confidentiality
Example mitigations could include minimizing its distribution/storage or obfuscating the information (e.g., facility coverterms, codenames). In many cases this information may be necessary to support critical engineering, maintenance, or ope... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit has attempted to bypass UAC and gain elevated administrative privileges.[14] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Web Cache Entanglement: Novel Pathways to Poisoning
Caches are woven into websites throughout the net, discreetly juggling data between users, and yet they are rarely scrutinized in any depth. In this session, I'll show you how to remotely probe through the inner workings of caches to find subtle in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux uses crontab for persistence if it does not have root privileges.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has the ability to copy files and download/upload files into C2 channels using FTP and HTTPS.[349][350] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 AutoSpear: Towards Automatically Bypassing and Inspecting Web Application Firewalls
The web application firewall (WAF) is widely employed to protect web applications like websites from various web attacks like SQL injection (SQLi) and cross-site-scripting (XSS). In particular, the WAF-as-a-servic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry will attempt to determine the local network segment it is a part of.[246] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has acquired domains to establish credential harvesting pages, often spoofing the target organization and using free top level domains .TK, .ML, .GA, .CF, and .GQ.[57][58][59][60][61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has the capability to upload collected files to a C2.[168] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind can execute commands via an interactive command shell.[223] MoonWind uses batch scripts for various purposes, including to restart and uninstall itself.[223] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects a list of domain groups with the command net localgroup /domain.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca collected information on user accounts via the whoami command.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has relied on publicly-available software to gain footholds and establish persistence in victim environments.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0628
ATT&CK Technique Name:FYAnti
FYAnti can download additional payloads to a compromised host.[159] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used the command net localgroup administrators to list all administrators part of a local group.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Services Registry Permissions Weakness
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the Registry entries used by services. Adversaries may use flaws in the permissions for Registry keys related to services to redirect from the originally specified executabl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
In Industroyer the first COM port from the configuration file is used for the actual communication and the two other COM ports are just opened to prevent other processes accessing them. Thus, the IEC 101 payload component is able to take over and maintain control of the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can report the file system type and disk space of a compromised host to C2.[273] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can identify if incoming HTTP traffic contains a token and if so it will intercept the traffic and process the received command.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has collected information automatically using the adversary's USBferry attack.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP can identify Chrome, Opera, Edge Chromium, and Firefox browsers, including version number, on a compromised host.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0210
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nerex
Nerex creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can download files onto a compromised host.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors collected information via Empire, which sent the data back to the adversary's C2.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper registry permissions are in place to inhibit adversaries from disabling or interfering with critical services. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 When Voice Phishing Met Malicious Android App
The traditional voice phishing we know is that an attacker makes a call to the victim and then commits fraud by way of social engineering techniques. However, these days, there are very few users who are deceived by such an obvious attack. But what ha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used Mimikatz to capture and use legitimate credentials.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0274
ATT&CK Technique Name:Calisto
Calisto uses launchctl to enable screen sharing on the victim’s machine.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail has the ability to automatically exfiltrate files using the macOS built-in utility /usr/bin/curl.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict storage and execution of SIP DLLs to protected directories, such as C:\Windows, rather than user directories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp uses a rootkit to hook and implement functions on the system.[14] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 100 Seconds of Solitude: Defeating Cisco Trust Anchor With FPGA Bitstream Shenanigans
First commercially introduced in 2013, Cisco Trust Anchor module(TAm) is a proprietary hardware security module that is used in a wide range of Cisco products, including enterprise routers, switches and firewalls. ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX can be configured to use DNS for command and control.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has registered itself as a system service in the Registry for automatic execution at system startup.[129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0145
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSOURCE
POWERSOURCE has been observed being used to download TEXTMATE and the Cobalt Strike Beacon payload onto victims.[356] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 BadMesher: New Attack Surfaces of Wi-Fi Mesh Network
With the increasing number of internet access devices, the application and research of the Internet of Things (IoT) have become popular day by day. As an IoT infrastructure, Wi-Fi networks play a significant role in providing quick and easy commun... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can execute through the WinExec API.[85] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Hunting Vulnerabilities of gRPC Protocol Armed Mobile/IoT Applications
Google's open source network communication protocol, gRPC has been used by thousands of mobile applications, including some IoT devices, and supports tens of billions of network services every day. Unlike the traditional Https ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0161
ATT&CK Technique Name:XAgentOSX
XAgentOSX contains the deletFileFromPath function to delete a specified file using the NSFileManager:removeFileAtPath method.[257] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Train users to only accept 2FA/MFA requests from login attempts they initiated, to review source location of the login attempt prompting the 2FA/MFA requests, and to report suspicious/unsolicited prompts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Moses Staff
Moses Staff has built malware, such as DCSrv and PyDCrypt, for targeting victims' machines.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus One encrypts data using XOR prior to exfiltration.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Operation Clairvoyance: How APT Groups Spy on the Media Industry
Cyber espionage actors have demonstrated great interest in the media industry. These actors seem to like to see Taiwan's daily activities through the "eyes" of these media companies and journalists. During Taiwan's intense 2022, we s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet used MS10-073 and an undisclosed Task Scheduler vulnerability to escalate privileges on local Windows machines.[32] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Ghosts in a Nutshell
At the beginning of 2018, two severe attacks, called Meltdown and Spectre, have been published. These attacks exploit that the CPU either lazily enforces exceptions or speculates on the outcome of branch predictions or data dependencies. While the results of those computation... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0506
ATT&CK Technique Name:ViperRAT
ViperRAT can collect device photos, PDF documents, Office documents, browser history, and browser bookmarks.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack has used process hollowing shellcode to target a predefined list of processes from %SYSTEM32%.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Filter DLL
Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Next-Gen DFIR: Mass Exploits & Supplier Compromise
There’s been a spike in major incidents and widespread DFIR disasters involving both service providers (such as MSPs and cloud providers) as well as software providers (such as SolarWinds, Microsoft, and Accellion). Responders have little visib... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Utilize out-of-band communication to validate the integrity of data from the primary channel. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Hacking a Capsule Hotel - Ghost in the Bedrooms
IOT devices are widely deployed. Some hotels are now allowing their guests to control their room from their smartphone or other devices.While traveling in a foreign country, a few nights were booked in a capsule hotel that was using various modern tec... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0410
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fysbis
Fysbis has masqueraded as trusted software rsyncd and dbus-inotifier.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.[131][132][133][134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:CallMe
CallMe has the capability to create a reverse shell on victims.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark has used a custom XOR algorithm to decrypt the payload.[218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
The Regin malware platform uses Extended Attributes to store encrypted executables.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used emails with malicious links to lure victims into installing malware.[38][39][40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1589.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Employee Names
Adversaries may gather employee names that can be used during targeting. Employee names be used to derive email addresses as well as to help guide other reconnaissance efforts and/or craft more-believable lures. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot injects into the svchost.exe process.[39][40][41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0590
ATT&CK Technique Name:NBTscan
NBTscan can dump and print whole packet content.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz has been spread through malicious links embedded in e-mails.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0634
ATT&CK Technique Name:EnvyScout
EnvyScout has been executed through malicious files attached to e-mails.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz’s LSADUMP::DCSync and KERBEROS::PTT modules implement the three steps required to extract the krbtgt account hash and create/use Kerberos tickets.[8][9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has used PowerView to enumerate all Windows Server, Windows Server 2003, and Windows 7 instances in the Active Directory database.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0558
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro can collect SMS messages from the device.[46] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 macOS Vulnerabilities Hiding in Plain Sight
Sometimes when we publish details and writeups about vulnerabilities we are so focused on the actual bug, that we don't notice others, which might be still hidden inside the details. The same can happen when we read these issues, but if we keep our eyes... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy can execute remote commands via the command-line interface.[140] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 The Black Hat NOC: Greatest Hits and Holy...Cows
This session will be a look into the most interesting things seen and learned within the Black Hat NOC, by two of the guys that have been running that circus for nearly two decades. It won't just be attacks and failures, I mean, it will be that, bu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
For C0015, the threat actors used DLL files that had invalid certificates.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7's Harpy backdoor malware can use DNS as a backup channel for C2 if HTTP fails.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor has used BITSadmin to download and execute malicious DLLs.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET collects contacts and application data from files in Desktop, Documents, Downloads, Dropbox, and WeChat folders.[198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can modify the Registry to store its configuration information.[104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has masqueraded as Windows system file names, as well as "chkntfs.exe" and "syscron.exe".[36][37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0518
ATT&CK Technique Name:PolyglotDuke
PolyglotDuke can store encrypted JSON configuration files in the Registry.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Calculating Risk in the Era of Obscurity: Reading Between the Lines of Security Advisories
Compliance with industry standards as well as various government regulations also requires a robust servicing and patching strategy. Beyond compliance, you must understand the risk to your resources from poor... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0648
ATT&CK Technique Name:JSS Loader
JSS Loader can download and execute JavaScript files.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot embedded the commands schtasks /Run /TN \Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SilentCleanup /I inside a batch script.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has created the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\AdobelmdyU to maintain persistence.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0565
ATT&CK Technique Name:Raindrop
After initial installation, Raindrop runs a computation to delay execution.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce authentication and role-based access control on the container service to restrict users to the least privileges required.[11] When using Kubernetes, avoid giving users wildcard permissions or adding users to the system:masters group, and use RoleBind... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent DDE attacks and spawning of child processes from Office programs.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Configure user permissions groups and roles for access to cloud storage.[11] Implement strict Identity and Access Management (IAM) controls to prevent access to storage solutions except for the applications, users, and services that require access.[12] Ensur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weakne... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas obtains application windows titles and then determines which windows to perform Screen Capture on.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
The QakBot web inject module can inject Java Script into web banking pages visited by the victim.[57][58] | secon |
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