text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has created scheduled tasks to launch executables after a designated number of minutes have passed.[68][69][70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
The WhisperGate third stage can use the AdvancedRun.exe tool to execute commands in the context of the Windows TrustedInstaller group via %TEMP%\AdvancedRun.exe" /EXEFilename "C:\Windows\System32\sc.exe" /WindowState 0 /CommandLine "stop WinDefend" /StartDirectory "" /R... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can check system time to help determine when changes were made to specified files.[22] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Last Call for SATCOM Security
In 2014, we took to the stage and presented "A Wake-up Call for SATCOM Security," during which we described several theoretical scenarios that could result from the disturbingly weak security posture of multiple SATCOM products. Four years later, we are back at Black H... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel malware has used a series of checks to determine if it's being analyzed; checks include the length of executable names, if a filename ends with .Md5.exe, and if the program is executed from the root of the C:\ drive, as well as checks for sandbox-related librari... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
PipeMon can inject its modules into various processes using reflective DLL loading.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:CALENDAR
CALENDAR has a command to run cmd.exe to execute commands.[43] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Testing Your Organization's Social Media Awareness
The phishing landscape is rapidly changing, and in the last few years we have witnessed over a 10-fold increase in social media-based phishing. Yet social media sites have taken few steps to detect or block automated intelligence gathering on th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails with malicious attachments.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
System settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded from legitimate repositories which may help mitigate some of these issues. Not allowing unsigned applications from being run may also mitigate some risk. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has sent malicious links to victims through email campaigns.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 sent spearphishing emails with attachments such as compiled HTML (.chm) files to initially compromise their victims.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner used a script to gather the IP address of the infected machine before sending to the C2.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can obtain a list of processes on a compromised host.[269] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0555
ATT&CK Technique Name:CHEMISTGAMES
CHEMISTGAMES can download new modules while running.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used compromised credentials to access other systems on a victim network.[49][50][14] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Patching Loopholes: Finding Backdoors in Applications
In this digital age, we live in a world of applications that enable us to conduct digital transactions ranging from everyday tasks to storage of sensitive data. But how secure are these applications?As the cybersecurity lead in the Singapore Go... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0325
ATT&CK Technique Name:Judy
Judy bypasses Google Play's protections by downloading a malicious payload at runtime after installation.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs and shellcode into memory at runtime.[131][132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can collect images stored on the device and browser history.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Day 2
At the end of day two of this year's virtual conference, join Black Hat Review Board members Rodrigo Rubira Branco, Aanchal Gupta, Kymberlee Price, and Stefano Zanero for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec comm... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0393
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerStallion
PowerStallion uses a XOR cipher to encrypt command output written to its OneDrive C2 server.[256] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used domain administrators' accounts to help facilitate lateral movement on compromised networks.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Ensure that endpoint defenses run in safe mode.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for cloud accounts, especially privileged accounts. This can be implemented in a variety of forms (e.g. hardware, virtual, SMS), and can also be audited using administrative reporting features.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 See Like a Bat: Using Echo-Analysis to Detect Man-in-the-Middle Attacks in LANs
Although Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks on LANs have been known for some time, they are still considered a significant threat. This is because these attacks are relatively easy to achieve, yet challenging to detect.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1565.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Runtime Data Manipulation
Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizationa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Follow vendor device hardening best practices to disable unnecessary and unused features and services, avoid using default configurations and passwords, and introduce logging and auditing for detection. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1134.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:SID-History Injection
Adversaries may use SID-History Injection to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Do not allow a domain user to be in the local administrator group on multiple systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon used the "StackStrings" obfuscation technique to hide malicious functionalities.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0221
ATT&CK Technique Name:Umbreon
Umbreon provides access using both standard facilities like SSH and additional access using its backdoor Espeon, providing a reverse shell upon receipt of a special packet[344] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 FASTCash and INJX_Pure: How Threat Actors Use Public Standards for Financial Fraud
The INJX_Pure and Lazarus FASTCash malware families are each built on publicly documented standards that enable their respective operating threat actors to perform financial "cash outs" at ATMs. While each of these m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
Enabled features, such as Protected Process Light (PPL), for LSA.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has pretended to be the xmlProv Network Provisioning service.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used the meek domain fronting plugin for Tor to hide the destination of C2 traffic.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0916
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Regularly scan the internal network for available services to identify new and potentially vulnerable services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY has the ability to set the HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript Registry key to execute logon scripts.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro has used a legitimate application to sideload a DLL to decrypt, decompress, and run a payload.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a Registry subkey to register its created service, and can also uninstall itself later by deleting this value. Hydraq's backdoor also enables remote attackers to modify and delete subkeys.[71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0431
ATT&CK Technique Name:HotCroissant
HotCroissant has attempted to install a scheduled task named "Java Maintenance64" on startup to establish persistence.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used the Cloudflare CDN to proxy C2 traffic.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT collects a list of running processes.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0172
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reaver
Reaver collects system information from the victim, including CPU speed, computer name, volume serial number, ANSI code page, OEM code page identifier for the OS, Microsoft Windows version, and memory information.[299] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla can check for internet connectivity by issuing HTTP GET requests.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net group command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has used batch scripts to delete itself after execution.[265] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
A Lazarus Group malware sample encrypts data using a simple byte based XOR operation prior to exfiltration.[17][18][19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used named and hijacked scheduled tasks to establish persistence.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0161
ATT&CK Technique Name:XAgentOSX
XAgentOSX contains the execFile function to execute a specified file on the system using the NSTask:launch method.[188] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0159
ATT&CK Technique Name:SNUGRIDE
SNUGRIDE establishes persistence through a Registry Run key.[249] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider reducing the default BITS job lifetime in Group Policy or by editing the JobInactivityTimeout and MaxDownloadTime Registry values in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\BITS.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:XTunnel
The C2 server used by XTunnel provides a port number to the victim to use as a fallback in case the connection closes on the currently used port.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Encrypt all important data flows to reduce the impact of tailored modifications on data in transit. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can send network system data and files to its C2 server.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM can run a remote scriptlet that drops a file and executes it via regsvr32.exe.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to add a value to the Registry Run key to establish persistence if it detects it is running with regular user privilege. [235][236] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT used file system monitoring to track modification and enable automatic exfiltration.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
System settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store which may help mitigate some of these issues. Not allowing unsigned applications from being run may also mitigate some risk. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat network traffic is Base64-encoded plaintext.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Ensure that developers and system administrators are aware of the risk associated with having plaintext passwords in software configuration files that may be left on endpoint systems or servers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has used a variety of tools in their operations, including AdFind, BloodHound, Mimikatz, and PowerSploit.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has been delivered via phishing emails which contained malicious links.[57] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 We Went to Iowa and All We Got were These Felony Arrest Records
In-depth discussion and review of the red team engagement of Iowa courthouses which resulted in an unprecedented outcome. Gary and Justin will take you through the engagement, arrest, and ensuing legal battle, and wrap up with lessons ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet infects DLL's associated with the WinCC Simatic manager which are responsible for opening project files. If a user opens an uninfected project file using a compromised manager, the file will be infected with Stuxnet code. If an infected project is opened with the Si... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0927
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Enforce strong password requirements to prevent password brute force methods for lateral movement. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0103
ATT&CK Technique Name:route
route can be used to discover routing configuration information. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0811
ATT&CK Technique Name:Redundancy of Service
Hot-standbys in diverse locations can ensure continued operations if the primarily system are compromised or unavailable. At the network layer, protocols such as the Parallel Redundancy Protocol can be used to simultaneously use redundant and diverse communica... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore has used openssl to decrypt AES encrypted payload data. Bundlore has also used base64 and RC4 with a hardcoded key to deobfuscate data.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can add the executable flag to a downloaded file.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0350
ATT&CK Technique Name:zwShell
zwShell has established persistence by adding itself as a new service.[142] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Strider
Strider has used local servers with both local network and Internet access to act as internal proxy nodes to exfiltrate data from other parts of the network without direct Internet access.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group used the Ammyy Admin tool as well as TeamViewer for remote access, including to preserve remote access if a Cobalt Strike module was lost.[9][10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0629
ATT&CK Technique Name:RainyDay
RainyDay can download files to a compromised host.[312] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1127
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution
Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in de... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak has a command to create a reverse shell.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos can spawn a new pseudo-terminal and execute arbitrary commands at the command prompt.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries may use new payloads to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through hijacking by using application control solutions also capable of blocking libraries loaded by legitimate software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credential Access Protection
On Windows 10 and Server 2016, enable Windows Defender Credential Guard [5] to run lsass.exe in an isolated virtualized environment without any device drivers. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb's loader has used DLL Search Order Hijacking to load malicious code instead of the legitimate version.dll during the Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe execution process.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy can launch interactive shells for communicating with the victim machine.[174][175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used the BITS protocol to exfiltrate stolen data from a compromised host.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has the ability to clean up and remove data structures from a compromised host.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound can enumerate and collect the properties of domain computers, including domain controllers.[21] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 CDPwn: Taking Over Millions of Enterprise-Things with Layer 2 Zero-Days
The attack surface exposed by proprietary layer 2 protocols is rarely explored by the research community, and it contains hidden bugs that have severe implications to the security of the devices that use them, as well as the n... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0820
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploitation for Evasion
Adversaries may exploit a software vulnerability to take advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to evade detection. Vulnerabilities may exist in software that can be used to disable o... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 HTTP Desync Attacks: Smashing into the Cell Next Door
HTTP requests are traditionally viewed as isolated, standalone entities. In this session, I'll introduce techniques for remote, unauthenticated attackers to smash through this isolation and splice their requests into others, through which I was ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can be installed via DLL side-loading.[56][17][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0208
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pasam
Pasam creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve information such as hostname and free disk space.[270] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0686
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuietSieve
QuietSieve can download and execute payloads on a target host.[193] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 ZEROing Trust: Do Zero Trust Approaches Deliver Real Security?
Over the last year, the "zero trust" network (ZTN) security architecture concept has generated interest both for its abstract security properties, and the marketing hoopla proclaiming it the "next big thing." The value proposition of "z... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 has the ability to hide memory artifacts and to patch Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and the Anti Malware Scan Interface (AMSI).[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two attempts to connect to port 22011 to provide a remote reverse shell.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail can receive data and executable scripts from C2.[470] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0475
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackConfig
BackConfig has used a custom routine to decrypt strings.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE exfiltrates command output and collected files to its C2 server in 1500-byte blocks.[12] | secon |
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